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Foreword 
 
 
Beyond the establishment of the European Union, in a context 
where nationalism of the nineteenth century continues to have real success 
in the twentieth century, debates about the historical past and the future of 
this important actor on the international scene are always present in the 
current political environment and the European academia and beyond. The 
analysis on the character of the EU, the essence of the European integration 
process, the many types of internal and external borders are in a constant 
change under the impact of numerous factors of influence of all kinds, and 
this is the very topic of this volume. 
Not coincidentally chosen by the editors, this volume titled The 
European Space. Borders and Issues brings together a collection of articles and 
studies that combine, for a scientific purpose, the authors’ concerns 
regarding the exceptional scientific work of Professor Ioan Horga1.  He has 
dedicated much of his academic research and teaching activities to 
European realities, to the history of the European Union and not least to 
borders of all kinds2. Trained as a historian, Ioan Horga managed through 
his interest in international relations, European studies and security studies, 
and through a wide openness to interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and 
transdisciplinary, to give his research a complex perspective and necessary 
understanding of phenomena and processes current in the Europe of today. 
His research activity is crowned by a rich activity in academic 
teaching, He is, through his role in the academic landscape from Oradea and 
at national level, a road opener, a founder of the school, a benchmark for 
the new generation that he has helped to shape. Historian by training, Ioan 
Horga managed through an interest bend on international relations, 
European studies and security studies, research to give his insight into and 
understanding of phenomena and processes necessary to present in Europe. 
His work consists of scientific research synthesis and analysis published as 
monographs, books sole author or collaboration, coordinated and edited 
collective volumes, specialized studies and articles published in prestigious 
journals in many ISI or international databases. .  
                                                     
1 See the bio and the bibliography of Professor Horga in this volume, put together by 
Florentina Chirodea. 
2 See Eurolimes journal, launched in 2006. Bimonthly journal, currently holds 20 issues. 
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Complex analyzes of the European space are crowned by an 
overview of European realities, the capacity to see beyond the historical 
realities of European prospects. It took into account the historical 
perspective on European space, whether it was bent on present realities, 
Professor Ioan Horga vocation is leading the research, the ability to see both 
the general and the particular. Either that he has taken into account the 
historical perspective on the European space or he has been preoccupied 
with the present realities, Professor Ioan Horga’s vocation is leading the 
research, the ability to see both the general and the particular.    
The theme of this volume-homage dedicated to Professor Ioan 
Horga reflects his interests regarding Europe. These interests include, as 
mentioned, the historical perspective, present in great works of historical 
synthesis, but also in historical analyses on local-regional realities. They 
come to argue our statements regarding Professor Ioan Horga’s superior 
ability to understand the realities of contemporary European by historic 
referencing. The European balance and, in particular, the process of European 
construction associated to the European enlargement eastward and cross-
referenced with international relations are research topics that are found 
both in the scientific work of Ioan Horga, but also in the activity of our 
colleagues who have subscribed to the emergence of this special volume. 
Identifying solutions for a better governance at both national and sub-
national (local, regional) and supranational (European) levels are challenges 
which require political and institutional transformation in national and 
European decision-making process. Special references to Central and 
Eastern Europe led the research to a special emphasis on the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and to the size of cooperation and security at the EU 
borders. This is nothing else than he core binder of the proposed research by 
Professor Ioan Horga, and which constitues themes that can be found in the 
following pages: regional and Euro-regional development; cross-border cooperation and 
the study of borders, respectively. 
His research activity is crowned by a rich activity in academic 
teaching. He is, through his role in the academic landscape from Oradea and 
at national level, a road opener, a founder of the school, a benchmark for 
the new generation that he has helped to shape. We once more like to 
emphasize his role to establish institutional structures that lay the grounds 
for outstanding research. The creation of the Department of International 
Relations and European Studies, an institutional structure research 
(International Centre for Euroregional Research, then the Institute for 
Euroregional Studies - Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence) or certain 
journals, created the premises for a rich activity whose landmark is the 
scientific research expertise of Professor Ioan Horga. A successful project 
initiated and coordinated by Ioan Horga has been Eurolimes. It is a journal 
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that is considered a true epistemological collection of border study. Each 
issue attempts to reflect an “image”, a facet of the rich typology of the 
border. Besides the theoretical work of conceptual and epistemological 
analysis about the European borders, Professor Ioan Horga runs analytical 
thinks on the many kinds of borders as case studies. The approaches are, on 
the one hand, references to the evolution of relations between states / 
regions in the border areas, the historical and cultural heritage, the role of 
the media in the process of cooperation at the border area, on the religious 
dimension of borders, the cleavages of ethno-national character or the other 
types of borders/frontiers like the linguistic ones, pr those based on culture, 
identity, economic, community-urban and so on.   
Using different theoretical and methodological perspectives, this 
volume examines the multiple aspects of the historical and political in 
Europe, of external borders and internal frontiers of the European Union, 
including the neighborhood policy, security issues, the issue of migration, 
autonomous regions, European internal crises and their repercussions. The 
first part of the volume summarizes some theoretical research and empirical 
studies on the historical and political realities in the European space3, mainly 
the Romanian one4. The following section deals with Professor Horga’s 
interests in the realities of the border space5 in the context of the European 
integration process6. The last part of the volume largely addresses security 
                                                     
3Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, Europe – Idea/Europe Integration. Times. Spaces. Actors., 
G. Contogeorgis, De la nature de la crise occidentale. Une crise de transition de la monarchie 
élective au système représentatif. 
4Zainea Ion, Cultură şi ideologie în România anilor 1971-1972; Antonio Faur, Endeavours to 
establish the “Cele Trei Crisuri” in Oradea and Aspects of  its Activity (1990-2000); Gabriel 
Moisa, Between Democracy and Totalitarism the Case of Patriotic Unionfrom Bihor 
County(1945-1947); Mihai D. Drecin, Nicolae Iorga şi Oradea; Nicolae Păun, Sur 
l’économie et les politiques industrielles de Roumanie dans l’entre-deux-guerres; Ludmila Roşca, 
University mission in the knowledge society; Gábor Kozma, Klára Czimre, Effects of the 
Natural Environmental Components on Sports.  
5 Isabel Maria Freitas Valente, The Portuguese Outer most Regions and the 30th anniversary of 
Portugal’s accessionto the European Communities; Mirela Mărcuţ, EU and Cyberspace - a Plea 
for the Fifth Freedom of Movement; Ana Maria Costea (Ghimiş), Beyond the minimum 
common denominator between the EU and Russia Study case: Ukraine; Radu Romînaşu, 
Intellectual Elites, European Spirit and Interethnic Cultural Collaboration on the Western Border 
of Interwar Romania. Case Study: The Main Editorial Concerns of the Great Cultural Reunion 
“Cele Trei Crişuri” in Oradea, Mircea Brie, Identity as frontier in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The case of the Republic of Moldova. 
6 Melania-Gabriela Ciot, BREXIT case – From individual idiosyncrasies to a collective answer; 
Constantin – Vasile Ţoca, Bogdan Pocola,  Leadership debate in the United Kingdom as a 
result of the Brexitvote; Istvan Süli-Zakar, The Social - Economic  Reasons of the Hungarian  
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and cooperation issues in Europe in the context of the challenges arising 
from the changes that have occurred over time. 
This volume undoubtedly reflects the desire for recognition and 
appreciation of the faculty staff of the Department of International 
Relations and European Studies of the way in which Professor Horga, 
mentor and colleague, has managed to create a local school in the area with 
national and international recognition, channeling the group effort to the 
research of border, thus shaping an identity niche, well-defined in the 
academic research. Each member of the Department has found, under the 
guidance of the Professor, an own scientific pathway, being able to develop 
professionally in the chosen direction.  
We thank our colleagues from universities in Europe and those in 
Romania for sending an article for publication in this volume dedicated to 
the 60-year-anniversary of our Professor and colleague -- this proves that we 
share the gratitude that we all feel he represents for all and for each of us 
PROFESSOR IOAN HORGA. 
At this celebration moment in time, we are happy to know that we 
can always count on your support and advice.  
 
 
  
Mircea BRIE 
Alina STOICA 
Florentina CHIRODEA 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
Peripherial  Regions’ Formation; Luminiţa Şoproni, European integration and the new frontiers 
of Europe. 
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Ioan Horga – Visionary, Professor and Researcher by 
Vocation 
 
 
 
Florentina CHIRODEA* 
 
 
Ioan Horga was born sixty years ago, on an April day, in Ţara 
Moţilor Region, on the middle course of Arieş River, in a village scattered 
on the slopes of the Apuseni Mountains1. His education started in his native 
village. After completing secondary school in 1971, he continued his studies 
at "Horea, Cloşca and Crişan" High School, in Abrud. Starting with 1976, he 
became student at one of the oldest faculties of "Babes - Bolyai" University 
                                                     
* Lecturer Phd at University of Oradea, International Relations and European Studies 
Department, E-mail: fchirodea@uoradea.ro 
1 Muşca settlement residents were confirmed as presence ever since the ‘primitive 
commune’. Later sporadic archaeological discoveries and numerous documents testify 
to the continuity of the ancient village community from the period of the Roman 
occupation until today. Currently, the village belongs administratively to Lupşa, best 
known for its tourist attractions, among which one can mention: the Ethnographic 
and Folk Art Museum, founded by Professor Pamfil Albu opened in 1939 and housed 
in a building dating from 1800 (the museum houses over 6000 exhibits from Ţara 
Moţilor ethnographic region, including a valuable collection of icons on glass and 
wood from the 18th and the 19th centuries); the Orthodox wooden church in the 
village of Valea Lupsii (dating from 1429, restored in 1694 and plastered in 1865); 
Lupşa monastery; the church from Hădărău village (1770). The census of 2011 
registered only 531 inhabitants. See The history of Lupşa village available at 
http://www.primarialupsa.ro/lupsa_istoricul-localitatii-109.html, accessed on 
November 28th, 2016; Dan Ghinea, Enciclopedia geografică a României, Encyclopedic 
Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, available at http://enciclopediaromaniei.ro/wiki/ 
Lupsa Commune, accessed on November 28th, 2016; Geamăna, un sat din Munţii 
Apuseni, available at http://www.vacantesicalatorii.ro/modules/revista/articole/ 
articol.php?artID=2182, accessed on November 28th , 2016; Alba Regional Statistics 
Department, Tables of the Population and Housing Census - 2011. The Rural Population of 
Alba County at the census from 2011, available at http://www.alba.insse.ro/cmsalba/ 
rw /pages/rezultate_rpl.ro.do, accessed on November 28th, 2016 
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in Cluj-Napoca, that of History - Philosophy2, a “peak institution in relation 
to similar faculties in the country"3. Despite the "gradual restrictions of 
activity, restructuring, internal merging” and "the chronic underfunding"4 
that defined the second half of the 70s, the Historical Schools5, founded in 
Cluj Napoca by Constantin Daicoviciu, Stefan Pascu, Zsigmond Jakó, Virgil 
Vătăşianu, Nicolae Lascu or Camil Mureşanu6 continued their remarkable 
research activity in the fields of archeology, medieval and modern history of 
Romania, the history of Transylvania, world history or art history. The 
major lines of study, opened by renowned professors from Cluj-Napoca, 
were continued, in the coming years, by some young teachers, who 
eventually became prominent names of contemporary historiography. The 
responsibility for the formation of young historians was undertaken by 
distinguished professors, among whom we should mention: academician 
Camil Mureşanu, Dean of the Faculty of History - Philosophy7 between 
1968-1976, academician Dumitru Protase – who, from 1974 on, became 
senior lecturer at the faculty mentioned above8, academician Pompiliu 
Teodor - Head of the Department of Middle History and Historiography9, 
emeritus professor Vasile Vese - lecturer and then reader at the Department 
                                                     
2 The history of the Faculty of History – Philosophy, ”Babeş-Bolyai” University Cluj-
Napoca, available at  http://www.ubbcluj.ro/ro/despre/prezentare/istoric, accesed 
on  November 28th, 2016 
3 Vasile Vese, „Universitatea „Babeş-Bolyai” în perioada regimului comunist 1959 – 
1989”, in Ovidiu Ghita (coord.),  Istoria Universităţii „Babeş-Bolyai”, Mega 
Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 2012, p. 281 
4 Ibidem, p. 285 
5 The term is used by professor Vasile Vese in a chapter dedicated to the History of 
„Babes-Bolyai” University during the period of the Communist regime (1959-1989) 
in order to characterize the teaching and research activity performed from the 
initiative or with the contribution of distinguished specialists from Cluj. 
6 Vasile Vese, op. cit., p. 281-282 
7 In memoriam, academician Camil Mureşanu, article published in the on-line edition of the 
Făclia newspaper, in February 25th, 2015, available at http://ziarulfaclia.ro/in-
memoriam-academician-camil-muresanu/, accessed on  November 29th, 2016 
8 Eugen Gheorghe, Academicianul năsăudean Dumitru Protase, decorat de preşedintele 
României, article published in August, 11, 2016 on the website  www.timponline.ro, 
available at http://www.timponline.ro/academicianul-nasaudean-dumitru-protase-
decorat-de-presedintele-romaniei/, accessed in November, 29th, 2016 
9 Doru Radosav, Pompiliu Teodor - profesor şi istoric (1930-2001), in Nicolae Bocşan, 
Tentaţia istoriei. In memoria profesorului Pompiliu Teodor, Presa Universitară Clujeană, 
Cluj-Napoca, 2003, p. 7-15 
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of Universal History10, emeritus professor Ioan Piso, assistant lecturer and 
then lecturer at the same Department, professor Nicolae Bocşan – assistant 
lecturer between 1978-1982, professor Ovidiu Mureşanu – assistant lecturer 
between 1978-1984, professor Avram Andea - assistant professor between 
1971-1981. 
Valedictorian at the end of the four years of study, Ioan Horga 
became teacher of History at „Înfrăţirea” Industrial Hight School, in 
Oradea, activity that he conducted until 1984. At the age of 28, he became 
member, first of the Municipal and then of the County Young Communist 
Union Committee, where he was responsible with the education sector. In 
the 5 years that followed, his qualities as teacher were fully demonstrated in 
the organization of professional contests and school Olympiads for the 
pupils of Bihor county11, especially in the national stages of those 
competitions (the National Informatics Olympiad was held in Oradea in 
1989)12. From 1990, the professor Ioan Horga returned to the teaching 
activity, gaining tenure at the Department of History of "Emanuil Gojdu" 
National College. A year later, he began his collaboration with the freshly set 
up University of Oradea and got a doctoral scholarship at the University of 
Reims Champagne-Ardenne, France. On May 30th, 1995, in front of a 
commission made up of renowned specialists in modern history, church 
history and Romanian history (J. Bérenger, Viviane Barrie-Currien – as 
thesis coordinator, Catherine Durandin13, Grunberg Bernard14, Pompiliu 
Teodor15) doctoral student Ioan Horga defended his thesis on „L’Église 
                                                     
10 See the official site of the Faculty of History – Phisology, ”Babeş-Bolyai” 
University, available at  http://www.ubbcluj.ro/ro/ despre/prezentare/istoric, 
accessed in November 29th, 2016 
11 Ioan Horga, candidat la Rectorat: ”Vreau să scoatem Universitatea din ghetoisare”, article 
published in on-line edition of the Bihoreanul newspaper, in Aprilie, 22th, 2012, 
available at http://www.ebihoreanul.ro/stiri/ultima-or-31-6/ioan-horga-candidat-
la-rectorat-vreau-sa-scoatem-universitatea-din-ghetoizare--101026.html, accessed in 
December, 5th, 2016 
12 Official website of the National Informatics Olympiad available at 
http://www.lego.rdsor.ro/oni98/info/ist.html, accessed in December, 5th 2016 
13 Professor at the National Institute of Eastern Languages and Civilizations and the 
Superior Institute of International and Strategic Relations, specialist in the history of 
Romania, see  http://www.inalco.fr/recherche-generale/durandin, accesed in 
December, 5th, 2016 
14 Professor of modern History at the University of Reims, specialist in the history of 
Latin America, See http://www.univ-reims.fr/site/laboratoire-labellise/habiter-ea-
2076/l-equipe,11220,20294.html?, accesed in December, 5th, 2016 
15 Professor of History at ”Babes-Bolyai” University of Cluj-Napoca, renowned 
specialist of the Enlightenment and pioneer in fields such as the history of ideas, the 
Romanian enlightenment and church history. See Doru Radosav, op. cit., p. 7-9  
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gréco-catholique roumaine (uniate) de Transylvanie à l’époque des Lumières. 
L’évêché d’Oradea (1780-1830)”16, obtaining his PhD in History with the 
qualification Tres honorable a l’umanite17 At the same time, his collaboration 
with the University of Oradea became permanent by his tenure, in 1992, to 
the position of lecturer at the Department of History of the Faculty of 
History - Geography. The quality of his teaching and research activity have 
always been the strong points of his academic career, his tenure in the post 
of lecturer (1997) and assistant professor (2000), confirming his expertise in 
the field of modern and contemporary history, history of Europe and 
European integration. 
His remarkable research and teaching experience was appreciated in 
major European university centers, professor Ioan Horga being invited to 
conference and deliver lectures and courses to students from Universities 
and Institutes in: Reims (France)18, Siena (Italy)19, Nancy (France)20, 
Wroclaw (Poland)21, Paris (France)22, Montpellier (France)23, Bologna - 
Campus Forli (Italy)24, Coimbra (Portugal), Salamanca (Spain), Rzeszow 
(Poland), Alicante (Spain)25, Bratislava (Slovakia), Banska Bistrika (Slovakia) 
                                                     
16 See database of the University of Reims, available at 
http://www.theses.fr/1995REIML004, accesed in December, 6th, 2016 
17 The diploma has been acknowledged by Romanian authorities based on the Order 
of the Minister of Education no. 3763/30.04.1996. 
18 Collaboration starts in 1998; at present, professor Ioan Horga teaches at the 
University of Reims, as Associate professor, the course entitled Regional development 
policy & Central and Eastern Europe in Transition and is member of the scientific 
committee of the Master studies programme “Specialists in the field of Integration 
and Neighborhood European Policies” 
19 Since 2003 he has been member of the scientific committee of the Master’s 
programme “Building of Europe” at the University of Siena and holds, as associate 
professor, the courses EU’s Cohesion Policy and European Neighborhood Policy 
20 The collaboration with the University of Nancy started in 2005 and covered a 
period of 8 years, being invited to conference on themes such as The new 
interpretation of the EU’s east frontier; Romania and EU 
21 In 2006 he was invited to conference in front of the students and the teaching staff 
of the University on the theme: Romanian Integration in EU: present and future 
22 In 2007 he was invited at the Institute of Political Sciences to conference on the 
theme Religious frontiers and The New Europe 
23 As visiting professor at the University of Montpellier, he held the conference 
European Cohesion Policy (2008). 
24 The conference European Neighborhood Policy at the Eastern Frontier of EU is held in 
2010 as visiting professor 
25 As part of the Erasmus Teaching Mobility Programme he delivers courses at the 
University of Alicante and Coimbra (the university year 2003-2004), Salamanca 
(university year 2004-2005) and Rzeszow (university year 2007-2008) 
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, Brescia (Italy), Venice (Italy), Krakow (Poland), Lublin (Poland), Prague 
(Czech Republic), Hannover (Germany), Maribor (Slovenia)26. His work was 
rewarded with distinctions such as: the Pro Cooperatione Award of the 
Academy of Hungarian Sciences - Debrecen Branch (2003)27 the Pro 
Universitas Award, from the University of Debrecen (2010), the Award of 
Excellence of the Ministry of Culture of Romania (2010), the Award of 
Excellence of the European Institute of Romania (2012). In 2013, the 
National University in Uzhgorod, Ukraine, awarded him the distinction of 
Doctor Honoris Causa for the contributions brought to the fields of science 
and education. 
The extensive experience accumulated in European universities, as 
well as the close understanding of internationalization projects and strategies 
promoted by such institutions determined professor Ioan Horga to bring 
forth similar objectives to the heads of Oradea University, in 2000. As a 
result, by the Rector's decision, a Department of International Relations and 
European Integration was established within the University of Oradea, with 
the mission of "promoting contacts with other universities and institutions 
abroad, in order to open the possibility for the participation of students, 
teachers and researchers in mobility programs, research and professional 
training"28. As head of that department, professor Ioan Horga 
institutionalized "active levers for developing a consistent package of inter-
university relations with similar institutions from Belgium, France, Italy, 
Germany, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary."29 For 7 
years, European programs, aimed at increasing the mobility of teachers and 
students in the European space, along with programs that could attract 
European funds for teaching or research projects were intensively 
promoted. During his mandate, Oradea University signed an Agreement for 
Scientific and Teaching Cooperation whereby the University became a 
member of the group of institutions enabled to organize the master's degree 
                                                     
26 See the structure of Romanian Association of the International Relations and 
European Studies available at http://www.rise.org.ro/structura/ioan-horga/, 
accesed in December, 6th, 2016 
27 The prize was awarded for the collaboration with Hungarian specialists, for the 
quality of conferences held as part of Symposia and Scientific Sessions organized in 
our neighboring country, as well as for the studies published in Hungarian journals. 
28 See the official website of the International Relationd Department, University of 
Oradea, available at http://arhiva-www.uoradea.ro/romanian/topic/52 
/Departamentul$de$Relatii$Internationale.html#prez, accesed in December, 6th, 
2016 
29 Ioan Horga (coord.), 10 ani de Relaţii Internaţionale şi Studii Europene, Oradea 
University Press, Oradea, 2013, p. 6 
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program The Process of Building Europe30; professor Ioan Horga also managed 
the General Secretariat of the Carpathian Region Universities Association 
(ACRU)31. 
The institutional framework thus created, professor Ioan Horga 
managed to use favorable circumstances in order to implement the project 
"Action Learning for SMEs in Bihor, Salaj and Satu Mare counties - a new 
model of entrepreneurial school in the field of human resources”, funded by 
Phare Program 2000 Economic and Social Cohesion, Human Resources 
Development. The actions performed in association with the partners in the 
project (the Local Council of SMEs of Oradea, Salaj Branch of SMEs, The 
Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture Satu Mare, The Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry Bihor, The Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Salaj, The Revans Institute for Action Learning & Research - University of 
Salford, UK) led to the establishment of the Center for Information and 
European Consultancy (CICE), which was provided with the necessary 
technical and informatics equipment, and a specialized book fund, later 
included in the CICE library; a total of 300 students from the University of 
Oradea (support staff and teaching staff with managerial positions) and 
different business representatives from Bihor, Salaj and Satu Mare also 
benefited from training sessions. Another source of funding used was the 
Jean Monnet Programme of the European Commission, which opened the 
possibility to establish, in 2002, at the University of Oradea, two Jean 
Monnet Chairs, one of them being the Euroregional Studies one32, headed 
by professor Ioan Horga33. The interdisciplinary character of this Jean 
Monnet Chair was fully valued in activities related to the Euroregional Studies 
and Cross-border Relations Master’s program, students from Oradea having 
thus the possibility to deepen their knowledge in various fields (economics, 
geography, international relations, European studies, CBC, history, 
communication, law, etc.) and gain practice as employees characterized by 
an open mind and the ability to communicate in a multicultural 
environment. 
                                                     
30 See the official website of the Centro di Ricerca sull’Integrazione Europea. Master 
in European Studies, available at http://www.crie.unisi.it/en/1004/master-in-
european-studies.htm, accesed in December, 6th, 2016 
31 Between 2006 and 2009, professor Ioan Horga held the position of Secretary 
General of this inter-university association. Currently he is the University of Oradea 
representative. See the official website of the Association of Carpathian Region 
Universities. Membership, available at http://acru.uvlf.sk/membership.html, accesed in 
December, 6th, 2016 
32 Department established by the EAC/A2/BBQ/AmD decision no.16138, of July 
24th, 2002. 
33 Ioan Horga (coord.), op. cit., p. 40 
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With a constant concern for developing curricular areas that the 
University of Oradea could make available to high school graduates, 
professor Ioan Horga, together with colleagues from the Departments of 
History, Sociology and Law, set up, in 2003, the International Relations and 
European Studies (RISE) license program. The wide range of scientific areas 
that were part of the proposed subjects in the curriculum ensured the 
formation of graduates with solid interdisciplinary training, so as they might 
be able to meet job requirements. Moreover, from the very first semester, 
students had the opportunity to study at least two foreign languages and 
acquire skills in the field of information and communication technology. 
Another key feature of the curriculum was the practical character of most 
courses offered to students, and especially the internships performed by 
students in institutions and organizations in Oradea. For their deployment, 
professor Ioan Horga concluded cooperation agreements with The Council 
of SMEs Bihor, The Employers’ Federation of Bihor county, Oradea 
Metropolitan Area, The Prefecture of Bihor County, the Carpathian 
Euroregion Foundation etc., thereby strengthening the links between the 
University of Oradea and the local socio-economic environment. In 
addition to the theoretical and practical training of students, professors Ioan 
Horga also created an environment where students could express their ideas 
freely, present projects or demonstrate their knowledge. As expected, the 
management of Bachelor and Master specializations were provided first by 
the Collective of European Studies and International Relations, and then by 
the Department of International Relations and European Studies, structures 
created at the initiative of professor Ioan Horga. The team of teachers and 
scholars gathered around Ioan Horga imposed itself, over the years, as a 
"close-knit and dynamic structure "34, individualized within the national and 
the European academic environment. 
In the scientific domain, with the same energy and determination, 
directed for the benefit of Oradea academic community, professor Ioan 
Horga strengthened the collaboration with the team of researchers from the 
Department of Geography and Regional Development at the University of 
Debrecen. Together with professor Istvan Suli-Zakar, he laid the 
foundations the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen (ISER, 2005), 
as Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence35. Meanwhile, ISER has 
become a real "research pole for European border issues"36, the results 
                                                     
34 Ibidem, p. 11 
35 It is the 3rd created Center of Excellence, after those in Cluj-Napoca and 
Timişoara. In 2010, a similar center was created in Iasi. 
36 Ioan Horga (coord.), op. cit., p. 9 
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being published in Eurolimes37 and in numerous collectively edited 
volumes38. Under the aegis of the Institute, the research team carried out 
numerous projects with European, local and national financing. Thus, in 
addition to coordinating the Jean Monnet Modules earned39 ISER members 
have implemented projects funded by: PHARE CBC 2006 INTERREG III 
A; Cross-Border Cooperation Programme Hungary - Romania 2007 - 2013; 
Transnational Cooperation Programme South East Europe; the European 
Commission – European Thematic Network for European Studies. With 
another funding direction, the local one, research was also performed, its 
results contributing to the understanding of the local and the regional past, 
to the valuing of heritage and the development of the local community40. 
His experience, exigency, energy, visionary spirit, obvious 
organizational and interpersonal skills, fully demonstrated throughout his 
entire professional activity, were elements that recommended professor Ioan 
Horga for the position of Vice Rector of the University of Oradea. Despite 
the very short term of office (2007-2008), the objective to increase the 
number of collaborative partnerships, concluded with other European 
universities, was doubled by that of ensuring the openness of the academic 
space to both civil society and the media. By the creation of an Office for 
Communication, University of Oradea managed to develop an institutional 
relationship with the local and national media and enter the online 
environment, the beneficial effects being visible in improved 
communication with different actors in society and the constant contact 
with the public opinion. In 2008, Ioan Horga resigned from the Vice-Rector 
position to become Dean of the Faculty of History, Geography and 
International Relations, a position he occupies at present at the Faculty of 
History, International Relations, Political Science and Communication 
Studies. 
Benefiting from an extensive educational and scientific activity and 
being animated by a constant desire to discover and shape young 
researchers, Professor Ioan Horga directed his efforts towards coordinating 
                                                     
37 Biannual publication, listed in international databases, Eurolimes appeared in the 
local publishing landscape in 2006. Under the guidance of Professor John Horga, 
the editorial staff publishes thematic issues, offering each time a different 
perspective on borders. See the website of the Eurolimes journal, available at 
http://www.igri.ro/?page_id=441, accessed in December 6th, 2016 
38 The 26 volumes published so far can be accessed on the official ISER website of 
ISER, available at http://www.iser.rdsor.ro/e-books.htm, accessed in December 6th, 
2016 
39 See the official site of ISER, Projects section, available at 
http://www.iser.rdsor.ro/project.htm, accessed in December, 6th, 2016 
40 Ioan Horga (coord.), op. cit., p. 50-53 
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doctoral internships. In 2006, he began supervising doctoral theses in the 
field of History, as part of the Doctoral School within the University of 
Oradea, and continued to materialize his desire to form many specialists in 
international relations and European studies in 2010, when he moved to 
"Babes-Bolyai "University of Cluj-Napoca41. His skills and expertise are 
recognized at the European level as well. Thus, in the period 2009 – 2010, 
professor Ioan Horga was invited to become member of The Commission 
for the assessment of doctoral theses, as part of the annual competition 
organized by the Committee of the Regions. The scientific, professional and 
ethical character of his supervising activity, along with the patience 
demonstrated in outlining every niche of research and dedication to follow 
the development of each doctoral student are reflected in the several dozens 
of doctoral thesis supervised so far by professor Ioan Horga, and also in the 
character of young specialists whom he mentored. 
It is not an easy task to present, in just a few pages, the prodigious 
activity of the person to whom this volume is dedicated. Surely some 
biographical data might have been omitted, others have been probably just 
mentioned, while others are extensively presented. We can, however, 
conclude that the following elements characterize Ioan Horga’s personality: 
innovative and inventive spirit; energy invested in each project; 
determination to reach objectives; seriousness and rigor in addressing each 
activity; warmth and passion demonstrated while talking to students and 
doctoral students; care for younger colleagues, materialized in valuable 
pieces of advice, and respect for senior colleagues; dedication in defending 
the interests of the collective to which he belongs. By summarizing in few 
words his personality, we merely begin to shape a portrait, based on 
vocational qualities of the Professor IOAN HORGA 
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Horga – “Moţul”1 
 
 
 
Mihai DRECIN* 
 
 
The colleague Ioan Horga has reached to a round age. Sixty years is 
the age of maturity from all points of view: biologically, profesionally, of life 
experience. Now you make a first inventory of what you went until now, 
you set the objectives of the near future which must fulfill you as human 
being and, exceptionally, to remain in the conscience of the family and 
community.  
The present volume gives the possibility to the colleagues from our 
university not only, to evocate memmories about professor Ioan Horga 
which can complete the knowledge upon his personality.  
I knew him and remarked him as a young student, in 1980, of the 
Faculty of History of the University “Babeş - Bolyai” from Cluj-Napoca, 
working later at the Industrial Highschool “Înfrăţirea” from Oradea. 
Together with some young graduates from Cluj and Oradea, he remarked 
during the discussions carried on at the mounthly meetings, rigorously 
organized, on diverse topics from our national history, by the School 
Inspectorate of Bihor County by his specialized methodists. He used to 
come up with datas and new interpretations of some events from our 
national and universal history, result of the new way of teaching of the 
university teachers from Cluj, but also of some personal lectures of the dayly 
bibliography. Thus, I found out that, as a chief of promotion, he did not 
have the chance to remain as a preparatory teacher to one of the university 
Chairs from Cluj-Napoca. The decision of the political leadership from 
Bucharest was to reduce more and more drastically the number of students 
from humanist faculties, they procedeed in consequence with the renewal of 
the university teaching environment or the acceptation at doctorate of 
young people capable and willing to progress.  
In such situations, some young people are in the dangerous pericle 
of plafonation. Moreover, this is more likely to happen in an industrial 
highschool, where, with some exceptions, as a teacher you could not valorify 
                                                     
1 Moţ = inhabitants from the Apuseni Mountain Area, Arieş River 
* Professor PhD, University of Oradea  
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all the accumulated professional knowledge, to be motivated to study 
further, to make scientific research. Ioan Horga defeated this pericle what 
explains his reuse by contest, in 1990, to a position of titular teacher at the 
Highschool “Emanuil Gojdu”, the most renewed from Oradea and Bihor.  
The opening towards West, after 1989, gives him a chance to get a 
scholarship for the preparation of a doctorate to the University of Reims. 
His thesis, anchored in history of the Greek–Catholic Bishopric of Oradea 
and of illuminism of the Ardelean School, has on its base intentions of 
research that started before 1989. Parts of these researches he will valorify in 
the paper by which he obtains the didactical grade I in the preuniversitarian 
education in 1992.  
The re-creation of the University of Oradea and, in its framework, 
of the specialization History–Geography, determines the leadership of the 
university and of the academic staff to look and select young promissing 
people to occupy the university positions whom to consolidate the nucleum 
of the university staff from Oradea, formed in the years 1963–1984 in the 
framework of the former Pedagogical Institute of three years. In this 
context, Ioan Horga becomes titular lector in the university year 1992/ 1993 
in the framework of the Chair of History.  
After he takes his PhD at the University of Reims (1995), more and 
more anchored in research and in the university environment, he will evolve 
rapidly in didactical and administrative functions: senior lecturer (1997), 
professor (2000), professor who leads doctorates in History at Oradea 
(2007) then in “International Relations and Security Studies” at Cluj – 
Napoca (2008), founder and chief of the Chair of International Relations 
and Security Studies in Oradea (2000, accredited in 2007/ 2008, 
independent Department from 2010), Dean of the Faculty of History, 
International Relations and Sciences of Communication ( from 2012).  
His university activity brings acknowledgement also in national 
diplomatic plan, being involved expert on problems of European Security.  
I reminded this profesional path of our colleague because this way 
one can characterize him and to underline his qualities. Born and raised in 
the Country of Apuseni Mountains, in the areal of Băii of Arieş, our 
colleague inherited several of the mental features of his special inhabitants 
from this “Country of Stone” as it is renamed by Geographers. With the 
thought at “the people from the Mountains of Apuseni”, which I know very 
well even in my own family, I find on the way of Ioan Horga’s previous 
years of living the power of work, the wish of affirmation, the capacity to 
adjust to new times; the resistance at the pressions that the life can throw in 
one’s face, loiality towards the ones who supported him, at a certain time, 
on the way of his affirmation and towards the collaborators, defender of 
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national traditions combined with the European assumation of continental 
values, wise negociator, Romanian patriot.  
I was not and I am not the adherent of the “cult of personality”, 
whoever would be the person and whatever as much it would have been 
influenced my destiny by the kindness of the respectiv chief. If I found to 
Mr. Ioan Horga the above mentioned qualities, it does not mean that he 
would not have, until know in life also mistakes, maybe even regrets. No 
man is perfect. But if we dream on perfection, it is fine! 
In such moments of professional and family achievements, I wish 
to the “men from Apuseni Mountains” good health, several years of life 
with new professional achievements, the pursuation of his continuous 
endeavour by doing real facts and actions for the cause of national interests. 
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The vocation of research: the European space and the 
study of borders in the scientific work of              
Professor Ioan Horga 
 
 
My gratitude to my Professor  
to whom I owe my entire career! 
 
Mircea BRIE*  
 
 
The contemporary Europeanrealities, the European construction 
and the particularities of the EU are general themes that define the 
milestones of rich scientific research of Professor Ioan Horga in the last two 
decades. His scientific work, which includes historical research during his 
early career, has about 200 titles. These works include research analysis and 
synthesis published as monographs, books of sole author or in collaboration 
with others, coordinated and edited collective volumes and conference 
proceedings, specialized studies and articles published in prestigious ISI 
journals or in various international databases. His publications have been 
published by prestigious publishing houses and journals of institutions in 
the country and abroad (France, Belgium, Britain, Portugal, Hungary, 
Poland, Moldova, Italy, USA, Spain, Ukraine, Sweden, Germany, etc.). 
Trained as a historian, Ioan Horga managed through his interest 
in international relations, European studies and security studies, and through 
a wide openness to interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary, 
to give his research a complex perspective and necessary understanding of 
phenomena and processes currentin the Europe of today. 
His research activity is crowned by a rich activity in academic 
teaching, He is, through his role in the academic landscape from Oradea and 
at national level, a road opener, a founder of the school, a benchmark for 
the new generation that he has helped to shape.  
From this perspective, mainly I but also my colleagues at the 
University of Oradea, owe respect for a man who served a cause: the 
creation of a school of international relations and European studies at 
                                                     
* PhD professor at the University of Oradea, Department of International Relations 
and European Studies. E-mail: briedri@hotmail.com 
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Oradea. Furthermore, the inclination towards niche areas such as research 
on the (euro)regional development, on the study of borders and CBC 
managed to put Oradea on the map. His research is, from this point of view, 
a reference standard nationally and internationally. From this position, 
Professor Ioan Horga campaigned for institutionalizing at the University of 
Oradea, and also at nationwide universities (through work in the National 
Council for Attesting Titles, Diplomas and Certificates - CNATDCU and 
the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education - 
ARACIS) of a field of study in International Relations and European 
Studies, and Security Studies. This rich activity of the university 
management activity is part of a comprehensive process of organizing 
Romanian university studies in the context of Romania’s integration in 
Euro-Atlantic structures. 
Without taking upon highlighting the rich work of Professor Ioan 
Horga, we would like to emphasize his role in establishing institutional 
structures that were the basis of outstanding research. The creation of the 
Department of International Relations and European Studies, a research 
institutional structure (International Centre for Euroregional Research, then 
the Institute for Euroregional Studies - Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence) 
or some specialized journals have created the preconditions for a rich 
research whose landmark is the scientific expertise of Professor Ioan Horga. 
The complex analyses on the European space are crowned with 
an overview of European realities, with the capacity to see beyond the 
historical realities of European prospects. 
Either that he has taken into account the historical perspective on 
the European space or he has been preoccupied with the present realities, 
Professor Ioan Horga’s vocation is leading the research, the ability to see 
both the general and the particular. Europa Luminilor1, Europa secolului al XIX-
lea2 or Relaţiile internaţionale de la echilibru la sfârşitul concertului european (secolul 
XVII – începutul secolului XX)3 are works of historical synthesis that come to 
argue our statements regarding the superior ability of Professor Ioan Horga 
to understand realities by linking behaviors of contemporary European 
history to the “actual history”4. His European thinkingsees and understands 
the European realities, including historical stands when these writings calls 
for the “democratization of European historiography” which is required to 
rise above national ones5. Besides, Professor Horga noted the need to 
                                                     
1 Ioan Horga, Europa luminilor, Editura Universităţii din Oradea, Oradea, 2002. 
2 Idem, Europa secolului XIX, Editura Universităţii din Oradea, Oradea, 2000. 
3 Ioan Horga; Brie M., Relaţiile internaţionale de la echilibru la sfârşitul concertului european 
(secolul XVII – începutul secolului XX), Editura Universităţii din Oradea, Oradea, 2006. 
4 Ioan Horga, Europa luminilor…, p. 7. 
5 Idem, Europa secolului XIX…, p. 13-14. 
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reform the educational and cultural policies in order to create solidarity and 
cooperation pillars of the European construction process, namely the 
creation of a European identity. Complex realities of the process of 
European construction, successes and difficulties recorded during the stages 
of this process, and opening eastward toward New Europe, are topics of 
attention and understanding of this dedicated and devotedresearcher. 
Construcţie Europeană. Tradiţie, realitate şi perspectivă (1998) is not only a historic 
telltale of the process of European construction, but reference is made to a 
dispute between national versus European. As the Europeanist as I’ve 
known him, Professor Ioan Horga advocates for strengthening the 
European institutions and reminds about “reducing the significance of 
borders”6 prefacing future research in the study of European borders. 
European institutions, the European Union functionalityas a whole, and 
other international organizations have been subject of his research at both 
general and particular. Scientific papers are both applied and theoretical, 
analytic, and synthetic. In this last category, the book Teoria relaţiilor 
internaţionale7 is positioned as a fundamental work of his research.  
The process of European enlargement towards the east began 
after the fall of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, and 
remained constant to the core of Professor Horga’s research. Two collective 
volumes, coordinated bt Professor Horga, were the center of debate 
between the contribution of the media8 and its relation to the governance9 
in the context of EU enlargement. The purpose is to find solutions for a 
better governance at both national and sub-national (local, regional) and 
supranational (European) levels. The European enlargement eastwards 
brings in his opinion challenges that require political and institutional 
transformation in national and European decision-making process. 
Moreover, even in the years before and after the wave of EU accession of 
Central and Eastern European states in 2004, Ioan Horga anticipates the 
need for systemic reformation of the European Union in the context of 
enlargement to the east10. This need is given by the particularities of these 
                                                     
6 Idem, Construcţie Europeană. Tradiţie, realitate şi perspectivă, Editura Universităţii din 
Oradea, Oradea, 1998, p. 6. 
7 Idem, Teoria relaţiilor internaţionale, Editura Universităţii din Oradea, Oradea, 2006. 
8 A. Landyt, Ioan Horga and R. de La Brosse, The contributiuon of Mass-Media to the 
Enlargement of EU, International Institute of Administrative Studies, Bruxelles, 2003. 
9 F. Maron, Ioan Horga and R. de La Brosse, Media and Governance Facing the Challenge of 
the EU Enlargement, International Institute of Administrative Studies, Bruxelles, 2005. 
10 Ioan Horga, „The Enlargement of the European Union Increases the Need for 
New Solutions for European Good Governance. Which is the Place of the Media in 
this Process”, in F. Maron, I. Horga, R. de La Brosse, Media and Governance Facing the 
Challenge of the EU Enlargement, International Institute of Administrative Studies, 
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countries in the enlargement process11 or by economic realities12, the 
realities of their cultural heritage and social identity. Romanian historical 
peculiarities, the specific national context of the accession process and 
economic realities often serve as case studies. The particular realities of 
central and eastern Europe led him to invoke European institutional reform 
based on intercultural dialogue, the need for democratization of decision-
making. European Parliament debates regarding European enlargement in 
the post, the functionality, are among his academic concerns. These include 
works such as The European Parliament, Intecultural Dialogue and European 
Neighborhood Policy13 or Le Parlement Européen et la Démocratisation du Processus 
Décisionnel Européen14. Reforming the European system includes debates 
regarding The Multilevel Guvernance, which Ioan Horga associated to 
respecting the principle of subsidiarity15, regional governance and 
institutional outlook on the Committee of the Regions16, but also to the 
needs of institutional and legislative reform after the Treaty of Lisbon in the 
context of The White Paper of Multilateral Gouvernance17. Lastly, the European 
                                                                                                                       
Bruxelles, 2005, p. 57-76; Ioan Horga, „General Considerations on European 
Enlightenment”, in I. Ţepelea, C. Antal, Proceedings of the 27th ARA Congress, 
Polytechnic International Press, Oradea, 2003, p. 175-184. 
11 Ioan Horga, „Romanian and its historical peculiarities amongst the newcomes in the 
European Union”, in A. Landuyt, D. Pasquinucci (ed.), Gli allaramenti della CEE/EU 
(1961-2004), il Mulino, Bologna, 2005, p. 565-592. 
12 Ioan Horga and L. Şoproni, „Romania’s Accession to the European Union. 
Economic Conditions”, in J. Kundera (ed.), Economic Relations in the EU Enlarged, 
Kolonia Limited, Wroclaw, 2007, p. 319-329. 
13 Ioan Horga; G. Silaşi; I. Suli-Zakar and S. Sagan, The Parliament European, Intecultural 
Dialogue and European Neighborhood Policy, Editura Universitii din Oradea, Oradea, 
2009. 
14 Cristina Dogot and Ioan Horga, „Le Parlement Européen et la Démocratisation du 
Processus Décisionnel Européen”, in The Romanian Review of European Governance 
Studies, 2009, vol. 1, 1, p. 18 – 24. 
15Ioan Horga, „The Multilevel Gouvernance (MLG) and the Respect of the 
Subsidiarity Principle”, in I. Horga, I. Suli-Zakar (ed.), Cross-Border Partnership. Whit 
special regards to the Hunagrian-Romanian-Ukrainian Tripartite Border, Editura Universităţii 
din Debrecen/Editura Universităţii din Oradea, Debrecen/Oradea, 2010, p. 169-
175. 
16 Ioan Horga, „Multilevel Governance (Mlg) and Subsidiary Principle in White Paper 
of Mlg of the Committee of the Region (CoR)”, in I. Horga, I. Gh. Barbulescu, A. 
Ivan, M. Palincsak, I. Suli-Zakar (ed.), Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights Into the Role 
of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design, Debrecen University Press & Oradea 
University Press, Debrecen/Oradea, 2011, p. 158-164 
17 D. Gal and Ioan Horga, „Multilevel Governance from Lisbon Treaty to the White 
Paper of Multilateral Gouvernance”, in Revista de Estudios Jurídicos of the University of 
Jaen, 2010, nr. 10 (Segunda Época) 
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enlargement is seen as a geopolitical reality that has imposed a new 
European agenda, new priorities and interests, both internal and external. 
The new Member States in line with their new status assume besides 
interests and preferences “a possible higher interest”18. The legitimacy of the 
European enlargement, seen in both its meanings (States and the European 
Union), is closely linked to the reformation of the EU. 
The research of Professor Horga about the European space, the 
co-operation between organizations, countries or regions, the cooperation at 
the EU’s borders, have as binder research the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP). the EU external relations took as a starting point the support 
from the European Neighbourhood Policy, the results of which were noted 
by the European Commission as positive ever since the early years of its 
launch in 200319. “The ENP has strengthened relations with partner 
countries and brought tangible benefits to both the Union and its partners, 
including the launch of regional initiatives and support to democratization 
in the European neighborhood”20. Under the influence of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, the concept of external border of the European 
Union tends to acquire new forms of expression. On the one hand we find a 
flexible contact area between the two sides of the border. Such a tendency is 
amplified by cross-border cooperation mechanisms, through Euroregions 
and European instruments successfully implemented at the external 
border21. On the other hand, the actions of the European Union which is 
trying to implement regional cohesion policies on its borders today are, 
according to analysts, proving that the Union is strengthening its external 
borders, currently taking this into account, at least for now, the variant of a 
slowdown process of enlargement towards east, without effectively closing 
doors22. The proximity area of the European Union was among his 
                                                     
18 Cristina Dogot and Ioan Horga, „Enlargement Process, Classic Geopolitics, and 
EU Internal Priorities”, in Eurolimes, 14/Autumn, 2012, p. 167. 
19 See Communication de la Commission. Une politique européenne de voisinage vigoureuse, 
Bruxelles, 05/1272007, COM(2007) 744 final. 
20 EUR-Lex, Access to European Union law, Regulamentul (UE) NR. 232/2014 AL 
Parlamentului European şi al Consiliului din 11 martie 2014 de instituire a unui instrument 
european de vecinătate, Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene, L 77/27, 15.03.2014, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.077. 
01.0027.01.RON, accessed on30.11.2016. 
21 Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu (coord.); Mircea Brie and Nicolae Toderaş, Cooperarea 
transfrontalieră între România şi Ucraina, respectiv între România şi Republica Moldova. 
Oportunităţi şi provocări între 2014-2020, Tritonic, Bucureşti, 2016 
22 In connection to the “orange revolution” in Ukraine, the European Commissioner 
for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-
Waldner decalred atDecmber 1st,2004 that „la question de l’Ukraine dans l’UE n’est pas à 
l’ordre du jour. Mais il est clair que nous ne fermons aucune porte”. See Régis Matuszewicz, 
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concerns before the official launch of ENP. Topics such as the 
democratization of Central and Eastern Europe were in the research agenda 
by connection to the role played in this process by the media and new 
communication technologies and information. Just to remind some of the 
titles published along with one of his friends, the French Professor Renaud 
de La Brosse: Two media threats to democracy in Central and Eastern Oriental23 or 
the collective volume The Role of the Mass-Media and of the New Information and 
Communication Technologies in the Democratisation Process of Central and Eastern 
European Societies24. Romania joined the European Union led to a growing 
interest for the neighbouring space. In 2007, together with Alla Roşca, 
published a study about the Republic of Moldova, La Moldavie tete de pont de 
l’UE25, where the complexity of the realities of this region, but also the 
difficulties in implementing the ENP are analysed. The European 
Neighbourhood Policy is then approached in relation to Romanian state 
border with Ukraine26, in relation to inter-university cooperation27, 
intercultural dialogue28 and contribution to the responsibilities of Romania 
under this policy29. Reforming the ENP and new EU policies in relation to 
                                                                                                                       
Vers la fin de l`Élargissement?, inLaurent Beurdeley, Renaud de La Brosse, Fabienne 
Maron (coord.), L`Union Européenne et ses espaces de proximité. Entre stratégie inclusive et 
parteneriats removes: quell avenir pour le nouveau voisinage de l`Union?, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 
2007, p. 109. 
23 Ioan Horga, R. de La Brosse, „Two media threats to democracy in Central and 
Eastern Oriental", in Democraţia în Europa Centrală şi de Sud-Est- Aspiraţie şi Realitate 
(secolele XIX-XX), Editura Muzeului Sătmărean, Satu Mare, 2000. 
24Ioan Horga, R. de La Brosse (ed.), The Role of the Mass-Media and of the New Information 
and Communication Technologies in the Democratisation Process of Central and Eastern 
European Societies, International Institute of Administrative Studies, Bruxelles, 2002. 
25 Ioan Horga, A. Roşca, „La Moldavie tete de pont de l’UE”, in R. de la Brosse, L. 
Beurdelai, F. Maron(ed.), Quel perspective pour la politique de voisinage de l’UE?, Bruxelles, 
Bruyere, 2007, p.164-182. 
26 Ioan Horga, „La frontiere roumaino-ukraninienne de la perspectve de la politique 
de voisinage”, in G. Edelstam, T. Lunden (ed.), European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Security: Challenges, Goals and Means, Stockholm, 2008. 
27 Ioan Horga; Mircea Brie, „La coopération interuniversitaire aux frontières 
extérieures de l’Union Européenne et la contribution à la politique européenne de 
voisinage”, in G. Rouet, P. Terem (coord.), Elargisment et politique Europeenne de 
voisinage, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2008, p. 203-233 
28 Ioan Horga; G. Silaşi; I. Suli-Zakar and S. Sagan, op. cit.; Mircea Brie; Ioan Horga 
and Sorin Şipoş (coord.), Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European 
Union’s East Border, Editura Universităţii din Debrecen/Editura Universităţii din 
Oradea, Debrecen/Oradea, 2011. 
29 Ioan Horga; A. M. Costea, „Eastern Partnership between the Permeability and 
Impermeability of EU Eastern Borders”, in C. Pacheco Amaral, G. Gabrichidze, Ioan 
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proximity to the eastern approach find a place in his studies of strategies, 
opportunities and challenges of the new format of the Eastern Partnership30 
or analysis regarding the permeability or impermeability of the EU's eastern 
borders in the context of the Eastern Partnership 31. 
Regional and Euroregional development remained constant to the 
attention of Professor Ioan Horga both in the scientific research, and 
institutional, educational or research management. He created at the 
University of Oradea, together with colleagues from the University of 
Debrecen, a research center that promotes research in euroregional 
development, and specialized masters programs which have the euroregional 
study or the regional development specialization. The Institute for 
Euroregional Studies (IRES) was formed as a result of both the need for 
developing an institutional research collaboration, as well as for the 
recording of the result of anormal rapprochement between the two 
academic communities. „As for the regional and Euroregional development 
at the Hungarian-Romanian border there has been a highlight on the role 
played by smaller or larger town from within the border area in creating 
development poles. The towns are centres of the economic space of their 
counties and the value of the inner potential depends on the distance from 
the county-seat”32. Regions, including the border (Euroregions) are 
addressed from the perspective of economic, social and cultural structures 
in which the integrated development of human resources and mobility take 
place33. In 2006, Professor Ioan Horga, along with his close collaborator 
István Suli-Zakar, coordinates two collective volumes analyzing the national 
and European prospects related to regional development in the 
Euroregional space, CBC Romanian-Hungarian (Regional Developpment in the 
                                                                                                                       
Horga, A. Kruglashov, E. Latoszek, M. Pachocka, V. Cucerescu, EU Relations whit 
Eastern Partnership: Strategy, Opportunities and Challenges, Print-Caro, Chişinău, 2016.  
30 M. Pachocka; E. Latoszek; V. Cucerescu; G. Gabrichidze; Ioan Horga; A. 
Kruglashov and Amaral, C. Pacheco, EU relations with Eastern Partnership: strategy, 
opportunities and challenges, Editura Print-Caro, Chişinău, 2016. 
31 Ioan Horga; A. M. Costea, op. cit. 
32 Ioan Horga, I. Suli-Zakar, „Contributions of Institute for Euroregional Studies 
Oradea-Debrecen to Shaping the Border into a Space for knowledge and 
Development”, in Analele Universităţii din Oradea, Seria Relaţii Internaţionale şi Studii 
Europene, vol. 2, 2010, p. 170-183. Pentru o mai complexă imagine asupra activităţii 
desfăşurate de IRES vă recomandăm parcurgerea lucrării I. Suli-Zakar,Ioan Horga, 
A. Ilieş, C.V. Ţoca, „Institute for Euroregional Studies - « Jean Monnet » European 
Center of Excellence”, in I. Suli-Zakar, Falvainak sorsa es A vasosnovekedes Szakaszai, 
Debrecen University Press, Debrecen, 2011, p. 15-45. 
33 Ioan Horga, A. Ilieş, O. Dehoorne, „Romania, regional internal and external 
economical structures integration, development and human mobility”, in Human 
Mobility in a Bordeless World?, Societa Geografica Italiana, 2001, p. 117-134 
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Romanian-Hungarian cross-border space. From national to European perspective34) and, 
a second volume (Challenges and Perspectives in the Regional and Euroregional Issues 
in the New Europe), the challenges and the perspectives of regional and 
Euroregional development in the space of the New Europe35. 
Administrative territorial reform has been a much discussed topic in the 
Romanian public space in recent years without finding resolve at the 
decision-making level. In this debate, Professor Ioan Horga proposed to 
take into account the realities of cultural and historical heritage, historical 
regions of functionality that are part of the Romanian state. The historical 
perspective is important in defining regional structures, it was born of a 
geographical reality and cultural, economic and social which must be taken 
into account today. Appeal is made to a debate on regional structures to 
include reference to both local space, subregional, but also at the national 
and supranational space36. The historical regional perspective is then 
associated with a new type of regional approach: „The subject of 
regionalization is even more pressing if we speak about frontier cities in 
Romania, because they are influenced by the national level, the regional one 
and also by the interregional level, given the fact that their border is also the 
border of the Romanian state and often citizens cross it or the regional 
authorities develop cooperation projects with other centres from the 
frontier regions”37. Lastly, regional and Euro-regional development topics in 
the area of Central and Eastern Europe is associated to the cohesion policy 
and regional development policies. In 2011, as a coordinator and 
collaborator, Ioan Horga published the collective volume Regional and 
Cohesion Policy – Insights Into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy 
Design38. This, along with other papers regarding the White Paper of the 
                                                     
34 I. Suli-Zakar, Ioan Horga, Regional Developpment in the romanian-hungarian cross-border 
space. From national to European perspective, Editura Universităţii din Debrecen, 2006. 
35 Ioan Horga, I. Suli-Zakar, Challenges and Perspectives in the Regional and Euroregional 
Issues in the New Europe, Editura Universităţii din Debrecen/Editura Universităţii din 
Oradea, Debrecen/Oradea, 2006. 
36 Ioan Horga, „Romanian perspective on the regional and local structures”, in C. 
Pacheco Amaral (ed.), The External Projection of Regional Autonomy in Europe, 
L´Harmattan, Paris, 2010. 
37 Ioan Horga, A. M. Ghimiş,“The role of the borders in the Romanian 
regionalization”, in Transylvanian Review, ISI Journal, vol. XXIII, Supplement No. 2, 
2015, p. 164. 
38 Ioan Horga, I. Gh. Barbulescu, A. Ivan, M. Palincsak, I. Suli-Zakar, Regional and 
Cohesion Policy – Insights Into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design, 
Editura Universităţii din Debrecen/Editura Universităţii din Oradea, 
Debrecen/Oradea, 2011. 
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committal of the Region (CoR)39, multilevel governance subsidiarity 
principle, regional policy in Central and Eastern Europe40, constitute the 
main core of the thesis proposed in this area, where the state remains an 
important partner of the European Union41.  
Cross-border cooperation has proved to be one of the favorite 
topics, associated to the research of the euroregional border space, which 
Professor Ioan Horga approached with attention and passion. This research 
topic is based on the complex analysis of the space frontier, especially of the 
border between Romania and Hungary, where an emphasis is on the need to 
build a dialogue, the instutional-legislative levers contributing to the 
development of cooperation between the two sides of the border. A special 
role in this process was played by European instruments to stimulate cross-
border cooperation. We refer here to the institutional and legislative 
structures of regional/euroregional European funds for territorial 
cooperation, especially those targeted specifically by the CBC. 
Developments marked the transition from the communist period 
corresponded in large over a period of openness compared to the 
neighboring space in Central and Eastern Europe. Contained in a Euro-
Atlantic integration process, Romania, like other states in this region, 
responded positively, registering significant progress on the path of dialogue 
and development cooperation opening its borders with neighboring states 
allied. Border cooperation relations between Romania and Hungary have 
benefited from a comprehensive analysis of ten years after the fall of 
communism42. The emphasis is on the effects of cooperation has in the 
border area. The actors involved in this process that creates leverage and 
                                                     
39 Ioan Horga, „Multilevel Governance (Mlg) and Subsidiary Principle in White Paper 
of Mlg of the Committee of the Region (CoR)”, in I. Horga, I. Gh. Barbulescu, A. 
Ivan, M. Palincsak, I. Suli-Zakar (ed.), Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights Into the Role 
of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design, Debrecen University Press & Oradea 
University Press, Debrecen/Oradea, 2011, p. 158-164. 
40 Idem, „Regional Policy in Central and Eastren Europe”, in Analele Universitatii din 
Oradea, Seria Relaţii Internaţionale şi Studii Europene, vol. VI, 2014, p. 7-22; Ioan 
Horga, A.-M. Costea, „The Regional Policy in the EUMS from Central and Eastern 
Europe between Decentralisation and Recentralisation”, in Debater a Europa, nr. 12, 
janeiro/junho, 2015, p. 103-134.  
41 Idem, „The State remained the most important partner of the European Union in 
the field of regional policy in Central and Eastern Europe”, in E. Latoszek, M. 
Proczek, A. Klos, M. Pachocka, E.Osuch-Rak (ed.), Facing the Challenges in European 
Union. Re-thinking of EU Education and Research for Smart and Inclusive Growth, EuInteg, 
Warsaw, 2015. 
42 Idem, „Co-operation and effects on borderlands Romania-Hungary in the ten years 
after communism fall“, in The 7 Geopolitical conference’s act Changing role of border 
areas and regional politics, Lodz, 2000, p. 89-98. 
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develop relationships beyond the perspective and the national, regional and 
local level, in line with the realities and mutual interests are identified and 
analyzed by Ioan Horga in 200543. Together with Professor István Süli- 
Zakar at the University of Debrecen, edit the collective volume in 2010, 
Cross-Border Partnership. Whit special regards to the Hunagrian-Romanian-Ukrainian 
Tripartite Border44 ,,which contains case studies and complex analytical 
refences. References to the Romanian-Ukrainian border were on the 
research agenda of Professor Horga on other occasions. In 2009 he 
published a paper on European instruments of Romanian-Ukrainian border 
cooperation45. Special attention is given in recent years by Professor Ioan 
Horga to the evaluation border cooperation. In 2013 he coordinates the 
evaluation volume Evaluarea cooperării transfrontaliere la frontierele României46, 
with public and material valorisation of scientific research regarding the 
evaluation of CBC programs47. He advocates for the institutionalization of 
public policies and programs evaluation at European (and national) level to 
implement appropriate practices and to act in the public expertise in 
evaluation. Academia is required to be involved in the evaluation process 
that contribute to the development of public policies and programs 
throughout their implementation. On-going assessment turns out to be 
from this point of view a tool that can be a natural adjustment imposed by 
the realities recorded in the runningprocess48.  
Studying various types of borders by Professor Ioan Horga 
conferred to the city of Oradea and to the University of Oradea, through 
the Euroregional Studies Institute, a privileged place in this niche area not 
only nationally but also internationally. A successful project initiated and 
                                                     
43 Idem, „The actors of Cross-Border Cooperation on the Romanian-Hungarian 
Border”, in Acta Geographica Debrecenensis, vol. XLVII, 2005, p. 244-265. 
44 Ioan Horga, I. Suli-Zakar (ed.), Cross-Border Partnership. Whit special regards to the 
Hunagrian-Romanian-Ukrainian Tripartite Border, Editura Universităţii din 
Debrecen/Editura Universităţii din Oradea, Debrecen/Oradea, 2010. 
45 M. Brie, Ioan Horga, „The Romanian-Ukranian Cross-Border Cooperation an The 
European Instruments”, in A. Kruglasov (ed.), Ucraina- Romania- Moldova: aspecte 
istorice, politice si culturale ale relatiilor în contextul proceselor europene contemporante, vol. 3, 
Cernăuţi, 2009, p. 302-318 
46 Ioan Horga, C. V. Ţoca, F. Chirodea, Evaluarea cooperării transfrontaliere la frontierele 
României, Primus, Oradea, 2013. 
47 Idem, „Valorizarea cercetării ştiinţifice din mediul academic pentru evaluarea on-
going. Evaluarea programelor de cooperare teritorială / transfrontalieră”, in I. 
Horga, C. V. Ţoca, F.Chirodea, Evaluarea cooperării transfrontaliere la frontierele României, 
Primus, Oradea, 2013. 
48 A se vedea Ioan Horga, „Evaluarea on-going a Programului de Cooperare 
Transfrontalieră Ungaria-Romania (2007-2013)”, in I. Horga, C. V. Ţoca (ed.), 
Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene, Editura Universităţii din Oradea, Oradea, 2013. 
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coordinated by Ioan Horga was and remains the Eurolimes journal. It is a 
journal that, through 20 issues published so far, constitutes a genuine 
epistemological collection relating to borders. Each issue is a consistent 
attempt to reflect an “image”, a facet of the rich typology of the border. 
This project is presented in the study Why Eurolimes? in the first issue. 
„Nowadays, to dedicate a journal to the issue of the borders in Europe – as 
Eurolimes is – seems to be an outdated question from both the point of 
view of process of the European integration, or the enlargement, and from 
the point de view of the expectations of the Europeans, who wish to 
circulate, work and live wherever they want to. But the issue of the border is 
much more complex than we assume from  the viewpoint of its essence and 
of the different experiences of Europe as a whole … This “border” 
scepticism envisages the complexity of the interpretation given to the notion 
of border and its evolution in the context of the present-day phenomena of 
globalization and integration”49. In 2010, five years after the first issue, in 
the study Eurolimes, where to?, Ioan Horga shows confidence in his interest 
shown towards this project: „Eurolimes will show an open interest”50. After 
ten years and twenty published issues he tries to redefine the essence and 
purpose of this project. Still Eurolimes?, the study opening issue no. 20, 
introduces us to the universe a mature project, which sits on a solid 
foundation and that rethinks the light of new realities.. “Eurolimes will 
remain an active platform for reflection on the European borders, in 
general, and on the EU’s borders, in particular, aiming to respond, rapidly, 
with knowledge products, to the fast changes of the European society. On 
the other side, Eurolimes, although is has been forced by the recent years’ 
realities to nuance its opinions regarding the future of the European 
borders, it strongly reaffirms that the EU will exist as long as it will have 
osmotic borders, that for very short periods of time can become closed, for 
needed adjustments, as it happened in the fall of 2015, under the pressure of 
the refugees’ wave. But the European Union will be forced to find solutions 
in order to keep its borders permanently open, in a space Eurolimes – type, 
appealing for this, among others, to the electronic surveillance of the traffic 
at its borders and even within it.”51. In Eurolimes, but also in various other 
publications, Professor Horga runs a series of conceptual analyses regarding 
the border. Under this category fall studies like: Europe from Exclusive Borders 
to Inclusive Frontiers (2007)52; The New EU Borders: the historical and culturale 
                                                     
49 Ioan Horga, „Why Eurolimes?”, in Eurolimes, nr. 1, 2006, p. 5. 
50 Idem, „Eurolimes, where to?” in Eurolimes, nr. 10/Autumn, 2010, p. 5-16. 
51 Ioan Horga, I. Suli-Zakar, „Still Eurolimes?”, in Eurolimes, nr. 20/Autumn, 2015, 
p. 18-19. 
52 Ioan Horga, D. Pantea, „Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers”, in 
Eurolimes, nr. 4/ Autumn, 2007, p. 5-10. 
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Heritage (2007)53; The European Union External Border. An Epistemological 
Approach (2009)54; Europe: A Cultural Border, or a Geo-cultural Archipelago 
(2010)55; Europe between Exclusive Border and Inclusive Frontiers (2010)56; Europe: 
Internal Cultural Frontiers or Union Cultural Area (2010)57; The European Union 
External Border. A Conceptual Analysis (2010)58 or Le frontiere europee – espressioni 
dell’identità (2014)59. “According to the same pattern, the Eurolimes paradigm 
designs, according to several researchers in the field, what we understand by 
“inclusive frontier”60, that is, the borders to which the European 
construction tends. The main idea of the integration process is not to settle 
barriers, but to attenuate them. From this perspective, internal borders 
become more and more inclusive and less visible. Security and border traffic 
control are transferred to external borders that become more and more 
exclusive, more restrictive if we respect the logic above. Such a theory is valid 
up to a point. Internal borders do not simply become more open, more 
inclusive61; there is an integration process taking place in steps. On the other 
hand, we cannot consider as fully equal good and inclusive/open, or bad and 
exclusive/close. A simple example can confirm our hypothesis: in war areas, 
borders are relatively open to refugees62. However, we cannot conclude that 
                                                     
53 Ioan Horga, S. Şipoş, „The New EU Borders: the historical and culturale Heritage”, 
in Actas del VIII Congreso„Cultura Europea”, Pamplona, 2007, p. 545-557. 
54 Ioan Horga, M. Brie, „The European Union External Border. An Epistemological 
Approch”, in Revista Română de Geografie Politică, anul XI, nr. 1/2009, p. 15-31. 
55 Ioan Horga, Mircea Brie, „Europe: A Cultural Border, or a Geo-cultural 
Archipelago”, in Eurolimes, vol. 5/Spring, 2010, p. 155-169. 
56 Ioan Horga, M. Brie, „Europe between Exclusiv Border and Inclusiv Frontiers”, in 
Studia Universitatis „Babes-Bolyai”, Seria Europeea, vol.1/2010, p. 63-86. 
57 M. Brie, Ioan Horga, „Europe: Internal Cultural Frontiers or Union Cultural Area”, 
in Moldoscopie, nr. 3 (L), 2010, p. 123-143. 
58 M. Brie, Ioan Horga, „The European Union External Border. A Conceptual 
Analysis”, in A. Kruglasov (ed.), Ukraine – Romania - Moldova; Historical, political and 
cultural aspects of their relations in the contemporary European processes context, vol. 4, 
Chernivtsi, 2010, p. 204- 227. 
59 Ioan Horga, M. Brie, Le frontiere europee – espressioni dell’identità, in Transylvanian Review, 
ISI Journal, vol. XXIII, supliment nr.1, p. 202-216. 
60 Kalypso Nicolaides, Les fins de l'Europe, in Bronislaw Geremek & Robert Picht (ed.), 
Visions d'Europe, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2007, p. 275-290; Jan Zielonka, Europe Unbund: 
Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union, London, Routledge, 2002; 
Idem, Europe as Empire,Oxford University Press, 2006; Geremek, Bronislaw, Picht, 
Robert, Visions d'Europe,Paris, Odile Jacob, 2007.  
61 Gerard Delanty, Border in Changing Europe: Dynamics of Openness and Closure, in 
Eurolimes, vol. I, Europe and Its Borders: Historical Perspective, ed. Ioan Horga, Sorin 
Şipoş, Institutul de Studii Euroregionale, Oradea, 2006, p. 51. 
62 Ibidem, p. 50. 
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we have an inclusive border “open just for pleasure” like European borders to 
which community integration tends as a model.63”In general, the concept of 
border is associated with the hard physical border, a concept related to the 
barrier that can be crossed provided certain special conditions and 
requirements (visa to enter that country is the best example of a restrictive 
requirement in the case of hard border). On the other hand, a state can have 
hard borders with a neighbouring country, while having soft, open borders 
with another neighbouring country. A border can be both hard and soft at the 
same time. A state can eliminate visas for the citizens of a state while 
strengthening and reinforcing requirements in border control64. In the 
European Union, community institutions suggest that Member States 
should have hard external borders and soft internal borders. Besides, several 
authors consider that hard, exclusive, close, sharp-edges or barrier are equal. They 
are all associated with restrictions and strict control being characterised by 
the numerous conditions imposed to those intending to cross them. On the 
other hand, soft, open, inclusive, porous, communicative or bridge type borders 
remove transit restrictions by rendering traffic more flexible65. From 
another perspective, Charles Maier identifies three possible conceptual 
approaches of the border66: the first, „positive and constructive”, considered as a 
border providing political order and good neighbouring relationships; the 
second, „negative and revolutionary”, seen as an illogical obstacle against 
normality, peace and unity; and the third approach, „dialectical and 
evolutionary”, characterized by the dissolution of a border and the inevitable 
settling of another, yet not necessarily at the same level of formality67. For a 
long time, the concept of border has developed as an “intolerance axis” of 
nationalism and racism, of neighbours’ rejection68. Beyond physical border, 
irrespective of the analysed conceptual approach, either within or outside 
the European Union border, we identify other types of “borders”. We 
consider these borders as symbolic and ideological considering that, more 
                                                     
63 Ioan Horga, M. Brie, „Europe between Exclusiv Border and Inclusiv Frontiers…, 
p. 69. 
64 See Olga Potemkina, A „Friendly Schengen Border” and Ilegal Migration: The Case of the 
EU and its Direct Neighbourhood, in Joan DeBardeleben (ed.), Soft or Hard Borders? 
Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2005, p. 165-182. 
65 Ibidem 
66 Charles S. Maier, Does Europe Need a Frontier? From Territorial to Redistributive 
Community, in Jan Zilonka (ed.), Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Governance 
and European Union, Routledge, London, New York, 2002, pp 41-43. 
67 Horga, M. Brie, „The European Union External Border. An Epistemological 
Approch…, p. 7. 
68 Gabriel Wackermann, Les frontières dans monde en mouvment, Ellipses, Paris, 2003, p. 
28. 
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often than not, they are not palpable. From Europeanism to nationalism, 
from ethno-religious identities to social chasms, the wide range of 
approaches on symbolic and ideological borders may continue in the 
context of a new fight against terrorism or of the implementation of an 
effective European neighbourhood policy. The physical border at the 
external limit of the European Union may “open” in time. Yet other types 
of borders may exist between people and communities. For instance, 
immigrants live within the European Union; by preserving their identity, 
they can create a world that “refuses integration” due to the particularities 
they develop. Thus, we can identify a split that may take the form of a 
symbolic cultural border sometimes even turning into an “external” 
border69. In addition to these works of conceptual and epistemological 
theoretical analysis about the European borders, Professor Ioan Horga runs 
analyticanalyses on many kinds of borders as case studies. The approaches 
are, on the one hand, references to the evolution of relations between states 
/ regions in the border area seen by analogy compared to historical realities. 
Historical and cultural heritage form a substrate that give special meaning to 
border areas, to the border directly70. The media played an important role in 
the democratization of societies in Central and Eastern Europe, and made 
its contribution to the transformation of border areas, in the sense/meaning 
that borders have71. The religious dimension of the border, where the 
border separate communities, ideas and religious currents, is analyzed and 
noticed as a peculiar reality of the area of Central and Southeast72. It is a 
region where ethnic-national identities often are accompanied by distinct 
religious identities. Historical perspective provides a picture of European 
cleavages in this area. Often overlapping ethno-nationalcleavages withthe 
religious ones led to tensions and conflicts, which not infrequently have 
become a form of violent expression (as is the case of the Balkan area, 
                                                     
69 Ibidem, p. 7-8. 
70 Ioan Horga, S. Şipoş, „The New EU Borders…, p. 545-557. Ioan Horga, S. Şipoş 
and I. Suli-Zakar, Europe and Its Borders: Historical Perspective, Editura Universităţii din 
Oradea, Oradea, 2006.  
71 Ioan Horga, „The role of Media in Changing the Meaning of the Borders”, in 
Eurolimes, nr. 3/Spring, 2007, p. 28-46; Ioan Horga, L. Şoproni, „The role of media 
in transforming the sense of borders of the World: The European Experience”, in 
P. Dobrescu, A. Ţăranu, A. Bârgăoanu (ed.), Globalization and Policies of Development, 
Editura Comunicare.ro, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 293-301; Ioan Horga, „Media, Identity 
and the Meaning of the European Frontier“, in D. Rolland, A. Landuyt (ed.), 
Historigraphies, politiques et territories: la construction de l’éspace politique européenI, 
l’Harmattan, Paris, 2010. 
72 Ioan Horga, S. Şipoş, „Considérations sur les frontières religieuses de l’Europe 
Centrale et de Sud-Est, in Eurolimes, nr. 5, 2009, p. 5-13. 
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recognized by periods of decay and violence, generated quite often by this 
overlap of religious frontiers than other types of borders - ethnic, linguistic, 
cultural, etc.). This perspective is added by the references of the cultural 
frontiers73 and identity frontiers74. The economic frontiers75 or the urban-
community frontiers76 are often placed against a complex approach which 
contains both the image of a space for communication, and of a space of 
fragmentation and cleavages77.  
In conclusion, we note the rich scientific activity of Professor Ioan 
Horga by his openness towards themes less addressed in national and 
international literature, and by the methodological contribution that his 
work brings. His references to the evolution of relations between states / 
regions in the border area are landmarks in the scientific area of European 
Studies and, moreover, International Relations or Security Studies.  
Being a historian at core, he has been finding meaning in the 
historical and cultural heritage which together form a substrate that give 
special meaning to border areas. In view of the above, the research 
infrastructure that he has created led to the diversification of approaches 
regarding the European space in general and the border space in particular. 
Professor Ioan Horga managed through a wide openness to 
interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary, to give his research 
a complex perspective and anecessary understanding of phenomena and 
processes current in the Europe of today. 
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As historian Robert Frank wrote in 2001: “l’histoire de l’Europe 
n’est en aucune façon une histoire de certitudes; elle est l’histoire de la 
question européenne, l’histoire d’un questionnement que l’historien doit 
constantement renouveler”1 [The history of Europe is in no way a history of 
certainties; it is the history of the European question, of a questioning that 
the historian must continue to ask at all times].  
The relationship between Europe – idea – “thinking Europe” – and 
Europe-integration – “integrating Europe” over such a long period of time 
– from the 1919-1920 peace treaties to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, allows 
us to examine the history of the European integration in an approach well 
beyond facts and institutions. It shows that the efforts of uniting Europe are 
not only embodied in the numerous achieved or failed attempts to give 
Europe some sort of political, economic or cultural architecture, but also 
raise complex ideological debates in various circles – of intellectuals, 
politicians, senior officials, industrialists, trade unionists, etc.. All this gives 
rise to a clash of projects. 
Thinking Europe means to reflect about projects of political or 
economic unity for the old continent, and also about European order and 
European security from the end of the First World War to the end of the 
Cold War and to the imploding of the Eastern bloc; it is also about 
searching for the roots and specificities of the European cultural identity 
and to reflect about the fate of “European civilisation”, its decline or role in 
the rest of the world”. “Building Europe” means realising the European idea 
in the field of realities. This is a complex process in which various methods 
are used (federal, confederal, communitarian), governing more or less 
                                                     
* Full Professor of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Coimbra and Research 
Coordinator of the Centro de Estudos Interdisciplinares do Século XX (Centre for 
20th Century Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Coimbra – CEIS20. 
1 Robert Frank, “Une histoire problématique, une histoire du temps présent”, 
vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire, juillet-septembre, 2001, n. 71, p. 89.  
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powerful drivers (quest for peace, search for prosperity, the preservation of 
national interests, the weight of public opinion) and involving many actors 
(experts, policy makers, pressure groups, economic resources, etc.)2  
The time periods used to shape this brief analysis – 1919-1992 – are 
indicative of the richness and complexity of the 20th century Europe 
integration. In 1919, weakened by a civil war, Europe wondered about its 
decline and fate, which rests on a new order laid down by the peace treaties 
(Treaty of Versailles), seeing in the emergence of the League of Nations a 
new international organisation being called to become more and more 
‘Europeanised’. 1992 pins down the end of a decisive period in the history 
of the European continent marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), by 
the unification of Germany (1990) and by the dissolution of the USSR 
(1991). 1992 marks, in particular, the date of signature of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the difficult ratification of which caused a profound euro-pessimism 
trend at a time when the war in the former Yugoslavia further compounded 
in a community Europe unable to settle the conflict. 
 
A historiographic account 
According to archive documents, the history of European integration 
began in the late 1970s. Despite being a relatively new field of research, it has 
nevertheless produced many different historiographic works. 
By making an account of this process, we have sought to summarise 
the various trends that enable the 20th century European unity narrative in 
the period under analysis. 
Three main approaches stand out due to the order in which they 
appear in the historiographic field: first, a federalist-inspired narrative, the 
inter-governmentalist vision, followed by a more contemporary approach 
that sought to overcome the “models” and integrate the “social” dimension 
of the European integration process. 
Let us then consider the first European integration narrative: the 
federalist approach. 
What is the founding narrative of the pioneers of European unity? 
The first works on European integration were not produced by 
historians, given that official document archives were not available at the 
time. So, these texts were produced by those who took the first steps 
towards European unity, filled with idealism and finalism, describing 
European unity as a historical need, while upholding the teleological vision 
                                                     
2 Elisabeth du Reau, La construction européenne du XXe siècle. Fondement. Enjeux. Défis, 
Nantes, Editions du temps, 2007. Hélène Fréchet (coord. par), Penser et construire 
l’Europe 1919- 1992, Nantes, Editions du temps, 2007. Nicolas Beaupré, Caroline 
Moine (sous a direction de), L’Europe de Versailles à Maastricht. Visions, moments et 
acteurs des projects européens, Paris, Editions Seli Aslam, 2007.  
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of European integration. This desire, disseminated across many works 
published in the 1950s and 70s, deeply marked the overall interpretation of 
the European integration process.  
Its actors often took the leading role in the European “mysticism” 
that characterised the old continent in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. Let us call to mind an important event: the “Congress of Europe” in 
The Hague, in May 1948, organised by the federalists – who were its 
mentors, facilitators and protagonists. 
We take note of the most representative of these staunch 
federalists: Denis de Rougemont, Swiss, the author of Vingt-huit siècles 
d’Europe. La conscience européenne à travers les siècles d’Hésiode à nos jours (1961), 
Bernard Voyenne, French, who wrote Histoire de l’idée européenne (1964), and 
the Dutch Hendrik Brugmans, who published L’idée européenne 1918-1965 in 
1966. Brugmans (1906-1997) concedes: “Notre travail est un acte de foi, 
autant en Europe qu’en l’Histoire…”3. Denis de Rougemont, in turn, states: 
“L’Europe a exercé dès sa naissance une fonction non seulement 
universelle, mais, de fait, universalisante… Le vrai moyen de la définir, c’est 
de la bâtir… Et il s’agit bien moins de la délimiter dans le temps de l’histoire 
et l’espace terrestre, que de renouveler sans cesse le rayonnement de son 
génie particulier qui se trouve être, justement, universel”4. For these authors, 
European federalism had already gained a foothold for over several decades, 
and they blamed the gradual weakening of the nation state, which, in their 
opinion, led Europe to chaos during the Second World War.  
As the idea was to “make Europe”, the Hague Congress in May 
1948 was, in the eyes of the federalists, the biggest lost opportunity to give 
the old continent the bases of a federal organisation. Instead, the Council of 
Europe created in 1949, a symbol of a close intergovernmentalism, 
embodied by Great Britain, was immediately considered as hopeless. 
Both the Schuman Plan (1950), embodying the genes of a European 
federation, and then the European Political Community project (EPC-1952-
1953), of federalist inspiration, raised the hope of those who fervently 
advocated a federate Europe. This project, however, was affected by the 
rebuff of the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC-1954). It 
was then that a large number of federalists opted for a realistic and non-
idealist path, supporting the emerging European Communities, as, for them, 
economic functionalism seemed to be the only way to achieve European 
unity. 
                                                     
3 Jean – Michel Guieu (et al.), Penser et construire l’Europe au Xxe siècle, Paris, Ed. Belin, 
2006, p. 10-11, 16, 18- 20. 
4 Denis de Rougement, Vingt – huit siècles d’Europe. La conscience européenne à travers les 
siècles d’Hésiode à nos jours, Paris, Payot, 1961.  
The European Space. Borders and Issues 
 
72 
As a result of this, a hagiographic narrative of the early days of 
European integration is filled with the heroes of the federalist pantheon. 
Note how Jean Monnet, the precursor of federalism, announced in 1943 
that he wished that the peoples of Europe would unite under a federation or 
a “European entity” rather than under European economic unity. However, 
he followed a different method and neo-functionalism became a prime 
driving force in the dynamics of European integration. 
In the 1950s-1960s, some Anglo-Saxon political scientists took an 
interest in the development of Community institutions and theorised on the 
neo-functionalist method. Ernst B. Haas (1924-2003) conceptualised about 
this mostly pragmatic process introduced by Jean Monnet through the 
creation of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community). Haas, a young 
American political scientist, stayed in Strasbourg between 1955 and 1956 
and in 1958 published his famous work The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, 
and Economic Forces 1950-1957. He was the first to develop the theory that 
true political union is gradually built based on the common practice of 
technical competences (the spill-over theory).  
Another author, León Lindberg, a follower of Haas, published in 
1963 The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, in which he 
explains the neofunctionalist process, showing, however, that European 
integration is achieved primarily through the socialisation of elites and the 
involvement of interest groups5 . 
 
Federalism and historians 
The federalists’ theories on the European integration process were 
also analysed by some historians, in particular in Germany and Italy. One of 
the first historians on European integration was Walter Lipgens, a federalist 
militant and member of the Europa-Union, the German section of the Union 
of European Federalists (UEF). He was the first holder of the 
Contemporary History Chair (1976-1979) at the Florence European 
University Institute founded in 1972. The first volume of his work 
published in 1977, Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik 1945-1950 (The 
early days of European integration policy 1945-1950) analyses the period 1945-
1950: the roots of European integration since the Second World War and 
the development of the European idea within the non-communist resistance 
movements and governments in exile. He was more interest in the history of 
ideas and thoughts about the federalist movements than in 
intergovernmental negotiations or the first institutional commitments to 
European unity. 
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In a similar vein, Lipgens also published a seminal collection of 
documents on the history of European integration since the Second World 
War, a task that was later continued by his follower Wilfried Loth. The 
purpose of the publication, however, was not fully achieved. He proposed 
to publish the key discourses, statements and documents, country by 
country, of the Resistance, of the militant movements for European 
integration, commented by professional historians. He published four 
volumes - Documents on the History of European Integration (1939-1950), in 1986-
1991, in which he emphasised the visible contrast between the various 
appeals to European integration and their poor influence on the actions of 
European leaders in the aftermath of the Second World War. These 
documents nevertheless explain the Schuman Plan and the beginnings of 
sector-wide European integration. In fact, this led to a shift in the approach 
to European integration in the 1980s. 
The federalist approach is also strongly represented in Italy, where 
an influential school privileges the historians’ understanding of the 
European integration process. This school is represented by Sérgio Pistone, 
a history professor of European integration at the University of Turin and a 
member of the Movimento federalista europeo, Ariane Landuyt and Daniele 
Pasquinucci, of the University of Siena, Daniela Preda of the University of 
Genoa, Piero S. Graglia (University of Milan) and also Corrado Malandrino 
(University of Eastern Piedmont), among others.  
While the federalists produce historiographic works on the history of 
ideas, a certain number of historians base their research on archives to 
produce a discourse that emphasises the place and involvement of national 
governments in the European integration process. 
 
The “realistic” discourse of the European integration 
 
1. The first analysts of “realistic” Europe 
As a reaction to the idealism represented by the federalist school, a 
number of teachers from the English-speaking world dwelt on the 
economic explanation and on the intergovernmental motives in the history 
of the European integration process. 
The first university scholar to develop this theory is Stanley 
Hoffmann, a Political Science Professor at Harvard University. In observing 
the policy undertaken by Charles De Gaulle and the paralysis of the 
Community institutions (the “empty chair” policy), in his article entitled 
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“Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nations State and Case of Western 
Europe”, Hoffmann proves that the Nation-State was still quite influential6  
Among the historians, in the 1980s British historian Alan Milward 
suggests a “realistic” vision and goes on to explain that the creation of the 
European Communities does not stem from an ideal, but rather from the 
desire of nation-states to consolidate the bases of their legitimacy after the 
Second World War. Milward, a renowned expert in Second World War 
economic history, steered his research to the economic reconstruction of 
post-war Europe. Thus, in 1984, he publishes The Reconstruction of Western 
Europe 1945-1951, showing that the American aid under the Marshall Plan 
American economic aid was not what saved Europe from the crisis in itself. 
He further explained that from 1945 on the reconstruction of Europe was 
underway, but nevertheless recognised the importance of the financial aid 
from the United States. He strongly criticised the federalist interpretation 
and stressed that the federalist movements had no role in a process led 
mostly by national interests. In his opinion, the new economic agreements 
in Europe introduced new forms of cooperation, both ambitious and 
pragmatic, instead of far too theroretical major political peace treaties as was 
the case after the First World War. 
Milward used his later work The European Rescue of the Nation-State 
(1992) to reaffirm, giving justifiable reasons, his theory that the European 
integration is essentially an economic rather than a political process, and that 
we should therefore act on the classic diplomatic narrative of international 
relations. The author also stated that rather than weakening the Nation-
State, European integration strengthened it. In a chapter suggestively 
entitled “The lives and teaching of the European Saints”, he explains that 
the so-called “Fathers of Europe” (Spaak, Schuman, Adenauer, Gasperi, 
Monnet) acted according to national interest. According to Milward, they 
viewed European integration as the most significant means to ensure the 
safety and prosperity of their country, of their national State. In the same 
line of reasoning, the British historian Frances Lynch (France and the 
International Economy. From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome, 1997) pointed out that 
France’s commitment in the Treaty of Rome was based more on economic 
rather than political determinants. The author grounded her studies on the 
French governmental and top administration discussions held between the 
end of the Second World War and the signing of the Treaties of Rome 
(1957), and on thorough research work done in French and British archives. 
This intergovernmentalist discourse was also used by the American 
political scientist Andrew Moravcsik, a Professor at the Princeton 
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University. In his work published in 1999, The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose 
and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, the author explains why the EEC 
was a success. His theory is underpinned by two fundamental principles: on 
the one hand, that European integration is driven by the large nation-states 
that control the process; on the other hand, that the key driver of those 
states is not political but rather economic, and, more particularly, of a 
commercial nature. The author added that it is the trade relations and not 
the political, ideological or other economic relations that underlie the 
European integration process, which, in her opinion, strengthens more than 
undermines the states. 
Although important, Moravcsik’s study has some shortcomings: his 
research is mostly based on secondary sources, more on memories (of Alain 
Peryrefitte) than on archive documents. His work falls within a classic 
diplomatic narrative. In the same vein, John Gillingham, a professor at the 
University of Missouri, expert on the history of the ECSC, in his book 
European Integration, 1950-2003. Superstate or New Market Economy? (2003) 
presents his theory grounded on two key pillars: classic liberalism in 
economy and neoliberal institutionalism in political science. European 
integration is therefore associated with a clash between two economic 
models – a statist model and one more liberal model. According to 
Gillingham, market forces dominate the European integration process from 
the 80s. Although some of his ideas are appealing, the chronological study 
just scratches the surface and the methodology is not very objective, in 
other words, his work wavers between the history of ideas and the history of 
the decision-making process7 What is the importance of the French School 
of International Relations?  
 
2. The French school of international relations 
It is interesting to note that in the 1950s the history of international 
relations was deeply renewed in the French school much to the influence of 
Pierre Renouvin, who sought to overcome the classic diplomatic narrative in 
order to integrate the “deep forces” – “material forces” and “collective 
mentalities”. In the 1950s, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle studied, in the light of 
what he had learned from the American political science, the decision 
processes. That is, Duroselle was the first to conduct a historian’s reflection 
on European unity. He did it at conferences, in articles, and in books. For 
example, he co-authored an article with Pierre Gerbet on “L’unification de 
l’Europe occidentale”, in Encyclopédie Française, t. 11. His work published in 
1965, L’idée d’Europe dans l’histoire, was prefaced by Jean Monnet. In his 
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famous book L’Europe. Histoire des peuples, dated 1990, Duroselle analysed all 
the factors that gave Europe some sort of unity, giving it the prominence of 
a true centuries-old civilisation community. Duroselle’s arguments on the 
decision process gained a following in the field of international relations. 
His successor at Sorbonne, René Girault, launched an international research 
programme on the “power in Europe in three different periods: 1938, 1948, 
1956-1958”, which were, without a doubt, remarkable milestones. He also 
examined how the power of the large European states (Germany, France, 
United Kingdom, Italy) was percieved by the political, economic, military 
officials and by public opinion to better understand its decline and to 
identify what had replaced the nationalism and imperialism of the European 
nation-states. Three major colloquia were held in the 80s gathering more 
than one hundred European historians – Sèvres, in 1982, Augsbourg, in 
1984, and Florence, in 1987 –, that resulted in three publications which 
occupy a prominent position in the historiography of the European 
integration process8. 
In the 1980s, the history of European integration gradually became 
a privileged field of research of historians of international relations, focused 
mainly on the role of decision-makers, of strategists, of diplomats, 
promoting the role of the National-State and national policies in European 
integration. The works of Pierre Guillen, Raymond Poidevin, Pierre 
Mélandri, and Maurice Vaïsse are an example of this. 
However, new prospects had opened up. Gérard Bossuat associated 
economic history to a history of the decision process and published is work 
in two volumes in 1992 on La France, l’aide américaine et la construction 
européenne, 1944-1954. For the period between the two world wars, the works 
of Éric Bussière (1992) and Sylvain Schirmann (2000) also crossed economic 
history with the history of international relations, emphasising the 
importance of economic resources. Other particularly relevant works were 
produced by Pierre Gerbert, La construction d’Europe, 1983, Gérard Bossuat, 
Les fondateurs de l’Europe Unie, 1994, and Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, La construction 
européenne, 1996, re-published several times to the present day. Their 
importance in international relations is manifested in numerous historians 
on European integration, for e.g., among others, the Italian historianu 
Antonio Varsori, or, among the Germans, Wilfried Loth. All their works 
tend to demonstrate that nation-states and national decision-makers have a 
great deal of latitude in the complex game of international relations and of 
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the forces that shape them. This holds true for historian Georges-Henri 
Soutou who, inspired by the work of the American historian Paul W. 
Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, published in 
1994, problematised the “European order” in the context of extensive 
research following the Vienna Congress. “European order” as being 
characterised by a mechanical balance of powers, but also by legal and 
diplomatic structures, and by a Community of values. Soutou referred to the 
originality of forms of cooperation between European states that developed 
before the formal process of European integration9  
 
3. The Europe of the historians of European integration 
In response to the historians who analysed, at local level, the history 
of their own countries, some university historians sought to interconnect 
their analyses and views, which enabled them to form lasting personal ties 
and, moreover, made it easier to set up institutionalised networks from 1982 
on. This was the case of the Group of Contemporary History Teachers, 
encouraged by the Commission of the European Communities, which was 
formed after a major Colloquium organised by the Commission in 
Luxembourg. Its purpose was to encourage historical research on European 
integration. This network published a trilingual journal – in French, English 
and German – entitled Revue d’histoire de l’intégration Européenne, and has 
organised regular conferences for the advancement of historical research on 
the history of European integration, presenting some innovative approaches 
(vol. 33, n. 4, 2011). 
This advancement is also explained by the opening of several 
archives. The findings of this research have been disclosed in several and 
extensive works. 
 
4. Between the federalist school and the intergovernmental 
school 
A new and ambitious school appeared between the 
intergovernmental school, which stressed the importance of member States, 
and the federalist school, mainly interested in Community dynamics. The 
aim of this new school was to interconnect the archive sources from the 
various member countries with those of European institutions. Hans Jürgen 
Küsters, Raymond Poidevin, Dirk Spierenburg and Piers Ludlow presented 
pioneering studies, and several doctoral theses were prepared at the 
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construir l’Europe au XX e siècle, Paris, Ed. Belin, 2006, p. 10-11, 16, 18-20. Sylvain 
Schirmann (et al.), Penser et construire l’Europe (1919- 1992). Etats et opinions face à la 
construction européenne, Paris, Editions Sedes, 2007, p. 7-11.  
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European Institute in Florence. In 1982, Hans Yürgen Küsters published 
his work Les Fondements de la Communauté économique Européenne, republished in 
1990, which is a systematic historical study in which he outlined the entire 
negotiation and ratification of the Treaty of Rome in a multilateral 
approach, based mostly on private archive collections and interviews, 
without, however, having had access to the archives of the governments of 
the six EEC member countries. 
Based on the ECSC archive, Raymond Poidevin and Dirk 
Spierenburg, a Dutch diplomat and former member of the ECSC High 
Authority, wrote a seminal work on the Paris negotiations (1950) to the 
merging of the Communities (1967), Histoire de la Haute Autorité de la CECA, 
1993. 
As the result of an European research programme and in response 
to a call from the European Commission, Michel Dumoulin (University of 
Louvain-la-Neuve) coordinated the production of a volume that describes 
the history of this institution since its early days, based on the evidence 
given by 120 protagonists of that time and on numerous written sources. 
Collective work entitled La Commission européenne (1958-1972). Histoire et 
mémoires d’une institution, 2007. 
One of the key EEC common policies, the Common Agricultural 
Policy, was the subject of a doctoral thesis produced by the Danish Ann-
Christina Knudsen, presented to the European Institute in Florence, 
supervised by Alan Milward. The Danish author conducted her research 
based on the archives of the EEC member countries and those of the 
European Commission, providing us a picture of the intergovernmental 
negotiations and of the mobilisation ability of the then European 
Commissioner for Agriculture, Sicco Mansholt, in her work Defining the 
Common Agricultural Policy. A Historical Study, 2003.  
A comparative study based on documents issued by the EEC and 
various other European countries, by Piers Ludlow, The European Community 
and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist challenge, 2005, served to show 
that the States continued to play a central role, even though their opinions 
were limited by Community rules. 
 
5. The transnational approach  
To tackle an approach more focused on government and national 
administrations, many studies were carried out to analyse the various non-
state resources, but which were also aimed at European unity. 
Thus, Laurence Badel emphasised (1999) the connection between 
French trade and free-market practices. Françoise Buger (2000) showed us 
how the French and German steel industries resumed their negotiations 
after 1945 and promoted European cooperation projects, rejecting the 
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ECSC’s technocratic intervention. Marine Moguen (2002) studied the 
commonalities and differences between the French and German unions. In 
2005, Francesco Petrini analysed the Italian General Confederation of 
Industry. 
Note also the relevance of the seminar organised by the Comité 
pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France du ministère de 
l’Économie et des Finances on Milieux économiques et intégration européenne au 
xxe siècle (2001-2004), attended by several researchers and directed by Éric 
Bussière, Michel Dumoulin and Sylvain Schirmann. One of the various 
collective publications that ensued was Milieux économiques et intégration 
européenne au xxe siècle. La relance des années quatre-vingt (1979-1992). The aim of 
these publications was to show how the various economic media, 
companies, employer associations, trade unions, etc., according to a national 
and transnational perspective, identified the different European economic 
models, the confrontation of which lies at the core of the dynamics of the 
European integration since its inception. These analyses and studies allow us 
to assess the existing opposition in the early stages of the European 
integration process between a free-market European model and the desire 
to create more contract-based and more organised forms of European 
cooperation10  
In the political sphere, studies are characterised by having a 
transnational approach. We have, therefore, used comparative studies to 
analyse international cooperation, for e.g., those that deal with the relevance 
of Christian Democracy in Europe. Kaiser, for example, discussed in depth 
the weight of transnational networks, that is, of organised groups having a 
European vision in different countries. 
This transnational analysis is expressed in the works and networks 
of intellectual circles. Note, for example, the case of historians Andrée 
Bachoud, Josefina Cuesta, Michel Trebitsch (2000), but also the religious 
circles (Philippe Chaunu, 2007). 
Studies on senior officials, on administrative cultures and their 
European views have also been systematically analysed (Laurence Babel, S. 
Jeanesson, P. Ludlow, 2005). The military are also the topic of discussion, 
for example in the article by P. Vial et D’Abzac-Épezy, “Quelle Europe 
pour les militaires? La perception de l’Europe à travers la presse militaire 
(1947-1954)”, Revue Historique des Armées, 1993. 
In fact, pro-European militancy projects also appeared and were the 
subject of recent research work. They bring fresh ideas to our knowledge, in 
particular in respect of the period between the two world wars, as shown in 
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the works of the following authors: Anne-Marie Saint Gille on Paneurope, 
Geneviève Duchenne on Belgian Europeanism between the two world wars, 
Christophe Le Dréau on the pro-European movements in Great Britain, 
Claus Corneliussen on Heerfordt, Véronika Heyde on the resistance 
movements and the European concept, and Bernard Vayssière on the 
Union of European Federalists, among others. 
 
Public opinion, identities and public space 
Like the constructivist approach developed by political science and 
as in the theory of international relations, many historians problematised the 
issue of European integration based on “collective subjectivities and 
identities”. From this point of view, an international research programme on 
“identité et conscience européennes au xxe siècle” was enforced between 
1989 and 1995, first at the instigation of René Girault, and then of Robert 
Frank. Both historians questioned the European image and the frailness of 
the “European feeling”. They created a vast network formed by dozens of 
researchers (180) who analysed comparative themes at transnational level. 
Among their findings, they show that the old and century-old European 
cultural identity does not automatically result in the European integration. 
In fact, it is the trauma resulting from the 20th century disasters that have 
helped shape a “European awareness”, that is, the need for the unity of 
Europe. The latter was vital in early efforts, but did not automatically 
transform into a new contemporary political identity. The feeling of 
belonging to the Community/European Union is very fragmented. It is 
worth emphasising the continuing national feelings. In this respect, we note 
the publications of René Girault and Gérard Bossuat, Les Europes des 
Européens, 1993; René Girault, Identité et conscience européennes au xxe 
siècle, 1994, Robert Frank, Les identités européennes au xxe siècle, 2000.  
Historians have given particular attention to public opinion. 
Opinion surveys exist for the early days of the Community, but this 
assessment instrument only became a relevant source from the 1970s on – 
the Eurobarometer surveys. We can mention the studies by Christine 
Manigaud and A. Dulphy (2002). The same goes for the reflections of some 
historians, such as Robert Frank, Hartmut Kaelble, among others, on the 
reality and modalities of a European public space, i.e., a common space of 
references and public debates. While from this point of view culture is an 
important element, the experiences relate mostly to the elites. Even if the 
European public space should be regarded differently in relation to the 
national public spaces, historians reflect on the emergence of common 
spaces of reference for Europeans – the memory of war, European places 
of remembrance, common heroes of united Europe, European symbols. 
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In conclusion, even though the history of Europe – Europe 
integration – is relatively young, especially due to the belated access to 
archive, its production is nevertheless abundant, its approaches are 
numerous, and its written production is multinational and is constantly 
being renewed. 
As we make this brief historiographic inventory of Times, Spaces and 
Actors, we note that historiography, strongly dominated by the 1945 
cleavages, has to be classified according to major chronological periods: 
between the two world wars, during the Second World War, and the period 
from 1945 to 1992.  
We conclude that the various historiographic trends and the wealth 
of historical production raised by the study of projects, of the European 
unity processes in the 20th century and of its actors have enabled us to 
confirm that far from being a linear process, the European integration 
process should be understood as unique changeovers between success and 
failure, of recoveries and of crises. It is an immensely rich and complex 
history filled with different ideas, times, spaces, actors and forms that have 
converged or clashed throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. 
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De la nature de la crise occidentale. Une crise de 
transition de la monarchie élective au système 
représentatif 
 
 
 
George CONTOGEORGIS* 
 
 
La crise actuelle. Une crise de transition à une phase nouvelle  
Les dernières décennies du XXe siècle ont marqué l’achèvement, pour 
l’Occident, de la transition du despotisme à l'anthropocentrisme (les sociétés en 
liberté). Deuxième chose, tout aussi importante : l'expansion des paramètres 
anthropocentriques sur l’ensemble de la planète. Désormais, les sociétés de ce 
que l’on appelle le «tiers monde» sont à leur tour sorties, pour l’essentiel, du 
despotisme et participent donc au devenir anthropocentrique. À une différence 
près : alors que l’Occident est arrivé au terme de cette première phase et crée les 
conditions de son installation dans la nouvelle période, la phase suivante, le reste 
de la planète vit à peine son entrée dans la première phase des sociétés en 
liberté.  
Il s’est passé dans le monde, depuis les années quatre-vingt, un 
changement d’importance cosmohistorique : l’économie monétaire et la 
communication, deux des facteurs clés qui façonnent la vie des gens, ont 
imposé leur autonomie face aux frontières et au pouvoir de l’État. L’économie 
monétaire a étendu son rayonnement à l’ensemble de la planète ; la 
communication fait que ce qui se passe dans un pays se sait dans le monde 
entier. 
À l’inverse, la société (en tant que catégorie politique) et l’État (en 
tant que système politique) sont demeurés hermétiquement fermés et 
pensent leur fonctionnement en termes du XVIIIe siècle. 
Cela veut dire que la crise actuelle n’a rien à voir avec les crises 
antérieures (économiques ou politiques). Les crises antérieures, depuis le 
XVIIIe siècle jusqu’aux années quatre-vingt du XXe siècle, étaient 
essentiellement des crises de transition de la féodalité à la société proto-
anthropocentrique. En d’autres termes, elles traduisaient la lutte que menait 
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l’homme social pour se libérer en tant qu’entité individuelle et acquérir 
certains droits sociaux et politiques.  
En réalité, pourtant, tant le système économique que le système 
politique continuent à reproduire l’ancien régime : ils appartiennent, en 
termes de propriété, à un tiers, un acteur qui se situe au-delà de la société 
des citoyens. La rencontre entre la société du travail et la société des 
citoyens, d’une part, et les systèmes de l’économie et de la politique, de 
l’autre, se faisait et continue à se faire d’une manière extra-institutionnelle : 
dans la rue, par des grèves ou des manifestations. 
Néanmoins, le fait que l'essentiel de la vie économique, 
communicationnelle, sociale et politique ait lieu à l'intérieur de l'État, c'est-à-
dire dans le cadre du système politique, a permis l'établissement d'un certain 
équilibre et, au-delà, des compromis entre les acteurs de la dynamique socio-
économique qui a mené à l'État de droit et à l'État providence. 
Le véhicule, pour ces évolutions sur l'ensemble de la planète, s’avère 
être la technologie, dans l’économie et la communication. Dans l’espace du 
tiers monde, elle désagrège les bases de l’ancien régime et crée des liens 
organiques cohérents avec l’Occident, qui mène les opérations, dans une 
relation de centre à périphérie. L’une des manifestations significatives de 
cette relation est le phénomène de migration économique (et politique), qui 
donne à penser qu’on cherche dorénavant à résoudre le problème social (et 
politique) de la périphérie en le transférant au centre, en Occident. Une 
autre évolution, non moins intéressante, est la modification galopante du 
concept et du contenu du travail par le biais de l’innovation technologique, 
qui change complètement la logique même de la relation entre économie et 
société. 
Dans le monde occidental, ces changements aboutissent à un 
bouleversement radical des valeurs et des rapports de force et, à présent, à 
une rupture de l’équilibre entre société, État/système et économie, au profit 
de la domination universelle de cette dernière. Cette rupture est aussi 
marquée, au sein de l’économie, par un bouleversement essentiel en faveur 
des forces du capital financier et marchand. Le trait propre de ces forces, 
conventionnellement appelées «marchés», est qu’elles provoquent une 
redistribution interne en accumulant, en Occident en l’occurrence, où elles 
ont leur siège, chez un cercle restreint d’individus la richesse créée par 
l’économie productive. Cependant, la base productive de l’économie 
occidentale s’est déplacée dorénavant vers les pays du «tiers monde» et, à 
l'heure actuelle, en Chine. Ainsi se fait-il que les emplois, qui relèvent du 
processus classique de production, sont créés dans le «tiers monde», tandis 
que la richesse se déplace en Occident, et avec elle le problème social (et 
politique) du «tiers monde».  
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Cette richesse, précisément, produit en Occident une force politique 
énorme, sans toutefois créer d’emplois en proportion. En tout état de cause, 
le monde du travail en Occident n’a plus rien à voir avec celui de la période 
antérieure à la Guerre froide.  
 
L’économie et la communication comme paramètres du 
cosmos planétaire, émancipés des États 
Cette répartition au sein de l’économie, le développement 
cosmosystémique/planétaire de celle-ci et la mobilité horizontale 
(interétatique) du travail sont la première cause de la faiblesse politique à 
laquelle a été réduite la société des citoyens.  
L’une des manifestations de ce bouleversement est la 
déstructuration complète à laquelle nous assistons de nos jours, de la 
relation entre travail et propriété (du système) – l’illustration la plus visible 
en étant la mutation du travail, qui était une relation de droit public et devient 
un travail marchandise – et l’orientation sans équivoque du but de la politique 
vers l’intérêt des marchés.  
Cependant, si l’on jette un regard plus circonstancié sur les faits, on 
s’aperçoit que les marchés ne tirent pas d’eux-mêmes leur force démesurée : 
celle-ci dérive du fait que, d’un côté, les paramètres de l’économie et de la 
communication sont passés dans le futur, se situent à un niveau 
cosmosystémiquement planétaire, tandis que, de l’autre côté, société et État 
demeurent, comme il a été dit, hermétiquement enfermés dans le passé, au 
siècle des Lumières essentiellement.  
La relation entre société et politique instaurée au départ aux XVIIIe-
XIXe siècles, quelles que soient les acrobaties conceptuelles qui l’entourent, 
est d’une texture extra-institutionnelle. La société des citoyens est inexistante 
comme concept, la société civile occupant sa place de catégorie politique extra-
institutionnelle. Cela explique que la société des citoyens ne participe pas au 
processus de prise de décisions et il est explicite que son intérêt ne fait pas 
partie du but de la politique.  
De même, la société des citoyens ne cherche pas à prendre en charge 
elle-même la gestion de ses intérêts comme elle le fait pour les questions qui 
concernent sa vie personnelle directe, et elle ne cherche pas à établir une 
relation institutionnelle avec les agents du pouvoir politique (et 
économique). C’est ainsi que la fonction politique a été prise en charge par 
des intermédiaires autoproclamés (les forces de la société civile ou les forces 
politiques) qui ont brigué leur légitimation en brandissant la promesse 
d’intervenir dans le pouvoir politique ou d’assumer la gestion de celui-ci 
dans le but de défendre les intérêts de la société. 
Pour la société postféodale, le fait d’avoir pu accéder à l’espace privé 
(la liberté individuelle) et que le système politique ait pu être cédé à des tiers 
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intermédiaires qu’elle pourrait légitimer au pouvoir a été considéré, par 
rapport au passé, comme un énorme progrès... D’ailleurs, ses priorités, mais 
aussi son expérience politique, prédisposaient à l’existence d’un système de 
valeurs qui ne contesterait pas le fait que le système économique et politique 
fasse l’objet d’une propriété de la part d'un tiers. N’oublions pas que les 
luttes du XXe siècle ont eu lieu sous le signe de l’appartenance du système à 
la propriété privée ou à l’État. Dans les deux idéologies, la société était 
située hors du système économique et politique.  
Cela signifie que la liberté sociale et politique ne fait pas partie des 
valeurs de notre temps. Ainsi, après que les pays européens ont introduit le 
suffrage universel à la veille de la Première Guerre mondiale, l’Allemagne, 
qui était la société la plus attardée d’Europe, lestée de nombreux fardeaux 
autoritaires, qui ont leur référence dans le culte de l'État, a cédé de manière 
totalitaire l’ensemble du pouvoir politique à Hitler.  
La crise de 1929 n’a pas été la cause de l’avènement d’Hitler et du 
nazisme. Elle a été l’occasion qui a permis à la société, simple masse politique 
qui ne constituait pas une catégorie politique, de porter Hitler au pouvoir. 
La même chose s’est produite en Russie. On ne se rend pas compte que du 
point de vue formel, le système politique dit représentatif/démocratique et 
celui du fascisme/nazisme sont de la même nature. Il est incarné totalement 
par l'État, la société étant cantonnée dans le secteur privé. 
Il s'ensuit donc que le rétablissement de l'équilibre entre le social et 
l'économique, dans le nouvel environnement créé par le développement 
cosmosystémique de l’économie et de la communication, ne peut se produire 
par le biais de l'ancien système politique. Aucun des intermédiaires politiques 
n’a de raisons de prendre en compte la société, puisqu’ils tirent leur 
légitimation exclusivement des appareils et des rapports de force qu’ils tissent 
autour de l’État. Le coût politique est lié aux réactions de ces forces, et la cohésion 
sociale ne se mesure plus en prenant pour critère la société des citoyens, mais 
ses résistances et ses tolérances face aux politiques de déconstruction qui la 
relèguent en marge.  
En somme, la puissance des marchés résulte de leur développement 
planétaire, mais elle est due au fait que le système politique et, par voie de 
conséquence, la relation entre société et politique sont demeurés inchangés.  
Le pire, c’est que cette relation est considérée comme une réalité 
non sujette à évolution. Je pense que cette approche du régime politique est 
anhistorique et, de toute façon, profondément conservatrice. 
Si nous envisageons le système politique actuel comme la phase 
primaire de la transition anthropocentrique – ce qu’elle est effectivement –, 
nous conviendrons que les marchés sont devenus tout-puissants et ont 
totalement pris en otage la classe politique parce que la volonté de la société 
est absente de ce système. 
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Une transition menée par l’avant-garde occidentale 
Nous allons revenir à cette question plus loin. Pour l’instant, il 
convient de se demander comment ce contexte général se concrétise au sein 
de l’Union européenne. 
Il est bien connu que l’Europe politique a été fondée sur une sorte 
d’entente cordiale, de gentlemen agreement qui cherchait des consensus, sinon 
l’unanimité dans la prise de décisions. Dans ce même cadre, on n’a pas 
considéré que l’axe franco-allemand était nuisible, parce qu’il constituait une 
sorte de primus inter pares qui, de plus, favorisait la création des équilibres 
politiques. 
C’est précisément ce système de fait qui a permis, d’une part, la 
montée de l’Europe politique et, d’autre part, son attractivité parmi les pays 
du continent et dans le monde. 
Depuis la crise grecque, qui symbolise l’entrée de l’Europe dans ce 
que j’ai défini, tout à l’heure, comme crise occidentale, on assiste à un 
renversement pur et simple du système européen. Les instances 
européennes ne servent plus que pour ratifier, en dernière analyse, la volonté 
allemande. 
L’axe franco-allemand semble être, lui aussi, en panne. La France se 
prépare, semble-t-il, à jouer un rôle semblable à celui de la période d'entre 
les deux guerres.  
Le passage d’une Europe de synergies et de consensus à une Europe à 
hégémonie allemande a été l’effet d’une stratégie de longue date dont les étapes 
récentes sont : la réunification du pays, le démantèlement de la Yougoslavie, 
l’élargissement brutal vers l’est et essentiellement l’euro. 
Cette volonté de puissance allemande s’est exprimée sans 
périphrases à l’entrée de la crise. L’occasion a été offerte par la Grèce, qui a 
servi de maillon faible pour plusieurs raisons. 
Pour mettre en lumière la gestion de la crise grecque par 
l’Allemagne, il est important de décrypter la stratégie qu’elle a déployée pour 
s’emparer du pouvoir européen. 
Je retiens: a) que la stratégie allemande vise, au-delà de l’Europe, le 
cadre occidental, voire international. L’Allemagne sait plus que tout autre, à 
mon avis, que son ambition internationale passe directement par l’Europe 
politique; b) étant donné que les armes ne peuvent plus servir sa cause et 
que la géopolitique est entre les mains des États-Unis, elle a choisi 
l’économie. Elle entend imposer l’institutionnalisation de la logique et de 
l’intérêt des marchés comme finalité de l’Europe politique. 
Il est évident que ce qui manque dans cette approche de la crise, 
c’est les sociétés. Il ne s’agit pas de sous-estimer la question de la dette ou la 
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concurrence mondiale, mais de mettre en lumière l’enjeu qui se cache 
derrière cette option et au-delà de la stratégie adoptée pour envisager la 
crise.  
Certains disent que c’est dans la mentalité allemande de placer la 
raison d’État au-dessus de l’intérêt de la société. Et qu’en vertu de cette 
approche, la plus grande économie européenne a déjà opté pour la dite 
« dévaluation » du niveau de vie des Allemands avant de l’imposer à l’Europe. 
Pourtant, dans le cas de l'Allemagne, cette politique visait à l'accumulation 
dans le grand secteur économique et, au fond, au renforcement de l'État 
allemand. Dans les autres pays de l’Union, cette « dévaluation » porte atteinte, 
en dehors du niveau de vie des citoyens et de l’État providence, à leur 
infrastructure économique et à l'indépendance de l'État. Tout montre que 
l’Allemagne cherche à créer des cercles concentriques à l’intérieur de la zone 
euro, avec à la tête le noyau dur, ses anciens alliés du Nord. Il ne s’agit pas de 
faire sortir la Grèce, par exemple, de l’euro, car elle perdra la passerelle de ses 
ambitions vers la Méditerranée orientale et le Moyen Orient. La Turquie n’est 
plus comme autrefois un allié sûr, elle est un concurrent potentiel pour ses 
intérêts. La Grèce, pour jouer ce rôle, doit être mise à genou. Y compris 
Chypre. En outre, si le laboratoire grec réussit, la formule sera valable pour la 
dite « périphérie » de la zone euro. 
De ce point de vue, il est intéressant d'esquisser en quelques lignes 
l’approche de la crise grecque par l’Allemagne et ses alliés. 
Au niveau économique d’abord : en projetant la dévaluation interne 
comme remède à la crise grecque, on l'a considérée comme étant l'égale de 
la dévaluation d’une monnaie nationale. Même si l’on oublie un instant que le but 
poursuivi est de servir l’intérêt des marchés, la dévaluation de la monnaie 
nationale améliore, sous certaines conditions, la compétitivité de 
l’économie ; la « dévaluation interne » marque une intervention violente et 
déstructurante au niveau de la base productive de l’économie elle-même, ce 
qui hypothèque la consommation et l’État providence. 
Dans le cas de la Grèce, c’est la « dévaluation interne » qui a été 
choisie pour faire face, nous l’avons dit, à la crise de la dette. Mais ainsi, elle 
a rendu la dette ingérable et a inévitablement imposé son « effacement 
partiel ». La « dévaluation interne » a porté un coup fatal au tissu productif 
de l’économie et a en fait entraîné la faillite du pays. Faut-il alors penser que 
seule sa « sinisation » fera que la société grecque cessera de vivre au-dessus 
de ses moyens ? D’un autre côté, les gouvernants n’ont toujours pas 
expliqué pourquoi la dette n’était pas gérable quand elle était égale à 120% 
du PIB au début de la crise et qu’elle le sera avec le même pourcentage en 
2020, c’est-à-dire une fois que la société grecque sera exsangue. Surtout que, 
dans le premier cas, les créanciers n’auraient pas eu à subir le fameux 
« effacement partiel ».  
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On entend dire également que la désagrégation de l’économie et la 
paupérisation forcée de la société amélioreront la compétitivité puisque la 
dévalorisation du marché du travail et de la richesse privée et publique 
éveillera l’intérêt des investisseurs et relancera l’économie. Indépendamment 
de ce que l’on peut penser de cette option, on convient que l’argument qui 
prétend que les Grecs vivaient au-dessus de leurs moyens était mensonger : 
il a servi de prétexte à l’objectif véritable du mémorandum, qui n’est 
manifestement pas de faire face au vrai problème de l’économie grecque, à 
savoir la dette, mais d’utiliser le pays comme cobaye dans la promotion du 
nouvel ordre européen. Sinon, la troïka n’aurait pas eu recours à 
l’effacement partiel. En tout état de cause, cette option renvoie au dogme 
des marchés selon lequel l’intérêt de ces derniers prime celui des sociétés ou, 
dans le meilleur des cas, l’intérêt de la société s’identifie par définition à celui 
des marchés. 
Cependant, dans le cas de la Grèce, le problème est que, de la sorte, 
la dimension politique de la crise est contournée. En effet, la crise grecque a pour 
cause première la transmutation partitocratique du système politique, 
l’appropriation et, au-delà, le pillage de l’État. Il n’est pas lieu d’expliquer ici 
la spécificité grecque. Contentons-nous de noter que, malgré tout ce qui se 
dit, ce phénomène est révélateur du déficit démocratique de la modernité et 
non du retard politique de la société grecque. De ce point de vue, la Grèce 
est ce qu’elle a été dans le passé, même moderne, à savoir le laboratoire qui 
indique la voie d'évolution des pays occidentaux. 
Dans ce cadre en tout cas, le mémorandum, prévu au départ 
comme un programme de sortie de la crise, est devenu une autre cause 
essentielle de l’impasse grecque. Et même, dans la mesure où il a choisi de 
transférer de manière univoque la charge de ses choix à la société sans 
s’attaquer à l’État, la société en déduira que la classe politique grecque sert 
de « véhicule » à l’instauration dans le pays de son propre despotisme, à côté 
de celui de la partitocratie grecque. En confondant la société grecque avec 
l’État, la troïka a perdu l’avantage de la légitimité. Ce n’est pas un hasard si la 
troïka, alors qu’elle va jusqu’à s’occuper en détail de l’imposition des 
chômeurs, n’a pas effleuré un seul instant les privilèges de la classe politique, 
les fondements de l’État dynastique ni, par extension, la fraude fiscale. 
Plus intéressant apparaît le côté politique et culturel de l’approche 
des pays en crise, et essentiellement de la Grèce, par le Nord. Les Grecs 
sont classés comme une catégorie raciale composée de voleurs, de menteurs, 
de paresseux, de corrompus, etc. Je ne reviendrai pas sur ce que j'ai décrit 
comme étant la cause première de la crise en Grèce, qui révèle la nature 
anthropocentriquement « tiers-mondiste » du système politique occidental, 
comparé au développement politique de la société grecque : pourquoi 
l'Allemagne n'a pas touché à la corruption et aux privilèges de la classe 
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politique grecque et a mis à l'abri de toute responsabilité les entreprises 
allemandes et leur personnel en Grèce.  
La crise actuelle a révélé une différenciation fondamentale entre le 
Nord et le Sud de l'Europe. L'Europe germanique n'a pas participé au 
devenir anthropocentrique vanté par la civilisation gréco-romaine. Le 
passage de l'Europe occidentale au féodalisme et les ravages causés par les 
hordes allemandes dans l'aire du cosmos anthropocentrique grec de l'époque 
s'inscrivent dans la lignée directe de cette division contemporaine. 
L'Allemagne a provoqué deux guerres mondiales pour établir son 
hégémonie en Europe. Si l'Allemagne avait le sens de la liberté de la société, 
elle aurait aussi conscience des limites de la puissance. Et l'Europe aurait été 
depuis longtemps allemande.  
Si l'histoire de l'Allemagne est vivante aujourd'hui chez les peuples 
européens, c'est parce que c'est l'Allemagne qui la rappelle. En deux mots, 
l'Allemagne n'a pas encore réglé ses comptes avec l'acquis de la civilisation 
européenne. 
Je cite un détail modeste mais néanmoins particulièrement 
significatif : pendant l’Occupation, l’Allemagne n’a pas seulement causé la 
perte de 30% de la population grecque pour servir d’exemples aux autres 
parce qu’elle rencontrait dans le pays la résistance la plus forte ! Elle a volé 
l’or grec de la Banque centrale et elle a pillé la société grecque en imposant, 
entre autres, un prêt obligatoire. Depuis, elle refuse de respecter son 
obligation de restituer le produit de ce pillage à la Grèce. Et il s’agit de 
centaines de milliards d’euros. En outre, elle refuse d’indemniser les victimes 
de ses actes de génocide. Cette attitude comporte un symbolisme de haut 
niveau, dans la mesure où la gestion de la crise actuelle va dans le même 
sens : on prête à la Grèce avec un taux élevé grâce à l’argent commun de la 
BCE, à laquelle on paye moins. 
Si j’ai évoqué ces tristes questions, c’est parce qu’il existe une 
constante dans la culture politique européenne allemande, qui revient 
maintenant à l’occasion de la crise. Une mentalité qu’on avait cru pouvoir 
laisser derrière grâce à l’Union.  
La violence, suivie d’une propagande légitimatrice sans égale, 
exercée sur la Grèce a fait revivre dans l’imaginaire de cette société, et plus 
ou moins dans l’ensemble des pays du Sud, la barbarie de l’Occupation, 
voire l’histoire. Il n’est pas sans intérêt de dire que le choix de la Grèce, à 
l'heure actuelle, comme laboratoire, acquiert une valeur symbolique 
supplémentaire, car c’est la Grèce qui, par sa résistance, a changé le cours de 
la guerre et doté d’espoir l’Europe démocratique des années quarante. 
Quoi qu’il en soit, l’accent mis sur l’intérêt des marchés et non sur 
celui des sociétés révèle que chez une partie des Européens du Nord, ce 
n’est pas la société qui est considérée comme la raison d’être de l’État et des 
In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga 
 
91 
marchés, mais l’inverse. Il est évident que cette partie de l’Europe n’a pas 
encore réglé ses comptes avec le progrès anthropocentrique. 
La question qui revient est donc celle-ci : est-il possible qu’une 
Europe des peuples fasse prévaloir sa volonté sur une Europe des marchés 
qui sert les tentations hégémoniques de certains pays ? Une Europe fondée 
sur la liberté et prospère, sur une Europe régie par des considérations de 
force ? 
Car, en dernière analyse, le problème de l'approfondissement de 
l'Europe politique ne sera pas résolu sans qu’il soit répondu à la question de 
la nature de son système politique et de sa finalité. La réponse à cette 
question dépend à la limite, d'une part, de la volonté des peuples européens 
de montrer les limites de l'Allemagne sans risquer d’aboutir à la fin de 
l’Europe politique ; et d'autre part, des évolutions au sein de l'Occident et au 
niveau de la planète. 
 
La rupture de l’équilibre entre société et économie. L’économie 
ayant passée dans le futur, la société reste enfermée au 18ème 
siècle 
Si nous adoptons ce raisonnement et que nous sommes donc 
d’accord que la crise qui régit l'Occident est avant tout politique, nous 
devons y faire face en termes politiques. Je ne veux pas dire, évidemment, 
que nous devons stopper l’évolution et revenir à l’ancien type d’État – le dit 
État souverain – ou privilégier la déontologie en dressant un code de 
conduite des détenteurs du pouvoir face à la société. Le retour à l'ancien 
régime conduirait à la disparition de la perspective anthropocentrique des 
sociétés. Et la déontologie a cours là où les sociétés sont rejetées du système 
politique, auquel cas le leader n’est pas soumis à contrôle et encore moins à 
des restrictions dans l’exercice du pouvoir. 
Par conséquent, la solution ne peut venir que de réglementations 
qui modifieront les rapports de force politiques de sorte que l’État et, par 
extension, la société passent au futur.  
Dans la phase que traverse actuellement le cosmos 
anthropocentrique, il est exclu de rechercher des solutions au niveau 
cosmosystémique / planétaire en constituant, par exemple, un cosmoÉtat 
(cosmopolis). D’ailleurs, la question n’est pas de créer un État de plus qui 
incarnera le système politique, mais un nouveau système politique qui 
remodèlera la relation entre société et politique afin de mettre fin à la prise 
en otage de cette dernière par les forces du marché.  
Il nous faudra garder à l’esprit qu’il existe dans les sociétés 
anthropocentriques une « relation » inéluctable : plus les marchés 
s’autonomisent et se développent au niveau cosmosystémique / planétaire, 
plus les sociétés tenteront de contrôler le système politique afin d’équilibrer 
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la force de ces marchés. Cela ne peut se faire, dans les conditions actuelles, 
qu’à l’intérieur de l’État. Et dans ce cadre, il est tout aussi clair que la 
relation entre société et politique ne peut pas changer au sein de l'État actuel 
sans qu’il soit porté atteinte aux fondements du système politique moderne. 
Par conséquent, pour dépasser la crise, il ne suffit pas de réviser la 
Constitution, de régler de manière différente les pouvoirs entre le président 
et la Chambre des députés ou le gouvernement. Ce sont là des détails qui 
concernent la structure interne, la forme du pouvoir qu’incarne l’État. 
Premièrement, nous devons être conscients de ce qu’est et de ce 
que n’est pas le présent système. Malgré les mensonges que dispense 
l’enseignement de l’intelligentsia oligarchique, le système politique de notre 
époque est typiquement oligarchique, avec à sa tête une monarchie élective à 
temps limité. Il n’est ni représentatif, ni démocratique. Cette prise de 
conscience est la condition sine qua non pour que nous cessions d’être 
enfermés dans le passé, prisonniers d’une logique tordue et, surtout, 
conservatrice et sans issue. Logique qui traverse l'ensemble des idéologies et 
des forces politiques, depuis le libéralisme jusqu'au socialisme. Nous libérer 
des certitudes que nous ont servies les élites modernes dès l’époque des 
Lumières en Europe est une condition fondamentale pour passer au futur.  
Je dois dire que la guerre des concepts est implacable, parce qu’elle 
présuppose une catharsis intérieure, la constitution d’un nouveau système de 
valeurs. Ce débarras est nécessaire pour réfléchir à la cause de la crise. Pour 
comprendre où va le monde. Pour apercevoir la sortie et savoir ce que nous 
devons faire. 
Plus vite nous nous libérerons des servitudes d’un passé devenu 
conservateur, plus les conséquences négatives seront réduites pour la 
société. Si nous ne le faisons pas nous-mêmes, la nécessité nous l’imposera : 
la descente des sociétés vers l’Enfer.  
La conscience que nous ne vivons pas dans un régime de 
démocratie, ni même de représentation, que le système contemporain est 
authentiquement oligarchique, avec une instance de monarchie élective à sa 
tête, n’a donc pas une valeur théorique, cela ne fait pas partie d’un exercice 
intellectuel. C’est la condition nécessaire à l’élaboration d’un projet nouveau 
qui nous sortira de la crise et nous conduira vers l’avenir. 
J’ajoute également que le fait de préciser en nous-mêmes ce qu’est la 
démocratie, que c’est quelque chose de tout à fait différent de la 
représentation, ou que le temps d’un système politique ne dépend pas de 
notre imagination mais de notre stade de maturité, nous permettra de ne pas 
répéter les sottises qui circulent partout concernant lesdites « démocratie 
directe », démocratie « représentative » ou « participative », etc.  
Pour arriver à la démocratie, nous devons passer par un stade 
transitoire, qui est la représentation. 
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La représentation transforme la société en institution partielle du 
système politique, elle reconstitue le lien entre société et politique, vu 
comme un pont obligatoire vers la démocratie. Mais ce n’est pas la 
démocratie. 
Même si cela ne plaît pas aux fervents partisans de l’oligarchie, des 
institutions comme le référendum ne sont pas démocratiques, ni même 
représentatives. De même, le choix de certaines institutions à titre tout à fait 
complémentaire, comme le tirage au sort ou le principe majoritaire, ne 
définissent pas la démocratie. Nous pouvons les rencontrer dans d’autres 
systèmes.  
La démocratie n’est pas une fin en soi, ni un système de 
gouvernance. Elle est le système destiné à réaliser une finalité concrète : la 
liberté globale (individuelle, sociale, politique), contrairement au système 
actuel qui garantit uniquement la liberté individuelle et certains droits socio-
politiques.  
 
Le passage au système politique représentatif comme 
condition pour le transfert de la société dans le futur 
Le passage au futur, celui qui changera les choses, exige que la 
société soit institutionnalisée en une constante stable, quotidienne du 
système politique – et non pas occasionnelle, au gré de la conjoncture, 
comme le sont exactement la Chambre des députés et le gouvernement. La 
constitution politique de la société des citoyens s'appelle « démos ». 
La question suivante est de savoir quelles compétences seront 
attribuées à la société/démos. Bien évidemment, certaines de celles qui vont 
de pair avec la qualité de mandant. Quelles peuvent être ces compétences ? 
La définition du cadre politique général dans lequel se situera le pouvoir 
politique, le contrôle, la responsabilité (pénale et civile) de ses agents, le 
retrait des décisions et la révocation du personnel politique qui s’écartent de 
la volonté de la société des citoyens, etc. 
Ce système, nous pourrions le qualifier de représentatif. Cependant, 
il est manifeste que l’entrée de la société dans la politéia sous le signe de la 
représentation modifiera aussi complètement l’agenda du dialogue, et donc 
la nature du processus politique.  
Le bénéficiaire final du travail préparatoire à la prise de décisions 
sera désormais la société/démos, et non le ministre, le Premier ministre ou 
la Chambre. Ces derniers auront des tâches préjudicielles, de préparation des 
lois, pas des tâches de décision.  
Ces remarques montrent finalement ce que n’est pas la démocratie. 
La démocratie n’est pas la représentation. La démocratie abolit la 
représentation, la relation de mandant à mandataire, et confie l’ensemble du 
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système politique à la société/démos. Cette dernière devient ce qu’est l’État 
aujourd’hui par rapport au système politique : son incarnation exclusive.  
Dans la démocratie, la société fait ce que font le gouvernement, le 
Premier ministre, les ministres, la Chambre et bien d’autres institutions, 
ensemble ou séparément. Dans la représentation, les compétences sont 
partagées entre mandant et mandataire selon certaines règles. Dans la 
démocratie, le leader politique est simplement le rapporteur habituel, 
l’orateur, pas celui qui gouverne.  
De nos jours, en dehors de la liberté individuelle, l’homme moderne 
ne jouit pas d’un pouce de liberté sociale et politique. Le tragique, c’est 
qu’on lui a appris à croire le contraire. Je dirais même que la description 
mensongère des concepts est parvenue à un tel degré qu’on en arrive à 
affirmer que la reconnaissance au citoyen de certains droits équivaut à la 
jouissance de la liberté sociale et politique. Grave erreur, aux prolongements 
idéologiques profonds ! 
La liberté se définit comme une autonomie, elle présuppose 
l’abolition de toute « répartition » dans l’exercice de l’œuvre socio-
économique et politique, exige qu’on ne soit « commandé par personne ». 
La démocratie constitue donc un processus d’accumulation de liberté sur le 
plan social et politique, au-delà de la liberté individuelle. En ce sens, elle 
annonce un système économique, social et politique entièrement nouveau.  
Ces précisions sont nécessaires pour comprendre que le système de 
valeurs de l’homme social actuel est dépourvu de tout cet arrière-plan 
qu’entraîne le concept de démocratie, mais aussi celui de la simple 
représentation. C’est pourquoi la question de la transition se pose 
aujourd’hui sous sa forme primordiale. Premièrement, en termes 
d'assimilation du système politique moderne avec la représentation et non, 
manifestement, avec la démocratie. Deuxièmement, au sens où l’évolution 
du système politique vers la représentation va de pair avec la modification 
des rapports de force, de sorte que la société des citoyens cesse de perdre ce 
qu’elle a réussi à acquérir sous le régime précédent, avant que son quotidien 
ne soit bouleversé. Cependant, il est sûr que ce qu’elle vivra mènera à 
l’éclosion de la nouvelle mesure axiologique de la société, la liberté politique, 
qui, à terme, mènera à la démocratie. 
 
La nécessité d’une révolution conceptuelle  
 Quels éléments de la représentation le système politique actuel 
contient-il ? Aucun ! Le politicien prétend que le système politique est 
représentatif en arguant qu’il n’est pas possédé par un chef tel que l’était 
Louis XIV, le monarque absolu. Mais il proclame qu’il ne représente pas la 
société, mais la « nation », l’intérêt « général », pas l’intérêt commun. 
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Mais qui définit ce qu’est l’intérêt national ou général ? Le politicien 
lui-même, qui mettra aussi en œuvre les politiques qu’il s’ordonnera à lui-
même d’appliquer ! Dans le système moderne, le politicien est à la fois 
mandant et mandataire ! On admet d’ailleurs aujourd’hui que l’État possède 
la souveraineté politique et que la société est un simple particulier.  
Les oligarques à tout crin ont grand soin de faire circuler l’idée que 
la société élit les politiciens, et autres sornettes du même acabit. On 
dissimule le fait que le vote ne contient aucun élément de représentation, ni 
de démocratie. C’est un acte de légitimation d’un personnel politique, 
fabriqué le plus souvent par les « appareils » qui se partagent l’État. Le fait 
de choisir un parti plutôt qu’un autre, un leader plutôt qu’un autre, n’a pas 
d’importance pour le système puisque, après le vote, le caractère 
irresponsable, incontrôlable et irrévocable du politicien est consacré 
expressément.  
Si vous demandez à un oligarque de tous les jours comment il 
explique que le droit du politicien d’ignorer ses promesses électorales est 
consacré par la Constitution, il va tout de suite vous regarder avec surprise 
et il ne fait aucun doute qu’il vous accusera de populisme. De même que si 
vous lui signalez que « l’État de droit » est valable pour tout le monde, 
excepté la classe politique.  
Pour les tenants de la modernité, la démocratie, c’est la possibilité 
qu’a le citoyen de manifester. Pas l’obligation du gouvernement d’entendre 
et de prendre en compte la volonté sociale. Par conséquent, la société peut 
se rassembler tout entière devant le siège du gouvernement ou de la 
Chambre pour manifester son opposition à la politique suivie ou à la 
corruption, ou bien la déclarer par la voie des sondages d'opinion. Il 
n’empêche que la Constitution donne au gouvernement le droit de dire qu’il 
se fiche de ses objections. C’est lui qui sait ce qui est bien pour elle, pas 
elle... 
Pensons à ce que seraient les politiques d’un gouvernement si ses 
décisions devaient avoir chaque fois l’approbation expresse de la société. Si, 
au lieu d’être le mandataire d’un vague intérêt « général », il devait 
fonctionner institutionnellement comme mandataire de la société des 
citoyens. 
 
Du «peuple» à la «société des citoyens». La société comme 
partenaire institutionnel du système politique à titre de 
mandant 
D’abord, il faut savoir ce que l’on veut. Veut-on voir la société se 
rassembler sur la Pnyx, sur la place centrale ou ailleurs ? Ou bien recueillir sa 
volonté ? Ce qui poussait les Athéniens à se rassembler sur la Pnyx, c’est que 
c’était un moyen de former leur volonté, et donc de prendre des décisions ! 
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Naturellement, si nous nous projetons dans l’avenir, la façon dont 
une société se constituera en démos et fonctionnera comme telle, la 
constitution même du système politique, devra être cherchée au niveau de la 
technologie de la communication, quelque chose comme l’Internet que nous 
connaissons aujourd’hui.  
Au stade actuel, nous avons déjà certains moyens simples, mais 
infaillibles, de nous enquérir de la volonté sociale : le vote électronique, qui 
donnera à tout citoyen la possibilité, après information et dialogue, 
d’élaborer les orientations générales du processus politique, de voter sur 
chaque point, de contrôler, révoquer, etc., les politiciens, ou leurs propres 
décisions au niveau local et national.  
J’insiste sur la remarque que le concept de démos désigne la 
constitution de la société des citoyens en institution permanente, à l’image du 
gouvernement ou de la Chambre, et non occasionnelle. Et j’ajouterai une 
autre chose, plus simple encore : la création d’un « échantillon » de démos 
délibératif permanent. Soit par la voie conventionnelle des sondages, soit sous 
une forme plus avancée, avec un « démos délibératif vivant », un échantillon 
de citoyens qui délibérera et se prononcera sur les points de l’ordre du jour 
de la Chambre ou du gouvernement, ou qui soulèvera lui-même d’autres 
points à traiter. À l’instar des sondages d'opinion quand ils se déroulent de 
manière scientifique, le « démos délibératif vivant » offrira une exactitude de 
quasi 100 % dans la formulation de la volonté sociale. Au contraire, les 
élections fonctionnent d’habitude dans l’optique du vote utile et, surtout, 
concernent seulement la légitimation, par arbitrage, du personnel politique 
qui gouvernera. 
Il existe donc des moyens. Il suffit que la réflexion des sociétés 
mûrisse, qu’elles dépassent leurs réserves oligarchiques et surtout qu’elles 
comprennent que c’est la seule voie pour sortir de la crise actuelle, pour 
passer, elles aussi, au futur. Car la question n’est pas de réguler à nouveau les 
marchés : elle est de savoir qui paie le prix ou, plus précisément, quelle sera 
la place des sociétés dans le devenir économique et politique.  
Cette question n’appelle qu’une seule réponse. Les sociétés sont la 
raison d’être des marchés, des États, de tout. Il n’est donc pas possible 
d’inverser la logique des choses et qu’elles vivent sous leur joug. Ce système 
qui veut voir les sociétés assujetties aux propriétaires de l’économie et aux 
possesseurs de la politique remonte au passé de la barbarie despotique et 
n’appartient pas au futur. 
Supposons que les sociétés exigent d’avoir une substance 
représentative dans le système politique. Comment cela se fera-t-il, étant 
donné que les forces socio-économiques et politiques dominantes le 
refusent ? 
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Une première remarque. La tendance générale qui continuera à se 
développer dans le futur sera précise : plus les marchés acquerront des 
forces qui traverseront horizontalement les États, plus ils évolueront au 
niveau cosmosystémique, plus les sociétés revendiqueront une participation 
accrue au système politique, de sorte à peser sur la fonction politique et à 
équilibrer ces forces. La représentation et, en perspective, la démocratie 
seront appelées à constituer la réponse au problème qui se pose déjà. 
De nos jours, la prépondérance totale des marchés marque la 
domination politique des forces de l’oligarchie. En soi, cette domination des 
marchés présage une régression majeure de l’acquis des sociétés au service 
de laquelle toutes les forces politiques établies sont mobilisées, d’une 
manière ou d’une autre. 
Car toutes les forces politiques, aussi bien celles qui se déclarent 
favorables au peuple que les autres, de la gauche à la droite, sont, vu le 
système politique, profondément oligarchiques. Toutes sont hostiles à 
l’institutionnalisation politique de la société des citoyens et, par conséquent, 
à l’évolution du système politique vers la représentation. Il se peut qu’elles 
s’opposent entre elles pour la possession du pouvoir, mais elles sont 
totalement solidaires sur la question du maintien de la société des citoyens 
hors du processus politique. Aussi le changement des rapports de force au 
profit de la société ne surviendra-t-il pas avec l’alternance des partis au 
pouvoir.  
Il ne faut pas non plus espérer des forces politiques dominantes 
qu’elles adoptent un projet de sortie vers le futur. Elles ne le veulent pas et 
ne le peuvent pas. 
Cela explique pourquoi jamais, au cours des derniers siècles, il n’y a 
eu une telle pénurie d’idées et de projets. L’émancipation de la société passe 
par l’éjection de la partitocratie, par une confrontation globale avec tout ce 
qui renvoie au passé.  
L’opposition générale visant à contraindre la classe politique offre 
deux éventualités : l’une est qu’émergent de celle-ci certaines forces qui 
discerneront la possibilité d’installer leur hégémonie au prix d’une 
association avec la société ; l’autre, que surgissent des entrailles de la société 
des forces nouvelles qui conduiront à la marginalisation de l’establishment 
oligarchique.  
La perspective du rejet de la classe politique établie, comme celle de 
la révolution, est soumise à une condition. Au-delà de l’évidence que les 
nuages d’une contestation importante (ou même d’une logique 
insurrectionnelle dans les sociétés) s’accumulent déjà, plus ou moins selon 
les lieux, un paramètre essentiel fait défaut : la dépersonnalisation de la 
responsabilité et, au-delà, son attribution à sa source politéienne. Le fait de 
signaler ce paramètre nous ramène donc à notre pensée initiale.  
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Le dépassement de la crise présuppose le dépassement de notre 
époque, c’est-à-dire de nos certitudes. Il faut tout d’abord un changement de 
projet et, surtout, une révolution sur le plan des concepts. Celle-ci aboutira à 
l’élaboration d’idées nouvelles avec en vue l’élargissement de la liberté et, en 
dernière analyse, à la transition vers le système politique représentatif du futur. 
Mais en tout état de cause, la dynamique sociale comporte un 
élément d’indéfinition en rapport avec la capacité de l’establishment 
politique et économique de contrôler les évolutions. Le mythe du berger piétiné 
finalement par son troupeau épuisé est instructif de ce point de vue, du 
moins pour ceux qui sont capables de se défaire de leur arrogance et de 
discerner les changements. 
Aujourd’hui donc, l’enjeu est, à mon avis, très clair : pour dépasser 
la crise, il faut dépasser notre époque. 
 
 
Résumé 
 
Notre époque recommande que la société quitte le passé où s'est installée depuis la 
Renaissance et s'harmonise à la phase suivante comme l'ont fait déjà les "marchés".  
Pour cela il faut: une révolution des concepts à commencer par la démocratie et la liberté; 
la réorientation de la finalité politique vers l'intérêt du social; la transformation du peuple en société 
des citoyens (en démos), qui égale à la transition du système de 
"Monarchie oligarchique" actuelle en système représentatif. 
 
Mots clés: Crise ; Europe ; Démos ; Gnoséologie 
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Culture and Ideology in Romania During 1971-1972 
 
 
 
Ion ZAINEA* 
 
 
Under the Communist regime, the entire literary and artistic 
creation was under the strict supervision and guidance of the party. The 
ideological program elaborated by it, mostly by the Plenary Session of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Romania in November 1971 
tasked the literary and social-cultural publications to promote more firmly 
the Marxist aesthetic principles, to militate for a realist and engaged culture, 
which would serve the cause of the social construction and the formation of 
the new man. 
Without exceptions, magazines, newspapers, books, plays, movies 
or exhibits were rigorously controlled by the General Directorate for Press 
and Publishing1, where all publications were brought to be analyzed and 
certified. Obviously, the control was finalized with observations, notes, 
papers and syntheses. Such a document, inscribed as „confidential 
information”, drawn up on December 14, 19722, deals with the way in 
which literary and socio-cultural journals promotes realist, militant, engaged 
literature.  The paper analyzes the period from November 1971 to 
November 1972, where all journals from the country were analyzed, except 
for the ones printed in minority languages. Not merely the significant 
accomplishments were analyzed, which are featured in the introduction of 
the paper3, but the mostly negative sides. More specifically, those journals 
                                                     
* PhD professor at the University of Oradea, Department of History. 
1 The institution was founded in 1949 and was under the subordination of the Council 
of Ministers.  
2 National Archives-Bihor County Service, Fund General Directorate for Press and 
Publishing-Oradea Unit, File 51/1972, f. 331-382. Paper no. S/2329. The paper has 
16 typed pages and has a 35 page-annex. 
3 mentioning that "a dominant feature of literary-cultural journals was the integration 
in the general effort to transpose the tasks given by the party, by reflecting on the 
events from political and spiritual life, by debating the major issue of the current 
development of the country"; that "numerous articles of the editorial board or 
signed by famous writers from every generation, as well as investigations or 
interviews, mirrored the adhesion to the new policy promoted by the Communist 
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and authors refusing to frame themselves according to the established 
orientations, objectives and their tasks. The observations are exemplified 
with materials from the interventions of the General Directorate for Press 
and Publishing, which meant that those materials would be eliminated or 
modified. Their content is annexed to the paper, meaning that it is now 
known. 
The first part of the analysis handles prose, considered to be 
defective compared to the requirements of the Romanian writing "to mirror 
the beauty of work, the constructive push, to redeem the concrete reality of 
our times in its true light". It was said that, on the one hand, some stories, 
sketches, novel fragments appeared, which were inspired from the fighting 
past of the working class, past heroic figures and moments, but on the other 
hand, "the approach on subjects, such as workers' lives, the efforts of the 
people engaged in the process of creative work, was poor and totally 
insignificant". This major issue was partially covered by the literary 
investigation, which gained in importance due mainly to the efforts of 
editorial boards, but it could not supply the role of literature in reflecting the 
socialist transformations from people's lives and conscience.  
A series of epic, drama or aesthetic writings were considered to 
have "discussed negative aspects and practices from the socio-political life in 
the past 25 years of socialist construction", either from the beginning or 
from the following years and, within them, there was "a tendency to 
negatively look at relations and conditions from our society". The 
accumulation of failings, mistakes, generalization would lead in some cases 
to "the deformation of realities..., to the presentation of a closed, suffocated 
universe that was hostile to the individual, to the affirmation of ethical 
value, incapable of transformation and superior development" and, in this 
context, "the alienation of man, his lack of satisfaction and aspirations 
would appear as an objective phenomenon". Several examples were given, 
such as the short story fragment entitled "Drumul câinelui" [Dog's Travel], 
the novel fragment entitled "Limita" [The Limit], both by Ion Lăncrănjan4, 
the play "La început a fost păcatul" [At first there was sin] by Virgil 
Cacoveanu5, the sketch "Cearta" [The Quarrel] by Alexandru Târziu6, the 
                                                                                                                       
Party of Romania, the answers of the writers on the destiny of the national culture, 
the feeling that they participate in the socialist construction, in the making of 
contemporary history" and, as a result "valuable prose was published, stemming 
from the knowledge of life, of the tribulations of our contemporary spirituality, as 
well as political poetry full of vibrant patriotism, debates, exchanges of opinions on 
the current literary-artistic phenomenon and on current theoretical issues..."  
4 The first of which was sent for publication in România literară no.16/1972, the 
second in the journal Luceafărul, no. 13/1972 
5 Tribuna (Cluj), no. 15/1972. 
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story "Babel" by Radu Cosaşu7, the novel fragments "Dezgheţul" [Snow 
break] by Petru Popescu8, "Insule mici, trecătoare femei" [Small islands, 
passing women] by Augustin Buzura9 and "Vine procurorul" [Here comes 
the prosecutor] by C. Toiu10. 
Another category of incriminated articles referred to those which 
"used allegory", approached more general problems, such as freedom, truth, 
power and, which due to their elements generated "political meanings with 
negative implications regarding the life of our society". Such examples were 
the short story 'Funerariile lui Polonius" [Polonius' Funeral] by Adrian 
Păunescu11, the novel fragment „Tăietorul de lemne”  [the Wood Cutter] by 
Mircea Ciobanu12, the sketch „Hotelul bunului Dumnezeu”  [Good Lord's 
Hotel] by Vasile Hristea13, the story „Centrifuga” [The Centrifuge] by 
Romulus Rusan14, the play entitled „Halta viitorului-sau proprie nouă fiecare 
culoare” [The Halt of the future or each our own by every colour] by 
Teodor Crişan15. 
A category of prose published or aiming to be published in pages of 
newspapers was considered as having a "minor theme, insignificant for the 
tribulations of the current man". They were on "peripheral subjects of an 
sought unusual character" about "bizarre characters manifesting their 
disinterest towards everything happening around them", "cases of human 
degradation, even if they were motivated by objective conditions", such as 
war, erotic obsessions or of another nature, which were characteristic to 
certain instinctual areas. Such examples were "Vina" [Guilt] by Maria Luiza 
Cristescu, "Accidentul" [Accident] by Roxana Pană, "Ploaia" [Rain] by 
Gabriela Adameşteanu, "De atunci în nici o iarnă n-a mai nins atît de 
frumos" [Since then, no winter had better snow] by Teodor Mazilu, all from 
România Literară, "De duminică" [From Sunday] by Alexei Rudeanu, 
"Autostop" [Hitchhike] by Dora Kalmuschi, from Cronica - Iaşi, "În plin 
sezon" [Full season] by Anişoara Odeanu, "Naraţiuni" [Stories] by C. 
Fîntînelu and "Evadăm împreună" [Escaping together] by Eugen Uricaru, all 
three from Argeş - Piteşti, issues 3 and 9/1972. 
                                                                                                                       
6 Luceafărul, no. 37/1972. 
7 Vatra (Târgu Mureş), no. 8/1972. 
8 Tribuna, no. 11/1972. 
9 Steaua (Cluj), no. 19/1972. 
10 Luceafărul, no. 42/1972. 
11 Vatra, no. 7/1972. 
12 Idem, no. 6/1972. 
13 România literară, no. 42/1972. 
14 Idem, no. 44/1972. 
15 Familia (Oradea), no. 1/1972. 
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There could be only one unequivocal conclusion: "Lacking a clear 
message, the capacity to convey emotions, given their insufficient artistic 
harnessing, such prose cannot contribute to the exertion of the social, 
educational function of new literature". 
The second part of the analysis handles poetry, where things were 
even worse. As we find out from the preamble, of the total poetic 
production in control at the Directorate in the period, three quarters were in 
the category "without any connection to reality", the poetry "lacking in any 
meaning or mobilizing character", while the remaining quarter represented 
the political and social verses "of those expressing the feeling of 
responsibility and engagement of the citizen poet". 
In connection to the first category, a first group was made up of 
"intimate, sterile meditation, metaphysical sadness" poetry, which were 
completed by those filled with "desperation, disorientation, the desire to 
escape from an apocalyptic, delirious universe". It was significant that "the 
theme of death, of the collapse and degradation of life resurfaced", seen 
either from the level of the universe, as an inevitable global cataclysm or 
from the level of the poet's environment, appearing as a frozen, unbalanced 
place, which is drifting or wrecked". Such poetry was: "Final" [Final] by 
Modest Morariu16, "Şi ce laudă va bucura pretutindeni" [What prace will 
rejoice everywhere] by G. Alboiu17, "Judecata de apoi" [The Last Judgment] 
by Petru Romoşan18, "Oraşul meu" [My city] by Ion Dragomir19, "Să fie 
chemat scafandrul" [Let us call the scuba diver] by Traian Coşovei20, 
"Vulturi enormi se roteau" [Enormous eagles swirling around], "Echilibru 
pe un fir de paianjen" [Balance on a spider web] and "Mişcare în derivă" 
[Adrift], all authored by Virgil Nistor21. 
A smaller group of poetry was formed of the poetry describing the 
"condition of the poet", poetry that "expressed the feeling of loneliness, 
helplessness, failure", but also "the feeling of frustration, lack of 
understanding from fellow man" of the poet trying to bring about a renewal. 
Such examples were: "Vînt de semănat" [Planting wind] by Florenţa Albu22, 
"Turn" [Tower] by Cezar Ivănescu23, "Poemul puţului părăsit" [The poem 
                                                     
16 Ateneu (Bacău), no. 6/1972. 
17 Luceafărul, no. 46/1972. 
18 Tribuna, no. 22/1972. 
19 Viaţa Românească, no. 11/1972. 
20 Tomis (Constanţa), no. 16/1972. 
21 Steaua, no. 19/1972. 
22 Viaţa Românească, no. 8/1972. 
23 Idem, no. 9/1972. 
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of the abandoned well] by George Alboiu24, "Griviţa poetului" [Poet's 
Griviţa] by Ion Iuga and "Patria" [The Country] by Marin Mincu25. 
A frequently seen category was the poetry with "obscure, 
unintelligible, pastiches, after surreal, avant-garde cliches". It was mentioned 
that such verses would characterize the lyrics of young poets, appreciated as 
flawed through the "absurdity of idea association, their absurdity, through 
their stringent language", a lot of them being "simple, shocking, terrible 
prosodies". Such conclusive examples were the following poems: "Idee fixă 
de cadmiu" [Fixed cadmium idea] by Dan Stanciu, "Elegii cu o pisică de 
cîrpă" [Elegy with a raggy cat] by C. Abăluţă, "Învelit de limba unui cîine" 
[Surrounded by a dog's tongue] by Dorin Tudoran, all three from Luceafărul, 
"Grădina ospiciului" [Hospice garden] by Constanţa Buzea from România 
literară, "Maimuţa din tălpi" [Monkey on the foot] by I. Dinică, from Ramuri 
- Craiova, "Locul blestemat din curte" [Cursed garden spot] and 
"Damigeana" [Demijohn], both by Petre Stoian, from Steaua, "Timp în care-
ţi ucizi fratele" [Time to kill your brother] by St. Damian in Amfiteatru. It was 
also mentioned that "poetry lacking in positive ideas, with grotesque and 
macabre images" were signed also by famous names, such as: "Groapa" 
[The hole] and "Boala bolnavă" [Ill illness] by Adrian Păunescu (Vatra), 
"Acord" [Agreement] by Gheorghe Pituţ (România literară), "Damnaţi" 
[Damned], "Totuşi" [Even though] by Maria Banuş and "Glin glin" by Emil 
Botta (Viaţa Românească, no. 11/1972). 
In the final part of the poetry analysis, the control institution 
mentioned that there were cases when the poetry of certain journal issues 
was characterized by "lack of message, disengaged character, existentialist 
atmosphere", because of which they were not authorized for print, such as 
the case of issues no.4, 14, 39 and 46/1972 from Luceafărul or the "Caietul 
de poezii" [Poetry Book] of Viaţa Românească, no. 1, 3, 6, and 9/1972. 
Hence, there were situations when the elimination of some poems could not 
change the overall tone of some batches. 
With a defective prose and poetry that was mostly unaligned to the 
directions given by the sole party, it was only natural to look for the causes 
and for the culpable parties. According to the control institution, the main 
guilty party were the editorial boards, which were accused of lack of 
discipline in "selecting and printing the prose and especially the novice 
poetry". The pages or columns meant to launch new names in literature, 
such as the column in Luceafărul open to the productions of its literary cycle 
or the România literară column "We propose a new poet/We propose a new 
writer", were considered to "bear the seal of gratuity, of formalism or 
                                                     
24 România literară, no. 44/1972. 
25 Idem, no. 20 and 21/1972. 
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ambiguity of the idea phenomenon". Examples from both fields were 
mentioned; from prose: fantasy prose fragment "Căldură" [Heat] by Ion 
Bledea, the sketch "Întoarcerea"  [Return] by Petru Dan Lazăr26, sketches 
"Solia" [Mission] and "Lecţie de libertate" [Freedom lesson] byVasile Hrizea, 
the fable "Şi lupul fugi..." [So the wolf ran..] by St. M. Găbrian27, stories 
"Ines" by Antoanela Iordache28 and "Un oraş pentru o vacanţă" [A city for a 
holiday] by Adriana Grănescu29; from poetry: "Spaţiu ipocrit" [Fake space], 
"Vîrsta" [Age] and "Tremur" [Shiver] by Sorin Vînătorul, "Cenuşă" [Ashes] 
by Ioana Moroiu30, "Perspectiva" [Perspective] by Doru Valeriu Veliman, 
"Dincolo" [Beyond] and "Cum e" [How it is] from the "Atelier literar" 
[Literary studio] of României literare31. 
The recommendations by some editorial boards for debuts that did 
not have the necessary value in terms of artistic realization and content was 
deemed "to be able to exert a certain influence in the orientations of some 
new comers". The institution concluded that the more careful selection of 
the original creation - poetry and prose - "would lift the general quality of 
the journals" and would become "an impetus for creative self-exigence, to 
the more active promotion of writings tied to the acute and complex issues 
of our Socialist realities and their objective and constructive reflection. " 
The literary review was considered to be another guilty party, given 
that its activity was very important for the "realist and engaged orientation" 
of literature for the "education and cultivation of the artistic taste" of 
readers. However, even in this sector analyzed in the third segment, 
"aesthetic conceptions and attempts to support and recommend defective 
literary productions in terms of ideas and message have emerged" beyond, 
of course, theoretical contributions, analyses and wise critical evaluations 
published in the spirit of Marxist party principles. 
Firstly, it was mentioned that, during inquiries, round tables, writing 
and articles, there were views according to which "the only criterion in 
appreciating literature is its artistic value, not its idea content, its realist 
character or militant message". This would have generated "confused 
considerations" regarding the report between creator and age, "pleas for a 
review autonomy", "a rejection of directions", of the so-called "norms" or 
"artistic biases", that would impair literary creation. Some discussions on the 
freedom of creation, creator's freedom of conscience, as a fundamental 
condition of the viability of art and use of talent, were seen as "replies to the 
                                                     
26 both from Luceafărul, no. 46/1972. 
27 all three from România literară, no. 45/1972. 
28 Amfiteatru, no. 2/1972. 
29 Idem, no. 4/1972. 
30 all from Luceafărul, no. 46/1972. 
31 România literară, no. 13/1972. 
In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga 
 
105 
current times", when the emphasis was on the issue of growing the 
leadership and guidance role of the party in literary and artistic creation. The 
examples were numerous: the article "De ce să-mi placă Pablo Neruda?" 
[Why would I like Pablo Neruda], signed "Polemical Thomas" 32, notes 
"Cum se face un film" [How to make a movie] and "Pictînd cu predilecţie 
oameni" [Painting mostly people] by Corneliu Baba33, the article "Ceea ce ai 
în faţa simţurilor în momentul cînd scrii" [What takes place in your senses 
when you write] by Gabriela Melinescu34, the note "Dragoste şi revoltă" 
[Love and revolt] by Ana Blandiana35, the article "Poetul nu e un taxi" [Poet 
is not a taxi] by Ion Caraion36, "Exigenţa criticii" [Exigence in review] by 
Dan Cristea37, "Condiţia criticii din ţara noastră" [The state of review in our 
country]38 and "Se simte lipsa unei reviste de critică literară" [There is a need 
for a literary review journal]39 by Dan Culcer, the interview done by Adrian 
Păunescu with Alexandru Paleologu, entitled "A continua să proclamăm 
adevărul cu caracter general, acoperind cu glasul abstracţiei, ţipătul de durere 
- aceasta e minciună, e laşitate, e crimă" [To continue to procclaim the 
general truth and cover the voice of abstraction and scream - this is a lie, 
cowardice, it is a crime]40. 
The literary review community was also accused of the "tendency to 
reject <the so-called interference in the creation process>", most likely 
blamed on "cultural servants", who were unadvised or incompetent, who 
would hinder the development of original literature and drama by using 
conjunctures. The idea that the only competent voices to express their 
opinion and decide are the creators themselves was considered to aim at the 
"guidance and control on the creation in publishing and circulating these 
types of productions". Such examples were the articles "Simple note" 
[Simple notes], "E timpul concretului" [It is time for the concrete] by 
Augustin Buzura and his interview by Adrian Păunescu41, the article 
"Evaziune etică şi estetică" [Ethical and aesthetic evasion] by Viorel Ştirbu42, 
                                                     
32 Steaua, no. 12/1972. The article uses as a pretext an imaginary discussion with a 
friend on the creation of the Chilean poet in order to invalidate the value of "bells 
and whistles" poetry. 
33 Astra (Braşov), no. 3/1972. 
34 Steaua, no. 20/1972.  
35 România literară, no. 13/1972.  
36 Luceafărul, no. 2/1972.  
37 Idem, no. 43/1972. 
38 Convorbiri literare (Iaşi), no. 1/1972. 
39 Ateneu, no. 10/1972.  
40 Tribuna, no. 8/1972.  
41 all from Tribuna, no. 5, 15 and 42/1972.  
42 Vatra, no. 6/1972. 
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the investigation "Realitatea socială şi prezenţa literaturii" [Social reality and 
the presence of literature]43, done by Luceafărul, the articles "Direcţia 
Teatrelor, for de autoritate morală" [The Directorate for Theaters, a moral 
authority forum], by Mihai Sabin44 and "Hitckok"45.  
The analysis went on to mention that some review materials would 
treat "the issue of the accessibility of different modern cultural forms" 
wrongly, thus ignoring the social role of art. It was shown that authors of 
such articles were trying to prove that the difficulties of the reception of 
works of art by the public were due to the ignorant character of the public, 
its lack of preparedness and understanding of art. Moreover, another idea is 
expressed by the same authors, namely that certain fields, such as poetry, 
painting, modern ballet, cannot be accessed by large masses, but only to a 
limited category of the "initiated". It was concluded that such articles 
"cannot become a plea for realist art". Such examples were: "Identificarea 
realităţii în artă" [Identifying reality in art], author Victor Ernst Masek, 
"Trup şi tenebre" [Body and darkness]  by Ion Caraion, "Literatura dificilă" 
[Difficult literature] by Ion Cîrstoiu46. 
Discussing the issues regarding the literary-artistic phenomenon, the 
control institution mentioned, in an approving tone until a certain point, 
that dogmatic conceptions and negative practices were criticized, which 
affected the development of literature in the early stages of the "revolution", 
but in some materials this was done "in a way in which was not only 
generalized for an entire historical era, but it also expressed a certain 
nonconformism towards the realist direction of art and culture"47. 
 The presentation of the creation and evolution of poets affirmed 
after 1950 caused not once "the challenge to the importance and value or 
engaged lyrics", as "the commendation of visions from the realities of life", 
exemplified by reviews for volumes entitled "Sărbătorile absenţei" 
[Celebrations of absence] by Vasile Vlad and "În bătălia pierdută" [Lost 
battle] by Dan Deşliu48, „A.E. Baconski” and "Maria Banuş” by Mircea 
                                                     
43 Luceafărul, no. 46/1972.  
44 Ateneu, no. 1/1972.  
45 Steaua, no. 14/1972.  
46 seen in order in Astra, no. 4/1972, Luceafărul, no. 23/1972, and Ateneu, no. 2/1972. 
47 "Culisele memoriei" [Behind the scenes of memory] by C. Ungureanu, "Condiţia 
dialectică a istoriei literare" [Dialectic condition of literary history] by Gh. Grigurcu, 
"Valorile literaturii exprimă fiinţa românească angajată" [Values of literature express 
the engaged Romanian being] by D. Micu, "Romanul unor idei" [The idea novel] by 
G. Pruteanu, all destined to the column "Argument pentru o istorie a literaturii 
române contemporane" [For a history of contemporary Romanian literature] 
opened by Tribuna. Tribuna, no. 8/1972. 
48 both from Vatra, no. 3/1972.   
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Iorgulescu49, "Deschideri" [Openings] by Leonid Dimov50, "Poarta cu 
săgeţi" [Arrow door] and "Temperatura cuvintelor" [Temperature of words] 
by Aurel Gurghianu51. 
The author of the analysis was annoyed by the fact that, while the 
party press "analyzed a series of defects in our literature", journals, with 
minor exceptions did not consider such phenomena. On the contrary, 
almost all literary journals highly recommended the books of Al. George 
"Semne şi repere" [Signs and marks] and "Marele Alpha" [Grand Alpha], as 
well as the essay volume "Bunul simţ ca paradox" [Common sense as a 
paradox] by Al. Paleologu, which, according to the control institution, "were 
distinguished by an opposition and nonconformism spirit towards 
established values and directions". Some reviews were poignant for the way 
in which they commended what had to be criticized and vice versa, volumes 
as "Semne şi repere" [Signs and marks] by Al.  George52, "Nebunul şi 
floarea" [Mad man and the flower] by R. Guga53 şi "Teatru - antiteatru – 
teatru" [Theater - anti-theater - theater] by Horia Deleanu54, all banned from 
publishing. 
Finally, the role of review in orienting and ideological and artistic 
education of readers was diminished also because that "there were a lot of 
reviews, critiques and notes basing their analysis and comment solely on 
elements related to poetic formula, the technical construction, the new 
character of images" in the permanent columns of the literary-artistic 
production, without the authors to "think of the idea content or the way in 
which the book reflected the truth of life". Moreover, the authors "would 
not say their opinion on the value of the works", they neither recommended 
them, nor rejected them. 
Again, the editorial boards were blamed because they "did not 
intervene actively within contradicting debates to clarify certain points of 
view and finalize discussions for one purpose". The case of Convorbiri literare 
was mentioned as an example, which stated that the editorial board does not 
intend to draw conclusions given that "each participant has its own 
conclusions, the reader is free to choose"55. Likewise, the case of the 
investigation organized by Viaţa românească on "Young people and issues of 
literature" with a few young writers considered "not the most representative 
                                                     
49 Convorbiri literare, no. 4/1972.   
50 Tribuna, no. 31/1972. 
51 both from România literară, no. 13/1972. 
52 Vatra, no. 6/1972.    
53 Convorbiri literare, no. 12/1972.  
54 România literară, no. 25/1972. 
55 while the material printed in Lupta de clasă appreciated that this discussion "needed 
certain ideological clarifications of principle". 
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for their generation", where the editorial board did not follow conservations 
that were "weak and confused" with a comment.  
It was suggested that editorial boards had to express their views in 
the permanent columns of journals on theater, arts, music, where the issues 
of these arts were presented through "the eyes of the authors". The theater 
column from Luceafărul was offered as an example, which was held by Marin 
Sorescu, Ion Băieşu and R. Penciulescu, who each pleaded for "the modern 
tendencies corresponding to their formation as playwrights and theater 
specialists". The interventions of editorial boards in certain situations would 
have moved the theater debate "to a general interest for their audience". 
Also regarding reviews, the analysis saw "unilteral preoccupations" 
regarding the "scientific potential of literary heritage", an area where the 
focus of journals was "on certain personalities", such as Eugen Lovinescu, 
Titu Maiorescu, Lucian Blaga, Vasile Voiculescu, Ion Barbu, while "the 
Marxist traditions of our culture are rarely presented". Such an examples 
was one article on Gherea in Argeş ("În căutarea lui Gherea" [Finding 
Gherea], author Mircea Iorgulescu), who also wanted to separate the 
personality of the socialist militant from the literary reviewer. Given such a 
situation, the recommendation from the final part of the analysis is natural 
for "the more active and consistent approach of rich materialist, progressive 
traditions of the literary history and review", considering its role as "a 
theoretical foundation of our contemporary literature, for the firmer 
affirmation of Marxist aesthetic principles in cultural and artistic life". 
Two major ideas were mentioned in the general conclusion of the 
Directorate analysis from November 1971 to November 1972. On one 
hand, "editorial boards must promote militant literature, tied to our socialist 
realities more strictly, more objectively and firmly", parallel with stimulation 
of "alive, interesting debates that aim for efficiency and finality more actively 
for the assertion of Marxist aesthetic principles and the elevation of our 
literary and artistic life to the level of current requirements".   
 
Conclusions 
The regime controlled, supervised and sanctioned writing with 
censorship, one of the instruments of Communist power, for the ultimate 
purpose to produce literature based on ideological requirements and the will 
of the Communist Party. As a result, writers had to accept or to learn to 
accept the guidance suggested by superior party leadership as a basic 
requirement for publication or risk being censored. 
We see that writing was produced in a different manner than 
required by censors; that there were journals and authors refusing to fit in 
the established orientations and tasks; that there was a certain 
nonconformism towards the "realist direction"of art and culture; that 
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writers, especially those from the interwar period had the most difficulty in 
adapting to the new cultural policy, as they became clients of censorship; 
that the writing considered problematic by censorship were preserved so 
that we can nowadays consult them; that they discuss practices of the 
Communist regime, such as limiting freedom, the value system, the 
interference in the creation process, but also in aspects related to social life, 
types and characters, times such as dogmatism, which are severely criticized 
and denigrated; moreover, according to the censors, the critique was 
extended from the particular to the general to the system and social relations 
that they generated. 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
National Archives-Bihor County Service, Fund General Directorate for 
Press and Publishing-Oradea Unit, File 51/1972, f. 331-382. Paper 
no. S/2329 
Amfiteatru, no. 2/1972, no. 4/1972. 
Astra (Braşov), no. 3/1972, no. 4/1972. 
Ateneu (Bacău), no. 6/1972, no. 10/1972, no. 1/1972, no.2/1972. 
Convorbiri literare (Iaşi), no. 1/1972., no. 4/1972, no. 12/1972. 
Familia (Oradea), no. 1/1972 
Luceafărul, no. 13/1972, no. 37/1972, no. 42/1972, no. 46/1972, no. 
2/1972, no. 43/1972,  no. 23/1972 
România literară, no. 42/1972, no. 44/1972., no. 20/1972, no. 45/1972, no. 
13/1972,  no. 13/1972, no. 25/1972, no. 25/1972. 
Steaua (Cluj), no. 19/1972., no. 12/1972, no. 20/1972, no. 14/1972. 
Tomis (Constanţa), no. 16/1972 
Tribuna (Cluj), no. 15/1972, no. 11/1972, no. 22/1972, no. 8/1972., no. 5, 
15 and 42/1972,  no. 31/1972 
Vatra (Târgu Mureş), no. 8/1972., no.6, 7/1972, no. 6/1972, no. 3/1972, 
no. 6/1972 
Viaţa Românească, no. 11/1972, no. 8/1972, no. 9/1972.     
  
111 
 
 
 
Endeavours to Establish the “Cele Trei Crisuri” in 
Oradea and Aspects of its activity (1990-2000) 
 
 
 
Antonio FAUR* 
 
 
After the events occurring in December 1989 that had a deep 
impact on our contemporary history, an unprecedented publicist activity had 
the premises to appear as a consequence of the freedom of speech and 
expression. Given the background, there were several initiatives aiming to 
print periodicals (of attitude, culture, and so on) as an expression of the 
wish for communication of the intellectuals in Bihor who started to get 
involved in post-December specific activities. 
Understanding the importance of cultural associations and 
foundations and to acquire a doctoral title on the Romanian cultural issue in 
Bihor (1848-1849), the associate senior lecturer Dr.Viorel Faur – who was 
also a member of the Romanian Senate in the first office (1990-1992), when 
it acted as a Constituent Assembly – made a series of cultural endeavours, 
amongst which the establishment of the “Cele trei Crisuri” Cultural 
Foundation (in April 1990)1, a genuine sequel of the interwar “Cele trei 
                                                     
* PhD professor at the University of Oradea, Department of History 
1 On the 1st of March 1990 was held the meeting establishing the “Vatra Romanească” 
Cultural Association – Bihor affiliate. It approved the statutes (shortly validated by the 
local legal authorities after the process of submitting the documents to become a 
“legal entity”). The initial part of the statutes comprise the following anticipatory 
statements: “The movement for national spiritual revival determined by the 
December 1989 Romanian revolution also comprises the action to restore some cultural 
associations that used to be active before 1948, to which we should add the efforts to establish 
new associations (societies) meant to respond to the desiderata of this historical moment, and 
particularly to those of the future (emphasis added – A.F.). Amongst them is the “Vatra 
Românească” National Union – Bihor affiliate seated in Oradea (Consiliul de 
coordonare, Documente: Asociaţia culturală „Vatra Românească” – filiala Bihor, in 
Cele trei Crişuri, no. 1, 1990, p. 3). One of the “means” used by this association (to 
achieve its “cultural” objectives) was settled then (in the first point of this 
subchapter of the statutes) as follows: “1. It will take steps to establish the “Cele trei 
Crişuri” Cultural Foundation that will contribute to reactivating local interwar valuable traditions 
and will become an efficient element to stimulate the cultural and scientific activity” (emphasis 
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Crisuri” Great Reunion. It was high time for the recovery of significant 
traditions and their pursue on the level of current requirements. 
Referring to the initiative of the academic Viorel Faur, the late 
historian Barbu Ştefănescu stated as follows: 
“For a long time, actually from several points of view, ever since I 
have known Professor Viorel Faur, he has been concerned with cultural activities 
related to his basic ‘job’ as a historian. Several years ago, he established, and has ever 
since run, the “Cele trei Crişuri” Foundation, the one editing the magazine bearing the 
same name. In the editorial office of the foundation, he has published a series of historical 
works and more, contributions of the academics from Oradea, of training youth from a 
scientific point of view, together with renowned names in the field of the Romanian 
historical writing, such as: Pompiliu Teodor, Nicolae Bocşan, Ioan-Aurel Pop, Doru 
Radosav, Ioan Lumperdean, Gelu Neamţu etc.”2 (emphasis added - A. F.). Such a 
scientific acknowledgement from a historical point of view is worth a 
justified attention, as it is the only cultural foundation in Bihor concerned 
with editing the “Cele trei Crişuri” magazine and over thirty history and 
literature books without the support of the state. Everything that was 
printed was achieved after persistent and tiresome endeavours (particularly 
of the director of the foundation, Prof. dr. Viorel Faur) to get 
advertisements (in the magazine) and sponsorship. 
Nowadays, a cultural foundation is under the sign of goodwill or 
generosity of a commercial company or a (cultural-scientific) institution that 
has grasped its meaning in the local spiritual and public life. Nevertheless, 
we have to say that more often than not, the relationship between the “Cele 
trei Crişuri” Cultural Foundation (as a beneficiary) and its material 
supporters was based on “persuasion ability”, or on the relations of its 
director with the enterprise leadership that decided to sponsor or advertise 
in the pages of the “Cele trei Crişuri” magazine. Hence, persuasion prevailed 
over the reason of such an endeavour, while the maturity process of the 
Romanian society has not been achieved to this day. 
An introduction was written on the history of the foundation and 
its activities in local press and particularly in an article published in one of 
the volume dedicated to the historian Viorel Faur on his 65th birthday3. The 
                                                                                                                       
added – A.F.) in this part of the country” (Ibidem). Certainly, this was the reason of 
the Cele trei Crişuri Cultural Foundation that worked independently until the end of 
the past century. 
2 Barbu Ştefănescu, Istoria ca profesiune de credinţă, în In honorem ViorelFaur (la împlinirea a 
vârstei de 65 de ani), volume coordinated by Corneliu Crăciun and Antonio Faur, 
Editura Universităţii din Oradea, 2006, p. 10. 
3Florin Ardelean, Istoricul Viorel Faur, director al Fundaţiei Culturale Cele trei Crişuri 
(1990-2000), p. 12-29. The study is based on the original documents of the Cele trei 
Crişuri Cultural Foundation in the personal archives of the director (historian Viorel 
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doctoral student Florin Ardelean, the author of this historical reconstruction 
referring to the “Cele trei Crişuri” Cultural Foundation, expressed useful 
considerations, out of which we will render the most relevant ones: 
“… in its activity, the director of the cultural foundation stood out as an 
element of continuity and stability by succeeding to imprint coherence to the editorial line of 
the foundation and of the magazine, as well as a steady rising evolution, thus 
strengthening the prestige of the cultural and artistic expressions developed under its 
auspices in time. 
The studies published in the magazine have succeeded in starting a rich dialogue 
between the local, the regional, the national and the European historiography. Thus, the blunt 
narrow-minded provincialism was replaced by a wide opening towards the researchers with most 
varied concerns coming from different parts of the country. Its dynamism has positively 
influenced the working environment in the foundation that has gradually stood out in the city of 
Oradea as a prestigious cultural-scientific institution”4. 
Undoubtedly, the projects of the foundation were very important 
(such as: the publishing of the “Cele trei Crişuri” magazine, the publishing 
of history and literature books, and the organisation of cultural events) and 
were implemented, thus contributing to enriching the spiritual life in Bihor 
with genuine events (such as the book releases belonging to personalities 
from Bucharest or Cluj-Napoca, or the publication of contributions 
belonging to well-known local and national intellectuals in several fields in 
the Cele trei Crişuri magazine). The value standards rose, thus making Bihor 
integrate in national spiritual life. Local creation mentioned in the Familia 
and Cele trei Crişuri magazines during the interwar period acquired substance. 
In fact, it was one of the objectives of the foundation and particularly of its 
contributors, all devout intellectuals with no material interests. 
 
1. The editorial activity of the foundation 
If until the end of the year 1989, the editorial activity was the 
exclusive task of the Committee for Culture and Socialist Education of the 
Bihor County (controlling and funding mostly the printing of books of 
history, literature, folklore and collections of scientific works in different 
fields, as well as the publishing of the Familia magazine), at the beginning of 
1990, this monopole faded away (together with socialism) making room to 
civil society initiatives expressed through the concern for printing new 
periodicals (testimonials for the freedom of expression) and other activities 
with cultural-scientific finality. 
                                                                                                                       
Faur), where we found the information together with reading the edited books and 
the content of the “Cele trei Crişuri” magazine and the “Alma Mater Crisiensis” 
cultural-scientific supplement. 
4Ibidem 
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Considering the favourable background, the new foundation 
decided to proceed to reviving important traditions, such as editing (from 
April 1920 to August 1940) the “Cele trei Crişuri” magazine that was the 
most widespread cultural magazine in Bihor and abroad, up to several 
American cities, for over two decades. 
The first issue of the second series of the “Cele trei Crişuri” 
magazine (that we will tackle in a subchapter of the present study) was 
published on the 15th of April 1990. 
In 1992-1997, the “Cele trei Crişuri” Cultural Foundation edited the 
following: 
 
I. History books: 
 
1992 
1. Viorel Faur, Cultura românilor din Bihor (1849-1918), 186 p. (the 
author was a senior lecturer at the University of Oradea; the book was 
originally his doctoral thesis); 
2. Idem, Viaţa politică a românilor bihoreni (1849-1919), 236 p.; 
3. Pompiliu Teodor, Istorici români şi probleme istorice, 194 p. (the 
author was a professor at theFaculty of History – Philosophy at the „Babes-
Bolyai” University in Cluj-Napoca and a corresponding member of the 
Romanian Academy); 
 
1993 
4.Viorel Faur, Generaţia Marii Uniri. Evenimentele din Bihor (decembrie 
1918-aprilie 1919), 144 p; 
5.Flaminia Faur, Mărturii despre evenimentele din Bihor (noiembrie 1918-
aprilie 1919), 144 p; 
6. Sever Dumitraşcu, Românii de peste hotare, 95 p. (the author was a 
senior lecturer at the University of Oradea); 
 
1994 
7. Roman R. Ciorogariu, Zile trăite, vol. I, 156 p. (re-edited by senior 
lecturer dr. Viorel Faur); 
8. Idem, Zile trăite, vol. II, 174 p. (idem); 
9. Nicolae Bocşan, I. Lumperdean, Ioan-Aurel POP, Etnie şi 
confesiune în Transilvania (sec. XVIII-XIX), 188 p. (the three authors belonged 
to the academic staff of the Faculty of History – Philosophy at the „Babes-
Bolyai” University in Cluj-Napoca; (two of them subsequently became 
rectors of the university, i.e. Nicolae Bocşan and Ioan-Aurel Pop); 
10. Flaminia Faur, Manifestările românilor din Bihor împotriva proiectului 
de lege şcolară din 1907. Documente, 179 p; 
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11. Antonio Faur, 100 de documente despre activitatea politică a dr.-ului 
Aurel Lazăr (1899-1918), 146 p. (the author was a student at the Faculty of 
History – Philosophy in Cluj-Napoca and subsequently became a professor 
at the University of Oradea); 
12. Pompiliu Teodor, Incursiuni în istoriografia română a secolului XX, 196 p; 
13. Barbu Stefănescu, Tehnica agricolă şi ritm de muncă în gospodăria 
ţărănească din Crişana (sec. al XVIII-lea şi începutul sec. al XIX-lea), vol. I, 255 p. 
(the author was a lecturer at the University of Oradea and subsequently a 
professor at the same higher education institution; the book was awarded 
the Romanian Academy Prize and was originally his doctoral thesis); 
14. Idem, Tehnica agricolă şi ritm de muncă în gospodăria ţărănească din 
Crişana (sec. al XVIII-lea şi începutul sec. al XIX-lea), vol. II, 350 p; 
15. Doru Radosav, Carte şi societate. Secolele XVII-XIX, 307 p. (the 
author was a senior lecturer and the director of the „Lucian Blaga” 
University Library in Cluj-Napoca; originally, the book was his doctoral thesis); 
16. Antonio Faur, Măsuri legislative şi economico-administrative de aplicare 
a Convenţiei de Armistiţiu (septembrie 1944- mai 1945), 150 p; 
17. Nicolae Edroiu, Paleografia româno-chirilică, 148 p (the author was 
a professor at the Faculty of History – Philosophy at the „Babes-Bolyai” 
University in Cluj-Napoca and subsequently a corresponding member of the 
Romanian Academy; the book was used to teach the course at the Faculty of 
History – Geography at the University of Oradea by Prof. Dr. Viorel Faur); 
18. Viorel Faur, Tragedia de la Sighiştel (decembrie 1918-martie 1919), 
50 p. (was printed in Beius and released at the unveiling of the Martyrs 
Monument in Sighiştel); 
19. Gelu Neamţu, Alexandru Roman – marele fiu al Bihorului (1826-
1896), 200 p. (the author was a researcher at the „George Baritiu” Institute 
of History in Cluj-Napoca; originally, the book was his doctoral thesis); 
20. Stelian Mândruţ, Mişcarea naţională şi activitatea parlamentară a 
deputaţilor Partidului Naţional Român din Transilvania între anii 1905-1910, 175 p. 
(the author was a scientific researcher at the „George Baritiu” Institute of 
History in Cluj-Napoca; originally, the book was his doctoral thesis); 
21. Viorel Faur, Contribuţii la istoricul bibliotecilor româneşti din Crişana 
(1830-1940), 161 p. (the author was a professor at the Faculty of History – 
Geography at the University of Oradea); 
22. Ioan Horga, Tradiţie şi noutate în spiritualitatea românească greco-
catolică din Epoca Luminilor. Epsicopia din Oradea, 176 p. (the author was a 
lecturer at the Faculty of History – Geography at the University of Oradea, 
then a professor; originally, the work was his doctoral thesis); 
23. Viorel Faur, Presa românească din Crişana despre mişcare 
memorandistă, 212 p; 
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1996 
24. Maria Crăciun, Protestantism şi ortodoxie în Moldova secolului al XVI-
lea, 210 p (the author was a lecturer at the Faculty of History – Philosophy 
at the „Babes-Bolyai” University in Cluj-Napoca; originally, the book was 
her doctoral thesis); 
25. Corneliu Crăciun, Societăţi academice din Bucovina (I): Arboroasa şi 
Junimea, 224 p (theauthorwas a lecturer at the Faculty of Greek-Catholic 
Theology in Oradea; thebookis a part of his doctoral thesis); 
26. Vasile Gionea, Femei vestite din trecutul neamului nostru, 213 p. (the 
author was a deputy and one of the „fathers” of the 1991 Constitution)5. 
 
II. On poetry and literary criticism 
 a. Poetry 
1992 
1. Ioan Ţepelea, Poverile din oglindă. Poezii, 65 p. 
 
1993 
2. Miron Blaga, Manuscrisele de la Remesias, 68 p. 
3. T.M. Mirodot, Paşi în cuvinte, 95 p (the author was a student at the 
University of Oradea) 
4. Florian Lazăr, Iubire rodind 
 
1994 
5. Octavian Blaga, N-am să uit niciodată nimic şi totdeauna am să răzbun, 
42 p (the author was a student at the Faculty of Philology in Cluj-Napoca) 
6.Alexandru Sfârlea, Către Sing, 46 p; 
 
Literary history: 
1995 
7. Ioan Derşidan, Tranziţii literare, 260 p. (the author was a lecturer 
at the University of Oradea) 
 
                                                     
5 Ibidem, pp 27-29 (the list of the books edited by Cele trei Crişuri Cultural Foundation 
from 1992 to 1995). On the foundation, see the first articles published in the media: 
Viorel Faur, Fundaţia Culturală Cele trei Crişuri, 1993, in Cele trei Crişuri, 1994, no. 3-4, 
p. 3; Nicolae Moraru (Viorel Faur’s penname), Premiile pentru ştiinţă şi literatură 
acordate de Fundaţia Culturale Cele trei Crişuri şi S.C. Keysis Grafx Srl. din Oradea, 
pe anul 1993, in Cele trei Crişuri, 1994, no. 3-4, p. 3; Activitatea editorială a Fundaţiei 
Culturale Cele trei Crişuri (1990-1995), in Cele trei Crişuri, 1995, no. 3-4, p. 3; 
Aniversarea Fundaţiei Culturale Cele trei Crişuri, 1995, no.5-6, p. 2; Fundaţia 
CulturalăCele trei Crişuri. Oradea, cărţi tipărite în anul 1995, in Cele trei Crişuri, 1996, 
no.1-2, p. 1 
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Thus, in five years (1992-1997), the “Cele trei Crişuri” Cultural 
Foundation made a decisive contribution to the publication (in Oradea) of 
twenty-six history books, an average of five books each year. From a numerical 
point of view, it was a rare performance, particularly if we think of the fact 
that the amount needed to edit them was provided by companies and 
institutions after several endeavours. 
The director of the Foundation thought of an “editorial policy” 
overcoming the provincial requirements and routine. Consequently, his 
interest focused on scientific personalities in Oradea and particularly in Cluj-
Napoca and Bucharest, thus experiencing for the very first time an activity 
requiring maximum efforts (both intellectual and material). 
Retrospectively, we can see that three members of the Romanian 
Academy in Cluj-Napoca published books (Pompiliu Teodor, Ioan-Aurel 
Pop and Nicolae Edroiu). Another significant fact is that eight doctoral theses 
by historians Viorel Faur, Barbu Ştefănescu, Doru Radosav, Ioan Horga, 
Gelu Neamţu, Stelian Mândruţ, Maria Craciun and Corneliu Craciun were 
printed, which is a real record for a cultural foundation, especially since it 
was the initiative of private persons, not a foundation of an institution or a 
high patronage with material means. 
To this we should add the fact that, besides the academic staff from 
Cluj-Napoca and Oradea (Prof. Dr. Sever Dumitraşcu, Prof. Dr. Antonio 
Faur) other young authors (such as Flaminia Faur), or experienced authors 
(such as Vasile Gionea, a reputed Romanian journalist) were published. 
The valuable work entitled Zile trăite (Living Days) by Roman R. 
Ciorogariu (Bishop) was re-edited (by Viorel Faur). It is the most important 
memoirs book on the events occurring in Bihor (in November 1918 – April 
1919). 
At the same time, the “Cele trei Crişuri” Cultural Foundation in 
Oradea focused on the literary manuscripts belonging to six poets from 
Bihor (Miron Blaga, Ioan Ţepelea, Octavian Blaga, Alexandru Sfârlea, 
Florian Lazăr and T.M. Mirodot) that they edited, thus encouraging this type 
of intellectual concerns too. We should also remind the book by lecturer Dr. 
Ioan Derşidan entitled Tranziţii literare (Literary Transitions). 
Even this note on the titles of printed works accompanied by some 
references to their authors allow us to draw the conclusion that an exceptional 
scientific and cultural element was working in Oradea in the last decade of the past 
century that cannot be compared to what other similar foundations have ever 
done. 
The “Cele trei Crişuri” Cultural Foundation found its expression in 
these editorial achievements lying at the foreground of the scientific life in 
the area of Bihor. 
 
The European Space. Borders and Issues 
 
118 
2. Editing the second series of the „Cele trei Crişuri” 
magazine 
The cultural climate at the beginning of the year 1990 was an 
incentive for the initiative of the intellectuals from Bihor that was very 
active particularly in the field of the press. From only one party newspaper 
and one magazine (Familia), they shortly reached a high number of 
periodicals (edited by different groups), most of them short-lived. 
The leadership of the “Cele trei Crişuri” Cultural Foundation 
reflected the oportunity to revive one of the most valuable magazines from 
the interwar period printed by the “Cele trei Crişuri” Reunion, a cultural 
association with a prominent role in the local cultural life, mentioning that it 
had material suport from the Royal Foundation during the interwar period. 
We also have to mention that the magazine was the only one that was 
ceaselessly published (in Oradea) during the interwar years, and then moved 
to Bucharest (where it was published until 1944, when the Soviet ‘specialists’ 
decided to ban it). 
After December 1989, an objective of the people involved in the 
action of reconstructing the most important traditions was reviving the 
“Cele trei Crişuri” magazine. The first issue (of the new series) was 
published in April 1990. The editorial office was made up of intellectuals 
with old cultural and literary concerns: Dr. Viorel Faur (director), Miron 
Blaga (editor-in-chief), Constantin Mălinaş (secretary general of the editorial 
office), Nicolae Brânda, Corneliu Crăciun, Teodor Crişan, Ion Davideanu, 
Dr. Mihai Drecin, Blaga Mihoc, Barbu Ştefănescu and Ioan Ţepelea, only 
personalities that represented some fields of science and local and national 
literary activity. 
During its development, there were changes in the editorial 
committee, yet its basic structure remained the same, thus providing a 
necessary and productive continuity, particularly from a qualitative point of 
view. 
Certainly, the most interesting would be an analytical aproach of the 
content of the cultural magazine and of its contributors. 
On this occasion, we aim at noting the essential dates referring to 
its publication. Due to the fact that the magazine had as priority reaching 
the legal stores of some libraries, in order to be aware of the real situation of 
the issues in this (second) series of the Cele trei Crişuri magazine, we have 
decided on mentioning this very useful information for the researchers of 
the Cele trei Crişuri magazine: 
 
I, 1990, no. 1 (April), 12 pages 
 no.2 (May), 16 p. 
 no. 3 (June), 12 p. 
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 no. 4-5 (July-August), 16 p. 
 no. 6 (September), 12 p. 
 no. 7 (October) 16 p. 
 no. 8 (November), 16 p. 
 no. 9 (December), 16 p. 
Total: 8 issues comprising 116 pages 
 
II, 1991, no. 1-2 (January-February), 20 p 
 no. 3 (March), 12 p. 
 no. 4 (April), 12 p. 
 no. 5 (May), 12 p. 
 no. 6 (June), 16 p. 
 no. 7 (July) 12 p. 
 no. 8 (August), 12 p. 
no. 9 (September), 12 p. 
 no. 10 (October), 12 p. 
 no. 11(November), 12 p. 
 no. 12 (December), 12 p. 
Total: 11 issues comprising 144 pages 
 
III, 1992, no. 1-2 (January), 12 p. 
 no.2 (February), 12 p. 
 no. 3 (March), 12 p. 
 no. 4 (April), 12 p. 
 no. 5 (May), 12 p. 
 no. 6-7 (June-July), 12 p. 
 no. 8 (August), 12 p. 
 no. 9-10 (September-October), 12 p. 
 no. 11(November-December), 12 p. 
                        Total:  9 issues comprising 108 pages 
IV, 1993, no. 1-2 (January-February), 12 p. 
 no. 3-4 (March-April), 16 p. 
 no. 5-6 (May-June), 12 p. 
 no. 7-8 (July-August) 12 p. 
 no.9-10 (September-October), 12 p. 
 no. 11-12 (November-December), 12 p. 
 Total: 6 issues comprising 76 pages 
 
V, 1994, no. 1-2 (January-February), 12 p. 
 no. 3-4 (March-April), 12 p. 
 no. 5-6 (May-June), 12 p. 
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 no. 7-8 (July-August) 12 p. 
 no.9-10 (September-October), 12 p. 
 no. 11-12 (November-December), 12 p. 
______________________________________ 
 Total: 6 issues comprising 76 pages 
VI, 1995, no. 1-2 (January-February), 12 p. 
 no. 3-4 (March-April), 16 p. 
 no. 5-6 (May-June), 12 p. 
 no. 7-8 (July-August) 12 p. 
 no.9 (September-October), 12 p. 
 no. 11-12 (November-December), 12 p. 
 Total: 6 issues comprising 76 pages 
VII, 1996, no. 1-2 (January-February), 12 p. 
 no. 3-4 (March-April), 16 p. 
 no. 5-6 (May-June), 12 p. 
 no. 7-8 (July-August) 12 p. 
 no.9 (September-October), 12 p. 
 no. 11-12 (November-December), 12 p. 
 Total: 6 issues comprising 72 pages 
VIII, 1997, no. 1-3 (January-March), 8 p. 
 no. 4-6 (April-June), 8 p. 
 no. 7-9 (July-September), 8 p. 
 no. 10-12 (October-December) 8 p. 
_____________________________ 
 Total: 4 issues comprising 32 pages 
 
IX, 1998, no. 1-2 (January-February), 8 p. 
 no. 3-4 (March-April), 8 p. 
 no. 5-6 (May-June), 8 p. 
 no. 7-8 (July-August) 8 p. 
 no.9-10 (September-October), 8 p. 
 no. 11-12 (November-December), 8 p. 
 Total: 6 issues comprising 48 pages 
IV, 1999, no. 1-2 (January-February), 8 p. 
 no. 3-4 (March-April), 8 p. 
 no. 5-6 (May-June), 8 p. 
 no. 7-9 (July-September) 8 p. 
 no. 10-12 (October-December), 8 p. 
 Total: 5 issues comprising 40 pages 
IV, 2000, no. 1-3 (January-March), 8 p. 
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Thus, during the time covering (April) 1990– (January-March) 2000, 
fifty-eight issues of the “Cele trei Crişuri” magazine with 788 pages (format 
14/50 cm) were published. 
After that date, the leadership of the editorial committee was taken 
over by Prof. Dr. Antonio Faur (as a director) and the magazine was edited in 
much better printing conditions. At the same time, the format changed to 
book, in order to be better preserved in the library. Since then (i.e. issue no. 
4-6/2000), the third series of the Cele trei Crişuri magazine has been published. 
We believe that all data referring to the second series of the Cele trei 
Crişuri are useful to both researchers and readers willing to become familiar 
with its content. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The establishment of the “Cele trei Crişuri” Cultural Foundation in Oradea at the 
beginning of the year 1990 had beneficial consequences on the local and national cultural life. Its 
initiator, Professor Viorel Faur, revived the activity of the nation wide famous interwar institution, 
Reuniunea Culturală Cele trei Crişuri (Cele trei Crişuri Cultural Reunion) working in Oradea 
and Bucharest from 1920 to 1944, when it was banned by the Soviet occupation forces. He had 
the suport of the Royal Foundations and of the Romanian Government. Unfortunately, the new 
foundation had to acquire funding from different economic agents and received it due to the 
endeavours of the director. Several history, poetry, and literary criticism belonging to local authors, 
or authors from other academic centres, were thus published. It was the result of a successful long-
term effort thanks to the perseverance and influence the director enjoyed in public area. An 
important aspect of the Cele trei Crişuri Foundation was the publishing of the second series of the 
interwar magazine Cele trei Crişuri that was printed from 1990 to 2000. From the year 2000 
on, the third series was published in a new format. Many well-known representatives of local and 
national culture contributed to the second series. The article aims to show in broad lines the 
achievements of the Foundation and the magazine while run by Professor Viorel Faur, so that the 
reader may have a good knowledge on this important page of the cultural history of Bihor. 
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Culture and Power in European Space 
 
 
 
Alina STOICA* 
 
 
The conscious process of forming the political, institutional and 
economic unity of European space can be traced back only a few decades 
ago, actually begining in the context of world bi-polar situation established 
by the end of the Second World War, once proposed by Robert Schuman 
on 9 May 19501. This action of transposition in practice of the idea of 
European unity came as a first materialisation of numerous initiatives and 
projects of the political thinkers that were suported throughout the 
centuries. The end of the war and the realities that followed have created the 
perception of danger in Europe's awareness of its position, the loss of its 
role on the stage of international relations worldwide, and last but not least 
of its identity. 
  
                                                     
* Associate Professor, Ph.D. Oradea University, professor Jean Monnet (Module – 
Cultural Diplomacy at de Eastern and Western Borders of “Cultural Diplomacy at 
the East and West Borders of the European Union - an Essential Element in the 
process of European Integration”, Grant Agreement no. 2012-2854/001-00) 
1 At 9 May 1950, Robert Schuman, by his proposal, determined the creation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first supranational institution 
from which today’s EU has developed, he started from the assumption that ”[w]orld 
peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to 
the dangers which threaten it”; and that ”[t]he coming together of the nations of 
Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany”. 
He continued to make his case through the arguments of the changing material 
structure and the change of minds triggered by supranational integration: ”The 
pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up 
of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation 
of Europe ... The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any 
war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially 
impossible ... that fusion of interest ... may be the leaven from which may grow a 
wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by 
sanguinary divisions”. Robert Schuman, Declaration of 9 May 1950, text version on 
http://europa.eu.int/abc/ symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm. 
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Culture, religion and the idea of European unity 
Special attention has been paid in recent years, in the published 
literature at the national and international level, to the reason which led to 
the unification of Europe and its historic journey. If we try to answer briefly 
to the first challenge, that regards the reason of unification, researching the 
history, we reach to the writings of the ancient Greeks and to the default 
theme of the oposition between the two continents, Asia and Europe2, 
mirrored in many military conflicts, which have awakened the consciousness 
of Greek cities of belonging to the Hellenic culture. The need for unity, on 
grounds of security, convinced ancient Greeks to find a language, a religion, 
a mentality and a culture with an important common substratum. 
Subsequently, unifying ideas have become definite from the Imperial 
perspective, around a hegemonic power-Rome. Among the factors of the 
construction of the of Cicero's Ecumenical Fortress3, the leading cultural 
factor is the default language, religion, customs and traditions that colonists 
and Roman veterans have forwarded  to the newly  incorporated regions of 
Rome by means of  soft power or  peaceful or by a  military one, by means 
of force or hard power. The Roman force of ideas was not limited to the 
power, the victories or to the dominant status of the Empire, but has 
boosted and given the consistency of the concept of the "Roman 
civilization", oposite to and superior to that of the "barbarian"4. Medieval 
time has preserved landmarks of the Roman world, its values, its impressive 
culture (which had assimilated the Hellenistic culture, the Dutch, but also 
local peculiarities of the provinces conquered or assimilated), Latin, which 
continued to be used as an official language in the West of the continent by 
the end of the Middle Ages, the criteria of political organisation, science of 
law, the idea of universal empire, etc. The cumulative power of the Roman 
Empire, completed by the unifying role of Christianity formed the basis for 
European unity. 
                                                     
2 See: Hippocrates –About Waters, Places and Winds; Aristotel – Politica etc. 
3 Alina Stoica, History of European Unity Idea, Oradea University Press, 2015, p.56. 
4 Barbarian means the other one, one who lived outside the Roman space and 
belonged to other people. The etymology of the word is onomatopoeic and derives 
from the sounds of the bar, and we convey the impossibility of the Greeks and 
Romans to understand each other's language. Transposed in facts, this idea has 
become an element of identity and differentiation between civilizations (n.n.). See 
also Maria do Ceu Fialho, Cidadania e Celebração na Grécia Antiga, in Maria Manuela 
Tavares Ribeiro (coord.), „Europa em Mutação”, Coimbra, Quarteto, 2003, p.13-15; 
Helen Bacon, Barbarians in Greek Tragedy, New Haven, 1961; Eschil, Agamemnon, 
http://ro.scribd.com/doc/24825912/Eschil-Agamemnon#scribd. 
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Do we have nowadays a United Europe in terms of economic, 
political or military perspective? We can admit without doubt numerous 
attempts in this direction, but any glimpse of success? The Romanian 
scholar, Member of the Romanian Academy, N. Bagdasar, in a paper which 
he had signed in 1931, regarding the idea of European unity, having 
previously made a review of the gap which characterizes the creative peoples 
of European culture, N. Bagdasar noted: ”From about 1845 untill now we 
didn't do  anything else than asking ourselves what Europe says and we 
strived to match us up after it.  Almost one hundred years, in which a young 
and healthy people makes the politics Caragiale heroes. Without asking a 
single moment what is this Europe and if it truly exists"5, cautiously 
underscored the Romanian researcher. 
About "the dream of European unity as a seductive possibility"6  
writes O. Pecican, in his efforts to highlight the "East intake"7 in the 
deliberations concerning the formation of Europe. The famous professor 
from Cluj Napoca city is the opinion that the only real and full basis for the 
idea of European unity is "risk-taking, internalizing and feeling as being 
imperative the need of the citizens -no matter what part of the continent- to 
be together. This has become more and more a reality starting from an elite 
and becoming, through education or contagion, the mirage of prosperity 
etc.-a wider aspiration"8. 
What chance of coagulation would have had Europe if it would 
have started from the principle of cultural unity, instead of the economic? 
Jean Monnet himself, father of Europe, towards the end of his life said that "If 
we were to do it all again we would start with culture." If the geographical 
delimitation of Europe had in mind at all times outlining the borders, 
cultural and spiritual side of Europe has abolished the frontiers, giving 
european space a unity. 
The success of Christianity as a unifying factor was the central idea 
of this religion, according to which all men have one God, so they must 
enjoy the same rights and rules accroding to their merit. "We believe that there 
is one God, creator of the world, which has forged it out of nothingness through his word, 
who was born before all ages”9. 
                                                     
5 Nicolae Bagdasar, Înspre realităţile noastre, în Nae Ionescu, Roza vânturilor, 16 aprilie 
1931, Bucureşti, Editura Roza Vânturilor, 1991, p.91-94; prima ediţia datează din 
1941 
6 Ovidiu Pecican, Europa o idee în mers, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Fundaţiei pentru Studii 
Europene, 1997, p.17. 
7 Ibidem, p.12. 
8 Ibidem, p.18-19 
9 Tertulian, De Doctrina Cristiana. See:https://bucatidincarti.wordpress.com/ 
2008/04/25/scurta-istorie-a-aparitiei-crestinismului/#more-184 
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Therefore, the religious dimension of the European culture is 
represented by Christianity. Its rapid spread and the impact on people was 
closely followed by an intense culture that, thoroughly analysed, can justify 
the tendency of Christianity to spread over the whole surface of the Earth. 
Beneficiary of the contribution of Greek philosophy, Christianity has 
proven the creator character in terms of politics and culture, an "axis 
mundi", with rules from which neither Kings could derogate. The European 
world was turned into a very well organized structure itself, influencing 
European States. "In none of the existing cultures, State organization never 
came to the development Europe has met -a separation of powers in a State, 
which guarantees a normal running10." 
It should be also noted that, in the first part of I Millennium a.d., 
the emergence of more significant cracks, led to the replacement of political 
and territorial unification tendencies with one at a spiritual level, based on 
the idea of Christian universalism. However, 1054 schism also prompted  
breaking this unit, emphasizing the political rivalries. The Christian Church 
could not, with few exceptions, become a true theocratic power. And yet, 
her contribution is indestructible. With the coming of Christ on Earth, has 
emerged in the world a new era of culture and progress, without which we 
would probably return in prehistory.11  
What Christianity meant for European culture? Her very existence. 
At the cultural foundation of the European peoples there are the book, 
school, science and Christian art, being all promoted and suported by the 
Christian Church, since ancient times, to the middle ages and modernity. 
Where Christianity has spread and Church was being organized, there 
entered the light of book and culture. In the Church`s convenants, reading 
and writing were the most common occupations. Thanks to the writings of 
Christian monks, historians have benefited from unusual sources, required 
to the reconstitution of the past. Furthermore all the peoples of Europe 
”have started their literature and culture by Christian writings initiated and 
inspired by the Church "12. The first European schools have been set up in 
addition to the churches or monasteries. The books used were books of 
hours and teachers were clergymen. The school as an institution is "a house 
of culture, the institution in which they are taught letters, formed the ideas, 
cultivated the spirit and matured the culture. Until modern times, the State 
had no connection with the school. Instead, the Church makes the school 
one of its essential purposes. Having as purpose the need of catechizing and 
                                                     
10 Ionescu, Nae, Scrieri, Bucureşti, Editura Eminescu, 1988, p.377. 
11 Felea, Ilarion, Religia culturii, Arad, Editura Episcopiei Ortodoxe Române a Aradului, 
1994, p.227. 
12 Ibidem 
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learning in general, which begins suddenly with the spread of Christianity, 
the Church has taught in school all the neophytes, getting them used to 
books and with the light of science”13. 
Therefore, the Church has promoted values that have contributed 
to the creation of European culture. Nowadays, in a society reached by 
disruption, which functions at the limit of laws and social norms14, which 
focuses its efforts on meeting the immediate needs of the people, but at the 
same time stimulates the wishes to enhance the consumption of goods, 
Churches are in a complex situation, to constantly remind people that their 
existence is not reduced at right away. 
Therefore, "the bigger attachment to Mysteries and Sacredness, the 
more dificult the adaptation, because the "body "civilization has come to 
claim that it can work even without the presence of the sacred"15. Here 
comes education, school, culture and mentality of the community, which 
comunity, State and the European Union convey. 
"The European Union shall contribute to the flowering of the 
cultures of the Member States, while respecting national and regional 
diversity and putting the highlights at the same time on common cultural 
heritage"16. To what extent is there a unifying cultural, educational level in 
Europe? 
 
European educational policies 
Since the mid-1980s, the Council of Europe has been involved in a 
major research programme on the evaluation of national cultural policies. At 
first there were evaluated the founding States of the EU. Then, in 2000, 15 
countries had already been analysed, other 4 were under consideration and 
some other 9 were to be analyzed17. European Commission has adopted a 
series of recommendations on the promotion inside each European State of 
an education encompassing not only structurally, but also in the educational 
content, elements of coincidence. Currencies adopted were "education for 
democracy", "long life education", "multicultural education". 
                                                     
13 Ibidem, p.228-229. 
14 Ilie Bădescu, Ozana Cucu-Oancea, Ghe. Şişiştean, Tratat de sociologie rurală, Bucureşti, 
Editura Mica Valahie, 2012, p.157. 
15 Alexandru Duţu, Ideea de Europa şi evoluţia conştiinţei europene, Bucureşti, Editura ALL 
Educaţional, 1999, 225. 
16 Official Journal of the European Union, the Treaty ...., art. 165, 2004, p. 74. See to 
http://www.justice.gov.md/file/Centrul%20de%20armonizare%20a%20legislatiei/
Baza%20de%20date/Materiale%202012/Legislatie/32004L0882.pdf 
17 Simion Mundy, Politici culturale. Un scurt ghid, Editura Consiliului Europei, Strasbourg, 
2000, p.2  
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Currently, the correlation between education and religion at national 
level but also at Europeanl level, advocates for healthy evolution of society. 
European standards, adopted by the national ones have in mind the role 
religion can play in the field of education, even though the school is no 
longer the prerogative of the Church nowadays. 
The fall of the Communist bloc in 1989-1991 and technological 
revolution have generated radical changes within the States released, 
modifying, among others the importance given to the role of the Church in 
society. The relationship between education and religious values is being 
reviewed. For example, in the case of Romania, shapes without background 
which migrated from West to East-and we are referring in particular to the 
freedom and democracy that are in contrast with the constraints with which the 
Romanian society was accustomed to- totaled questions respecting the 
direction toward which straightened the Romanian society and education. 
Then, certain objectives of national educational policies are induced by 
concerns about speeding up the process of European integration. These 
effects are felt either directly, by strengthening the foreign languages 
teaching, either indirectly by comparing the school policies. As a result, 
European institutions see themselves forced to imagine innovative policies, 
thus trying to keep up with the renovation of educational systems.  
Therefore, At EU level, education is the responsibility of the 
Member States. Union institutions play a suporting role only. In accordance 
with article 165 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, 
the community "shall contribute to the development of quality education by 
encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by 
suporting and suplementing their action while fully the responsibility of the 
Member States towards the content of education and the organisation of the 
education system, as well as their cultural and linguistic diversity."18  
Undoubtedly, the present European educational policies and 
strategies are geared primarily towards education in the spirit of democratic 
citizenship and social cohesion. Educational systems must face various 
challenges, developments and issues related to both education and society as 
a whole. Under these circumstances, it increases the role of education as a 
factor contributing dramatically to social cohesion. Cooperation on 
European policies in the field of education and vocational training began 
with the adoption of the white paper on education and training. "Teaching 
and learning-towards the knowledge society", by means of which European 
Union is selfdefining it as heading towards a learning based society, based 
on the acquisition of new knowledge and on lifelong learning. The 
                                                     
18 Official Journal of the European Union …., p.74, accessed by May 2012 
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document was published just prior to the launch in 1996 of the European 
year of Lifelong Learning19. 
In 1997 issued a communication from the Commission- ”For a 
Europe of knowledge”-linking the objective of lifelong learning with 
proposals for programmes relating to education and training in the period 
2000-2006. Among them we mention the Erasmus programme, which, over 
the past 20 years, has allowed cross-University exchanges, which have 
received tens of thousands of students and teachers in education scholarship 
programs, placement, staff training and teaching staff. We can also add 
Leonardo da Vinci programme, addressed to students but also to academics 
who have been successful in conducting staff training. 
In January 2000-Socrates II Programme began Grundtvig 
subprogram aimed at adult education, and in November 2006 there apeared- 
”Programme for Lifelong Learning 2007-2013”. New program brings 
together former programmes as Socrates and Leonardo da Vinci20. 
European educational policies aimed at the educational systems. 
Influenced by the phenomenon of economic globalization/regionalization, 
which we are facing recent years, these cross significant changes involving 
an increasingly trendency for uniformity. Adapted to evolving society, which 
they represent, they are still marked by a multitude of differences among 
which we mention the education organization on cycles/levels of education 
or the school guidance concept. The phenomenon of globalization 
generates an evolution of  EU educational systems on two levels: vertical, 
qualitative-"the need to develop and adapt the school curriculum to the 
exigency of the optional perspective through curricular projects integrated 
into the Community requirements which belongs to the school; the 
formation of specialized teachers per fields of studies "-and "quantitative, 
horizontal – the growth and diversity of social phenomena facing the 
school: school migration and school deviation"21. On the other hand, the 
effects of political and social events of recent years (wars, technological 
revolution, etc.) that led to racism, violence, xenophobia, made it necessary 
to grant a special attention to education. One of the few instruments 
                                                     
19 Educaţia ca politică Europeană. Cooperarea europeană în domeniul educaţiei, vezi: 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/72382860/politici-educationale-europene, p.12, 
accessed by Aprilie 2012. 
20 Ibidem 
21 Camelia Ciucurescu, Dinamica sistemelor de învăţământ în Uniunea Europeană (teza de 
doctorat), Bucureşti, 2009, p.2, accessed by Aprilie 2012. Vezi: 
http://www.unibuc.ro/studies/Doctorate2010 Noiembrie/ 
Ciurescu%20Camelia%20-%20Dinamica% 
20Sistemelor%20de%20Invatamant%20in%20Uniunea% 20Europeana/ 
Rezumat%20Teza%20doctorat.pdf. 
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available to States and communities, education is absolutely necessary to 
find some cures for European and world issues. But for this the European 
Commission and the European Council have decided to concentrate 
educational policies towards increasing the quality and effectiveness of 
education systems and vocational training in the EU, but also to the 
improvement of education and training of teachers and trainers. 
 
European cultural networks 
The unification of Europe, "the European Common House", tries 
to eliminate formal borders between different cultures which make up the 
European area. Thus, future generations will no longer need to have the 
option for one of the cultures, but will focus on the educational element, 
which can freely access any of them.  
An essential contribution in that direction have European cultural 
networks. Established since the 1980s, they are now aproximately 500 so far 
of which about 100 are functional. In the 1990s became a generic term 
encompassing unofficial contacts between professionals. It should be noted, 
too, that they have the advantage of "alternative aproaches that official 
bodies, too limited by inherited policy cannot offer. In the same way, the 
networks provide a broader base for policy development than any individual 
institution, protecting its own funding base and projects "22. 
Particularly effective in the direction of cooperation, networks 
represent "functional compromise between market and organization, 
maximizing the positive characteristics and minimizing negative ones." 
When you create a network there are usually some concrete common 
objectives, it is the answer to the need to exercise a mutual aid, the need to 
break isolation, establish contacts and the framing of a common aproach. 
Most of the times the network becomes the platform for exchanging and 
acquiring the attitudes, beliefs and ideas, promoting the common interests 
of its members23. 
Manifesto of European cultural networks adopted in Brussels on 21 
September 1997, by the Forum of European Cultural Networks, considered 
that "European cultural networks contribute to European cohesion, 
facilitating mobility of cultural operators, cross-cultural communication, 
makes it easy to combat xenophobia, racism and provides practice in 
intercultural understanding, strengthens the cultural dimension of 
development which is not produced by purely economic factors." Even 
                                                     
22 Simion Mundy, op.cit., p.22. 
23 Ibidem, p.23. 
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nowadays European institutions encourage the formation of thematic 
networks24. 
Perhaps the first European regional alliance with cultural pursuits 
was The Working Community of the Alpine Countries. Created in 1972, 
with the name Arge Alp this unitfied new regions in four States (Austria, 
Italy, Germany, Sweden). Designed to protect the alpine cultural differences, 
this goal has resulted in recommendations in various fields, including that of 
education at local, regional, and State level. Maybe one of those long living 
cultural networks, was the one that resulted in 1976 from intergovernmental 
relationship involving France, Germany and Sweden. Originally intended for 
the settlement of problems of the neighbourhood, it has long controlled 
even inter-university relations, and since the 1990s has encouraged school 
collaboration towards promoting bilingualism25, one of the most pressing 
local issues, possible a trigger of violence.  
Work Community for the Western Alps founded in 1982 whose 
cooperation protocol called together three Italian regions, two French and 
three Swedish cantons, has provided a framework for cooperation in the 
field of culture and education. 
Currently, the best known networks in the field of culture in 
Europe are IMET (Informal Meetings of European Theatres), EFACH 
(European Forum for the Arts and Cultural Heritage), ENTCFCM 
(European Network of Training Centres and Faculties of Cultural 
Managers), AIRS (Association of Independent Radio Stations), etc.26, all 
acting in the direction of cooperation and the development of European 
culture in a uniform manner. 
In conclusion, regional cross-border cooperation at the educational 
level is not yet an interstate European education policy, but only a start in 
this direction. At the education level, each State observes and analyzes the 
education system of neighbouring State or States, thus making its own 
reform. Exchange of experience for pupils, students and teachers effectively 
contribute to an alignmentof the European educational systems. To all this 
it is added validation of diplomas that attests to mutual recognition between 
States. Part of the national or European culture, educational system evolves 
                                                     
24 Prima strategie europeană pentru cultură. (The First European Strategy for culture), 
accesed May 2012. Vezi: http://www.muzee.org/romania/ro/noutati/foarte-
important.-prima-strategie-europeana-pentru-cultura.html; Dorel Zaharia, Beneficiile 
existenţei reţelelor culturale tematice europene, p. 269-270. Vezi: http://www.philologica-
jassyensia.ro/upload/VI_2_Zaharia.pdf  
25 Euroregiunile – forme şi structuri teritoriale de cooperare transfrontalieră. Accessed by May 
2012. Vezi: http://www.scribd.com/doc/78230866/Intro-Ist-Euroreg 
26 Zaharia, Dorel, Beneficiile existenţei reţelelor culturale tematice europene. Vezi: 
http://www.philologica-jassyensia.ro/upload/VI_2_Zaharia.pdf ., p. 270. 
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in paralel with it. In an era of globalization, national culture of European 
countries gives individuality and unity even for European Union. In suport 
of these ideas come the thematic cultural networks of the European Union, 
which, on the path of cooperation and mutual suport, are able to aproach 
the States, regions, and especially people. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In the present context of attempts to achieve the objectives of strengthening European 
unity, when it is obvious the failure of previous attempts of unity from the economic policy side to 
the political one, it might be time to look with more confidence toward the role that culture might 
play in this regard, as essential element of the European integration process. It is already well 
known the role of cultural diplomacy in the foreign policy of the states, from the most powerful to all 
other. On the occasion of several national and international conferences we have addressed this 
topic. Moreover we tried to demonstrate the probability of creating a unique foreign policy of the 
European Union, based on the cultural factor and on how it manages to retain the link between 
European cities and the former ex-colonial Territories. We have tried to demonstrate the economic 
power and the role that the EU could gain on the international relations scene.  
The present work aims to develop another text of ours published only in Romanian, in 
2013, at Marne Publishing House, Italy, in a collective volume-”Education and Faith toward a 
Reunification of the Values”. We propose to show the role that culture had in the case of the idea 
of European unity, relying for centuries on religion as a unifying factor, but also on the relationship 
between these European peoples, culture and education. 
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Between Democracy and Totalitarism. The Case of 
Patriotic Union from Bihor County (1945-1947) 
 
 
 
Gabriel MOISA* 
 
 
Situated in the category of “the traveler fellows” of the 
communists, the Patriots’ Union of Romania played an important role in the 
effort to conquer the power, along with other such structures as Plowmen 
Front, Hungarian People’s Union, Patriotic Defense, etc. 
The Union of Patriots was founded by the communist circles in 
Romania as an illegal organization in the summer of 1942, in order to 
contribute to finalize a comprehensive internal oposition as against the war 
unleashed against the Soviet Union. After August 23rd 1944, its work was 
quickly redirected in order to un-fascism the country. The Union of Patriots 
joined the platform draft of the National Democratic Front prepared by the 
communists and claimed Dr. Petru Groza government installed on March 
6th 1945, under which the government had 5 ministries1. That in the 
conditions under which one of the party’s leader, Gheorghe Vlădescu-
Răcoasa, said in September 1944 that the Union of Patriots was not “a 
political party that splits posts and ministries”2. Since September 1944 the Union 
of Patriots assignment remained the coordination of the citizen committees and 
village committees recently emerged. Structures of the Union of Patriots have 
been established throughout the country, with the purpose of “cleaning 
enterprises, institutions, faculties and schools of Guard elements”3. In the world of 
villages, the members of the Patriots’ Union joined first the organizations of 
the Plowmen Front to “share as” the greater properties than 50 hectares. In 
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1 The National Bank of Romania, Restitutio. Viaţa şi opera lui Mitiţă Constantinescu, nr. 4 , 
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cities, the “guards” of the organization dealt with “unmasks” within the 
frame of the “saboteurs of enterprises, speculators and owners who dose goods”4. 
The General Congress of the Union of Patriots in January 10-12th 
1946 decided to turn this organization in the National People Party. Among 
the 120 members of the Central Committee of the new party were among 
others Dr. Dumitru Bagdasar, Petre Constantinescu-Iasi, Traian Sãvulescu, 
Andrei Oţetea, Alexandru Philipide, George Călinescu, etc. It was passing to 
a new stage in the conquest of the power by the communists, and they had 
to be stronger organized, the year 1946 being a decisive year in this respect 
with regard to runoff election in November. 
The first organization of the Patriots’ Union in Bihor County was 
founded on October 15th 1944 in Beiuş even before the total release of 
Bihor County by the Romanian and Soviet armies, at a setting meeting, 
followed by a call on the purpose and program exposure of the 
organization5. This meeting was attended by several residents of Beiuş city, 
the most of them attending out of curiosity rather than of a real interest. 
The population was not extremely eager to enroll in the new political 
structure. This can be found also from a report of January 17th 1945, where 
they were placed 200 members on the lists of Beiuş organization. But only 
50 of them paid regularly their membership fee and only one, in the person 
of the branch president, Alexandru Riţiu, could be considered active, the 
other members remaining “inactive”6. Also, the report mentioned that despite 
of this situation, the political party suporters were numerous, at least 3000 - 
4000 people, “closely grouped around the P.U.”7. Given this situation, only a 
small number of persons of the suporters of the crowd succeeded to be 
worked in, the document noted that there was “a defect in the organization”8; 
blamed on the “lack of propaganda and the small number of the held meetings”9. On 
the other hand, it was specified here, “the lack of a democratic political party”10 
more difficult to organize because people wanted “to join not the organization 
but the democratic political parties”11, cause of which it was believed that the 
“Plowmen Front would be more successful”12. 
                                                     
4 Ibidem, p. 165 
5 Arhivele Naţionale – Serviciul Judeţean Bihor, Fond Partidul Naţional Popular – 
Organizaţia Judeţeană Bihor, dosar nr. 4/1945, f. 1 (referenced as A.N.- S.J.Bh) 
6 Ibidem 
7 Ibidem 
8 Ibidem 
9 Ibidem 
10 Ibidem 
11 Ibidem 
12 Ibidem 
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Since January 1945 they started the expansion of the Patriots’ 
Union, moving the party delegates in over than 30 communes and towns of 
the county area and the organization of some constituent assemblies. Of the 
30 localities only 20 were able to begin the organizing of the committees of 
the Patriots’ Union. In the other region of the county the structure of the 
organization was in progress. 
In the northern part of the county, the Union of Patriots was 
founded on October 20th 1944, soon after setting free of Oradea. The 
starting point was the general meeting of the day of November 12th 1944, 
held in a building in Oradea, 6 no. Theater Street 13, when it was formed a 
provisional County Committee composed by 9 members. Two were 
intellectuals, a clerk, a craftsman and five workers. Also, on this occasion it 
was set the political line, taking the decision to fight “against the national 
chauvinism existing between the cohabitant peoples (Romanian-Hungarian) and against 
the Nazi-fascist enemy until his final destruction”14. The first initiative in this 
regard was the exclusion of the two intellectuals who belonged to the 
provisional committee for that they proved to be “unhealthy elements, one of 
them having a fascist past”15. 
About how to conduct the Union organization in Oradea we find 
from a report of the local leaders of the party at December 30th 1944: “The 
village organization is running slowly and very hard, because the city population majority 
is Hungarian, in terms of propaganda we should act in two languages, Romanian and 
Hungarian, and the field of organization of the P.U. is the middle population stratum - 
intellectuals, merchants, craftsmen - and until today they withdraw to enter the political 
organization. But mostly that withdrawal is felt from the Romanian population, which 
both intellectual and the rest of the population is tested by chauvinist ideas and we are 
regarded as communists”16. However, in the first month of 1945, the Patriots’ 
Union organization in Oradea had registered 170 members of whom 30 
Romanian, 60 Hungarian, 50 Jews and 30 other nationalities (Germans, 
Serbs, Bulgarians)17. 
During this period, the Union of Patriots carried a little more 
consistent propaganda through the press articles explaining “What is the 
Patriots’ Union?”18 So, according to that “the P.U. is an organized mass movement. 
To it can participate and can be joined by all the patriots determined to fight against the 
opressor and exploiter Hitlerism and fascism without difference of gender, age, language or 
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16 Ibidem 
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religion, being excluded only the enemies of democracy”19. Meanwhile the political line 
of the Patriots’ Union is defined as one which “is reflected in its platform of fight 
and it is alongside the political struggle of the Romanian Communist Party, the most 
achievable progressive political line”20. 
An overview of the political life in the north-central part of our 
county is presented by Imre Tóth, an activist of the C.C. of the R.C.P. sent 
from Bucharest to Oradea in February 1945 to organize, control and direct 
the activities of the Patriots’ Union - Oradea. A few days after his arrival in 
the city on the Crisul Repede River he found that the political scene was 
monopolized by the left forces: “The M.N.S. groups (n.n. Magyar Nepi 
Szövetség – the Hungarian People’s Union), the Plowmen Front and Union 
Organization are highly organized, but M.N.S. grouped inside many Hungarian 
reactionary elements”21 – the activist warned. The conducted survey reveals the 
exclusiveness practiced by the Hungarian revanchist circles infiltrated in the 
leftist parties, particularly the communist22. This situation is aggravated in 
his view as the Communists of Bihor sat the Hungarian national interests 
before those of the party. “The Communist Party, composed of the Council of 11 
persons attending the board: Mikloş Gyarmati, Boroş Janos, Feldman and Balasz Emil 
lead the N.D.F. organization following their own principles”23, says the report by 
Tóth Imre. Regarding the Union of Patriots, the Romanian Communist 
Party put its great expectations to attract people on its side; the activist sent 
from Bucharest noted that “the line of the Union of Patriots is no existing”24. 
In the report drawn up on February 13th 1945, Imre Tóth specified 
that if till that moment the organization had registered 350 members of all 
nationalities, after that “it has ceased to be even a democratic mob directly to the 
Communist Party, with the main influence of Mikloş Gyarmati, who sent a circular to all 
members of the U.P.”25. The same figure was presenting a bleak picture of the 
party: “Their indiscipline (n.n. of U.P. members) led to the disintegration of the Union 
of Patriots that deliberately dissolved in several ethnic cells. We notify all the members of 
other origin than Romanian, women, youth, and friends that the organization of Oradea 
does not accept any more as so far members of any ethnicity - as instructed from the center. 
                                                     
19 Ibidem 
20 Ibidem 
21 A.N.- S.J. Bh., fond Partidul Naţional Popular – Organizaţia Judeţeană Bihor, dosar 
nr. 4/1945, f. 4 
22 Ion Zainea (coordinator), Democraţie occidentală şi democraţie populară: evoluţia spectrului 
politic în nord-vestul României (1944-1950), Oradea, Editura Universităţii din Oradea, 
(Oradea, 2004) p. 166 
23 A.N.- S.J. Bh., fond Partidul Naţional Popular – Organizaţia Judeţeană Bihor, dosar 
nr. 4/1945, f. 4 
24 Ibidem 
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So, only people of Romanian ethnic origin can be members of our organization. For this 
purpose we please the friends - who we are sure they will understand the political deep 
meaning of this issue - to be enrolled in Madosz26 and Jewish Democratic Union”27. 
In a letter on February 12th 1945, concluded with the slogan of 
FREEDOM! (text broadcast in Hungarian and translated into Romanian), 
signed on behalf of the Patriots’ Union - Oradea organization of Balogh 
Dumitru, Aranycs M., Szabo Dumitru, Rifflod M., Zuh Alexandru, Juhasz 
G. and Lusztig I., addressed “To all the members of the ns organization in Oradea 
of non-Romanian origin”, it was clearly called on ethnic segregation. It was, 
clearly, a text and an action of ethnic discrimination, produced, in fact, of 
political calculations, invoking inexistent provisions whereby the members 
of the Patriots’ Union who were not Romanian, were encouraged to enroll 
in the Hungarian People’s Union and the Jewish Democratic Union. The 
address asked the Romanian exclusivity of this organization, “without any 
justification for those who had registered or intended to join and without any real benefit 
for the Romanian population and beyond any of its requirements, in the place of this 
expected justification, just the expressing of the confidence in the friends who we are sure 
they will understand the political deep meaning of this issues ... “28 
In fact, the measure to forbid the non-Romanians to enter the 
Union of Patriots, despite the invocation of some provisions received from 
the higher bodies, was found to be abusive and - in a determined way - local 
generated by obvious political interests of group.  
The conclusions drawn by Tóth Imre led to eliminate from the Union 
of Patriots in Oradea of all those who were not ethnic Romanian. Therefore, 
only 40 people remained registered. This fact actually showed something else, 
the desire of the power to implement a new stage of organization and struggle 
of the Hungarians, that of regrouping in a single pole of power, of the 
Hungarian People’s Union, which could provide a better coordination of the 
planned actions, but also the discipline necessary to achieve the final objective29, 
namely to keep the Northern Transylvania on Hungary. 
In short time, the Union of Patriots – the organization of Bihor 
County, has become a structure composed exclusively of Romanian ethnics. 
They have organized a meeting on February 18th 1945, where “with Dr. 
Simonca presidentship all the ethnic Romanians joined the block and entered the Union of 
Patriots but without any program, any organization and any instructions given by us with 
                                                     
26 It is certainly a confusion, as they are Nepi Szövetség Magyar - Hungarian People’s 
Union Mandosz, as an organizational structure of the Hungarians in Romania has 
been in the interwar period 
27 A.N.- S.J. Bh., fond Partidul Naţional Popular – Organizaţia Judeţeană Bihor, dosar 
nr. 4/1945, f. 3 
28 Ibidem, f. 2. 
29 Ion Zainea (coordinator), op. cit., p. 166-167  
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the principles they had from various chauvinist parties. Being a special Romanian party, 
under the camouflage of the U.P., taking the first meeting, there was divergence between 
the principles of the U.P. and of the new congeries and, in fact, I wanted to intervene to 
explain the U.P. line, I was off being Jew ... “30. We are here in a paradoxical 
situation in which after Tóth Imre’s report practically prompted the leaving 
of Hungarians from the organization of the Patriots’ Union, it is him who 
deplores all this in an ostentatious gesture of facade. 
On February 18th 1945, in the Heymann cinema hall of Oradea, the 
general meeting of the Union of Patriots took place, attended, in addition to 
representatives of the other democratic organizations in the county, about 
600-700 Romanians. As we learn of the daily Viaţă Nouă (New Life) “during 
this great assembly, the intellectuals and Romanian democratic citizens of the town joined 
the organization of the Union of Patriots”31. Also during this meeting, they elected 
the Union of Patriots County Committee, composed of 7 members, and the 
Board of Directors of the Union of Patriots of 22 people32. On February 
20th1945, the first sitting after the general meeting of the management 
structure was completed in the following structure: first president - 
Gheorghe Şimonca (General Attorney), President - Ştefan Lipcei (Lawyer), 
Executive Chairman - Virgil Ciaclan (Lawyer), First Secretary - Dumitru 
Balogh (Official), Secretary - Iosif Tăutu (Official), treasurer - Michael 
Arania (Craftsman) plus two members of the Board - Ioan Magdu (Official) 
and Teodor Popa (Lawyer)33. 
The Board consisted of: Laurenţiu Botoş (Judge), Aron Popoviciu 
(Court Official), Traian Surducan (Sedra Orphan County Chairman), 
Teodor Prodan (City Hall First Advisers), Gavril Seleşiu (Senior Official of 
the Municipality), Ioan Abrudan (T.T.P. Engineer), Petre Fărcaşiu 
(Inspector T.T.P.), Iosif Caba (Conductor T.T.P.), Iosif Pop (Police, 
retired), Alexandru Pop (Police, retired), Alexander Caloş (Finance Official), 
Ioan Florea (Finance Official), Ioan Rosca (Bank Director), Dumitru Hera 
(County School Inspector), Ernestine Tiponuţiu (Official), Ioan Mezei 
(Trader), Vasile Oraş (Craftsman), Peter Huşca (Craftsman), John Breban 
(Craftsman), Teodor Benţiu (R.R.W. Official), Traian Leu (Worker) and 
Dumitru Sabău (Worker)34. In the same meeting, there were also elected the 
members of the organization that would represent the Union of Patriots in 
the County Parliament of the N.D.F., respectively Simonca Gheorghe, 
                                                     
30 A.N.- D.J. Bh., fond Partidul Naţional Popular – Organizaţia Judeţeană Bihor, 
dosar nr. 4/1945, f. 4 and back 
31 Înaintea marii adunări a U.P., în „Viaţă Nouă”, an I, nr. 30, 18 februarie 1945, p. 1 
32 A.N.- S..J. Bh., fond Partidul Naţional Popular – Organizaţia Judeţeană Bihor, dosar 
nr. 5/1945, f. 3 
33 Ibidem, f. 1  
34 Comitetul de conducere al U.P., in „Viaţă Nouă”, an I, nr. 38, 28 februarie 1945, p. 2 
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Ciaclan Virgil and Aranici Mihai, as the old representation in the person of 
Mr. Pop Ionel should be changed. As it can be ascertained, the management 
structures were composed exclusively by Romanian ethnic citizens. 
In conclusion, we can say that the whole situation was caused not 
by any xenophobic attitude of the local political leaders, Romanian or 
Hungarian, of the Union of Patriots – the organization of Bihor County. 
This successful attempt to segregate the formation on ethnic criteria had 
joined the effort almost general of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania 
ceded to Hungary after the Vienna Dictate, which aimed at preserving the 
territory to Hungary. This did not hesitate to separate from the Romanians 
constituting its own political structures to campaign in this regard. The 
Hungarian People’s Union was the most important of them being in close 
alliance relationship adjunct to the Romanian Communist Party, a 
Romanian Communist Party dominated in that period at the decisional level 
of Hungarian and Jewish ethnic elements in Transylvania, the latter of 
Hungarian culture. The very representative of the C.C. of the R.C.P. sent to 
Oradea to target the local organization of the Union of Patriots, Tóth Imre, 
was a Hungarian Jew of Transylvania, as he himself acknowledges. The 
conclusions of his report are relevant in this regard. Even he, a messenger of 
the C.C. of the R.C.P., suggests the separation on ethnic principles which 
shows us the official line of at least a substantial part of the central 
management of the Romanian communists. 
The leaders of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania did not 
hesitate for a moment during that period being involved in their national 
interest, to acquire communist feelings, hoping that they will come to meet 
Moscow and Stalin who has not decided yet the fate of the Northern 
Transylvania, showing be more loyal and more reliable to the Soviet power 
than the Romanians. Moscow’s decision of March 9th 1945, according that 
Transylvania lost by Romania after the Vienna Dictate is in the composition 
of the Romanian state has produced disapointment among the Hungarian 
minority leaders. Their effort to communize after in the interwar period they 
had, as members of the Hungarian Party, an anti-Soviet position had been in 
vain. They have not however droped the idea and the examples are 
numerous in the years following the World War II.  
After the return of the Romanian administration in the Northern 
Transylvania, the Hungarian local political structures have temporarily 
supressed their impulses, even if only of surface, bound to accept the 
international realities of ethnic cohabitation with the Romanians until the 
arrival of better times. Locally, shortly after returning of the Transylvanian 
territories to Romania, on March 18th 1945, were published “The Apeal of 
the Patriots’ Union and of the Plowmen Front to the Romanian Brothers in 
Oradea and Bihor County” and “The Apeal of the Hungarian People’s 
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Union to the Hungarian Population of Bihor County”, produced and 
disseminated in the context of restoring the Romanian administration in the 
Northern Transylvania, which was urging the citizens to discipline and 
mutual respect35. 
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Nicolae Iorga and Oradea 
 
 
 
Mihai D. DRECIN* 
 
 
 
Nicolae Iorga, in good faith being named “the historian of his 
people”dedicated his entire life to the writing of the Romanian past and to 
the making of our national history in the first half of XXth century. In the 
central part of his writing and his political activity stood the demonstration 
of autohtony and continuity of his forerunners in the national geographic 
space, of economic, cultural, religious and soul unity of Romanian people 
from Nistru to Tisa, until 19181. As a political man, party leader, deputee 
and senator in several legislatures, president of the Chamber of Deputees 
and of the Senate, prime-minister, suporter of Royal House- he remarked 
himself as a defender of the Union from 1918 and consolidator of united 
Romania2.  
In this double quality of researcher of the past history and creator 
of history of his times, Nicolae Iorga comes twice in the city near the Cris 
River, at 36 years distance of time, during the Austro- Hungarian regime, 
respectively during Romania Reunited.  
After in 1901, he published “The history of Romanian literature in 
the XVIIIth century”, a paper as Iorga himself acknowledges “with such a 
difficult subject from whose prelucration they were completely missing the 
preparatory papers”3 (in the sense of virgin terrain, not aproached until 
                                                     
* professor PhD at the University of Oradea, Department of History 
1 Look for arguements in his syntheses Istoria poporului românesc (The history of the 
Romanian people), Editura Casei Şcoalelor, Vălenii de Munte, 1922- 1927; Istoria 
românilor, f.e., Bucureşti, 1936- 1939.  
2 Mihail Opriţescu, Partidul Naţionalist – Democrat (1910- 1938) condus de Nicolae Iorga 
(The Nationalist – Democrat Party (1910- 1938) led by Nicolae Iorga, Tip. Fed Print SA, 
Bucureşti, 2000; Petre Ţurlea, N. Iorga în viaţa politică a României, (N. Iorga in the 
political life of Romania), Editura Enciclopedica Bucureşti, 1995; Idem, N. Iorga. O 
viaţă pentru neamul românesc (N. Iorga. A life for the Romanian people), Editura 
ProHistoria, Bucureşti, 2001.  
3 N. Iorga, O viaţă de om aşa cum a fost, (The life of a man as it was), Editura Minerva, 
Bucureşti, 1964, p. 211, edition prepared by Valeriu Râpeanu and Sanda Râpeanu.  
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then, even on small pieces, by the predecessors –n.n.), the author feels the 
need of its completion with unpublished material from the libraries of Blaj 
and Greek- Catholique Oradea. It is about the studies owned to the 
representatives of Ardelean School and to their students.  
It must be underlined the fact that at the end of XIX century, once 
with the proclamation of the Kingdom of Romania (1881), especially after 
1900, the Bucharest shows more and more its attention towards Romanian 
Transyvania , towards the cultural, economic, political elite from Braşov, 
Sibiu, Blaj, Năsăud, Beiuş, Oradea, Lugoş, Caransebeş, Arad. They were 
taken into consideration both personalities belonging to the older 
generations but also the young ones around “Tribuna” of Sibiu or around 
Octavian Goga. The personal and family relationships that intensify and 
consolidate, including through reciprocal visits4, fortified the fundament on 
which it was build the enlarged Romania.  
In this context, Nicolae Iorga makes more visits in Transivania – 
the one from 1902 interesting us especially because of the wish to underline 
his ties with Oradea.  
                                                     
4  See the case Partenie Cosma, the executive director of “Albina” Bank from Sibiu 
(1886- 1916) in excelent relations with the university and political world from the 
Kingdom of Romania. Cf. Mihai D. Drecin, “O instituţie bancară din Transivania în 
vremurille Primului Război Mondial. Studiu de caz: Banca “Albina”from Sibiu 
(1914- 1919)” in vol. Primul Război Mondial. Perspectivă istorică şi istoriografică, The First 
World War. Historical and Historiographical perspective, coordonators: Ioan Bolovan, 
Gheorghe Cojocaru, Oana Mirela Tamaş, Editura Presa Universitară Clujeană/ 
Academia Română- Centrul de Studii Transilvane, Cluj – Napoca, 2015, p. 480. N. 
Iorga, Ceva despre Ardealul românesc. Viaţa culturală românească astăzi ( Două conferinţe cu 
privire la românii din Ardeal şi Ungaria)/ Something about the Romanian Ardeal. The cultural 
Romanian life today (Two conferences with regard to the Romanians from Ardeal and Hungary), 
Editura Onişor, Năsăud, 1907. It results that N. Iorga was at Sibiu in 1906 where he 
sustains the second conference published in the volume presented above. Ion I. C. 
Brătianu, Din Ţara Moţilor. Amintiri, From the country of Apuseni Mountains. Memmories, 
Imprimeriile “Independenţa”, Bucureşti, 1924, p. 9- 12. In 1907 he visits the areal 
and he saves the Church from Albac in which  “they were cuminecated Horea and 
his honest fellows”. The Hungarian administrative local authorities wished to sell 
the the wood of the church. Brătianu buys it, transports it to Turda, than with the 
special wagons takes it on his property from Florica. Here Nicolae from Sohodol 
rebuilts it. Pr. Piso from Brad gives away the imperial gates from the Church of 
Cloşca from Cărpiniş and the glass from the wood of cerisier from the church of 
Mestecăniş, where Crişan made his swears.  
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Firstly he stoped to Blaj, where, together with the research of 
manuscripts, he concludes durable relations with I. Micu Modovan and 
Augustin Bunea5.  
In the spring of 1902, Iorga arrives to Oradea “where the activity of 
Mecena of the understanding bishop Samuil Vulcan, his ties with a Şincai 
and other forerunners of Romanian culture in the XVIII th century gathered 
in the library of the diecesis so much unused material, comprising also the 
given chronic of the Principate of Muntenia”. The bishop of Greek- 
Catholik Oradia at that time was Mihail Pavel that he names “the great 
benefactor” which “did not take anything for himself giving all for the 
cherishing and enlinghtenment of the people”. Although he did not know 
him personally, he kept in touch with the canonic Neş, the father of the 
future professor Teodor Neş6.  
Interesting is the observation that he makes on the Greek- Catholic 
Clergy from Oradea in comparison with the ones from Blaj. If the clergy 
from Blaj were a combination of “proud romanticism, by severe peasantry 
and of catholic exclusivism without nothing from the Jezuit finesse; they 
were also hapy and rapid people, not without a high culture, but whom, 
used with the advantages of a peaceful life of province, would not have died 
for a belief and they would not stend up for an idea”7, the people from 
Oradea were on the oposite pole. They looked like on the times of Vulcan 
(Samuil –n.n.), with “bolden heads, longue moustaches of Hungarian nobles 
from the days of Pavel Chinezul (1432- 1494, Romanian ruler of Timişoara, 
general captain of the army of the king Matia Corvin –n.n.), the old 
Ottoman clothes lagging behind, the long pipe as a Turkish one. And not 
the least the foreign accent of our ears....The word had fallen slowly, 
interrupted by slow confortable falling or full of meaning, from the mouth 
full of tabac of these old men who nurtured with their modest isolation 
great dreams, which nobody liked to confess”8. With other words, if Blaj 
                                                     
5 N. Iorga, O viaţă de om..., p. 213-215. University studies at Roma, canonics and 
professors at the schools from Blaj, close collaborators of the mitropolites Ioan 
Vancea and Victor Mihali, author of papers of great historical and teological 
eruditions, brave continuators of Ardealean School, members of Romanian 
Academy, fighters for the national cause and the modernization of the society of 
Romanians from Transylvania. See more recently the study of Marcel Ştirban, 
“From the life and the activity of the historian Augustin Bunea (1857- 1909)”, in 
vol. Din Istoria României, XI, Aniversări şi comemorări. Bibiografii (From the history of 
Romania, XI, Anniversations and commemorations. Bibiographies, Ed. Napoca Star, Cluj- 
Napoca, 2014- 2015, p. 63- 86.     
6 N. Iorga, O viaţă de om.... (A life of men...), p. 215.  
7 Ibidem, p. 213.  
8 Ibidem, p. 215.  
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brought with him “the atmosphere of the prelats of the court from Austrian 
times”. With other words, if Blaj brought with him “the atmosphere of the 
vallets of the court from Austrian period”, more communicative, more full 
of life, smiling, the Greek – Catholic Oradea was cold, silent, full of secrets, 
modest by its clothes, talking a Romanian language full with a lot of 
Hungarianism. The particuarity of behaviour I explained through the 
geopolitical position of the two important centers of iluminism of the 
Romanian culture. If Blaj, was in a demographical zone massively 
Romanian, Oradea was placed at the ethno-demographical margins of 
Romanian geographical space, subjected to the direct pression of 
Hungarizanion that came from Pusta Panoniei. Moreover, the city of Blaj 
was inhabited in its great majority of Romanians, while in Oradea, in 1900, 
the Hungarians represented 89, 55% (48. 456 inhabitants), and Romanians 
only 6,43% (3481 inhabitants) recenzed after maternal language9. One more 
thing, we shoud bear in mind is the influence of the protestant way of life 
and behaviour well represented in Oradea, one more cold and subtle than 
the Catholic one or the Ortodox one, in spite of the activity of the powerful 
Roman- catholic and Greek- Catholic from Oradea, which in the last two 
centuries tried to diminish the protestant inheritance of the city, so as the 
Orthodox one from the entire areal of Bihor.  
In 1938, N. Iorga is, again, the guest of Oradia. At December 1st, on 
the territory of the Western Theatre, he sustained in front of a numerous 
auditorium, the conference “For the defence of the Western boundary”10. 
Its text was published in the review Familia, no. 1/ 1939, a special number 
dedicated to the ideea of union at Romanians which emphasizes the small 
union from 1859, but also the great union from 1918, on the achievements 
of Romanian people both before but also after 1918, until the day. Besides 
the historical text, the number in discussion publish poetry, theatre, 
                                                     
9 Recensământul din 1900 (The censorship from 1900), Editura Staff, Cluj- Napoca, 1999. p. 
110- 111. In the same censorship achieved by authorities of the Hungarian state, 
according to the religion we had the next datas. Hungarian Roman – Catholics, 
reformed and unitariens – 34 410 inhabitants (62, 91). Izraeliţi 12.338 (22,80 %) , 
Ortodox Romanians and Greek – Catolics  6760 inhabitants (12, 49 %). See the 
numerical evolution of the inhabitants of Oradea, including on ethnies and religion 
in Mihai D. Drecin , “Consideraţii asupra evoluţiei demografice a oraşului Oradea, 
pe baza recensămintelor oficiale (1880 – 2011)” (Considerations on the 
demographical evolution of the city of Oradea, on the basis of official conscripts 
(1880- 2011)”, in vol. Economie şi Istorie. Dialog şi interdisciplinaritate, In Honorem prof. 
univ. dr. Ioan Lumperdean la împlinirea vârstei de 60 de ani, coordonatori: Dana Bako, 
Iosif Marin Balog, Rudolf Graf, Răzvan V. Mustaţă, Editura Academia Română/ 
Centrul de Studii Transilvane, Cluj- Napoca, 2015, p. 513- 524. 
10 Familia (Oradea), January 1939, p. 33- 50.  
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memories, political comments to the day which made reference to the idea 
of “union” and the dangers that were threatening it at 193811.  
The times in which Nicolae Iorga came to Oradea were troubled in 
the international context. The corrections of the boundaries imposed in 
1918- 1919 by the fight of the nations from the multinational Empires 
(Austro- Hungarian, Russian, Ottoman) and agreed upon the decisions of 
the Peace Conference from Paris (1919- 1920), mentioned in the treaties of 
peace from Versailes, Saint – Germain, Neuilly, Sevres and Trianon – was 
sustained by the Fascist Germany and Italy, Horthyst- Fascist Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Soviet Union. Moreover, the Hungarian revisionism manifested 
more and more ofensively in Transilvania, being financed by the 
neighbouring Hungary12. The anti-revisionist movement from Romania, 
including Oradea and Bihor13, was trying to bloc the Hungarian offensive by 
cultural actions which framed perfectly in the doctrine of cultural 
nationalism and humanism cultivated by Nicolae Iorga since 191014.  
Considering, in good reasoning, that December1 st 1918 was the 
astral year of the history of Romanians, N. Iorga wrote and delivered 
speeches each year around the great event about its historical roots, the 
sacrifices made up by nation in order to accomplish the perenial dream, the 
duty to keep awake the great political and military achievement from 191815. 
His thoughts about this important event he spread in conferences hold in 
front of an auditorium more and more divers from a social point of view, 
but on everybody’s understanding, in articles of the gazzettes, studies and 
scientific volumes, interpelations in the chambers of the Romanian 
Parliament.  
                                                     
11 Ibidem. See “Sumarul”where are stipulated the articles and the literary products 
published by the: Victor Papilian, M. G. Samarineanu, G. Tulbure, Tiberiu Moşoiu, 
Tudor Mănescu, Augustin Chirilă, George Bota, Dr. V. German, C. S. Anderko, 
George Sfârlea, Alexandru Olteanu, Paul Constant, Tiron Albani – cultural 
personalities, scientifical and political of first instance of the Romania of the time.  
12 See Mihai Stratulat, Revizionismul şi neorevizionismul ungar, Editura Globus, Bucureşti, 
1994, p. 230- 274. Cristian Troncotă, Istoria serviciilor secrete româneşti. De la Cuza la 
Ceauşescu, (The history of secret services. From Cuza to Ceauşescu), Editura Ion Cristoiu SA, 
Bucureşti, 1999, p. 169- 176.  
13 Dr. Lazăr Iacob, Teodor Neş, Ştefan Mărcuş, Bihorul strajă la hotare, Editura Casa 
Naţională a judeţului Bihor, Tipografia Diecezană, Oradea, 1933; Nicolae Iorga, În 
luptă cu absurdul neorevizionism maghiar, (Fighting with the absurdity of Hungarian 
neorevizionism), Tipografia Diecezană, Oradea, 1939.  
14 Nicolas M. Nagy – Talavera, N. Iorga. O Biografie, (Nicolae Iorga – A biography), Editura 
Institutului European, Iaşi, 1990, p. 12, 18.  
15 Gheorghe Sbârnă, “Nicolae Iorga şi păstrarea < icoanei unităţii naţionale> from 
December 1 1918” in vol. N. Iorga (1871- 1940). Studii şi documente (N. Iorga (1971- 
1940). Studies and documents, IV, Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 2007, p. 473- 482.  
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The conference from Oradea is a remarkable synthesis of the 
history of the place, caught in the national history of Romanians and of 
Central Europe, but also with pertinent sendings to the political movements 
of the year 1938 on the European plan.  
From the very beginning Nicolae Iorga declares firmly that the 
discourse that he will keep in front of the “Saints fathers bishops and their 
beloved listeners” is not a simple conference but a process he fulfiling the role of 
prosecutor. He motivates his assertion by saying “the conferences are for 
another times, for the peaceful times and for the assured times, for the times 
when before of a people does not stay united the dareness and the most 
characteristic stupidity in the negation of the fundamental laws of the nation 
which is beyond (Romanian – n.n.) It is not about of a conference as for the 
good times, it is about an assertion as for the time of threath which are 
directed on the meaning, which from generation to generation, through our 
admirable peasantry. I had them there”16. In consequence, the ideas 
presented are framed in a “process (in which) I have today the function of 
prosecutor against the ones that without justice try to hit in our law, also of 
defender in the same time of the saint laws of Romanian people. It is a 
judicial task which I have on my account and the judge must be fair, but 
brave, in consequence with all fairness and with all the courage of a judge 
which knows all the pieces of the process and knows who are the fair and 
true things and which are the falsified things. “17 
The age, life experience and the professional knowledge – as 
history- summed up by a life, gives her the moral right to talk, him, Iorga, 
being “one of the few survivors of the generation who decided these 
boundaries of Romanians and who have the right and duty to defend 
them”18.  
Before concluding on the history of Oradea and Bihor, in fact the 
history of the Great Romania, in paralell with the history of international 
relations at European level of those times, N. Iorga caracterized the 
Romanian people as being “a great people and a humble people, a people 
that do not offend and not purge. Our soul denies any of these means used 
to bring violence to other human souls. They can not close the eyes 
concerning the social and cultural benefits which we (Romanians) had 
achieved for us all (in the sens for all cohabiting ethnies – n.n.)”19.  
                                                     
16 Familia (Oradea), seria a III-a, nr. 1, 1939, p. 33.  
17 Ibidem.  
18 Ibidem, p. 34.  
19 Ibidem.  
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Analizing the international political constellation from the Europe 
of the moment, Iorga has in mind our relationships with the close 
neighbours but also with the great Western powers.  
The Hungarian danger Iorga considers it as being the most important, 
not necessarilly by the military force of this Hungarian neighbour but 
through the incisive propaganda made by the entire world for the himerical 
territorial laws where always there were minorities in comparison with the 
local inhabitants20. Iorga makes reference to some “tendentious 
books”published by the historians and other personalities of Hungarian 
culture, apearances of last hour, in which the Romanians are “deep and 
unfarely offended”. Metodically, the Romanian historian points out the 
basic ideas of the respective papers coming immediately with its 
counterarguements. This incloses both data of evenimential history framed 
in regional and European context, but also the arguments of 
comportamental logic not only one time dressed in the clothes of fine irony.  
From the paper coordonated by the philosopher, literary historian 
and the estetician of leftist orrientation Georg Lukacs, entitled “The 
Hungary and the civilization”21, Iorga debates the assertion according to 
which only the Hungarians created the civilization in this part of Europe, 
less the Romanians. The answer of the Romanian historian is direct and 
severe when he says: “if it is a Hungarian civilization, civilisation of 
borrowing, by admirable capability to borrow from everybody, but with all 
incapable to introduce something personal, if it exists such a civilization of 
transmitting, with big churches, with imposing palaces, in these places of 
ours, in the fundamental life which is the life of the peasant, they are not 
only two kinds of houses: the house of the Romanian peasant and the house 
of the Germans from Mozela and Rhine, which belongs to the sachsen. 
Besides these, I try to discover what represents the conquering nation 
(Hungarian – n. n.) in the field of the fundamental civilization and I reach to 
no conclusion”. Finally it comes to an irony when it is made reference to the 
floral motif with which the secui decorated the Palace of Culture from 
Târgu Mureş: “the tulip which is graved on all the trays from Braşov which 
were given to the daughters as wedding present to all nationalities. With a 
tulip is too less in order to reclame a great chapter in the history of human 
civilization”22.  
                                                     
20 „the crazy dreams of the lords from Budapest”. Cf. Ibidem.  
21 „with the foreword of the two Tharaud: Jerome and Jean, who bring from time to 
time to us (in Romania –n.n.) with friendly image”. Cf. Ibidem, p. 37.  
22 Ibidem. Moreover, we would add, even the tulip is taken over from the turks in the 
same time with the organization of Pasa ‘s domain from Buda and the dissapearance 
of Hungary as a state 
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In the same volume, the young historian Eckhardt Francisc23 
published a study in which he makes endeavours to consolidate the old 
theory of the migration of the vlachs from the South in the North of 
Danube starting with the XII century. The Romanians who stay massively in 
Hungary as “a people of shepards”, so people who raised sheeps, used to 
have a life of migratories that receive from the Hungarian masters, the task 
to cut off the woods and to arrange the agricultural terrains in order to 
practice agriculture. From the XIVth century, the leaders of these colonies 
of vlachs – the cnezial leaders (kenez in the text –n.n) mix throgh marriages 
with the famillies of Hungarian masters, receiving nobility titles. The rest of 
the Romanians remained in their social condition of Servs together with 
Hungarian servs24. From all this scenary embraced by the Hungarian 
historiography with scientific roots since the XVIIIth century, N. Iorga 
subscribes, on the basis of documents, to the process of Hungarisation of 
some families of voievods, cnezi and juzi from Transilvania that stood on 
the basis of the great families of great Hungarian nobles from the province 
(Iosika, Bekes, Kornis)25. Reffering to the late migration of Romanians in 
Transilvania, where they would have found the Hungarians, Nicolae Iorga 
comes with a logical counter-arguement when he says “If the shepards came 
later, no one comes to be servant and slave, but, if there is someone slave 
and servant, this means that he is the old inhabitant that was defeated 
because no one did not throw him out from his old suposed country; if they 
came in another place, this means that they looked for something better: 
they did not come to decrease their situation and honour in their new 
country that they might have found it”26. Not even the young historian 
Eckhardt, captivated by the theories of Romanian migratory shepards 
theory, do not escape the irony of Iorga which says “How it is known, 
against the shepards, the ships never stood up, but very often protested the 
dunkays”27. 
                                                     
23 N. Iorga names him “one of the smartest historians from the new generation of 
free Hungary (after the First World War – n.n.)”. In can be also an irony from the 
moment that it remains claustrated in old historiographical mentalities from Austro- 
Hungary. Cf. Ibidem.  
24 Ibidem, p. 38.  
25 Ibidem, p. 35- 36.  Passing by, N. Iorga talks about a discussion that he had with 
somebody from Ioşika family, to whom he reminded the Romanian origine of his 
family. The reaction of the Hungarian noble is thus registrated: “Mr. Ioşika, I insist 
to tell, that he did not get angry at all but, he smiled and his smile made us see better 
how Romanian he is”.  
26 Ibidem, p. 38.  
27 Ibidem.  
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The historian Gherevits Zoltan is more restrictive with the 
historical time of Romanians who would have came in Transylvania only 
after the invasion of tatars. Before the area had been abandoned, because of 
the fact that the goths, gepizi, avarii, slavianswould have threwed all Roman 
colonists, Hungarians finding here the pecenegi and cumans. Moreover, the 
areal of provenance of the migratory vlachs is localized in Southern Istria. 
Nicolae Iorga dismantles, with logical arguments, all this theory. He says 
“No one do not settle in an unpopulated region,…. that it has to be 
somebody to explain the country, because otherwise the bears from the 
woods will eat you and spoil all you do, it must be somebody who 
introduces the place where you want to settle. This is also valuable for 
Hungarians and Sachsen”28. On the other hand, the German migratories, 
avarians, slavians, pecenegi who fought with the Hungarians, “there are not 
people whom to work the land, they are neither shepards, but they go on 
their horses, they sit somewhere in a military centre where they gather the 
tents because they are colonists all….they were living in primitive conditions 
as a people who is not fed from the work of his hands. In consequence to 
assert that it existed barbarians in the Dacia of Traian from a moment of 
time before is the best argument for the <existance>of Romanians because 
it can not exist the parazitism without the people of whose behalf it lives 
this parazite. Also, Hungarians themselves are a parasite people which did 
not settle in any region, until they did not know that it exist a popular mass 
incapable to defend itsef, but capable to work and give them means of 
living”29. Concerning the geographic base of migration of Roman colonists 
– Southern Istria, N. Iorga underlines with his exceptional logic: “The lower 
part of Istria is like the uper part, only stone; there the sheeps don’t have 
what to eat…How do you imagine in this little peace of land to be all the 
forefathers of Romanian people?” And now, it comes the irony: “Wouldn’t 
be left for us only to say that they were (the forefathers of Romanians – n.n) 
in the hands of a Hungarian magnate and when they opened it, it came out 
from there a group of little men that grew up until they reached normal 
people”30. In the end, the lack of written documents whom to prove the 
presence of Romanians at North of Danube, but also in Transilvania, only 
in later centuries rather than the presence of Hungarians, is thus logical 
explained: “We write today also for things without value and we keep all the 
archives; but on that time there were some extraordinary things or changes 
of boundaries, in order to exist a written act. Also in general it is written 
much more about people who were not kind than of people who are kind. 
                                                     
28 Ibidem, p. 39- 40.  
29  Ibidem, p. 40-41.  
30 Ibidem, p. 40.  
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In consequence, in the proportion in which there are fewer documents, it is 
observable what a kind people we are, who do not provoked any kind of 
quarelling in front of justice and in consequence we do not need documents 
to guarantee our mastership”31.  
The broaden horizon of knowledge of European and global history, 
of the psychologies of the people, allows to Nicolae Iorga to make the 
separation between the ambitions and the frustrations of political leading 
class and the mass of Hungarian people. He stated: “So when I talk about 
Hungarians, it is about of some people from Budapest who live as in the 
years 1700, with the same ideas, with the same feelings, with the same 
prejudices and with what is necessarry in order to ruin for once their 
country, as their forefathers through the same habits demolished it for once 
and if the Austrians had not come to take them (Hungarians) out from the 
grave sealed by the Turks, it would not have existed a Hungary. Because, the 
old Hungary was killed by the representatives of Hungarian monarchy, in 
the battle of Mohacs, abdicating from their national duty”32. In 
contradiction with this minority of elitists, Iorga knew and suported 
“…people from the country – one that he told me, above all, a task to earn 
the bread for me and my people. This bread it can be gained perfectly in this 
country (Romania – n.n.), nobody does not prevent this, asking what nation 
belongs somebody in order to earn his living. We are workers of Ardeal and 
do not enter in the same band with the parasites from Ardeal (Hungarian 
noble men suporters of Budapest – n.n.) of our nation. Also, since then the 
group maintained its existence (as suporter of Romania – n.n.) and the ones 
who followed me, encountered often this kind people who made the same 
declaration”33. The obvious delimitation between usual Hungarian and the 
medieval aristocracy it makes it very clear when the Romanian historian 
says: “Not between us (Romanians- n.n.) and Hungarian people who is a 
very capable people, very hardworking, very brave, very loyal or towards 
whom the state who reaches the margins of its rights, but between us and 
the ones whom from centuries exploited, brought their own nation to 
poverty and to the condition of animals”34. In consequence, Nicolae Iorga 
completes his national – European belief of the peaceful coexistance 
between nations with the following specification: “I love any honest, 
hardworking, right among people. To the question “Why you do not take 
into consideration that for us Budapest is Mecca?” he answers: “If it is 
about by a Mecca of spirit and of culture, each of us can go to this Mecca? 
                                                     
31 Ibidem, p. 39.  
32 Ibidem, p.36.  
33 Ibidem.  
34 Ibidem, p. 35.  
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If it is about a Mecca of spirit and culture, each of us can go to this Mecca. 
If there is about a Mecca that is not the black expensive stone of Caaba, but 
the old symbol of Hungarian kings from the Middle Age, obviously that the 
way towards this Budapest is for anybody a betrayal towards a state that has 
the duty and has the power to defend itself.”35 
The cousin country Poland, is accussed that by its external policy 
made by the minister Beck, it achieves a “change of front in each moment, 
pursuing aims that can be never accomplished”36. It is understood the 
reaching out of Germany and Hungary, that meant the violation of 
Czechoslovakian territory and the suport of anti-Romanian actions of 
Hungarian aristocracy37, considered as “very high ilusions” in their 
endeavours of preserving their own territorial integrity. “A relief of Poland 
from this politics would mean, no doubt, one of the greatest benefits for 
this admirable people”- concludes N. Iorga38.  
Towards The Nationalist Germany, the great military power of the 
moment, N. Iorga has an attitude of apeasement considering that “today 
(this – n.n.) is too nice to suport the hand of some categories from Poland 
whom correspond to the aristocrate class from Hungarians”. This hope the 
historian shares also towards the Italy, asserting “that never an Italian soldier 
will not die, to fulfill the crazy dream of the masters from Budapest”39. 
Unfortunately, here he got wrong. 
In order to close, I would say today, the analysis of the European 
geopolitical situation, N. Iorga expresses himself in subtle manner towards 
the diplomacy of our traditional allies France and England which they do not even 
not nominate. The rejection of the conciliatory French – English towards 
the offensive of the revisionism of Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria is 
made indirectly warning the aggressive Poland who attacked Cechosovakia: 
“I believe – says Iorga- they make (the Poles –n.n.) very big illusions also in 
what concerns … the elites from the same story that are no doubt our allies, 
just that they make two many things which we do not know (Romanians – 
n.n.) so that we have no more the conscience that they still are our allies”40.  
                                                     
35 Ibidem.  
36 Ibidem.  
37 See the Polish- German agreement from August 24 1938 concerning the actions 
against Czechoslovakia and the occupation of Czechoslovakian region Tesin from 
Octomber 2-3 1938, respectively the gathering of old family ties between Hungarian 
noble men and Polish panes.  
38 N. Iorga, “Întru apărarea..”, p. 35.  
39 Ibidem, p. 34.  
40 Ibidem, p. 35.  
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The conference typed in the review Familia is a logic and precise 
architecture, the ideas that they needed to be underlined being titrated by 
expressive, direct and mobilising titles41.  
In continuation, the senior lecturer aproaches events from local 
history, history of Oradea and Bihor County, interpreting issues and 
explaining the relationship Romanian – Hungarians, the role of local 
inhabitants in the economic affirmation of the areal found Hungarian rule42.  
N. Iorga discusses about “the tradition”that Hungarian 
historiography is transmitting to Oradea as a necropolis of the kings 
Ladislau and Sigismund of Luxemburg, by the virtue of which Budapest has 
territorial pretentions on the areal. “To burry yourself somewhere – says 
Iorga- this does not create only an extraordinary right: not what you give to 
the land from your ashes is an argument but what you give us all from your 
creative energy. Yes, a number of Hungarian kings, among whom some 
were so very less Hungarians such as Sigismund of Luxemburg. Having a 
French origine, being a predecessor of the dynasty of Angevins, all French, 
the chief of a new aristocracy of chevalliers that included a lot of 
Romanians, all brave people of Maramureş, from the Country of Haţeg and 
so on, and, in what concerns his situation, it was that of the Roman 
emperor. Hungary was for him a mean through which he served his imperial 
ambition, all these kings it might have died there, but from where the 
arguement that, if in your house somebody dies, his heritiers to come and to 
make process because our father died in your house, <the house is our 
inheritence>. I confess that I don’t see the argument…So, if the Hungarian 
kings are burried in Oradea- in fact their graves never came up – it is only a 
tradition of hazardated burrial, not even a popular memory (subl.ns) To us, 
in Argeş, there was no stone on the grave of Voda Basarab from 1340- 50, 
but all the world knew what to say: look, here is burried the architect. Or in 
the parts of Buzău there was no sign which to say that there they were the 
grave and the treasures of lady Neaga, but the people knew, and they took 
out the church and the stones from the grave and the necklesses and the 
court. There is a popular tradition while in these places there is no popular 
tradition in connection with the Saint Ladislau but only a literary memory, a 
memory for the cronical”43. 
The Hungarians, says Iorga, came after 1100 at East from Tisa. 
Defeated in Western Europe as any “predatory band that looks for the gain 
                                                     
41 The subtitles on whose basis we synthetized the ideas until now they are: Politica 
Poloniei “The politics of Poland”, “Anumiţi oameni de la Budapesta”(Some people 
from Budapest), “Cărţi tendenţioase”(Tendentious books).  
42 Subtitles: “Rostul nostru în aceste regiuni” (Our mission in these regions) and 
“Rolul macedonenilor”(The role of macedoneans” 
43 N. Iorga, “Întru apărarea”, p. 41, 42-43.  
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where it is.” So, they take the way of the Byzantine Empire where “there 
were castles, cultivated camps, economic civilization old of a few thousands 
years”. In order to reach there they had to pass the Ardeal with “forests, 
searched paths that served for the food of local inhabitants…It would have 
been a crazy from the side of Hungarian kings, so if they would have left the 
ways of the West to go after what?”. Here the conquerers found Romanian 
inhabitants. Only a few in numbers, the Hungarians “they are spread here 
and there; so that it is not an installed people, but one that spreaded around. 
In the old sense of the world, spread means the stone that comes from the 
arch, it falls a little stone here, another there, so that they are spread the 
Hungarians in these places (in Ardeal n.n). This is obvious until here. The 
bischopal registry from Oradea of the Roman – Catholic Bishopric “I see 
our peasants and then how they are even now”44. Moreover, the name of 
the villages and places are of Romanian origine with roots in the world of 
Dacians. The architecture of the households, of houses and their 
surroundings, the way of work of the land and the care of the animals and 
ships is in “his traditional way of Romanian people, somewhere”45.  
From all these reasons with direct reference to Oradea, N. Iorga 
concludes: “In consequence it remains only a single thing: the presence, 
temporal and incidental, of Hungarian kings that stay in the fortress, that do 
not create cities, excepting the original fortress. The first fortress of 
surveillance before passing the Apuseni Mountains and entering in Ardeal, 
this settlement of Hungarian kings was made in the middle of Romanian 
population how it is shown in these areals by the nomenklature with a clear 
Romanian character46.  
Nicolae Iorga knew and, so, he underlined the important role that 
the macedo- Romanian sellers had in the modernization of Central Europe, 
during the passage from feudalism to capitalism. In the particular case of 
Oradea, N.Iorga knew that, during the XVIII th century, after the Habsburg 
conquest of Transilvania, besides the peasants’ world of Romanians from 
Velenta and other suburbias apeared around the military Fortress from 
Oradea, the Macedo – Romanian sellers gave the configutation of the city of 
Oradea. After how they raised “this wonderful church” from the centre of 
the city (The Church with the Moon – n.n.), they were the factor of 
modernization of Timişoara, Buda, Pesta, Triesta, Viena etc., and “they were 
everywhere”. It is underlined that “from the life of the company from 
Macedonia, it developed the Romanian cultural life”. On this financial – 
banking fundament it is built the Romanian iluminism of Samuil Vulcan 
                                                     
44 Ibidem, p. 41-42.  
45 Ibidem, p. 43.  
46 Ibidem, p. 43-44.  
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until Mihail Pavel. For Hungarians Oradea “was a corner of province where 
some people were writing in latin a few unusual books. It was not any sign 
of national pride in all their literature from these sides, while our literature 
was an enthusiastic song dedicated to the past, present and future of the 
Romanian people. If it is about culture, what it meant Oradea for our 
culture, it can not be compared with that course of cultural content, entirely 
abstract, teoogical, fiological, of some Hungarians that stood around here”47.  
In the next chapters, N. Iorga anchores in the present of his time 
and transmits his faith in the future. They are encouragements, based on the 
achievements of “Romanian epoch” of only two decennies, a duty of all 
Romanians from the Western boundaries of the country, in troubling 
European political times48.  
After 1918, the Romanian state gave land to the peasants, including 
the Hungarian ones, reform that Hungary did not succeed to make in his 
own postwar state. “You see the supreme gratitude of us: we gave land to 
the Hungarian, not moving them who knows where, in order not to become 
dangerous elements but, even if they could be dangerous, on the land that 
his forefathers had. A unique case in the history of all people with an 
admirable generosity, indeed Romanian and Christian”. Iorga says in 
continuation:”I am amazed by what I see. Here there are peasants that have 
their land, peasants that woke up to another life. Here not only that they are 
raised our churches, from which some of them are pride achievements, but 
next to the cottage of former servant, it is built a high, luminous house, 
covered with bricks. All that read from the bricks, layed on these lands, it 
does not mean only what it normally comes out from the liberty and 
economic growth of the peasant. We created here here a life of human 
liberty for all49. In this way, it was put an end to the cruel domination of 
Hungarian aristocrats who, “as some vampires, that suck the human blood 
without choice, if the blood comes from the Hungarians or from 
Romanians”. In consequence, it dissapeared “those Afrikan houses where 
the vegetal roof is higher than the walls and where almost a sunshine can get 
through until the house where he is living, lays down and dies the most 
rejected and humiliated from all servants that had always been in Europe. 
And this not only valid for ours, but for theirs”50. 
For our historical rights, that we got by work and sufference, for 
the achievements from the last two decennies, Romanians must “fight”51, to 
                                                     
47 Ibidem, p. 45- 46.  
48 Subtitles are entitled “What do we have achieved”, “We are fighting each other”, 
“How there are strenghtened the consciousness”, “Our duty”.  
49 N. Iorga, “Intru apărarea”, p. 47.  
50 Ibidem.  
51 Ibidem, p. 38-39.  
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defend them- says Iorga. This is the duty of the priests and teachers, 
independanty of their religious confession, of Romanian peasants. Thinking 
on the possibiity of imixting the interests of some great powers between 
Romanians, Hungarians or Bulgariens, the great historian was reffering the 
conditions for success “who wants to beat with us … to come, but only us 
and only them”.52 
In the end of his speech, N. Iorga makes it very clear the purpose of 
his coming to Oradea: “I did not come here to make speeches of great days, 
but only to strenghten your consciousness (subl. ns) and I don’t believe that 
them are gathered otherwise that by the fact of deep knowedge of the past 
of our people with his rights. It does not exist no further action than this 
awareness of our people, until the last peasant… A people has the right – 
and I would like that this formula to remain in the mind of everybody – a 
people has the historical right on some land only in the case when his 
possesion was never interrupted, when in the middle they were not two 
foreign dominations and when the conquest of his territory was made with 
his own forces”53.  
With the characteristical objectivity, as a result of the accumulations 
of an enormous baggage of datas and learnings from the history of the 
world, but also for their own political experience, N. Iorga ended his 
conference making reference to a source of oral history, as we would say 
today: “A Hungarian minoritarian, an old friend – says Iorga- was telling: to 
wish an old country (Hungary – n.n.) it means to re-enter in a feudal regime 
which, by the intelligence and by the spirit of sacrifice of Romanian people, 
it ceased. But this does not mean only this. This (Romania – n.n.) is a 
receiving country for everybody, because is a wise country and quiet that did 
not look for misunderstandings. To re- enter in Hungary, this mean to 
associate to a political adventure, renewed from year to year and whom will 
drive safely, if they will not find a smart man to stop this. This I told to our 
Hungarians from these places”54. 
Having in mind the theme of the present conference, “Nicolae 
Iorga – our contemporary”, we try a brief radiography of the political 
situation from the Europe of our days, in the same context as the Romanian 
one – by the veil of the ideas launched by the great historian in 1902 and 
1938 in Oradea.  
From the considerations of Iorga towards the cultural atmosphere 
which was entertained by the Greek – Cathololic Bishopric from Oradea of 
the year 1902 – we must retain the role of culture in the prezervation of 
                                                     
52 Ibidem, p. 50.  
53 Ibidem, p. 45.  
54 Ibidem, p. 48- 49.  
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nationality. Without a cultural life based on tradition and its endeavour of 
permanent renewal, a nation will perish, dissapear. The affirmation through 
autentic culture, full of patriotism and opened towards Europenism is an 
actual and permanent objective of the Romania of our times.  
Still, lately, the idea of multiculturality, at the level of each country 
from European Union, starts to be put on question mark, being even 
labeled as a failure and danger, in the conditions of the surprising and 
massive emigration from Orient. In other words, the political factors of 
decision of our country must suport each other, on all the possible ways, the 
learning, assimilation and development of Romanian language and culture 
by all the citizens of the country, independantly of ethnie. Concomitently, 
the values of the culture and national science must be propagated at 
European and world level, as an example of intelectual force of our people, 
always opened towards new, capable to contribute to the culture and the 
modern science of humanity, with ideas and models even in world premier.  
On the other hand, the suport of cultivation of the language and of 
the cultures of ethnical minorities from our country is enrolled in the 
principles of European democracy, that pretends the insurance of the 
interethnical harmony, a cohabitation with the ethnical majority following 
the model “not some near others, but some together with the others, in a 
peaceful and fruitful collaboration”.  
 
The ideas and calls of the conference from 1938, marked by 
the situation political of the time, are in concordance with the 
political realities of our times.  
Making a tour of horizon on politics of our neighbours, Nicolae 
Iorga transmitted us a sum of fears that are valable also today for Romania.  
On the first plan stays the Hungarian danger that continues to involve in 
the destabilization of our country, by a multitude of ways and forms. The 
governers from Budapest use with ability the Hungarian minority from 
Transylvania, on the fundal of narrow interests of Romanian parties, of 
corruption and of week achievements in the administration of the country 
by the governments from Bucharest. If in 1938, URSS was staying still in a 
“splendid isolation”while we were part from the already traditional alliance 
with France and England, today the isolated Russia found economic and 
political allies in Central Europe with the special intention to undermine the 
unity of European Unity. Among these, Hungary is in the first places. In 
consequence, it is obvious the suport granted of Russia granted to Hungary 
in the last minutes of peaceful silence in Central Europe. The present day 
Hungary as interwar period and communist Hungary can not hope to a 
dismanteling of our country by a military action, even through the suport of 
“military camps organized by the Security and Partium” by extremist 
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ellements from the ranks of Hungarian ethnics. Still, an international 
favourable conjunction, of the kind August 1940, could anullate the 
enormous difference between them and us in military and demographical 
plane. Thus, let us not forgive that the Hungarians, per ansamble, can be 
more easily fanatized as “the slow” Romanian people.  
If after 1938, when Romania and Poland had direct boundaries, N. 
Iorga talked of cousin Poland as about a friend, sometimes, with surprising 
reactions of friendship with Hungary, postume valorification of nobility 
sensibilities of our Polish panes with Hungarian aristocrats of the Middle 
Age, today our neighbour in the north is Ucraine, taken out in 1991 from Soviet 
Union. For our country, the ucrainean independent state represents a real 
danger, in spite of Romanian – Ucrainian Treaty closed by the president 
Emil Constantinescu, less advantageous for us by its stipuations, including 
the ones from the secret additional protocol of the treaty. Ucraine does not 
have a past of independent state. In short time after the setting up as a 
medieval state it was attached to tsarist Russia. After the period Bogdan 
Hmelniţki, short upheavals of independance we registrate between the years 
1917- 1920 and 1941- 1944, always under foreign influence and control, 
soon defeated by bolshevik arms. In consequence, the ucrainians could not 
burn the nationalist burn with extremist notes, particular for each national 
state at its beginnings. This spirit instead to diminish today, in raport with 
ethnical minorities (Russiana, Romanians, Polish, Hungarians) is 
exacerbated even above the phenomenon known in Soviet epoch. 
Combined with generalizated corruption, the decrease of the level of life of 
usua population, Russian military pressures, the loss of Crimeea, the 
decrease of Western European political suport and American, Ukraine tends 
to become a theatre favourable to the outburst of a civil war, a politica 
uncontrolled areal. The possible political reintegration in the Comunity of 
Independant States (CSI) found under Russia’s control would complicate 
the security of our country. Even if we bet on good relations Romanian – 
Ukrainian how can be explain a recent declaration of a high military 
ucrainean official, it is true ulteriour retractated, that Ukraine is positionning 
an important military unity at the boundary with our country, from which it 
gave us reasons that Romania is a much more dangerous than Russia?! 
In 1938, Nicolae Iorga does not enroll between enemies Bulgaria and 
Iugoslavia. Maybe because in front of these states it was a monarchy of 
German origine (Bulgaria) as in our country, and with Iugoslavia we were 
related by the marriage between the former king Alexandru and Mărioara, 
the sister of the king Carol II. With Iugoslavia we have solid relations and 
older dipomatic ties consolidated in the Small Understanding and Balkanic 
Understanding. Thus things are more nuanced. The panslavism and pan 
russianism are strong political currents in Bulgaria and Serbia, even if the 
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first is member of EU, and the second tries to bypass the economic storm 
in which it had fallen after the dismanteling of Iugoslavia by an accession in 
EU. The Romanian diplomacy will have to cultivate good relations with the 
two neighbours from south in order to ensure us at least the back.  
The boundary with the Republic of Moldova, our twin brother born 
artificially through the decision URSS, is one quiet and dangerous in the 
same time. Bucharest lost the moment 1991 when we could have got united 
with Bassarabia. The causes of this failure to build the reunited Romania 
from 1918/ 1919 are known. The pro- Moscovite communists which took 
over the power in December 1989 in our country could not forgive the 
revolutionary youth spent at studies or during “the nights around Moscow” 
(“Pad moscovschie vecera”). Today, the cousin country and a brother 
constitutes a battle field between pro- European parties and pro- Russian, in 
fact, both some and others, dominated by political groups that has in mind 
their own enrichment, abandonning the principles of justice, western – 
European democracy, national Romanian unity. The rise of the pressure of 
the Russia, including by transnistrean enclave; the migration of the youth 
from Bassarabia in Romania (mother country) or somewhere else in the 
world – a part of it grewed in Romanian schools: the dramatic decrease of 
the level of life of usual citizens and of the interest of European Union and 
United States towards “The Republic of Moldova as a potentia oasis of real 
democracy”- it can bring to the imposal in the Eastern part of our country 
as a statal teritory pro- Russian, anti – Romanian and anti- European. This 
perspective must be stoped through a Romanian diplomacy and western- 
European energical diplomacy, well though in economic, cultural, and mass 
– media plan which to attract towards European ideals, including of the 
levels of living, all inhabitants of Bassarabia, independantly of ethnie.The 
strategy must be continued with optimism and pragmatism in the same time, 
without generatory interruptions of demobilization and pessimism.  
Towards the Germany and Italy of the year 1938, Nicolae Iorga was 
wrong. He hoped that his great inheritance and German and Italian cultural 
tradition will matter more in the political decision of the political leaders of 
these states. Unfortunately, the mediocrity and the excessive 
authoritarianism of Hitler, Mussolini and of their teams, imposed another 
destiny of Europe and, in this context, of Romania. Today, Germany, France, 
England, even latin states from the southern Europe, there are the main pillars of 
European Union. The historical experience of the past, especially in the 
years of the Second World War and of Cold War would have to lead us 
towards the effort of consolidation of European Union, of treating all 
members as equals in rights, leaving on secondary plane, even partially, their 
own economic interests including in the energy sector which would favorize 
Russia and its accolites. These great economic powers, symbols of the real 
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democracy, would have to understand that “the state sitting between two 
boats” is dangerous, to an equal extent, for them and their new partners 
from Central and Eastern Europe. In order to accomplish this we must 
share the difficulties of the settling of democracy in equal way, according to 
the economic possibilities of each member country of EU in part. Thus, the 
model of EU will remain in history as a sublime one, failed from arrogance, 
selfish interests and stupidity.  
In order to close the geopolitical voyage of the momentum (2015- 
2016) that it is found our country, let us not forget the Black Sea. A lot of time 
considered the most faithful neighbour after the selective argumentation of 
the great historian and political man Gheorghe Brătianu, today it starts to 
become very “hot”. Crimeea found under Russian control – with a military 
armada in continuous increase and evolution; the political discontents 
Russian – Turkish on the fundal of some incidents still minor of a military 
nature; a Gruzian and Ukrainean seaside, uncertain for a certain peace; the 
military manoeuvres of the Russian and American flottes (here together with 
his allies from NATO) – they annuled the old quality of Romanian seaside 
as an areal of traditional peace for the country. With other words, Romania 
of our days is in a dangerous isolation in Europe.  
In all great political complex of nervous setting of EU, SUA has, in 
our opinion un important role if not decisive. Here we have in mind the 
democratic tradition, the economic and military force, the world diplomatic 
vision of nord- Americans. An eventual isolation of United States towards 
Europe and its problems would be equivalent with the asiatization of the 
old continent, but also with comunization by stages of their own country. 
The populists presidents, mediocres in the domain of general culture, 
restrained in the box of a North-American life for the moment a reach one 
they will sign the death à la longue of our North – American political nation.  
The second part of my communication based on edited 
bibliography and written and presented informations from mass – media on 
the Romain and foreign TV channels which we did not foresee at footnote, 
is a try to accomodation of assertion of the historian Nicolae Iorga, made in 
1938, at the realities of Romania from after eighty years. They are based also 
on a certain experience in the local and national position of the undersigned, 
but also of the university researcher of the past and recent present of the 
history of Romanians – in the last fundamented on rigour and scientific 
sincerity, not always accepted and used by our political, actual, nervous 
world, eager for the inedite and spectacular of the moment.  
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Abstract 
 
The first part of the study points out the circumstances of the great Romanian historian’s 
presence in Oradea in 1902, and 1938, respectively. The first visit is linked to a scientific research 
he had carried out at the Archive and Library of the Greek- Catholic Diocese, where the historian 
studied the works of the most prominent figures of the Romanian Enightenment from the 
eightteenth century, preserved at the Episcopal Court of Mihail Pavel. In 1938, N. Iorga delivered 
a lecture at “Queen Mary” Theatre Hall, exactly on December 1st, during which he took a stand 
against the assertions of the Hungarian historiography who claimed that Oradea and Transylvania 
were traditional geographic areas of the Kingdom of Hungary. N. Iorga’s arguments in favor of 
Oradea, Bihor and Transylvania as a whole – as Romanian geographic and demographic areas are 
based on archival and archaeological data and on the historical logic. The political situation of the 
Europe of his time, as seen by politician Nicolae Iorga, is closely analyzed at the end of his lecture.  
In the second part of the study, starting from the closing of Nicolae Iorga’s lecture, the 
author makes a presentation of the current poitical situation of 2015 Romania, where many of N. 
Iorga’s fears from 1938 come to surface, perhaps even more heightened than they were 80 years ago.  
 
Keywords: Nicolae Iorga, Oradea, 1902- 1938, culture, history, politics.  
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Sur l’économie et les politiques industrielles de 
Roumanie dans l’entre-deux-guerres 
 
 
 
Nicolae PĂUN* 
 
 
L’économie mondiale a eu de la peine à se rétablir suite à la Grande 
guerre. Pendant les quatre années, de 1914 à 1918, les ressources humaines 
et matérielles de la planète entière ont été engagées pour la première fois. La 
guerre totale, comme elle est souvent apelée dans l’histoire économique, a 
laissé des traces profondes, surtout en Europe. Il a fallu plusieurs années 
pour que la valeur des économies atteignit les niveaux d’avant-guerre, bien 
que nous ayons remarqué des augmentations spectaculaires des nouvelles 
branches économiques, selon les tendances d’une autre révolution 
industrielle – l’automobile, la chimie, la métallurgie etc. 
Les nouveaux moteurs du dévelopement économique sont visibles 
à partir de 1922-1923 au niveau global. Dans le cas de la Roumanie aussi, les 
perspectives favorables dont les exploitations industrielles extractives et de 
transformation bénéficieront commencent à être mises en valeur, suivant les 
tendances des nouvelles politiques européennes. 
Sous l’inspiration de la doctrine néolibérale, les gouvernements et 
les parlements d’après 1918 se sont apuyés sur ce nouveau paradigme 
économique de dévelopement et de modernisation des industries. Il est 
évident que le raport entre l’agriculture et l’industrie n’a pas pu être changé 
pendant une période moyenne de dévelopement, ce que, d’ailleurs, on ne 
souhaitait pas, mais il faut aprécier la politique économique de l’État 
roumain, qui a soutenu le nouveau modèle d’industrialisation. Celui-ci était 
fondé sur la spécificité des relations socioéconomiques du pays, qui 
permettaient de mettre en valeur les ressources de matières premières et 
d’énergie, la transformation supérieure, industrielle, des produits agricoles1. 
Dans l’argumentation de l’option pour le modèle agraire-industriel, un poids 
important est attribuable à la défense nationale, d’autant plus que les liens 
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1 Vasile Puşcaş (coord.), Dezvoltare şi modernizare în România interbelică 1919-1939, 
Bucarest, p. 69. 
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déficitaires avec les fournisseurs pendant la guerre ont compté beaucoup 
dans le dévelopement d’une industrie métallurgique-sidérurgique, de 
transformation. Une industrie de défense nationale2 est aparue sur la carte 
de Roumanie, ayant comme citadelles Hunedoara, Reşiţa, les nouvelles 
usines de Copşa-Mică, Cugir, Malaxa, IAR Braşov et beaucoup d’autres. 
Selon Nicolae Arcadian, en 1919, aproximativement 25% de la 
valeur de l’entière industrie de Roumanie était générée en Transylvanie. La 
contribution de cette dernière au processus d’industrialisation de la 
Roumanie a été impressionnante. Corroborées avec la structure de l’Ancien 
Royaume, en 1916, les statistiques indiquent une croissance du nombre 
d’entreprises industrielles, de 845 en 1916 à 2 747 entités, à la fin de la 
conflagration mondiale3. 
 
Tableau 1. Importation des voitures et des moteurs 1919-1932 
Première période Milliers de tonnes Millions de lei 
1. 2. 3. 
1919 8 93 
1920 13 198 
1921 36 553 
1922 52 841 
1923 36 1 517 
1924 30 1 743 
1925 32 1 992 
1926 41 4 104 
1927 46 3 202 
Moyenne annuelle 33 1 583 
   
Deuxième période Milliers de tonnes Millions de lei 
1928 55 3 864 
1929 51 3 968 
1930 35 2 852 
1931 17 1 650 
1932 13 1 041 
Moyenne annuelle 34 2 675 
Source: Victor Axenciuc, Evoluţia economică a României: cercetări statistico-economice 1859-
1947, vol. 1, Ed. Academiei, Bucarest, 1992-1996, p. 100. 
 
Une image quantitative du commencement du processus 
d’industrialisation soutenu par tous les gouvernements de Roumanie est 
offerte par l’importation des voitures, apareils et moteurs pendant la 
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3 V. Axenciuc, Introducere în istoria economică a României, vol I, Ed. Fundaţia România de 
Mâine, Bucarest, 1959, p. 275. 
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première décennie de l’entre-deux-guerres, y compris lors de la grande 
dépression économique. 
Dans une aproche comparative, on constate sans trop d’effort que 
l’Ancien Royaume ne disposait que d’une modeste partie de l’industrie de 
transformation, mais il se positionnait relativement bien par le pétrole, le sel 
et le charbon. La Transylvanie et le Banat offraient du charbon, des minerais 
de fer et non ferreux complexes, du gaz méthane, de l’or, de l’argent etc., 
mais aussi une importante dimension de transformation – voir Reşiţa, 
Hunedoara, Titan-Nădrag-Călan. 
Revenant à Nicolae Arcadian, il est à remarquer aussi la proportion 
de la population totale employée dans l’industrie – environ 401.000 
travailleurs en 1919. 164.200 travaillaient dans le milieu urbain ou étaient 
représentatifs pour le commencement d’un processus d’urbanisation et 
d’industrialisation. Nous pouvons également souligner le dynamisme de la 
population de Transylvanie, notamment avec ses 1.884.400 habitants qui 
étaient employés dans l’industrie extractive, le commerce, les banques, les 
crédits et l’administration. Le poids des petites et moyennes entreprises était 
spécifique à cette province-là. 
Toutes ces données statistiques nous déterminent de constater le 
fait que le potentiel économique et industriel de la Roumanie a augmenté, en 
1919, de 135%, par raport à 1913, en grande mesure grâce à l’industrie de 
Transylvanie. 
 
Tableau 2. L’industrie en Transylvanie - 1919 
Région No. des 
entreprises 
Capital  
investi 
Force  
motrice 
Personnel 
occupé 
Valeur de la 
production 
Transylvanie 42.0 37.0 55.0 52.0 38.0 
Source: Industria şi bogăţiile naturale din Ardeal şi Banat, Tipografia Cartea 
Românească, Cluj, 1927, p. 51. 
 
À partir de ces prémices favorables, fondées sur le potentiel 
économique de la Transylvanie, de la Bucovine et de l’industrie extractive de 
l’Ancien Royaume, le débat sur le caractère de l’économie roumaine a été 
marqué par la doctrine néolibérale. 
L’homme politique et économiste Vintilă Brătianu soutenait que, 
depuis 1918, la Roumanie disposait de toutes les conditions naturelles afin 
de devenir un État industriel complet4, pour que plus tard, en 1923, il ajoutât 
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Transilvania », in Dezvoltarea întreprinderilor metalurgice din Transilvania (1919-1940), 
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que l’industrie énergétique avait un rôle décisif dans le dévelopement de 
l’économie en général. 
Mihail Manoilescu, à son tour, soulignait le rôle particulier de 
l’industrie lourde dans le cadre des branches industrielles, la politique du fer 
étant considérée par celui-ci comme « la politique de la défense nationale, 
économique et militaire, qui à la fin des fins conditionne l’activité entière de 
production et de circulation »5, et considérait que la civilisation roumaine 
était étroitement liée à l’existence de l’industrie. Manoilescu visait, par la 
politique industrielle, un dévelopement selon des critères scientifiques, avec 
la satisfaction des propres demandes, aussi bien que l’assurance d’un volume 
de produits industrialisés destinés à l’exportation. Il soutenait en 1923 que 
« maintenant que le monde se trouve dans une étape de démarrage 
économique, lorsque pour la Roumanie il s’imposerait catégoriquement 
l’élaboration et l’aplication d’une politique d’industrialisation, solidement 
fondée du point de vue scientifique, nous ne pouvons pas contourner les 
critères de l’efficience.6 » Bref, il proposait une consolidation de l’industrie 
en général, avec une attention particulière accordée à l’industrie 
métallurgique et sidérurgique.  
La pensée économique tout entière de la période était d’accord avec 
la stratégie qui posait une industrie consolidée parmi les priorités du 
dévelopement. Le néolibéralisme soutenait l’industrialisation et la priorité de 
défendre le pays, sur la base des nouvelles technologies. Du point de vue de 
l’évolution sociale, les économistes ont soutenu également que le 
dévelopement de l’industrie était une option pour l’absorption de la force de 
travail des milieux ruraux, qui ne pouvaient pas assurer son existence de 
l’agriculture. On envisageait aussi l’arrêt des émigrations. 
En concordance avec la doctrine néolibérale, l’État avait un rôle 
crucial dans le processus d’industrialisation et, par la suite, il s’imposait la 
participation directe de ce-dernier pour des raisons économiques, sociales, 
                                                     
5Voir aussi les commentaires visant le modèle industrialiste de développement de la 
Roumanie proposé par Mihail Manoilescu,in Nicolae Păun, Viaţa economică a 
României 1918-1948, Presa Universitară Clujeană, Cluj-Napoca, 2009, p. 112-114. 
Pour des informations supplémentaires, nous recommandons : M. Manoilescu, 
Doctrinele şi teoriile noastre în lumina criticei. Răspunsul d-lui profesor Gh. Taşcă, extrait, 
Bucarest;Idem, Forţele naţionale productive şi comerţul exterior. Teoria protecţionismului şi a 
schimbului internaţional, Bucarest, 1986; Idem, Potenţialul românesc neutilizat, Bucureşti, 
1937; Idem, Rostul şi destinul burgheziei româneşti, Ed. Albatros, 2002; Idem, Un plan de 
politică economică, Bucarest, 1930. 
6 Ioan Saizu, Modernizarea României contemporane (perioada interbelică). Pas şi impas, Ed. 
Academiei Române, Bucarest, 1991, p. 169. 
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nationales et de sécurité7.On a imposé la doctrine « par nous-mêmes », en 
tant que fondement conceptuel du dévelopement du capital autochtone et 
de l’accélération de l’évolution économique nationale. Ceci exigeait que, 
dans le cadre du processus de reformation et de dévelopement de 
l’économie roumaine, la priorité fusse accordée au capital national, 
notamment au libéral. Le capital étranger était bienvenu en partenariat avec 
le roumain dans les branches que le capital libéral ne pouvait pas exploiter. 
Comme Vintilă Brătianu, les économistes Constantin D. Buşilă et 
Alexandru Topliceanu ont soutenu aussi le dévelopement de l’industrie 
énergétique. Alexandru Topliceanu argumentait qu’il fallait mettre en valeur 
tout d’abord les ressources inépuisables d’énergie (les chutes d’eau), et 
ensuite les épuisables (combustibles), confirmant les études de l’époque sur 
le rôle de l’électrification dans le dévelopement8. 
I.G. Duca (Parti national libéral) plaidait pour l’industrialisation, 
mais avec la primauté du caractère agraire de l’économie roumaine. Il 
affirmait, en 1927, que « par sa structure économique, la Roumanie est sans 
doute, premièrement, un État agricole, et elle doit à tout prix garder ce 
caractère9 ». « Il ne nous semble pas du tout qu’il y ait une incompatibilité 
entre l’essor de l’agriculture et le dévelopement de l’industrie […]. En outre, 
de nombreuses industries sont elles-aussi étroitement liées à l’agriculture; ne 
sont-elles pas une condition indispensable de son progrès? Enfin, notre pays 
a de nombreuses richesses. Ces richesses ne peuvent pas rester 
improductives. Leur mise en valeur s’impose, et par cette mise en valeur, on 
crée inévitablement de nouvelles industries. Une telle évolution naturelle, 
peut-elle être arrêtée simplement parce que nous sommes un pays agricole et 
que nous devons rester un pays agricole? Certainement pas10. » Le 
néolibéralisme, dans la conception du PNL et tel qu’il a été perçu par I.G. 
Duca, se caractérisait par le progrès social obtenu par l’ordre, la démocratie, 
le nationalisme et l’harmonie sociale11. 
I.N. Anghelescu, beaucoup plus acharné qu’I.G. Duca, a plaidé 
pour le besoin d’industrialisation, soutenant que si la Roumanie continuait à 
garder son profil agraire, elle n’avait pas d’autre chance que de « s’intégrer 
                                                     
7 I. G. Duca, « Doctrina liberală », in vol. Doctrinele partidelor politice, Bucarest, 1924, p. 
100-104. 
8Voir, pour plus de détails, l’étude de l’ingénieur D. M. Şerbulescu, « Consideraţii 
asupra electrificărilor rurale realizate până în prezent în România. Modul de 
organizare şi propuneri pentru dezvoltarea viitoare », in Buletin I.R.E., 1940, 8, no. 
1, p. 369-415. 
9 Ştefan Csucsuja, Marcel Ştirban, Ludovic Báthory, op. cit., p. 13.  
10 Ioan Saizu, Politica economică a României între 1922 şi 1928, Ed. Academiei, Bucarest, 
1981, p. 35. 
11 I. G. Duca, op. cit., p. 104. 
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économiquement dans un autre pays, avec lequel elle crée une économie 
intégrale »12. 
Il devient visible, même suite à ces quelques opinions consignées ci-
dessus, qu’il y avait une préoccupation des économistes et des politiciens 
roumains pour l’industrialisation, soit qu’elle ait un rôle prioritaire, soit 
secondaire. L’expérience de la guerre, aussi bien que le succès de 
l’industrialisation occidentale, ont éclairci le fait que l’industrie occupait un 
rôle central dans l’économie d’un pays et que c’était la voie à suivre. En plus, 
la Roumanie a ressenti pendant la Première guerre mondiale le manque 
d’une industrie de défense, mécano-sidérurgique. 
Afin que l’industrie devînt effectivement une partie importante, 
voire stratégique, du dévelopement, il était nécessaire de créer un cadre 
législatif qui l’encourage et la soutienne. 
Comme nous avons remarqué, presque toutes les prises de parole 
au sein de la société plaidaient pour la transition d’une économie fondée en 
principal sur l’agriculture (elle-même extensive), vers une autre moderne, 
industrialisée. Nous avons également observé que les élites politiques, aussi 
bien que les économistes les plus notables du pays, ont plaidé pour un 
dévelopement de l’économie agraire-industrielle, qui, bien qu’elle maintînt 
son caractère agraire en premier lieu, allait mettre l’accent sur le côté 
industriel. 
L’élaboration du cadre législatif nécessaire au dévelopement de 
l’économie est devenue une priorité depuis même le premier Parlement de 
Roumanie et a démarré dès ses séancesinaugurales. La Commission pour 
l’agriculture et celle pour les industries ont été parmi les plus actives et 
extrêmement préoccupées. 
La réforme et la législation agraires ont été les premières qui aient 
marqué l’époque des nouveaux changements. Ainsi, la législation agraire a 
été promulguée immédiatement, dans les années 1919-1921, et a envisagé le 
lotissement en faveur des paysans et le dévelopement d’une agriculture 
intensive. Cette réforme se trouvait en étroite connexion avec 
l’industrialisation, puisque, comme nous l’avons remarqué dans les opinions 
de l’époque, une agriculture intensive s’avérait impossible en l’absence d’une 
industrie. 
La législation industrielle13 a visé la mise en concordance des 
nouvelles réalités économiques avec le dévelopement et le progrès désirés 
par l’État roumain. En plus, son rôle était de consacrer du point de vue 
juridique un nouveau marché économique, capable d’intégrer l’aport des 
                                                     
12 Ioan Saizu, op. cit., p. 37.  
13 Voir, pour plus de détails : Nicolae Păun, Stat şi economie, Ed. Interferenţe, Cluj-
Napoca, 1991.  
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nouvelles provinces et d’en résoudre les problèmes (la reconstruction 
économique après la guerre et le dévelopement). Les lois élaborées dans le 
cadre de ce processus devaient offrir des normes et des institutions en vertu 
desquelles l’État envisageait de déveloper des politiques d’action, 
notamment en ce qui concerne l’aprovisionnement de l’industrie avec des 
machines et des outillages, l’élargissement de la base du crédit industriel, les 
plans d’action dans le domaine des combustibles, des matières premières et 
des transports. Ce sont les principaux aspects qui ont déclenché 
l’élaboration des normes juridiques promulguées par notre pays pendant 
l’entre-deux-guerres. 
Dans les années 1918-1921 seulement, on a adopté plus de 60 lois, 
règlements et décrets-lois14. Parmi ceux-ci, les plus importants ont été : la 
Loi sur l’encouragement de l’industrie nationale, le Décret-loi sur la création 
de la Caisse de crédit pour la reconstruction de la petite industrie, la Loi sur 
l’institution des syndicats des fabricants et des artisans etc. 
La loi sur l’encouragement de l’industrie nationale de 1912 a été 
considérée vitale pour l’économie du pays, de sorte qu’elle a été déclarée loi 
fondamentale et étendue, par conséquent, à l’échelle de l’entière économie 
nationale. Celle-ci imposait des tarifs douaniers pour les produits étrangers, 
et qu’un nombre important des travailleurs industriels soient roumains, bien 
que les entreprises apartinssent au capital étranger15. Les termes d’aplication 
de cette loi ont été constamment prolongés, couvrant tout l’intervalle de 
l’entre-deux-guerres. Par exemple, seulement pendant la période du 
gouvernement Gh. Tătărăscu (Parti national libéral) ont été émises des lois 
pour un tel prolongement les 4 avril 1934, 8 avril 1935, 8 avril 1936 et 12 
novembre 1936. Les nouvelles lois ont introduit des modifications 
importantes au texte de base de 1912, comme la création du « Fonds 
industriel », constituépar une taxe de 1% sur la valeur des emprunts faits 
avec exceptions aux taxes douanières. Le fonds était destiné « à l’assistance 
accordée aux petits industriels et artisans roumains avec machines et 
outillages ». En outre, les lois sur l’encouragement permettaient à l’industrie 
d’établir des prix beaucoup plus grands sur le marché intérieur que ceux de 
l’extérieur. Par exemple, en 1935, les produits métallurgiques sur le marché 
de Roumanie étaient plus chers de 220% que ceux sur le marché belge16. 
Un autre pas important a été la fondation, par un décret-loi, de la 
société par actions anonyme « Reconstruction industrielle », dont l’objectif 
                                                     
14 Selon Nicolae Păun, Rolul statului în viaţa economică a României în perioada interbelică. 
Evoluţie doctrinară şi instituţională, Cluj- Napoca, 1991, p. 62. 
15 Selon Alexandru Cuzin, « Relaţiunile comerciale dintre Austro-Ungaria şi 
România », in Românul, no. 153, 12/25 juillet 1912, p. 1.  
16 Selon Emilia Sonea, Gavrilă Sonea, Viaţa economică şi politică a României (1933-1938), 
Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, Bucarest, 1978, p. 71-72. 
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était « d’aprovisionner l’industrie avec des machines, des installations, des 
matériaux de transport, des matières premières, des combustibles, de 
participer aux entreprises industrielles existantes ou qui seront créées à 
l’avenir, tout en procurant du capital et des matériaux, en accordant des 
avances sur les droits des industriels aux compensations de guerre17 ». La 
société avait pour but d’aider les industriels et les entreprises industrielles à 
se rétablir suite à la guerre, mais en même temps, de contribuer à la création 
de nouvelles entreprises. 
Le plus important corpus législatif a été la Constitution de 1923, qui 
garantissait le droit à la propriété, mais elle faisant également un autre pas 
important : l’introduction du principe de nationalisation du sous-sol et des 
dépôts miniers (selon le modèle des mesures similaires prises par les États 
occidentaux bien auparavant). 
Les articles économiques de la constitution ont rendu possible la 
transformation de la Roumanie, d’un pays agraire en un pays agraire-
industriel. L’industrie placée sous des auspices libéraux éprouvait un essor 
remarquable. On a créé des institutions nécessaires au dévelopement de la 
vie industrielle, des leviers économiques, et les entreprises anciennes ont été 
placées sur de nouveaux fondements libéraux, par le biais d’au moins trois 
lois importantes : la Loi sur la création de la Société nationale du crédit 
industriel du 23 juin 1923; la Loi sur la commercialisation et le contrôle des 
entreprises de l’État du 7 juin 1924 et la Loi des mines du 4 juillet 1924. 
La Société nationale du crédit industriel a eu pour rôle principal 
d’accorder des crédits à l’industrie et, ainsi, elle a soutenu le dévelopement 
industriel de la Roumanie. Elle était soumise au contrôle de l’État et a accordé la 
primauté et soutenu notamment l’industrie métallurgique. Par conséquent, 
jusqu’en 1925, 42 firmes métallurgiques ont reçu des crédits industriels, avec un 
montant total de 597.152.824 lei, soit 30,5% du total des crédits accordés à 
l’industrie par la Société nationale du crédit industriel pendant les années 1924-
192518. 
Une place particulière dans le cadre des politiques du gouvernement 
national-libéral est revenue aux mesures destinées à la création d’une forte 
industrie des équipements et de l’armement. Le 11 juin 1925, on a adopté la 
Loi sur « les entreprises industrielles liées à la défense nationale ». 
Graduellement, les usines de Cugir, Copşa Mică et Reşiţa ont été 
transformées en fabriques d’armement. En plus, par la Loi du 13 novembre 
1934, le Ministère de la défense nationale et le Ministère de l’armement ont 
été autorisés à utiliser « Le fonds de la défense nationale créé par la Banque 
nationale de Roumanie, pour l’acquisition d’installations, le partage et la 
                                                     
17 Monitorul oficial, no. 110, 8 août 1919. 
18 Selon Ştefan Csucsuja, Marcel Ştirban, Ludovic Báthory, op. cit., p. 14. 
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réparation de l’armement, des munitions, de l’équipement, du harnais19 ». 
L’industrie métallurgique a été soutenue par l’intermédiaire des lois 
promulguées, car elles ont mené à une participation importante de l’État 
dans le cadre des entreprises et à un meilleur financement de celles-ci. 
La grande dépression économique a eu des effets sur le plan 
législatif. Ainsi, en 1933, la préoccupation des politiciens d’aider les 
industries minières et métallurgiques à dépasser la crise s’est concrétisée en 
la promulgation de la « Loi sur l’autorisation de la Régie publique 
commerciale des entreprises minières et métallurgiques de l’État, de 
Transylvanie », par le biais de laquelle on a contracté un emprunt de la BNR 
avec un montant de 114.000.000 lei20. L’emprunt a assisté les entreprises 
gravement affectées par la crise économique à se rétablir et à recommencer 
leur production. Les stipulations budgétaires du chapitre « impôts directs » 
en 1935-1936exhibaient la somme de 3 675 600 000 lei; 1936-1937 – 4 350 
000 000 lei, et en 1937-1938 – 4 725 000 000 lei. La contribution de 
l’industrie à ces valeurs, en pourcentages, pendant les années respectives, 
était de 24,30%; 23,72%;et 25,30%, respectivement.Dans le cas des impôts 
directs (douanes, taxes sur la consommation, timbre, chiffre d’affaires et 
impôt sur les spectacles), à l’exception de ce dernier chapitre, la contribution 
de l’industrie était faible, comme suit : 1935-1936 – 71,60%, respectivement 
6 285 000 000 lei; 1936-1937 – 71,97%, soit7 443 000 000 lei; 1937-1938 – 
71,3%, ou 8 724 000 000 lei. À l’exception de ces données, l’industrie a 
participé aux encaissements publics des taxes de timbre et aux impôts sur les 
actes et faits juridiques, par un montant de 760 millions lei, en 1935-1936, de 
865 000 000 lei en 1937-1938, et de 1 056 000 000 lei dans l’exercice 1937-
193821. 
Le cadre législatif industriel a été enrichi aussi par des mesures 
protectionnistes établissant des quotas à l’exportation, depuis 1932, des 
réductions aux importations des biens de consommation qui pouvaient être 
produits dans le pays, un système des primes d’exportation etc. En outre, 
l’État a augmenté ses commandes vers les entreprises du domaine de la 
défense nationale et a accordé des facilités de financement aux entreprises 
industrielles qui exécutaient des commandes d’État, par l’octroi d’avances et 
de crédits de la BNR. Ces mesures ont permis l’essor de l’industrie et l’ont 
encouragée à se déveloper vers de nouveaux domaines. 
Les politiques, aussi bien que la législation par laquelle on a réalisé 
l’industrialisation de la Roumanie jusqu’à un certain niveau, qui a été atteint 
                                                     
19 Emilia Sonea, Gavrilă Sonea, op. cit., p. 73.  
20 Monitorul oficial, no. 97, 8 août 1919. 
21 Voir« Contribuţia industriei naţionale la sarcinile fiscale », in Analele industriei şi 
comerţului, 1939, 4, no. 8-9, p. 19-20. 
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pendant une période extrêmement tendue, marquée par les conséquences de 
la grande dépression et de la menace de la guerre, ont eu un effet positif au 
niveau de l’économie et ont encouragé l’évolution des entreprises 
métallurgiques et sidérurgiques d’extraction, aussi bien que de 
transformation. 
L’économie du pays a connu une ample restructuration, qui lui a 
permis de changer son caractère, d’agraire à agraire-industriel. On a avancé 
dans la société non seulement des solutions économiques, mais aussi des 
programmes pour la modernisation et le dévelopement de la communauté. 
L’expérience roumaine n’a pas été une simple copie du modèle 
occidental, mais un apréciable raccordement à l’esprit européen, dans des 
conditions socio-économiques et géopolitiques spécifiques, relativement 
différentes de celles à l’occident. 
 
 
Sommaire 
 
Les lignes d’évolution d’après 1918, tracées autour de la pensée et la pratique 
économiques de notre pays, ont mis en valeur le potentiel de dévelopement des provinces historiques 
et, notamment, de la Transylvanie. L’industrialisation et le changement du caractère de l’économie 
roumaine, d’agraire et agraire-industriel, voilà les réponses de l’économie, d’encadrement et de 
raprochement au modèle occidental, dans des conditions socioéconomiques et géopolitiques 
particulières, différentes de celles trouvées à l’occident. 
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University mission in the knowledge society 
 
 
 
Ludmila ROŞCA* 
 
 
Introduction 
Research study: University mission in the knowledge society is a 
topic based on current and extremely valuable things for social, political, 
economic reality in the Republic of Moldova, because professionals are 
needed for the dynamic development of these areas, who are characterized 
by strategic thinking; who have formed a respectful attitude towards the 
concept that incorporates all the country; who manifest themselves in 
diverse forms of social relations as integer figures. The presence of this 
social group is a prerequisite for the prosperity of society at all times, but its 
contribution is required, particularly in crises, social system malfunction. 
The social system is open, complex, non-linear, characterized by its own 
regularities of operation. In normal operation, the objective and subjective 
factors, which ensure dynamic stability of the social system, interact, 
cooperate and thereby ensure at the same time, system stability and 
dynamism. In crisis conditions of part of the social life or the whole system, 
the significance of the subjective factor activity increases. Namely university 
is responsible for this segment of social life, summarizing the results of the 
institutions' educational efforts of other levels of organization, but 
responsible for the formation, training, mentoring younger generation. 
Given that, the Republic of Moldova is characterized by various crises: 
political, constitutional, economic, financial, cultural (inter-ethnic, religious 
conflicts etc.), the mission of the university in Moldovan society is 
complicated, but it has decisive role. 
Now, at the level of European Council there are no events, actions, 
which would have addressed the need to increase the performance of 
national training and education. European higher education reform is 
dictated by the imperative of increasing the quality of services provided by 
universities, competitiveness. In the contemporary world, higher education 
is seen as a strategic area because the power of a state can be enhanced 
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through the efficient functioning of the system of training and education. 
Objectives of the training and university education also include questioning 
the person; training and skills development required by a field of 
professional activity. 
The knowledge society is a formula generally accepted by scientists, 
designating entering a new phase of development of the Information 
Society (Session of Extraordinary European Council in Lisbon on 23-24 
March 2000). The subject of knowledge society is Homo sapiens sapiens. 
Trained and educated in the university of the XXI century, joining 
education / training with research and production, it is competitive in the 
labour market, active in social relations, characterized by high moral 
character, which feeds the sense of duty and responsibility. From promoting 
ethical principles of academic integrity: academic freedom, autonomy and 
accountability, transparency, meritocracy, honesty and fairness - it is shaping 
the mission and role of the university XXI century. This is the central 
objective of the investigation, the results of which are presented in the 
article. 
 
Aplied methods: systemic analysis, content analysis, comparative 
study, interdisciplinary aproach. 
 
Research rezults: The concept of university as a socio-cultural 
institution is elaborated by contemporary philosophers. In his work "The 
idea of university", K. Jaspers emphasized that to work at the university 
"means to gain a sense of truth in science", knowledge of methods and their 
potential and thereby "knowledge of science limits". The university develops 
philosophical sense of truth that can be achieved along the path of the 
methods aplied. University should be devoted to research without 
compromise that should not be justified only to the criteria of reason and 
truth. The concept of university not only secures the mission of institution 
in human society, but also designates the limits of scientific knowledge. In 
Jaspers's conception, university is the refuge of freedom of thought, 
freedom responsible for spirit. 
Both in philosophy and at work, in everyday life, K. Jaspers pays 
great attention to communication. Authentic communication between two 
human beings constitutes a decisive factor, and university as a place of 
freedom provides the possibility of authentic communication between 
teachers and students, and between students, and between teachers. To 
communicate is to design a common perspective of those who discuss and 
investigate gnoseologic problems. In philosophy, K. Jaspers uses the verb to 
call for, which is understood to awaken the existence of the interlocutor, as 
it is present in case that would be distracted or numb. Existentialist 
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philosopher did not admit to say that someone cannot make him call for or 
that someone lacks inner possibilities. K. Jaspers was convinced that in 
every human being there is the possibility of existence, we can always call 
for it and this is the most important part of the work of professors of 
philosophy1. 
An original interpretation of the mission of the university in 
contemporary society we find in the work "Existentialism and Education", 
signed by G.F. Kneller. The author noted that university is the core of the 
education system, it should be concerned with: deciphering the contents of 
good life; human nature, the nature of society, the nature of ultimate reality 
that any kind of knowledge they seek to penetrate. G.F. Kneller assigns to 
education a double meaning: "act or experience that has a formative effect 
on the mind, character or physical ability of an individual" and another as a 
process "by which society through schools, colleges, universities and other 
institutions, deliberately transmits its cultural heritage - knowledge, values 
and skills gained - from one generation to another"2. Simultaneously, 
education has the meaning of a product, it means what we get by learning - 
forms, methods, principles, levels of knowledge, ideals and techniques we 
are taught. 
Education as a highly complex phenomenon can be studied from 
many perspectives, each revealing new meanings. A sense of education, 
which cannot be ignored because it defines the mission of university, has 
been exposed by a founder of sociology of education, E. Durkheim. The 
scientist pointed out: Education is methodical socialization of the young 
generation ...; it is the action exercised by adult generations on those who 
are not yet ripe for social life ... It covers not man as was created by nature, 
but man wished by the society and it wants him as the inner structure 
requires: to exist any society needs homogeneity and education is the means 
by which society renews the conditions of its own existence gradually, by 
planting the child's soul essential similarities that are most apropriate to the 
type of society. The purpose of education is to socialize biological individual 
by building his social being which overlap the individual one 3. 
Education is a manifestation of social and human reality. Inherent 
in social life, education is a direct shareholder perceptible reality, especially 
in the encounter between generations, knowable by traces the history of 
civilizations (documents, institutions and others) and logically deductible 
systemic aproach to the evolution of society in which there are large 
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differences the potential of knowledge tending, law-like, towards 
equilibrium. Balancing continuous education system is performed in a 
communication process focused on the exchange of information, and is 
subject to its laws. Education is a form of human action practice, it results 
from the interaction of an individual or collective subject who initiates it. 4 
With globalization, the university cannot be measured only in 
relation to its own design or those of universities in the country, or specific 
region. University is measured (and must be measured) with the best 
universities in the world. This means that the university is required to carry 
out scientific research at the forefront recognized and different institutions, 
firms, etc. in key positions prefer its graduates. Professor at the University 
of Michigan, James J. Duderstadt, describes the transformation of the 
university through evolution and revolution.5 In the first case, changes occur 
gradually over time, universities adapt to the external environment, in 
response to various influences that come from society. In the second 
situation, the transformations take place in a relatively short time, producing 
radical, dramatic and axiological core aims of universities. Analysing the 
transformations of social institutions, it is hard to apreciate which of these 
two models of change are dominant today. Looking at the results of these 
transformations in higher education, we see the coexistence of traditional 
universities, universities that have adapted and reinvented entirely new 
universities, born in response to requests of historical time, social practice. 
The dangers and oportunities of the new environment in which 
universities operate today can be addressed by two trends: adaptation via 
withdrawal or proactive, entrepreneurial adaptation. In the first case, it is 
expected that the problems go away by themselves or that they will find their 
own solution. In the second situation, it is seeking constructive solutions to 
the challenges coming from inside and outside, to adapt the market to exploit 
the novelty of the permanent changes. The main hazards related to the activity 
of contemporary universities are: massification of higher education, the 
decline in public funding, increasing demographic and socio-economic 
diversity, demand for permanent adult education, the unprecedented 
development of information technologies, market globalization of higher 
education etc. Referring to the massification of higher education, Professor 
K.J. Dougherty noted that the evolution of higher education, traditionally 
elitist to a mass higher education, is a reflection of new technological 
developments, democratic values, the needs of the new knowledge-based 
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society.6 The next challenge - the decline in public funding for universities - to 
the universities tends to seek alternative sources of funding, primarily from 
the private sector. It is about the direction of transformation that showed 
Burton R. Clark a teacher, referring to how universities adapt to market 
requirements, namely, the existence of a diversified funding base.7 
Together, these reform efforts opened new oportunities for 
universities and students. In essence, this process has two purposes: to 
create a European higher education area by reducing barriers to the mobility 
of teachers, researchers and students; enhancing competitiveness of 
European universities. Underlying the need to implement the Bologna 
Process there were more visions. One is that, since the Middle Ages, 
European continent gave rise to mainstream universities that passed 
through centuries and are still present in the modern world. Second, 
European countries (European Union) are lagging behind their competitors: 
the United States, China, Canada, Japan, Australia.8 And the third would be 
the principle of social cohesion, intercontinental mobility, unity of the 
European continent etc. In essence, all these visions contain two basic 
components: the European economy and European values. 
Therefore, the XXI century - requires a new kind of education. No 
one can be the beneficiary of a new civilization, without a new kind of 
education, and no longer provide this new kind of education without 
making changes in the organization of universities, interacting with the 
cultural, economic, administrative, technological environment. Higher 
education institutions are communities that offer higher education and 
research. Along the way, they have turned into complex, large-scale 
organizations, which cannot be directed, administered just under the 
traditional academic standards. The mission of universities is to produce, 
exploit and transmit knowledge. In a globalized economy, knowledge is 
capital and the true engine of society development. Currently, university is 
facing new challenges in terms of performance and accountability. The 
products offered by the university are knowledge and power, suplied to 
society in various forms: 
• training of specialists in various socially useful fields; 
• research, consulting, expertise; 
• involving academic community in society. 
This benefit of the university can be considered only as quality 
products and its activity satisfy the requirements and expectations of 
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customers, internal and external partners regarding formation society 
representatives in areas required by the labour market at an apropriate level 
of problem solving by socio-economic research and consulting, creating an 
apropriate work-life performance in the said institutions. 
We see thus that the mission of universities is complex and it is 
based on three essential points: 
• vocational mission (in this way students are being transmitted 
knowledge and skills to be prepared as highly skilled workforce in a specific 
area or specialization); 
• mission to create knowledge (knowledge is transmitted to students 
and is developed or transferred to technology and other areas that have an 
economic impact of progress in social development); and 
- social mission (graduates obtain skills and values of general 
character and this allows the development of societies based on knowledge 
and communication between people, with democratic character). 
Analysing aspect of globalization of higher education, Professor R. 
Deem presents a set of changes, modifications, changes in financing 
arrangements, organizational and cultural changes, new forms of education 
delivery through the Internet or by attracting foreign student groups, using a 
speech based on different cultural and linguistic resources. This change is 
necessitated by the fact that different groups - results of globalization - 
different discourses claim.9 When we talk about globalization in higher 
education, we consider the existence of a global market for higher 
education, which creates a global competition. In the world penetrated 
various integration processes, human capacity is important to orient in time 
and social space. Human orientation is based on decision, having options, 
and choosing kind of occupation etc. University is required to develop 
human cognitive abilities, particularly strategic thinking so that students, 
graduates, employees, skilled in the art will be able to steer the social life of 
the community. 
The social orientation of contemporary human temporal-spatial 
changes has particular significance, determined by the evolution of society 
from traditionalism to modernism and postmodernism. The orientation of the 
first category of people, highlighted by Bauman, is driven by the desire to take 
advantage of cultural and economic expansion American and European, 
which simultaneously can lead to denial / ignorance values, customs and 
traditions, morals, constituted in historical time, into a concrete space. In 
other words, the problem interdependencies and temporal-spatial changes 
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characteristic of the contemporary world can be traced through the dialectic 
of tradition, innovation and traditional culture - culture progressive and 
innovative. It is also important that the teacher not only to youngsters be 
prepared theoretically but personally accept change, to respect the principle of 
tolerance in intercultural communication, be ready to accept other opinions 
and aproaches. The correct orientation of young people ready to fit in socially 
useful activities carried out in a world of many colours "woven from 
inequalities ", in our opinion, would mean: 
- knowledge of the native language, history and moral foundations  
- customs, traditions, manners; civilizational process steps, carried 
out within the space of the state; 
- development of historical consciousness, under which recognition 
of belonging to a nation, to a certain culture and civilization is possible; 
- ability to observe in time the change of natural environment of 
existence, the socio-cultural environment and to respond to the 
requirements / conditions thereof. 10 
University can be seen as an organization that operates in a 
competitive market of services (education, research, expertise, consultancy 
etc.). In this regard, higher education institution competitiveness is 
determined by its ability to adapt to the changing needs of economic and 
social environment. Its main task is to meet the specific needs of the 
education and training of the individual and the social and economic 
development needs of the community (local, regional, national, 
international). University reaches this goal only if it meets these 
requirements to a quality standard, which enables both the individual and 
society to become proficient in a globalized environment, characterized by 
competition and dynamism. Maintaining standards is possible only in 
conditions of academic activity oriented performance through continuous 
improvement of suply and results by providing an efficient management of 
financial policy, the rational use of resources, encouraging a responsible 
attitude of the staff etc. However, the university continues to retain 
scientific and cultural mission. It produces new scientific knowledge and 
critically evaluates the general - accepted by the academic community, 
creates, through its members, intellectual works of national and international 
value. In performing these functions, it seeks autonomy and academic 
progress of human knowledge, usually unpredictable process. However, 
these major goals of the university must harmonize with their mission of 
educating and training the younger generation. By preparing the younger 
generation who will manage the affairs of society in various fields, 
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universities still have mission to prove the truth of the maxim: There are no 
poor countries and rich countries. There are well-managed and poorly 
managed states! 
Currently, we are witnessing major changes in European 
educational system. Higher education is a major public service offered by a 
national society of universities of different types and profiles. The impact of 
the personal development of an impressive number of citizens is particularly 
important: it provides an oportunity for greater personal autonomy; 
enhanced social mobility; professional and international mobility; the higher 
income etc. From year to year the number of people who have access to this 
service in several European countries entry into tertiary level education is a 
right guaranteed to all those who have completed secondary education with 
an apropriate certificate (baccalaureate). Although retaining students is never 
one hundred percent for higher education, the yield of this training is 
recognized in society and the university becomes more engaged in lifelong 
education of a person. 
In terms of ethics, contemporary society is a society of post-debt, 
where more and more people recognize the need for ethical minimum of 
debts, pragmatic, pluralistic, liberal rules that make people and social groups' 
coexistence possible. We all live in a society of knowledge or information - 
knowledge society - post-industrial form of social organization in which the 
main activities and sources of income are related to content management. 
By knowledge, we understand a certain use of data, information, knowledge, 
training session or training for certain activities and education. Knowledge, 
in the narrow sense, is a precondition for the generation of novel useful and 
relevant. In the economic activity immaterial capital (staff qualifications, 
relativity, flexibility, knowledge bases, etc.), now, has a more important role 
than visible assets. 
University integrity aims at union of education with research, with 
production. As it was established historically, universities currently remain 
selective in their work, and young people undergoing university experience 
remain deeply transformed throughout their lives. Research recruit persons 
exclusively through academic training, which means that the license only 
becomes the basis for selection in future for higher levels of training of the 
person. In addition, the broader recruitment base is, the more chances to 
grow and discover more human resources and better equiped. Today, elite, 
exceptional individuals endowed, not only are trained in higher education 
institutions, they formed more at masters and doctoral programs. Yet, 
keeping universities remains from the establishment at the beginning - to 
seek and to transmit the truth into science and morality. Universities, as 
large companies do, should also educate request, provide curricula of the 
future. In the XXI century, university remains stable future institution 
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having the following characteristics: multidisciplinary, requires continuing 
education, integrates science, education and production, treats information 
properly and has a particular rhythm work, states Professor Maliţa.11 
As the future is in favour of several disciplines and a broad 
specialization, it is good that in every educational system there are two ways 
to field aproach: one - as a profession and two - as a discipline. And this is 
on the grounds that university not only grants a professional qualification, 
but rather, a license versatile in a broad field of science. Under the new 
conditions, university involves education. Everything in the concept of 
university that is particular, specific or narrow in scope of aplication 
becomes general, broad and comprehensive. More and more note that 
university becomes a permanent place and it is tied back periodically to keep 
a record of training and training needs. Not that university has classrooms 
and gives supremacy or upward, but its modern laboratory is significant, 
failing in which the universities are less likely to adapt to something new, to 
the requirements. Namely, university is obliged to treat the information 
accordingly. Under the new conditions, university reveals its second 
vocation when it promises to be a documentary centre to the volume of 
information. The existence of computing centres enable universities to 
investigate the so-called problem of finding information. 
University remains the institution, which has a special working 
rhythm, sometimes criticized for the slow pace, its enviable task sometimes 
referred as instantaneous. University integrates science, education and 
production. University is considered an institution able to link with other 
research and production factors, which are essential for tomorrow's society. 
Public works, presentations, communications, discovery could not be 
coagulated only after decades of work. We can ask: In whose favour pace 
future is pronounced? University is an institution in the long term. It has in 
its structure necessary time to pursue core objectives for society, such as the 
progress of science. Type of human activity in the future will be closer to 
the type of university investigation. 
If we refer to the Moldovan economy, then it continuously records 
an average gap with the European Union countries and these differences, 
instead of diminishing, continue to increase. Reducing disparities requires a 
sustained pace of economic development, economic efficiency comparable 
to many resources. If we try to rapidly recover the delays, treading the same 
path they have travelled European countries, our attempt will fail. In the 
process of economic evolution it is required a new strategy, a more 
apropriate one, of integration of the walk. Social Reality shows us that 
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something is possible (for example, development of mobile telephony and 
cable television). 
Starting from the specified above, we notice that economy must be 
directed to those areas of economic development that require less costly 
infrastructure and more reduced energy resources, where the gap is 
measured in years, not decades or centuries. We remember that each major 
industrial revolution gave rise to a certain cycle of development that had 
both beneficiaries and losers. The start of these cycles has been marked, 
each time, the use of certain energy. If we cannot reduce the gap in terms of 
power management, then it may be diminished in information management. 
The first industrial revolution was the one that started with the use of steam, 
its beneficiary, in large part, was England. The second revolution was 
triggered by the use of the internal combustion engine, which used oil 
instead of steam and led to the development of the automotive industry and 
aeronautics, the main beneficiary being the USA. The third revolution was 
triggered by the use of nuclear energy, the US and Russia beneficiaries, who 
played world supremacy. From 1970 comes a new kind of energy altogether 
different from the others, by its immaterial - information. The information 
revolution is in full swing, development has allowed the US to establish 
itself as the leading world power. However, this revolution has led to the 
emergence of new Asian economic powers, countries lacking energy 
resources, but quickly adapted to this race of new technologies, such as 
Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia or Thailand and India. It is 
extremely important that the way as each country integrates into the race of 
this new revolution, information revolution, it also depends on the position, 
the place that it will have in the process of globalization. 
Another example is that after the 40s of the XX century in the US 
higher education gains a mass character, becoming a social and political elite 
education in education accessible to all. This wave of massification of higher 
education in Europe barely reaches over thirty years in the 70s. In recent 
years, there is an increase in the number of students, for example: US (295.5 
mln. population) in 1978 was 11 mln., in 1988-13 mln. and in 2000-14 mln. 
of students or 4.8% of the population; France (63 mln. population) in 2004 
is 2.2 mln. students or 3.49% of the population; Chile (15 mln. population) 
in 1978-131.000, in 1988-235.000, in 2000-311.000 students or 2.75 of the 
population; the Republic of Moldova (4 mln. population) in 2005-115.000 
students or 2.9% of the population. Higher education is becoming more 
accessible both for students who have financial means and capabilities for 
students who do not have such power. Today, the problem of access to 
higher education remains of great importance for the successful 
development of a society based on research and knowledge and it is solved 
differently from country to country. For example, the US has drafted Trio 
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project, UK Aimhigher project, which offer various activity programs to 
suport and assist students from all social levels. In Australia, UK etc. 
governments provide funding to higher education institutions for the latter 
to accept a greater number of students, throughout the UK there are 
Foundation Degrees, which aims to help and to broaden the participation of 
students from all social layers. Such programs exist in Sweden, France etc. 
China's example is also of great interest, which in 1978 opened the outer 
world, focusing on higher education (students from disadvantaged social 
strata benefit from financial suport from the state), or Japan, where 98% of 
the population has higher education, and such examples may be followed. 
All of them have one explanation: in a more and more competitive world, 
the percentage of people who received higher education is a crucial factor in 
the society development from economic perspective. 
Currently, we are witnessing the commercialization of university 
studies. Higher education and research are conceived as products, goods. 
Universities provide education, research, expertise, consultancy etc. that can 
bring profit, and quantity, their quality and price are already market driven. 
Academics, students, funders etc. choose alternatives based on individual 
preferences at universities. In a commercial world, universities, looking for 
investment shareholders are obliged to operate under the business model: 
they have a reduced board, undertake commercial and financial experts etc. 
However, university should serve government objectives, its activity being 
assessed in terms of efficiency and competence of public authorities who 
manage the reform process. In most cases, these two perspectives: the 
commercial and government complement each other and do not opose. 
Often at international fora, researchers are asking: But are governments 
ready to face university reform? Yes, most governments are facing the 
finished product; they require immediate and measurable results, and thus 
lead a rigorous accounting, and thus governments, wishing or not, promote 
supervision, accreditation, standardization, audit, which are sometimes 
excessive. In countries where public funding of universities is below 50% 
(US, Australia, etc.), or is a bit more than 50%, the university experienced 
strong sales, they (universities) are involved in processes of generating 
profits. For example, in Sweden the funding of universities is carried out 
based on the number of students enrolled in degree studies, i.e. as the 
number of enrolled students is higher, and the amount of public financing is 
greater. In recent years, funding for higher education in China, South Korea 
and many countries in Latin America, the Pacific, where the share of this 
funding in GDP is 1%, significantly increased. 
Massification of higher education requires, certainly, quality of 
education, which is a joint responsibility of both the university and all its 
social partners. Universities, teachers, students, public authorities etc. must 
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define implementing quality in higher education as a priority objective of 
learning, teaching and research. Bologna Process requires from universities a 
re-orientation towards employment and training of specialists based on 
skills. This development raises new issues relating to the internal 
organization of the university, its place in a society is increasingly extensive. 
In this context, it becomes the current concept of integrity. 
University and scientific community has been and must always 
remain a model of consistency, coherence and moral dignity. Mostly, public 
image of the institution depends on moral verticality of all making it up. 
That is why universities, first, must promote and stimulate intellectual work, 
scientific creation and professional obligations that are freely assumed. Each 
member of the university community must act fairly, honestly, without 
deceiving colleagues directly responsible for the obligations of the 
incumbent. Academia largely resembles the rest of society and prints 
certainly all society's ills. However, this environment is often viewed with 
less severity than other beneficiaries of public funds are. When we talk 
about corruption, in particular, trading in influence, abuse of office, 
protectionism, theft of means, bribery, nepotism, etc., we tend to focus 
more on state institutions. For the lack of effective public control system 
has given way, in some cases, to the transformation of some institutions into 
personal fiefdoms that are headed discretionary, under patronage rules, that 
confuse personal relationships with those of the institution. 
Another problem is that the state, being a lazy monopolist, is 
interested only in strategic control over the university and academic world, 
and not the operation of the system, its performance and competitiveness. 
Specifically, lacking accountability system, public scrutiny over academic as 
it is overly bureaucratic and centralized. Consequently, universities are not 
left, are not encouraged to develop their own mechanisms of self-regulation, 
they do not have arbitration tribunal / neutral and efficient mediation in 
case of conflict or block with state authorities and other institutions. It 
should be noted that the responsibility belongs not only to the guardianship 
forums, but to the members of the academic world as well, who should 
behave as a cohesive community interested in self-regulation. It hapens 
sometimes that group interests, oportunism, conformism and cowardice 
create a certain tolerance of abuse that takes place in academia. The 
responsibility lies with the larger universities and is that they, through 
internal quality assurance process must define their own instruments, 
procedures and standards for internal evaluation, conduct ongoing 
evaluation programs and develop a quality culture within the institution. 
Another aspect, not less important, of our research domain is that 
all universities are public and should be organized by a number of principles 
of university autonomy, public accountability, ensuring academic freedom. 
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Solid foundation of this process is the knowledge. Today, universities are 
called to help build a new humanism, a new university in which: teaching, 
scientific and organizational autonomy; freedom of thought and research; 
democratic participation and social responsibility; innovation, transparency, 
ethics etc. constitute its essential values. The main feature of the university 
today is generosity, it does not only own honour and glory, and its 
objectives are linked to the interests of society and the community where it 
operates. In education, universities have a duty of leading the society. They 
educate especially young people and influence societies through research 
and innovation. Mostly university depends on the people who come up with 
new ideas and who often have different opinions. Universities are 
dependent on diversity: scientists from different fields work together; train 
students and teachers differently, which makes the existence of different 
perspectives possible; cultural and linguistic diversity facilitates learning 
through comparative and distinctive aproaches. 
In the knowledge society, characteristic of the developed states, to 
which other European countries tend, the departments of the intellectual 
sphere, the intangible assets of education, especially higher education that 
has the major role, produce the main economic effects. The concept of 
academic integrity meets practical needs of the universities to provide 
quality services to various social groups. More broadly, the concept of 
integrity means honesty, probity, sense of dignity, justice and 
conscientiousness that serve as a guide to human conduct. In turn, moral 
integrity is prohibition to request, accept or offer, directly or indirectly, any 
advantage or benefit in the performance of duties / obligations or abuse of 
their position in any way, or tasks performed. European intellectuals' 
scientific discourse is focused on interpretation / understanding and 
assimilation of Keywords: cooperation, participation, integrity, legitimacy, 
dialogue and respect, designating the attitudes required for all people, 
especially the younger generation. From this perspective, higher education 
institutions are obliged to take apropriate measures to cultivate new values, 
to promote the values of ethical conduct, with particular emphasis on 
integrity and prevention of corruption in academia developing a 
participatory civic culture. Intellectual transition is a prerequisite and pillar 
for all other components of the transformations taking place in the country. 
In the XXI century education, particularly the university, must represent and 
represents a priority for all governments. Intellectual transition includes 
several elements such as strategic thinking, perceptions, opinions, attitudes, 
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beliefs, habits, values etc. that need to be changed through education and 
training.12  
XXI Century University teaches people of all ages and experience to 
acquire, process, aply in production and produce new knowledge. 
Knowledge in the knowledge society has a significant value; it is an 
important resource group activity, its outcomes. University educates, forms 
scientific management skills required. At least one member of the founding 
team of enterprise / organization / institution must be informed, to be able 
to store information in a database, systematize and use all this information. 
To achieve the goal, the manager must be knowledgeable in the field, even if 
not skilled, he must understand the interaction between art and market. It is 
essential for knowledge manager to be aware of training model of the 
human persuasion, communication with them, knowledge of the laws and 
customs of the working group. For this reason, the manager has to 
continuously learn to adapt to particular situations. 
Information is intelligible to every receiver, which adds his 
knowledge, he charged. Knowledge is defined as cumulative stock of 
knowledge and skills of using information generated by the receiver. 
Knowledge reflects the perception and judgment processes in the human 
brain with the material received as information. Information and knowledge 
differ in that man's intellectual capacities depend on the competence with 
which he perceives, understands and uses the information. The same 
information for different people may have significantly different values due 
to major differences in perception and ability to use their knowledge 
generating different part. Intellectual capacity of people and the knowledge 
they possess in a given field are certain to turn data and information into 
knowledge particularly valuable or not to generate knowledge.13 At the level 
of knowledge are found in enterprise workforce (human capital), the 
requirements and preferences of customers, products, processes, capabilities 
and its systems (structural capital). As a result the value of knowledge assets 
significantly exceed the value of tangible assets. Overall, the stock of 
knowledge grows more quickly than in the past. Along with increased 
knowledge, there is a reduction of classical resources addictions, controlling 
the primacy of knowledge, as of the company's capital. Within each 
undertaking three major processes related to knowledge are produced: 
acquisition and production of knowledge, which is achieved by learning 
processes of employees; knowledge production as innovations; use 
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knowledge through their adopted decisions and actions, which in their turn 
are translated into products, services, new knowledge, which are marketed in 
terms of profitability. 
In the 80s of the last century, the OECD provided a definition of 
the knowledge economy: "economy based directly on production, 
distribution and use of knowledge and information". This definition has 
been taken over by those skilled in the art to foreshadow economic future. 
A culmination of this was the EU summit in Lisbon, where it was settled as 
a fundamental objective for countries: building knowledge-based economy. 
At present, the knowledge economy is characterized by: 
- Priority of knowledge in all areas of economic activity due to the 
decisive impact they have on the functionality and performance. In 
production processes, knowledge is an important input than land, money or 
work. 
- Concentration of economic activities, not on the production of 
goods but on treating information, knowledge accumulation and producing 
knowledge-goods. 
- Substantiation of economic activities, not primarily on tangible 
resources (land, buildings, equipment) but on intangible resources, 
knowledge and requirements posed by competent people. 
- Capital knowledge is a special, intangible, fluid capital, whose 
tenure, exclusive one, is difficult to achieve and that can be retrieved and 
reused. 
- The proliferation of symbolic equipment and products, while 
reducing the relative physical products; symbolic products are based on 
information, whose value is independent of the physical characteristics of 
these goods. Money was the first form of symbolic capital, through it 
replacing system based on barter exchange. Cards, electronic commerce, 
electronic banking, computer software packages etc. are symbolic product 
categories that will prevail in the knowledge economy. 
- Mass production, in the sense of eliminating the need to focus 
large amounts of physical and human resources in a unit to generate 
economic performance. The first steps have been made by systems "just in 
time", based on the integration of computer processing etc. 
- Gradual disapearance of borders between the organization and 
activities of undertakings at sectorial, regional, national, international levels. 
The organization focuses on division of labour and hierarchy gives place to 
organization founded on teamwork, the ability of a manager to replace 
employees between them, to ensure interdepartmental functionality. It 
gradually diminishes differences and boundaries between various fields and 
schemes in the context of internationalization of activities. 
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- Creation, exploitation activities and improvement of technologies 
become widespread and important, subject for survival and performance. 
- Share majority, in continuous rise, of the services sector in 
economy, to the detriment of the manufacturing sector. 
- Development and growth of the exports, due to the decrease of 
the differences between national markets and the gradual elimination of 
institutional, time and space boundaries between countries. 
- Rapid multiplication of small businesses along with relative 
reducing of large firms because they are simple and can adapt more quickly 
to changing circumstances. It is an important response to changes in the 
business environment. This ensures attainment of the objectives targeted. 
- The proliferation and diversification of the economic association 
between the organizations, strategic alliances, business networks, clusters, 
industrial parks etc. - to capitalize on a higher-level knowledge and other 
resources available. Underlying forms of collaboration there is a new type of 
knowledge, integrative and computer links, and modern communications. 
The new organization and management model is based on the 
principles of economic activity: 
- The value of intangible assets. Mainly company employees who 
have professional studies represent the value. It is also important to 
recognize the value of tangible assets, without which no enterprise can 
operate. In this context, it is important to realize that the company's assets 
structure is changed, the values created, requiring both types of assets: 
tangible and intangible. The maximum value is achieved by combining them 
in certain proportions, which varies depending on the industry, firm size, 
the context in which it acts etc. 
- Mitigation of geographical distances on business performance. 
Traditionally, the geographical location of a country or businesses, 
constituted a decisive factor in shaping national economies and companies 
in obtaining economic performance. Currently, connection with customers 
and supliers, wherever they are placed on the globe, can be done instantly. 
As a result, except for some sectors, such as mining, oil, strategic share of 
the geographic factor has diminished considerably. 
- Considerable reduction of time penetrating innovation. The rate 
of renewal of knowledge, products, technologies, etc., greatly accelerated. 
Current possibilities for instant connection to new information, statements 
etc. often enable a prompt response, increase capacity for innovation and 
adaptation to market needs, tending towards progress in real time. 
Accordingly, innovations occur much faster and run with a higher speed, 
diminishing, the importance of the time factor. For meditation: web adoption 
of 50% of world population took five years, while the spread of computers - 
30 years, electricity - 40 years, steam power - 100 years. 
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- Holders of knowledge become the supreme value of the country, 
undertaking. Valuable ideas were instrumental in the development of 
enterprises, national economies, and therefore their carriers are invaluable. 
The detention of these persons in the enterprise using a variety of means, 
including transforming them into co-owners, has become a necessity. 
- Accelerate the development and growth by using networks 
(networking). Making networks in the economy that integrates economic 
agents of different sizes, oriented around value vector is generating rapid 
economic growth. Through these networks, technical, human and economic 
flow rates greatly amplified, often generating "explosive" economic effects. 
- The value of products increases exponentially with value market 
segment occupied. Traditionally, the rare a product was, the higher value it 
had. Currently, there is a situation contrary to proliferate, in the sense, that the 
higher the volume of amplified products of some sort is, as these have a 
greater market share, the value increases. Example are telephones and faxes. 
As they have diversified their usefulness and value increased due to the 
network effect. 
- The importance of intermediate levels in the economy increases. In 
traditional economy, distributors and other intermediaries were constantly in 
uncertainty due to the development of economic links, which facilitated direct 
links between producers and consumers. Specifics of the current transition to 
the knowledge economy is the emergence of a class of intermediaries, called 
"info-intermediaries" that contribute to transforming data into useful 
information and even knowledge. Amplifying the volume and complexity of 
information and knowledge determines rapid growth of the info-brokers and 
their impact on the functionality and performance of the company. 
- Purchasers acquire more power, and sellers - new oportunities. The 
ability to quickly get buyers using intelligent software, through a simple 
"click", the information regarding the best products, lowest prices, best 
relations "price-quality" of products give them a high capacity to choose and 
quickly get the product and service they want. They obtained a significant 
upward on sellers, reversing the traditional trade relations. At the same time 
new oportunities for producers and sellers are created as possessing detailed 
information on market situation, know very well what to produce and what 
prices to sell to be profitable. 
- Trading products and services are becoming increasingly 
personalized. A quick and cheap information on specific customer requests is 
reflected in the manufacture and sale of products under the express 
requirements thereof. This provides a growing suply product customization, 
resulting in a substantial reduction in inventories and waiting times in the 
course of economic processes. The economic effects of this change, although 
difficult to assess, are undoubtedly immense. 
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- Availability of any product everywhere. Given the rapid access to 
information on products, large distance often separates desire to buy an 
effective oportunity to do so, is substantially reduced, tending to reach 
numerous products from scratch. The explanation for this development lies in 
the possibility of making instant orders via e-commerce "online" of their 
desired products and their fast delivery. The situation tends to be similar to 
listening to a song you like. To have it, there is no need to go to the store, 
being able to order it and get it immediately via computer.14  
University of Oradea is located in Bihor county, in the area called 
West Gate of Romania. This institution meets the needs of the knowledge 
society, which suports the continued growth and satisfies everyone's needs, 
who want to improve their skills. The academic community of the University 
of Oradea is involved in national and regional development, promoting the 
tradition of free thought and democratic values in integration circuit. 
Department of History, International Relations, Political Science and 
Communication fully serves the interests of the academic community, 
suporting an atmosphere of collaboration, cooperation, based on the rules and 
principles of professional ethics. The research directions of the three chairs 
History, International Relations and European Studies, Political Science and 
Communication are: Study of identity and migration in the EU; Cooperation 
to combat trafficking; History of international relations; Euro-regional studies 
and cross-border cooperation; European neighborhood Policy; European 
regional policies; The history of local media in Romania; Ethics and media 
law; Romanian Western history; Historical Anthropology etc. 
After signing the Agreement on collaboration between the Institute 
of International Relations of Moldova with the University of Oradea, 
especially with the Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Science 
and Communication Studies, we participated in five international scientific 
conferences, in the program Erasmus + academic mobility, activities in the 
period of 2013-2016. Communication with colleagues from the Faculty of 
History, International Relations, Political Science and Communication Studies 
is built on the principles of professional ethics, deontology. Exchange of 
experience, carried out with goodwill, mutual trust, work atmosphere, always 
allow us to come back to Moldova with new ideas, projects of collaboration, 
research, more active involvement in society, in the municipality of Chisinau, 
in the institution. The Dean of the Faculty of History, International Relations, 
Political Science and Communication Studies - University Professor Ioan 
                                                     
14 L. Belohiow, The Evolving Competitive Paradigm// Business Horizon, nr.2, 1996; 
E. Abrahamson, Management Fashion// The Academy of Management Review, 
vol.21, nr.1, 1996; J.Camilus, Reinventing Strategic Planning// Strategy & 
Leadership, nr.3, 1996. 
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Horga, in my opinion, is the model of a university professor, authentic, 
modest, principled, a big patriot of Bihor, Romania, active suporter of the idea 
of rebuilding the European Union, professional manager with a busy agenda, 
but with clear daily priorities. The team that he created, via activities well 
planned and managed, outlines a visible impact on the social life of the city 
Bihor, of Oradea, of the University. Using conclusions from the work 
"Energetic Personalism" signed by Professor Constantin Radulescu Motru, it 
is worth mentioning with firmness: Professor Ioan Horga is an energetic 
personality who managed to refine, ennoble the place. Only by such 
academics, University of Oradea fulfills de facto its mission, serving the 
knowledge society, where knowledge manifests itself as a driving force for 
social progress. 
 
Conclusion 
For the transition from the traditional economy to the one based on 
knowledge it is necessary to assimilate the paradigm of competitiveness. 
According to it, the knowledge economy establishes a high-level production 
culture and customer service for communication between producers of 
goods and agents providing services, for relations between the public and 
private sectors of national economies. Compliance with these principles 
becomes a reality in conditions when all the people involved speak the 
language of business, send clear, cohesive messages, and assumes 
responsibility for performed actions. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In the article "University mission in the knowledge society", the author relates two complex 
social phenomena: the university and economy based on knowledge. The author revived definitions / 
interpretations of education, academic, professional training, popular in the twentieth century, the author 
highlights requirements of contemporary society, defined as knowledge society, stressing that the university, 
from the need to preserve its own status, is obliged to reform / reorganize so as to provide services to the 
population, irrespective of their age. Knowledge-based economy calls for educating competitive managers, 
able to observe and react apropriately to changes in social practice, to the situation of the enterprise / 
organization / institution. 
At the level of European Council there are no events, actions, which would have addressed the 
need to increase the performance of national training and education. European higher education reform is 
dictated by the imperative of increasing the quality of services provided by universities, competitiveness. In 
the contemporary world, higher education is seen as a strategic area because the power of a state can be 
enhanced through the efficient functioning of the system of training and education. Massification of higher 
education requires, certainly, quality of education, which is a joint responsibility of both the university and 
all its social partners. Universities, teachers, students, public authorities etc. must define implementing 
quality in higher education as a priority objective of learning, teaching and research. 
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Effects of the Natural Environmental Components on 
Sports 
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Introduction 
In recent times, an increase can be observed in the economic, social 
and political role of sports, and as a consequence of that the representatives 
of the various disciplines pay more and more attention to the demonstration 
of the relationship between their own disciplines and the sports. From the 
position of settlement geography, one of the options for the complex study 
of the activities related to sports is the tetrahedron model of settlements 
which indicates that „a settlement should be interpreted in a given 
geographical environment living in intensive interaction with its elements as 
a system of economic, social and technical structures1”. The aim of the 
paper is to illustrate the impacts of the natural sphere from among the 
spheres mentioned with sharing the conclusions drawn in the international 
literature, and to demonstrate the effects of certain environmental 
components on sports. 
 
Effects of the natural environmental components 
From among the elements of the natural environment, relief and 
climate should be mentioned on the first place as influencing factors. These 
bring certain settlements into favourable and other settlements into 
unfavourable position, and they also make adjustment to them necessary. 
From the aspect of the relief, the slope conditions of a given surface is very 
                                                     
* Department of Social Geography and Regional Development Planning, Institute of 
Earth Sciences, University of Debrecen, H-4032 Debrecen Egyetem tér 1. E-mail: 
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1 József Toth, ”A településhálózat és a környezet kölcsönhatásának néhány elméleti és 
gyakorlati kérdése”, in Földrajzi Értesítő, 1981, p. 267-292.  
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important which must be faced while creating sports infrastructure. 
Horizontal surface is essential in the case of stadiums and sports halls 
hosting athletic competitions and various ball games, while the varied relief 
is preferred for the investments related mostly to winter sports (e.g. ski-
jump, downhill courses).  
The other very important aspect of the relief is the altitude which is 
mainly taken into consideration in the organisation phase of the sports events 
and in the outcomes of the competitions. On the one hand, with the height of 
the sea level the number of snowy days per year increases, making the given 
area more suitable for practising winter sports. On the other hand, the oxygen 
content of the air is lower in the higher altitudes which actually may cause 
certain problems, such as decline in performance, for the professional 
sportsmen. According to the results of the survey carried out during the 2010 
FIFA World Cup South Africa2 the general running performance of the football 
players during the games played at lower altitudes was better. (Figure 1)  
 
Figure 1 Teams’ total distance covered at different altitudes in the 2010 World Cup 
matches. 
 
Source: George Nassis, ”Effect of altitude on football performance: analysis of the 2010 
FIFA World Cup Data”, in  The Journal of Strength & Conditioning Research, no. 3, 2013, p. 
705 
 
                                                     
2 George Nassis, ”Effect of altitude on football performance: analysis of the 2010 
FIFA World Cup Data”, in The Journal of Strength & Conditioning Research, no. 3, 2013,                
p. 703-707. 
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The third very important impact is in close relation with the 
previous one: the trainings regularly conducted at higher altitudes has a 
positive effect on the production of red blood cells. Consequently, after 
returning to lower altitudes, the sportsmen attending training camps at 
higher altitudes had a one or two weeks advantage in comparison with the 
players training at lower altitudes. The detailed surveys3 suggested that the 
highest advantage is meant by “the living high-training low” method (high 
meaning 2500 metres, and low meaning 1300 metres), and called attention 
to the fact that the actual perfection depends on several other factors (e.g. 
preliminary training conditions of the athletes). 
The fourth key impact is related to the phenomenon that with the 
increase in the altitude the resistance of air decreases which actually means a 
significant advantage in the sports requiring rapid moves/sprint. The 
conclusions of the research (Table 1) reveal that in the case of speed skating, 
if all other terms are identical then the model presuposes 2.5-5.0% 
improvement with the increase in the altitude (in our days, for example, all 
speed skating world records were achieved in two cities – Calgary and Salt 
Lake City – in the case of the adult men and ladies, and the same aplies for 
the juniors except for one distance4:. Similar tendency may be observed in 
the case of athletics as well: in the mid-2000s six of the best twenty results in 
the 200 metres sprint running were achieved on tracks located 1000 metres 
above sea level (by today this is true only for two results). As a consequence 
of the above, the settlements concerned play a very important role in sport 
tourism, also meaning economic advantages for them. 
 
Table 1 Computer simulation of the effect of altitude on long-track speed skating 
performance time. 
Race 
distance 
Location (altitude above sea level) 
 
Hamar 
(126 m) 
Nagano 
(375 m) 
Inzell 
(690 m) 
Calgary 
(1035 m) 
Salt Lake City 
(1305 m) 
500 m 39.70 s 39.49 s 39.25 s 38.98 s 38.81 s 
1000 m 
1 min 
18.53 s 
1 min 
17.24 s 
1 min 
17.02 s 
1 min 
16.15 s 
1 min 15.56 s 
1500 m 
2 min 
04.41 s 
2 min 
03.05 s 
2 min 
01.43 s 
1 min 
59.69 s 
1 min 58.55 s 
Source: Chapman, R. F.; Stickford, J. L.; Levine, B.D. (2010), ”Altitude training 
considerations for the winter sport athlete”, in Experimental physiology, no. 3, p. 415 
                                                     
3 James Stray-Gundersen, Robert F. Chapman, Benjamin D. Levine, ”«Living high-
training low» altitude training improves sea level performance in male and female 
elite runners”, in Journal of applied physiology, 2001, p. 1113-1120. 
4 See http://speedskatingresults.com/index.php?p=9 
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The other important component of the natural environment is 
climate whose effects may be experienced in the case of the outdoor sports 
events. In the first considerable publication related to the topic, Thornes5 
emphasised that weather conditions are important not only from the aspect 
of the athletes but also from the aspect of the audience – and the latter, in 
fact, also influences the economics of the sport events. Moreover, the 
author divided the sports into three categories: 
- specialised weather sports: the events are dependent on certain 
weather conditions (e.g. sailing, gliding, hot-air ballooning), 
- weather interference sports: the most suitable weather conditions 
have no extreme values; nevertheless, extremities have the same impact on 
all participants (e.g. football, American football, rugby), 
- weather advantage sports: the changing weather conditions can 
afford advantage for some participants (e.g. golf, athletics, cricket). 
 
Table 2 Subjective assessment of influence of meteorological parameters on a range 
of sports 
 
air 
pressure 
Tempe 
rature 
wind 
Precipi 
tation 
fog average 
sailing 1 4 5 3 4 3,4 
ice sailing 1 5 5 4 4 3,6 
downhill skiing 1 4 3 5 4 3,4 
spring skiing 1 4 5 5 5 4,0 
cross country skiing 2 5 4 5 2 3,6 
bob-sleighing 1 5 3 4 4 3,4 
cycling 3 3 5 4 1 3,2 
football 1 2 4 5 1 2,6 
parachuting 2 3 5 4 4 3,6 
athletics (jumps) 2 4 5 3 1 3,0 
athletics (track) 3 3 5 3 1 3,0 
shooting 1 1 5 3 4 2,8 
1 – slight, 2 – little, 3 – noticeable, 4 – important, 5 – large 
Source: Allen Perry, ”Sports tourism and climate variability”, in: A. Matzarakis, C. 
R. de Freitas and D. Scott, Advances in Tourism Climatology, Berichte des Meteorologische 
Institute der Universitat Freiburg, Nr. 12, Freiburg, 2004, p. 176 
 
When carrying out detailed studies of the weather components, the 
researchers pointed out that their effects vary by sports, and the different 
sports are affected by the effects of adverse weather to varying degrees 
(Table 2). Wind, temperature and precipitation are the most influential 
                                                     
5 J. E. Thornes, ”The effect of weather on sport”, in Weather, 1977, p. 258-268. 
In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga 
 
203 
weather parameters, and the winter sports are the most intensively affected 
by the weather conditions from among all sports6.  
A considerable part of the studies analysing the effects of wind were 
conducted in the field of athletics mostly focusing on the jumping and 
running contests. The outcomes (Table 3) suggest that wind direction and 
wind speed significantly influence the performance of the athletes, which 
could explain why the world records achieved in tailwind of more than 2 
m/s are not certified. Wind speed, however, belongs to the unpredictable 
factors (though there are regions where windy periods occur more 
frequently than the annual average), and consequently its effect can be taken 
into preliminary account only to a limited extent in the organising activities 
related to sports. 
 
Table 3. Effects of wind speeds on the performance of the athletes (lost and gained 
time in seconds) 
  wind speed (m/s) 
  5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 
head 
wind 
men’s 100 -0.340 -0.262 -0.189 -0.121 -0.058 
 women’s 100 -0.378 -0.291 -0.209 -0.134 -0.064 
tail wind men’s 100 +0.217 +0.183 +0.145 +0.101 +0.053 
 women’s 100 +0.23
1 
+0.196 +0.156 +0.110 +0.058 
Source: Quinn, M. D., ”The effects of wind and altitude in the 200-m sprint” in 
Journal of Aplied Biomechanics, no.1, 2003, p. 54. 
 
Temperature can be taken as the second most important factor 
which – in comparison with the wind – is a much more stable weather 
component, and therefore its effects are much more predictable. The 
importance of its consideration results from the fact that sporting under too 
high temperature does not only result in performance deterioration but due 
to overheat and water loss it is also harmful to health. This is especially 
frequent in the case of the regions (and thus cities) located along the middle 
latitudes which (1) belong to the economically more developed regions, and 
thus have advanced sports life (e.g. major world events – Olympic Games, 
world championships), and (2) – mainly in the summer periods – are highly 
subject to the above discussed climatic threats. For the mitigation of risks 
the organisers aply various methods: on the recommendation of the 
International Olympic Committee, it is necessary to provide separate 
                                                     
6 Allen Perry, Perry, ”Sports tourism and climate variability”, in: A. Matzarakis, C. R. 
de Freitas and D. Scott, Advances in Tourism Climatology, Berichte des Meteorologische 
Institute der Universitat Freiburg Nr. 12, Freiburg, 2004, p. 174-179.  
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facilities (e.g. air-conditioned locker rooms) within the establishments, and it 
is practical to prefer later hours to begin a sports event when fixing the 
specific time. (Table 4) 
 
Table 4 Scheduled start times in the Spanish championship on 30 August 2015 and 
28 February 2016. 
start time 30 August 2015 28 February 2016 
12:00 0 match 1 match 
16:00 0 match 2 matches 
18:15 0 match 3 matches 
18:30 2 matches 0 match 
20:30 4 matches 3 matches 
22:00 1 match 1 match (22:05) 
22:30 3 matches 0 match 
Source: http://www.eredmenyek.com/foci/spanyolorszag/primera-
division/eredmenyek/ 
 
Precipitation can be regarded as the third most important weather 
parameter which basically has a dual effect. On the one hand, precipitation 
in the form of water is regarded as a rather significant hindering factor: in 
certain sports (e.g. tennis) rain makes it impossible to organise the contest, 
while in other cases (e.g. football) it makes difficult to play continuous 
football to a great extent. Those sports can be listed into a separate category 
(e.g. golf, cricket) in which the contestants take part at varying times on the 
same day and the changing conditions (and this is especially true for rainfall) 
may produce unexpected results. 
The other element of the effects of precipitation is constituted by 
those sports where the organisation of the contest could hardly be imagined 
in the lack of a proper amount of precipitation (namely snow). This 
category, naturally, includes the skiing related winter sports (e.g. cross-
country, alpine). In this context, its role in mass sports and tourism is also 
considerable (according to researchers, a basic criteria for winter tourism is 
minimum 100 days of reliable snow cover). For the sake of the above 
considerations, the uphill shift in the snow line resulting from the climate 
change may be regarded very dangerous7 with an estimated value of 120-150 
metres/˚C (although, the phenomenon is primarily due to the increase in 
temperature but regarding its effect it is discussed here). 
 
                                                     
7 Michael Hantel, Christian Maurer, ”The median winter snowline in the Alps”, in 
Meteorologische Zeitschrift 3, vol. 20, 2011, p. 267-276;  Andreas Gobiet, Sven Kotlarski, 
Martin Beniston, et. al., ”21st century climate change int he European Alps – A 
review”, in Science of the Total Environment, vol. 493, 2014, p. 1138-1151. 
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Figure 2. The relative number of artificial turfs accepted and recommended by 
FIFA in different European countries (turfs/10 million inhabitants)  
Source: http://quality.fifa.com/en/Football-Turf/FIFA-recommended-pitches-
wordwide/#/index, downloaded: 23.07.2016. 
 
In Europe, the phenomenon causes a really serious problem in the 
Alps where, according to the 2007 OECD Report (Agrawala et al. 2007), the 
number of snow reliable ski resorts will drop under 500 if there is a 
temperature rise of 1˚C, and will drop to 404 if there is a temperature rise of 
2˚C (the case of Germany is especially sensitive where even a temperature 
rise of 1˚C would result in a decline of 60%). Subsequently, all those 
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settlements where winter tourism plays an important role in economy, the 
economic life would be jeopardised (artificial snow could reduce the risk but 
it does not afford a real solution). The seriousness of the threat is suported 
by the fact that in the case of many Winter Olympic Games the snow 
necessary for the competitions had to be transported to the locations from 
great distances in the past period.   
In many cases, the effects of the above discussed weather 
components can be also observed in a complex way. From the aspect of 
infrastructure, it may be established that adverse weather conditions (too 
frequent rainfall, lower sunshine duration due to northern location or 
covered roof) make the maintenance of natural grass cover very difficult, 
and consequently matches are played on artificial turf (if its quality is 
apropriate then it is also aproved by the FIFA). Though there are no 
detailed statistics available on the number and regional distribution of the 
artificial turfs worldwide but in Europe the northern and southern countries 
are dominant with respect to the fields aproved and recommended by FIFA 
(Figure 2). 
With regard to the events, the complex effect is felt in a way that in 
the winter periods of the northern hemisphere the weather conditions offer 
only limited oportunities for competitive outdoor sports, and consequently 
the interest in the locations in milder areas, mostly with Mediterranean 
weather, significantly increases. This may be experienced especially in the 
case of football where January and February are the chief periods for spring 
and summer seasons (however, the rainfalls characterising this period often 
caused problems). Therefore, many of the teams choose the Mediterranean 
Basin for the training camps which brings – in a period that theoretically 
counts as dead season from the aspect of tourism – significant income from 
tourism for the regions concerned8, and therefore specialised infrastructure 
(e.g. high number of training grounds) have been already constructed for the 
visitors on the settlements concerned (Figure 3).  
 
 
 
                                                     
8 Nicos L. Kartakoullis, George Karlis, ”Developing Cyprus as a sport tourism 
destination: the results of a swot analysis”, in Journal of Sport Tourism, vol. 7, 2002,                   
p. 3-17; Erdogan Koc, ”New product development in the Turkish tourism market: 
the case of football tourism”, in Journal of Sport and Tourism, vol. 10, 2005, p. 165-172. 
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Figure 3 The location of training camps of Bundesliga football clubs in 2015/16 
winter break
 
Source: http://www.bundesliga.com/en/news/Bundesliga/blmd17n-infographic-
the-bundesliga-clubs-winter-schedules-2015-16.jsp 
 
The third area of the complex effects of the environment is 
interference with the results of the sports events. In this respect, the 
researchers usually mainly refer to the “home advantage” phenomenon 
(Courneya and Carron, 1992) which is suported by various factors (e.g. 
audience suport, acquaintance with sports facilities, judicial partiality). The 
explanations, nevertheless, in certain cases may also include the climate: the 
weather conditions of the Brazilian Belém or the Turkish Van (e.g. Belém – 
wetter and hotter climate) are difficult to adapt for the teams arriving from 
the other parts of the country and this means a significant advantage for the 
home teams9.  
 
  
                                                     
9 Richard Pollard, Cristiano Diniz da Silva, N. C. Medeiros, „Home advantage in 
football in Brazil: differences between teams and the effects of distance travelled”, 
Brasilian Journal of Soccer and Science, 2008, p. 3-10. 
   Aylin Seckin, Richard Pollard, 2007. „Home advantage in Turkish professional 
soccer”, Journal of Sports Science and Medicine Supplement, 2007, p. 203-204. 
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Conslusions and Recommendations 
Summing up the study it may be established that although the 
society in the past period took significant steps to cut itself adrift from 
the effects of the natural environment with regard to the sports events 
but this causes considerable extra costs and certain risk elements can be  
never cancelled. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Nowadays sports have gained a more and more important role in the economic, 
social and political life, as well as being and important tool in sustaining the health of the 
population. One of the options for the complex analysis  of the sports related activities is the 
tetrahedron model of settlements which indicates that "a settlement should be interpreted in a 
given geographical environment living in intensive interaction with its elements as a system of 
economic, social and technical structures”. The aim of the paper is to illustrate the effects of 
the natural sphere from among these spheres sharing the conclusions drawn in the 
international literature. The study discusses the most significant elements of the relationship 
system of two of the most important environmental components – relief and climate – and 
sports, the peculiarities in the differences between the settlements, and the settlements 
characterised by the most advantageous conditions. The importance of the similar studies lies 
in the fact that the regions with advantageous conditions can exploit their advantages for 
sport tourism which is today becoming more and more substantial and thus can create 
economic gains for themselves. 
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The Valencian Linguistic Conflict: Dialect or Regional 
Language? Instrument or Argument for the Catalans 
independence?  
 
 
 
Mariana BUDA*  
 
 
The Valencian linguistic conflict, often called by the sociolinguist 
Rafael Ninyoles i Monllor in his book Conflicte lingüístic valencià, the Valencian 
sociolinguistic conflict, is an expression that has to do with the conflict 
between the use of Valencian language and Catalan language on the territory 
of the Comunidad Valenciana in Spain. Otherwise, this expression it refers to 
the controversy regarding the identity of Valencian language and its relation 
with the Catalan language. There is a theory which suposes that the Catalan 
was imported in the region of Valencia and so the Valencian is just a dialect 
of the Catalan language and not a language. As in every sort of conflict, 
there are two oposed ideas and conceptions: the Valencian Nationalists who 
want to preserve and to promote the linguistic and cultural personality of 
the Valencian Language and the pro-Catalans which ideals would be to 
consider the Valencian as a dialect and to unify it with Catalan in order to 
constitute a unique language. Without any doubt, this linguistic conflict can 
and has to be related with the process and the desire of independence of 
Catalan people.            
 
1. General aspects. Legal overview 
Looking at the Spanish Constitution from 1978, where the status of 
regional languages is mentioned, in the Article 3.3 the linguistic diversity in 
Spain is recognized: “La riqueza de las distintas modalidades lingüísticas de España 
es un patrimonio cultural que será objeto de especial respeto y protección”1. Even if the 
Regime of Franco tried to unify the languages spoken by the Spanish people 
and to impose the Castilian for all the inhabitants of the country, the 
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1 The richness of the linguistic varieties in Spain is a cultural heritage that will receive 
special respect and protection, Spain Constitution, p.2 
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speakers of regional languages continued to use their languages at home and 
among close friends and to transmit their culture to the children. As a result, 
due to the activity of some private institutions, that continued studying and 
promoting their use, the regional languages in Spain survived and were 
preserved.2 
Officially, several Autonomous Communities in Spain have legal 
statutes providing protection to a number of different languages in Spain. 
Between them we should mention: the Principality of Asturias whose 
language is Bable, or Asturian dialect3, the Autonomous Community of 
Aragon, whose language is Aragonese or the Aragon language4, the 
Valencian Community whose language is recognized to be the Valencian5, 
the Balearic Islands where is very common the Balearic dialect, very similar 
to Catalan.  
In the Principality of Asturias, even if Bable is not recognized as an 
official language, it is protected by their Statute of Autonomy. This language 
isn’t spoken only in Asturias, but also in the regions of Leon and Zamorra, 
reaching Miranda do Douro in Portugal.6 Regarding the Autonomous 
Community of Aragon, in their Statute is mentioned that all linguistic 
variation of Aragonese should be protected, as they are part of the cultural 
and historical heritage of the region. In the Statue of Valencia Autonomous 
Community (which includes the provinces of Alicante, Castellon and 
Valencia) it is mentioned that the two official languages are Valencian and 
Castilian. However, a linguistic conflict exists between the Valencian and the 
Catalan Languages, because the Valencians insist their language is a unique 
one, while the Catalans insist that the Valencian language is simply a 
regional dialect of Catalan. Even more, the Catalan Statute recognize the 
Aranese, a variety of the Occitan language spoken in the Northwest of 
Lleida, as a dialect of the people living in the area. On the same path, the 
Catalans would like that the Valencian Language has the same statute. This 
is why the topic is delicate and has more points of view. 7          
                                                     
2 „Other Languages in Spain”, accessed May 25, 2015, 
http://www.donquijote.org/culture/spain/languages/other-languages-in-spain 
3 „Estatuto de Autonomía del Principado de Asturias”, Article 4.1,  accessed May 25, 
2015, http://www.congreso.es/consti/estatutos/estatutos.jsp?com=65&tipo=2& 
ini=1&fin=9 &ini_sub=1&fin_sub=1 
4 „Estatuto de la Autonomía. Estatuto de Aragon”, Article 4.1”,  accessed May 25, 
2015, http://www.estatutodearagon.es/estatuto_de_autonomia 
5 „Estatuto de Autonomía de la Comunidad Valenciana”, Article 6.1, accessed May 
25, 2015, https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1982-17235 
6 „Other Languages in Spain”, accessed May 25, 2015, 
http://www.donquijote.org/culture/spain/languages/other-languages-in-spain 
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There is another curios case in Spain, that of the Castúo language, 
spoken in some parts of Extremadura. This language has influences from 
the dialects spoken in the regions of Leon and Rioja, but also from the 
regions of Aragon and the Basque County.8     
Another interesting aspect, in addition to the linguistic variation in 
Spain that enriches the country, is the fact that the Castilian language has 
different dialects that have developed their own features. This is most 
obvious in different parts of Andalusia. For example, in the Western part of 
Andalusia, the language spoken shares many characteristics with the Spanish 
language spoken in the Latin America. An explanation could be the fact that 
the majority of the Spanish settlers to the New World were from this region. 
The case of the Canary Island is also interesting, because there is evident the 
linguistic influence of the Spanish from Western Andalusia, Portuguese and 
English. This mixture of influences remembers the history of these islands 
and their overseas travel between America and Europe. 
In Spain, the linguistic situation is very rich and diverse. However, it 
is important to note that, despite all of these variations, Castilian is still the 
most commonly used language and it is the unifying language of the whole 
Spanish territory.9  
 
1.1. The Catalan Language  
The Catalan Language is one of the regional languages spoken in 
Spain, in the region named Catalonia, and it’s one of the most spoken 
regional languages in Europe, with aproximately 7 million speakers.10  
During the time, the evolution of this language was curios, but 
flourished at the same time. The first text in Catalan dates from the 12th 
century and it is called Homilies d'Organya. Later, in the 13th, 14th and 15th 
century, the Catalan literature flourishes, first under the Provençal literature 
and later as the producer of its own thematic and formal resources. Later, 
from the 16th to the 18th century the Catalan literature underwent a period of 
decline in which the royalty and the political class of the time imposed 
different restrictions. In the 19th century it emerged again with the 
movement called Renaixença, or Renaissance. Later, Pompeu Fabra was the 
first grammarian who effected the regulation and grammatical 
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castuo  
9 „Other Languages in Spain”, accessed May 25, 2015, 
http://www.donquijote.org/culture/spain/languages/other-languages-in-spain 
10 “Catalan Language. General Overview”, accessed May 28, 2015, 
http://www.orbilat.com/Languages/Catalan/Catalan.html  
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systematization of the Catalan language and unified spelling standards for its 
use.11  
The Spanish Constitution from 1978 recognizes the use of both 
Castilian and Catalan languages as official in Catalonia, and since 1983 
Catalan language is official in Balearic Islands as well. Catalan is also spoken 
in other areas of Spain and outside of the country. It is spoken in some parts 
of Aragon and Murcia, in Spain, but also in the French region Roussillon, in 
the Principality of Andorra and in the Italian city called Alguer, in Sardinia. 
It is the mother tongue of some 5 to 6 million people.       
 
1.2. The Galician Language 
Together with the Catalan Language, the Galician language is 
another Romance Language spoken on the Spanish territory and recognized 
by the 1978 Constitution as a regional language. It is spoken in Galicia, a 
territory in the North-Western Spain and was carried by the Christian 
conquerors outwards to present day Portugal. 
The begging of the Galician dates from the 12th century, when the 
language was called Galician-Portuguese. Later, on the 14th century, after 
producing a body of literature, the language split into Galician and 
Portuguese, for historical and political reasons.12 However, the true 
renaissance of this language came in the 19th century, when there is a 
notable production of literature, especially poetry. The language it’s not 
spoken only in Galicia, where is co-official together with the Castilian 
language, but also it is spoken in some areas of Asturias and Castile-Leon.13    
Today, there are about three million people speaking Galician, but 
it’s very difficult to make an exact calculation due to its similarity to Castilian 
and the multiple interferences derived from a practically universal 
bilingualism. To this figure we must add the Galician communities living in 
Latin American countries that use it.      
 
1.3. The Basque Language  
The Basque Language or the Euskera is the language spoken in the 
northern central area of Spain. Euskera is the name of the language in the 
Basque language. Today, there are about 600 000 speakers in Spain, but the 
language is not spoken only in Spain, because the Basque Country includes 
                                                     
11 “Pompeu Fabra”, accessed June 1st, 2015, 
http://www.lletres.net/pla/fabrapla2.html 
12 „Other Languages in Spain”, accessed May 25, 2015, 
http://www.donquijote.org/culture/spain/languages/other-languages-in-spain 
13 “Galician (Gallego)”, accessed June 1st, 2015, 
http://www.omniglot.com/writing/galician.htm 
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also some territory from France, called the French Basque Country, with 
aproximately 100 000 speakers.14  
The Basque language is the only one which beginnings are not really 
traceable and who has a number of hypotheses. It has been suggested that the 
forerunner of the Basque language was introduced into this part of Europe by 
immigrants from Asia Minor at the beginning of the Bronze Age, but we know 
as well that the Basque and Castilian entered history together, since the first text 
preserved in Castilian, is also written in Basque.15 Also, it is known the fact that 
the Basque it’s not a Romance language as the others regional languages in 
Spain.  
Since the 1978 Constitution, the Basque Language it’s recognized as 
official language in the Basque Country, together with the Castilian. The 
mountainous landscape of the region has contributed towards maintaining 
linguistic diversity, leading some linguists, based on the intercommunicative 
difficulties found, to claim the existence of seven different Basque 
languages. To overcome this fragmentation the Royal Academy of the 
Basque Language was created in 1919, and in 1968, a standardized Basque 
grammar called batúa was adopted for official purposes.16 
 
2. The Catalan language’s origins and history   
The legal basis of the language in Spain has been stipulated in the 
1978 Constitution, mainly by Article 3 and in the Catalonia, Valencia, The 
Balearic Islands and Aragon Statutes of Autonomy. In Catalonia is 
implemented in 1998 by the law of the common languages (which replaces 
the law of 1983). In accordance with this legislation, Catalan is a specific 
language of Catalonia, Balearic Islands and Valencia and it is also an official 
language of these regions together with the Spanish. In the Andorra, in 
accordance with the Andorra Constitution, the Catalan language is the only 
official language.17 
While speaking about Catalan’s dialects, even if in the Middle Ages 
there is no evidence that the dialects existed, starting with the sixteenth 
                                                     
14 “Basque (Euskara)”, accessed June 1st, 2015, 
http://www.omniglot.com/writing/basque.htm 
15 „Other Languages in Spain”, accessed May 25, 2015, 
http://www.donquijote.org/culture/spain/languages/other-languages-in-spain 
16 Iñigo Urrutia; Xabier Irujo, „The Basque Language in the Basque Autonomous 
Community  (BAC)” in The Legal status of the Basque Language today: One Language, 
Three Administrations, Seven different Geographies and one diaspora, ed. Gloria 
Totoricagüena and Iñigo Urrutia, 2008, p.171, accessed June 1st, 2015, 
http://www.euskonews.com/0463zbk/ene_120.pdf   
17 „Cultura Catalana. Lengua” accessed June 1st, 2015, 
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century, dialects of Valencia and the Balearic Islands begin to be 
differentiated from the central area of Barcelona. However it has kept a 
certain degree of uniformity in the literary language which has continued to 
flourish.18  
There are two main dialect groups in modern Catalan: Occidental, 
subdivided into North-West Catalan and Valencian; and Oriental, 
subdivided into Central dialect, Balearic, Roussillonnais and Alguerese (the 
dialect spoken in Alghero, Sardinia, where Catalan was introduced in the 
14th century). Each of these dialects, except for Alguerese, is in turn divided 
into subdialects, of which up to eighteen have been identified. These various 
dialects differ only in minor respects (details of pronunciation, vocabulary, 
and verb conjugation) and are easily mutually intelligible. The dialectal 
differences are not usually reflected in the written language. The Institute of 
Catalan Studies is responsible for establishing and updating the standard 
language, which is based on the Barcelona dialect with some admixtures 
from Valencian. No one spontaneously speaks the standard, but it is used in 
writing and by the media. 
Valencians - except for the intellectual elite - are inclined to 
consider their speech a separate language. For a number of historical and 
other reasons, a sector of the Valencian people are deeply distrustful, if not 
overtly hostile, to Catalans. The ultra-rightist party Unió Valenciana suports 
this sentiment, and among other things it called for linguistic secession by 
establishing a separate orthography.19 
Looking back in the history, by the end of the 10th century, the 
Catalan was already a formed language, with Latin origins. During the 13th 
and 14th centuries Catalan reached its high point of geographical expansion 
in the Iberian Peninsula through the conquest of the kingdoms of Valencia 
and Murcia. The language also spread around the Mediterranean through 
victory over the kingdoms of Majorca, Sicily, Sardinia, Naples, Athens and 
Neopatria in Peloponnese. Catalan came to be spoken, even if not always as 
a first language, in five states around the Mediterranean which were 
governed by Catalan dynasties. Due to the Royal Chancellery, whose style 
was strongly influencing for all Catalan writing, the prose of the 14th and 
15th centuries was marked by a high degree of uniformity. 
Catalan retained its vigor until the union of the Aragonese and 
Castilian crowns in 1474. After that, although mainly grammatical works 
apeared, it gradually entered a period of decline. Following the War of the 
Spanish Succession (1705-1715), Philip V abolished all the government 
                                                     
18 „“Catalan Language. General Overview”, accessed May 28, 2015, 
http://www.orbilat.com/Languages/Catalan/Catalan.html 
19 Ibidem 
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institutions then existing in Catalonia and implemented Spanish laws. 
Catalan went through various periods of prohibition and even of 
repression.The Catalan renaissance began in the late 19th century with the 
economic progress of Catalonia.20  
 
3. The Valencian language’s origins and history 
The Valencian language derives from the Latin language, brought in 
the area by the Christians colonists in the former kingdom of Valencia. There 
are three theories related with the origins and the evolution of the Valencian 
language. 
The Mozarabist hypothesis or the Valencians theory, which it’s 
based on the thesis that Valencian is an independent language, issued from 
the vulgar Latin, as a result of an isolated evolution. That romance language 
was diversified by Arab elements and influenced by the Spanish language - 
Aragonese and were precisely the Mozarabs who kept this language during 
the Arab domination, practicing the use of Arabic for official business and 
Romance at home. There are proofs that demonstrate that when Valencia 
was reconquered by the king Jaime I, the language still had vitality and the 
inhabitants, even if they were converted to Islam, they were still practicing 
the bilingualism.21  
The second theory is the Repopulation theory, or the Pancatalan 
theory, which is totally oposed to the previous one. The followers of this 
theory consider the Valencian a variety of Catalan, brought to the Valencian 
lands during the Reconquista by the Catalan resettles. In this opinion the 
Islamic invasion caused the complete loss of the roots and the existing 
culture before and therefore of the language. In favor of this theory are 
some Catalan institutions, such as the Institute for Catalans Studies.22   
The third theory, called the Occitan theory don’t have to many 
followers. The main hypothesis of this theory consists in the assertion that 
the Valencian language is part of a set of Occitan languages, romances, 
interrelated, which have a number of similarities. According to this theory, 
the medieval poets imposed their culture on the inhabitants of the Kingdom 
of Valencia.23  
Probably the origin of Valencian language is a mixture of these 
three theories. Suposing that the Valencian language is an Arabic dialect 
influenced by the Occitan language and the Romance language, which are 
                                                     
20 Ibidem  
21 „Origen del valenciano”, accessed June 2nd, 2015, 
http://www.idiomavalenciano.com/origen-del-valenciano.html 
22 Ibidem 
23 Ibidem 
The European Space. Borders and Issues 
 
218 
dialects of Latin language, it is probably the most as close to reality as 
possible.  
Until the XIII century, the term valencian meant inhabitant of the 
Romanian Colony Valentia, founded in 138 B.C., when the Muslim 
domination recalled it Balànsiya. Today’s Community of Valencia derives 
from the Kingdom of Valencia which had been united with the Kingdom of 
Aragon in a third realm independently driven by King Jaime I of Aragon, 
along with the Reconquista of 1238. During this time, the region of Valencia 
enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. This is due to a clever system of 
institutions and laws, adopted in 1240. In the sixteenth century, the 
inhabitants of the Muslim faith have been obliged to convert to Christianity 
or to leave the province. The new inhabitants of this region were mainly 
Catalans. Along with them they brought as well their language, which spread 
in the area of Valencia and has become known as Valencian. 24   
The Kingdom of Valencia has lost its autonomy in 1707 by the 
decree Nueva Plant, during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), 
when King Philip V of Spain subordinated all federations of Aragon 
Kingdom directly to the Castilian Crown. As a result, the system of laws 
adopted in 1240 has been abolished, and valencian language has been 
prohibited at an official level and in education. Spanish becomes the official 
language and has been accepted by the local elite. The Valencian was still 
used at informal level, but remained widespread. Ethnic identity of the 
valencian population has started to change in the nineteenth century in a 
regional identity. This new identity was not in conflict with the national 
Spanish identity, and it was a fair competition from a political point of view 
for the Spanish nation.25 
During the second Spanish Republic (1931-1939) there have been 
different attempts to restore the autonomy, but these have been stoped by 
the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). In March 30, 1939, after the fall of 
Catalonia and the majority of the territory of the Republic, Valencia 
surrendered in front of Franco, and this meant the end of the war. Franco 
started his dictatorship. For Valencia, as well as for the rest of Spain, has 
followed a tough period. Although the anti-separatist measures were quite 
easy in the area of Valencia, there were economic difficulties due to isolation 
of Spain, and political and economic issues, for its connections with the 
fascist regimes. After a dictatorship of 36 years, Spain has become a 
decentralized state as a result of the establishment of democracy. Spain was 
                                                     
24 Höfer, Karel (2012): Valencian Identity, Language and Language Policy, 
alppi.vedeckecasopisy.cz/publicFiles/00186.pdf, accessed June 10, 2015  
25 “Historia del Valenciano”, accessed June 10, 2015, 
http://www.idiomavalenciano.com/historia-del-valenciano.html   
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divided into 17 autonomous regions, one of them being the Valencian 
Community.26 
 
4. The Valencian Linguistic Conflict  
In spite of the definition of Valencian as the language of the 
Valencian Community, its linguistic enclosure is a controversial issue. 
Because it is similar to the Catalan, the majority of the linguists considered it 
as a dialect of this last one. In the Valencian Linguistic conflict, the 
inhabitants of Catalonia maintain their opinion that Valencian and Catalan 
are two versions of the same language and plead for the use of the same 
standard with three variants (Catalan, Valencian and Balearic), based on the 
fact that Valencian and Balearic are subordinated to Catalan. 
This way of thinking is not common with the majority of the 
Valencian speakers, which shall consider their language as unique and 
independent from the Catalan. But, neither the Status of Autonomy from 
1982, nor the Law 4/1983 regarding the use and teaching of Valencian 
language, gives the freedom of the recognition of the status of the Valencian 
language as an independent one. This legal problem gave birth to the 
conflict between the two models of standardization of the language, conflict 
which has continued until 1998, when the Valencian Government has 
aproved the setting up of a new body, The Valencian Academy of Language, 
which purpose was to establish a set of rules for the use of Valencian 
language.27 
It is difficult to establish accurately the degree of similarity between 
the Valencian and Catalan. The general idea is that the fact that the 
Valencians can understand Catalans and vice versa. Finally, the idea of this 
conflict is a political one. Aparently very recently, some political 
“nationalist” movements with a strong desire to be independent from the 
Spanish State, they have started to make their voice heard in some of the 
autonomous communities in Spain. Catalonia is one of them, where there is 
a significant presence of separatist nationalist movements. 
The Catalan Nationalism tries to build a political project called “The 
Catalans Countries” (Països catalans). For many years, the Catalan 
Nationalism has invested large sums of money in the propaganda, inside and 
outside of Spain in order to make the rest of the population to believe that 
the valencian language is a dialect of Catalan and consequently, the 
Valencian society and its territory are part of the “Catalan nation” and are 
also part of the so called “The Catalans Countries”.   
                                                     
26 Ibidem  
27 “Conflicto político de la lengua valenciana”, accessed June 10, 2015, 
http://www.idiomavalenciano.com/conflicto-politico-de-la-lengua-valenciana.html 
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The Catalan nationalists try to promote this project as being an 
exclusively linguistic one, hiding the real political meaning. They want a 
social and political absorption of the Valencian Community inside Catalonia 
in order to give it a higher political, social and territorial force to the 
ambitions of Catalan nationalism.28 
This concept of “Catalan countries” can have different meanings 
depending on the context. Broadly, can be divided into two groups: 
linguistic or politic. The political definition of the concept is larger, because 
it includes by default the linguistic sphere. From the politically points of 
view, it refers to a number of projects endorsed by suporters of Catalan 
independence. They argue, on the basis of the linguistic fact for the creation 
of a common identity that goes beyond territorial limits of Catalonia and for 
political cooperation between the regions that are part of "Catalan 
Countries". 
Thus, the cultural term used narrowly by Catalans philologists 
became highly controversial, more in the Valencian Community, since 1980. 
Some Valencians tend to believe that the concept was meant, in fact, to 
increase the strength of Catalonia in order to be able to win the 
independence, and to have the possibility to "annex" Valencia. But, because 
in Valencia there is a certain sense, even if not very strongly expressed, of 
their own identity, and it’s not linked to Catalonia, they are in great 
disagreement with the possibility of establishing the so-called "Catalan 
Countries", political project. 
 
5. Conclusions  
The sociolinguistic situation of Valencia is, in many ways, unique: 
the Catalan is spoken in the most part of its territory since the thirteenth 
century, after being conquered by the Christian settlers and occupied by the 
Catalans (and other peoples less numerous). Until 1970 the Valencian 
language was used only familiar context or in a colloquial way, despite the 
fact that its use and teaching have been officially banned since 1707.   
In 1977, Spain became a democracy and for many people it seemed 
that this is a good oportunity to reactivate the question of Valencian identity 
and language. Although the official use of language and the teaching were 
reintroduced in Valencia in 1983, this language has lost its speakers 
constantly, not so much in absolute terms as in relative. Surveys show that 
today - thanks to the introduction of the Valencian language in the 
education system - more and more young people can write, speak and read 
in Valencian, than before, although very few uses the Valencian language. 
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Between 1980 and 1990, the right-wing parties and the media 
insisted that there is a plan for the replacing the genuine Valencian identity 
and Valencian language with a version of "Catalan". In what followed, "to 
be a good Valencian" meant to resist such a plan, and therefore to be 
completely against Catalonia, where possible. Of course, being against those 
whom language you share can hardly be "sensitive" if you aspire to "reborn" 
such a language - or simply to help her survive. Even worse, oposing 
yourself to this plan of "catalinisation" of Valencia meant, in fact, to be 
oposed to all efforts to "revive" the traditional language, such as standard 
modern language was discredited because it would be inauthentic. This 
prevented the spread of the language. 
In theory, this conflict ended in 1998 through a compromise 
between the Spanish right-wing party (People's Party) and the Catalan 
parties who ensured the unity of language, although the Valencian 
politicians were careful to never recognize explicitly any unity of language. 
As a result, currently two thirds of the Valencian believe - or want to believe 
- that Valencian and Catalan are not the same language. 
On the other hand, the Spanish State also oposes to the Catalans 
desire to earn independence and would not want their numbers to grow, just 
for this reason. If the unity of Catalan / Valencian is recognized, the 
“Catalan Countries" project becomes a political one and having an official 
base, then the Valencian Community would be part of it, and the Catalan 
force would increase considerably. 
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1. Brief contextualization 
In contemporary times1, Nation, rather than “region”, has been the 
engine of History.2 
Until recently, arguments for regionalization were not very well 
received and had an uncertain future in Europe. In fact, the creation of the 
European Communities in the 1950s took place in a context where, with the 
exception of Germany, centralization was the common feature of the states 
that were the driving force of the Community. Hence, the founding treaties 
barely mention regions. 
Nowadays, the historical, political and social changes have finally 
given credence to those who found it necessary to create and strengthen 
region as an “entity with political power”3 and to help it play a part in the 
European integration process. A quick glance at reality makes it possible to 
say that, in line with the deepening of the European integration process, many 
of its participating states have undergone a process of political 
decentralization, creating a new level of government that is closest to citizens. 
                                                     
* PhD, CEIS20 - University of Coimbra 
1 The need to participate in this rightful tribute to Professor Ioan Horga and my 
inability to write an original text on time, due to a number of setbacks, made me 
republish part of a short text, with a few changes, on a subject I know is dear to 
him. See “A propósito dos trinta anos da adesão de Portugal à Comunidade 
Europeia um percurso histórico a partir da ultraperiferia portuguesa" / Concerning 
the 30 years of the Portuguese accession to EEC, in R: I Relações Internacionais, 
no. 48, December 2015, p. 43-59. 
2 Valente, Isabel Maria Freitas - As Regiões Ultraperiféricas Portuguesas – Uma perspectiva 
histórica. Autonomous Region of Madeira, Funchal: CEHA, 2009. 
3 See: Amaral, Carlos Eduardo Pacheco – Do Estado Soberano ao Estado das Autonomias – 
Regionalismo, subsidiariedade e autonomia para uma nova ideia de Estado. Oporto: Ed. 
Afrontamento, 1998.  
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As a result, it can be said that regionalization and integration are not 
contradictory processes but rather two faces of the same phenomenon: the 
crisis of the State when seen as the only level of government capable of solving 
all problems affecting society. While we press forward in the “adventure” of the 
single currency or in the common foreign policy, fields such as education, 
culture, research, regional planning and agriculture, among others, are usually 
most frequently discussed by entities closest to citizens and with which they 
share a high degree of self-identification, at the crossroads between 
representative democracy and participatory democracy: region as an 
individualizing marker of diversity. 
The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) reflects this reality and, for the first 
time, presents region as an «entity with political power, acknowledging its 
mechanisms of participation in the decision-making process»: the European 
Committee of the Regions was created. On the same subject, the Treaty of Lisbon 
(2009) grants a higher degree of participation to regions at a European level, 
in general. With regards to the outermost regions, this treaty reinforces their 
coordination and participation abilities in the European policies.  
Within this context, it is worth citing the following quote from an 
article titled Autonomia Regional e Liberdade. 25 Anos de Integração Europeia dos 
Açores by Carlos Eduardo Pacheco do Amaral: «Regions have means at their 
disposal to present themselves as and experience their status of autonomous 
agents by participating in the decision-making processes of the European 
Union and adapting the EU’s general legal framework to their specific 
conditions and needs. The old dream of a Europe of Regions seems to be 
coming true at the moment».4  
We cannot but agree with this statement, since it is becoming clear 
that Europe has become a Europe of Regions, as argued by Carlos Amaral.  
 
2. The Affirmation of the Azores, Madeira and the Canary 
Islands in the European Community 
Against this background, it is both useful and important to highlight 
the fact that the EU’s third enlargement, including Portugal and Spain, 
brought a new geopolitical dimension to the European integration process, 
allowing, for the first time, Europe to no longer be viewed as “from and for 
States” only.5 This enlargement should guarantee the drafting of both general 
and unified policies for the entire Union and also of specific and distinct 
policies for the EU regions or communities with varying needs and levels of 
                                                     
4 See. Amaral, Carlos Eduardo Pacheco – “Autonomia Regional e Liberdade. 25 Anos 
de Integração Europeia dos Açores”. In Portugal-Europa, 25 Anos de Adesão. Coimbra: 
Almedina, 2012. p.59-72. 
5 In this respect, it is recalled that, during the first EU enlargement, the Danish and 
English Autonomous Regions chose not to join the European Communities.  
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development such as, for example, mountain regions, rundown industrial 
regions, and islands. Among these islands, some would benefit from a specific 
status - the outermost regions. 
In fact, some regions reflect a very specific geographic, political and 
historical reality within the European Union (EU) – the Outermost Regions 
(ORs). The French overseas departments, the Portuguese islands of Azores and 
Madeira, and the Spanish Canary Islands all feature a number of similarities and 
differences placing them under a special legal framework within the EU. 
Despite a number of specific characteristics common to all these regions and 
which hamper their development and the bridging of the gap between them and 
other regions of the EU, such as their great distance from the European 
continent, insularity, small area, difficult topography and harsh climate, 
undiversified economy and economic dependence on some products and 
energy sources, as well as their political and administrative regimes, it may be 
concluded that most of these regions have their own particular regime and 
different economic regimes and tax systems, as well as different statuses with 
regards to their accession to the EU. 
Following the democratization processes experienced in the mid-
1970s, Portugal and Spain would adopt a policy of greater autonomy for their 
islands. Portugal remained a unitary state. Nevertheless, it granted political and 
administrative autonomy to the insular regions of Azores and Madeira. In 
turn, Spain become a multi-regional state comprising seventeen autonomous 
communities with balanced autonomous statuses. 
Hence, the Portuguese Government is a unitary state structured on 
the principles of the autonomy of local authorities and the democratic 
decentralization of the public service. The archipelagoes of Azores and 
Madeira constitute autonomous regions with their own political and 
administrative statutes and their own institutions of self-government. Each 
archipelago has its own Regional Assembly, elected for four years by direct 
universal suffrage, and a Regional Government comprising a President and 
Regional Secretaries. The Regional Assembly exercises legislative power, votes 
the State Budget and monitors the regional government, which exercises 
executive power. 
Concerning the Canary Islands, their institutional organization is 
based on a Legislative Assembly elected by universal and proportional 
suffrage and on a Governing Council that exercises executive and 
administrative functions, with a President elected by the Assembly and 
apointed by the King of Spain. It should also be mentioned that the Spanish 
Constitution is based upon the indissoluble unity of the Nation, the common 
and indivisible country of all Spaniards. It recognizes and guarantees the right 
to the autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and 
the solidarity amongst them all. 
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One conclusion that can be drawn is that autonomy, on one hand, 
and European integration, on the other hand, make up the two fundamental 
cornerstones of the struggle against internal disparities, also serving as vehicles 
for the political unification of these regions. On this subject, Avelino de 
Freitas Meneses, in an article titled “As Ilhas de Portugal na Construção da 
Europa” wrote the following: «For the Autonomous Regions of Azores and 
Madeira, autonomy is the main achievement of the Revolution of April 25, 
1974 but the European Union is also indispensable. Indeed, today’s Europe is 
no longer the Europe of Nations. Instead, it is increasingly becoming a 
Europe of Regions. Hence, together with the Constitution of the Portuguese 
Republic, the European Union is one of the main suports of autonomy as an 
expression of democracy and a tool for development».6  
It should also be borne in mind that the presentation of Portugal’s 
aplication for EEC membership (on March 28, 1977) posed a huge challenge, 
from an executive and administrative point of view, to the recent autonomies 
of Azores and Madeira. Hence, during the period of the accession 
negotiations, the Regional Governments of Azores and Madeira apointed a 
member responsible for European integration who, in representation of the 
corresponding region, followed the negotiations with the European 
Commission.  
Within the scope of the new institutional framework, on the part of 
the Azores, the negotiations for accession to the EEC were coordinated by 
the Regional Committee for European Integration, presided by the 
Government member responsible for this process. In the case of Madeira, in 
1978, the Regional Decree No 13/78/M of March 10 created the Regional 
Committee of Studies for European Integration, replaced in 1981 by the 
Regional Committee for European Integration (Regional Decree No 6/81/M 
of April 20), which followed the whole negotiation process for this region’s 
accession to the EEC. In 1986, Government Council Resolution No 273/86 
of March 13, created the Regional Committee for EEC Affairs. In other 
words, within the framework of the negotiations for the integration of 
Portugal in the European Community and of the measures needed to 
safeguard the region’s specific particularities, the Regional Government of 
Madeira followed the negotiation process from its beginning, apointing its 
own representative in the Committee for European Integration.7 
Considering the goal of this reflection, it should be highlighted that 
                                                     
6 Meneses, Avelino de Freitas – “As Ilhas de Portugal na Construção da Europa”. In 
As Ilhas e a Europa. A Europa das Ilhas. Funchal: CEHA, 2011, p. 398-411. 
7 Created in the Presidency of the Council of Ministers by Decree-Law no. 306/77, of 
August 3. RAM - Regional Directorate of European Affairs and External 
Cooperation/Regional Committee for European Integration. Last accessed on October 13, 
2015. Available at: file:///C:/Users/Isabel%20Valente/Downloads/file874.pdf 
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the process of integration of the Portuguese and Spanish outermost regions 
followed different directions from the moment when those territories were 
integrated in the European Community. Thus, Madeira and Azores opted for 
full membership8, which, from the beginning, enabled them to benefit from 
all European structural assistance. In turn, the Canary Islands opted for a 
more eclectic regime, with special conditions, namely as regards to customs 
and economic and fiscal union, established in the Protocol attached to the 
Accession Treaty, which curiously mentions the Canary Islands, Ceuta and 
Melilla.9 
Within this framework and as part of the accession process 
concerning Azores and Madeira, it is important to emphasize the immense 
political scope of the incorporation of the “Common declaration concerning 
the economic and social development of the autonomous regions of Azores 
and Madeira” in Portugal’s Accession Treaty by its signatory states10. It should 
also be noted that this declaration acknowledges the economic and social 
disadvantages of the two Portuguese archipelagoes, which result from their 
geographic location (far from the European continent), difficult topography 
and severe lack of infrastructures. As a result, the permanent constraints of 
the Atlantic islands were, for the first time, identified and would later be used 
in the drafting and definition of the concept of outermost region.  
 
3. The Concept of Outermost Region 
The principle of economic and social cohesion assumed a critical 
importance since the Single European Act came into force (1987). From that 
moment onwards, this principle formed one of the key pillars of the 
European project, «viewed as the guarantor of the implementation of the very 
clear goal of territorial harmonization of Europe, from an economic and 
social viewpoint. Europe can only ensure a smooth and healthy accession for 
candidates if it preserves its economic and social cohesion, with no 
postponements that may raise doubts to new members with regards to the 
resolve in the implementation of their goals».11 
                                                     
8 Nevertheless, it benefitted from special regimes in fiscal matters. 
9 Protocol no. 2 concerning the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla, attached to the 
Accession Treaty of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the 
EEC, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 302, November 15, 1985, p. 400. 
10 Common declaration concerning the economic and social development of the 
autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira, annexed to the Accession Treaty of the 
Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the EEC, Official Journal of the 
European Communities, L 302, November 15, 1985, p. 479. 
11 Amaral, Carlos Eduardo Pacheco; Castro, Pedro Faria and – As ultraperiferias na 
Europa do futuro. Ponta Delgada: University of Azores, 2004. 
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Hence, within an expanded Europe with a more diversified level of 
development, the principle of economic and social cohesion must be 
preserved through a Community policy favoring the less developed regions 
and states. 
In this light, it is worth recalling the words of European 
Commissioner Michel Barnier: «The cohesion policy must not neglect the 
regions of the present Union, where real needs remain. Cohesion in Europe is 
not only a question of economic balance – it is also a political matter. Above 
all else, the European Union also means solidarity and cooperation between 
states and regions. It is not meant only to produce standards, regulations or 
directives».12 
It is both useful and important to recall that, since the 1970s, regions 
had been lobbying the European Communities to fully integrate their interests 
into the European construction process. This joint strategy began in 1973, in 
Saint-Malo, with the creation of the EEC’s Conference of Peripheral Maritime 
Regions (CPMR), comprising the regions of the Member States and of the 
states presenting their aplications for EEC membership.  
Within this context, Jean-Didier Hache poses the following question: 
«Almost all member states have implemented special provisions for their 
islands. Why does not Europe do the same?»13  
This marks the beginning of a long and arduous journey, though a 
relatively fast one, before Europe adopted a legal and unifying concept for 
these specific regions – the ORs, which, nevertheless, took place from the 
mid-1980s onwards, on the initiative of the Portuguese authorities.14 In fact, 
the establishment of the status of outermost regions for these islands is the 
result of the determined and enthusiastic action of the Regional Governments 
of Madeira and Azores, in strict coordination with the Government of the 
Portuguese Republic. There is no question that, thanks to Alberto João Jardim 
(President of the Government of the Autonomous Region of Madeira)15 and 
                                                     
12 Barnier, Michel – « L’élargissement de l’Union européenne et politique de 
cohésion ». In Europa :Novas Fronteira. Lisbon, Principia, 2001, p. 11-13. 
13 See. Hache, Jean-Didier - «Quel Statut pour les Îles d’Europe?». In Quel Statut pour 
les Îles d’ Europe?/What Status for Europe’s Islands? Paris : L’Harmattan, 2000, p. 30. 
14 On this subject, see Fortuna, Mário - «A problemática das regiões ultra-periféricas,». 
In Compêndio de Economia Regional. Coimbra: APDR, 2002, p. 596-622. 
15 It is worth remembering that Alberto João Jardim stood out in the Community 
context for his role as a leader of the European regionalist movement. Between 
1987 and 1996, he served as President of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime 
Regions of the European Union and is currently serving as its Honorary President. 
He served as a representative of Portugal in the former EEC’s Advisory Council on 
Regional and Local Policies, later replaced by the Committee of the Regions. He is 
Vice-president of the EU Committee of the Regions. He is one of the Portuguese 
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João Bosco Amaral16 (President of the Government of the Autonomous 
Region of the Azores), the Portuguese Autonomous Regions were able not 
only to set the negotiating agenda in the framework of the ORs, but also to 
gather a considerable degree of the international suport necessary for the 
aproval of the said framework. 
Though its origin is still a matter of dispute, it is believed that the 
term ultraperiférica (outermost) was first used in October 1987, during the 
CPMR’s General Assembly17, held in Réunion and directed by then President 
of Azores, João Bosco Mota Amaral. Attempting to highlight nuances within 
the conceptual framework, then President of Azores spontaneously used the 
expression «more than» later replacing it with the prefix «ultra» to describe the 
concept of remoteness aplicable to the situation of the islands located far 
away from the European continent. Thus, in Patrick Guillaumin’s words, «the 
outermost islands and regions were born, having been created by the Regions 
themselves».18 
It is true that attempts were made to create a political space covering 
these regions and enabling their economic and social development - a project 
that had been cherished in the late 1950s. This would later hapen in a more 
formal manner at the Rhodes European Council, in 1988.19 «The member 
states had a clear political motivation: to grant a special status to the seven 
regions – Azores, Madeira, Canary Islands, Réunion, Guadeloupe, Martinique 
and French Guiana – ensuring that the European Communities would adopt 
measures to mitigate the detrimental effects of the Internal Market, given the 
insularity of those regions».20 
                                                                                                                       
representatives at the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of 
Europe. Finally, he was both a founder and a member of the Bureau of the 
Assembly of European Regions. 
16 In turn, João Bosco Soares Mota Amaral stood out in the Community for his work 
as a Member and President of the Portuguese Delegation to the Permanent 
Congress of the Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (1979/1995); as 
President of the Islands Commission of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime 
Regions of the EEC (1994/1995); as a Member of the Standing Committee of the 
Assembly of European Regions; as a Chief of the Portuguese Delegation in the 
Committee of the Regions and as Vice-President of the Committee of the Regions 
(1994/1995). 
17 The ORs host the CPMR for two consecutive years: First in Réunion, in 1987, and 
later in Madeira, in 1988. In this way, the CPMR certainly contributes to transform a 
«community of approach» into a «community of destiny». See GUILLAUMIN, 
Patrick - «La Dimension Ultrapériphérique de l’Union Européenne». In Quel Statut 
Pour les Îles d’Europe? Paris: Harmattan, 2000, p. 108. 
18 Patrick Guillaumin, art. cit., p. 108. 
19 On the initiative of then Portuguese Prime Minister, Aníbal Cavaco Silva.  
20 Carlos Eduardo Pacheco Amaral and Pedro Faria e Castro, op.cit. 
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Once again, the Portuguese regional politicians played a significant role. 
In 1988, the President of Madeira invited his colleagues of the ORs for a 
working session to address issues of common concern, at a time when the 
project of the separate program of specific actions to deal with the remoteness 
and insularity of the French overseas departments21 (POSEIDOM) was being 
discussed in the Community bodies. Thus, the group of Outermost Regions of 
the EU was born.22 At the request of Portugal and Spain, the Committee 
proposed that the Council create two new programs based on POSEIDOM: 
the POSEIMA,23 dedicated to Madeira and Azores, and the POSEICAN,24 
concerning the Canary Islands. Ceuta and Melilla were not the subject of any 
POSEI framework program because Spain did not aply for any change of 
status. Moreover, these two cities are not as distanced from the European 
continent as the regions benefitting from those framework programs. Within 
this context, the POSEI programs attempt to give substance to the goals set at 
the Rhodes European Council. 
In the context of the reform of the Structural Funds, all these regions 
are classified as objective 1, a wording referring to all regions lagging in 
development.25 It should be remembered that recourse to Structural Fund 
action is one of the two engines that «should propel the economic take-off of 
these regions». The second engine «consists in shaping the implementation of 
certain common policies, in order to better align them with reality».  
Indeed, it was amidst this scenario that the «concept of outermost 
region, designating the regions benefitting from the three programs and based 
on the particularities common to these regions and which set them apart from 
                                                     
21 The Posei programs began in 1989 with the adoption of the program of specific 
options meant to fight the remoteness and insularity of the French overseas 
departments (Poseidom). Programs dedicated to the Canary Islands (POSEICAN) 
and Azores and Madeira (Poseima) were approved in 1991. In terms of their nature, 
policy actions under Posei can be classified in six major groups: financial, sectoral, 
relating to agriculture and fisheries, fiscal, customs, regional cooperation and state aid. 
22 In fact, as a result of the constant informal meetings following Alberto João 
Jardim’s historic initiative, the seven regions signed a Cooperation Protocol, in 1995, 
in Gourbeyre (Guadeloupe), creating the Conference of the Presidents of the ORs. 
23 Decision of the Council of the European Communities no. 91/315/CEE, of June 
26, 1991, concerning the Program of specific options to combat the remoteness and 
insularity of Madeira and Azores (Poseima), OJEC no. L 171, June 29, 1991. 
24 Decision of the Council of the European Communities of June 26, 1991, 
concerning the Program of specific options to combat the remoteness and insularity 
of the Canary Islands (Poseican), Official Journal of the European Community 
(OJCE) no. L 171, June 29, 1991.  
25 Ireland, Greece and Portugal fall entirely within this category of regions where the 
per capita GDP is lower than 75% of the EU average. 
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other EU regions»26 was pushed to the forefront. 
With a view to the development of the concept of outermost region, 
on one hand, and to obtaining a greater number of measures of positive 
discrimination for the ORs, on the other hand, the Parliamentary Days 
Madeira-Azores-Canary Islands were first held in 1991 and have since taken 
place on a regular basis. 
1992 marks a fundamental and decisive point in the acknowledgment 
of the structural handicaps coupled with the remoteness, insularity, difficult 
topography and harsh climate foreseen in Declaration no. 2627, a proposal 
made by France and enshrined in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). Though 
this is a mere action attached to this Treaty it should be viewed as a 
unanimous agreement of the Member States to adapt Community law to these 
territories. In fact, it was possible to accommodate «specific measures in their 
favor, in so far and as long as there is an objective need to take such measures, 
with a view to the social and economic development of those regions. Those 
guidelines should refer objectives both to achieve the internal market and to 
recognize the regional reality, so that those Outermost Regions may reach the 
average economic and social level of the Community».28  
Hence, this declaration is a first step towards the acknowledgement, 
by the EU countries, that there are regions with specific and peculiar 
characteristics which justify the existence of specific policies directed to the 
ORs and that these policies should be different in nature or, better said, have 
a more permanent character, requiring a stronger commitment by the EU 
countries.  
In political terms, this strengthened the principle of the territorial 
harmonization of Europe from an economic and social viewpoint, hence the 
Resolution of June 29, 199529 on the Commission document «Europe 2000 – 
Cooperation for European Territorial Development», which called for the 
creation of a special legal status for the Outermost Regions of the EU. 
It is quite clear that the declaration was meant to offer legal and 
constitutional suport to the initiative represented by the POSEI programs. 
However, Declaration no. 26, annexed to the Treaty, would prove insufficient 
in view of the «strict understanding of the legal services of the European 
Commission on the need to act, as determined by the POSEI regulations, 
                                                     
26 AZZI, Giuseppe Ciavarini – “Etapa por Etapa. O Caminho que Conduziu ao 
Estatuto das Regiões Ultraperiféricas.” In Economia & Prospectiva, Economias. Lisbon, 
no. 13/14 July/December 2000, p. 49-60. 
27 Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht, on February 7, 1992; the 
Declaration concerning the EEC’s Outermost Regions, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, C 191, July 29, 1992, p. 104. 
28 Mário Fortuna, op. cit., p. 598-600. 
29 OJEC 183, July 17, 1995, p. 39. 
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under a mandate properly clarified in the aforementioned Treaty. It was in this 
respect that the outermost regions began to take action with a view to hold an 
intergovernmental conference, in 1996, to revise the treaties».  
It should also be noted that the Strasbourg Conference of March 16, 
1995 restated the need to obtain from IGC ‘96 the legal safeguards allowing 
the EU to take the necessary measures to compensate for and adjust to the 
regional reality and specificities provided for in Declaration no. 26 of the 
Treaty of Maastricht, in line with the goal of economic and social cohesion. 
According to the representatives of the regional governments, the inclusion of 
new articles in the Treaty of Amsterdam should be invoked next. 
To this end, it was necessary to add to the Treaty an article 
encompassing the whole of the ORs to replace Article 227(2), which only 
mentioned the overseas departments and whose wording was outdated. 
On March 14, 1996, the ORs, gathered in Funchal, Madeira, for the 2nd 
Conference of OR presidents, requested a new wording for Article 227(2) of 
the Treaty of Rome. They decided to go even further by examining the matter 
and drafting a common project to be inserted in the new Treaty. This reunion 
marked the creation of a Monitoring Committee for the ICG. This committee 
held several meetings in 1996. In Gozo, during the meeting of the Islands 
Commission; in Brussels, in April, on the occasion of the meetings of the 
Committee of the Regions; and in Tenerife, in October 1996, on the occasion 
of the CPMR’s meeting. In all these meetings, the Presidents of the ORs 
reiterated in a Joint Declaration the need to strengthen the status of outermost 
region and also clarified the goals that should be enshrined in the articles. 
At the same time, all Member States began to realize that this matter 
could be ignored no longer. 
The European Council of Turin, held on March 29, 1996, stated in its 
conclusions that the Intergovernmental Conference should examine the status 
of the ORs. Within the scope of this Conference (IGG ‘96), the regions 
fought to be recognized as fully fledged ORs, thus benefitting from a 
framework better adjusted to their economic and social development in light 
of the objectives guiding the cohesion policy30. It is worth mentioning the 
interest and suport given to this matter by the Portuguese Government31 
                                                     
30 In the same year (1996), deputies Sánchez García, Mendonça, Vieira, Costa Neves, 
Sierra González and Fernández Martín tabled a motion for resolution (B4-0721/96). 
31 The Autonomous Region of Madeira has always put pressure on and made 
demarches to the central government regarding the notions and discussions about 
the concept of outermost region, as well as the need for a legal and political basis. In 
this regard, see Motion no. 1/96/M, adopted by the plenary session of the 
Legislative Regional Assembly of Madeira, on May 8, 1996, where «the government 
of the Portuguese Republic is requested, within the framework of the negotiations 
taking place at the ICG, which began on March 29, in Turin, to pay particular and 
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during IGC ‘96. Portugal advocated the setting of measures leading to a policy 
of suport to the European social model, with a view to a social and economic 
cohesion that is a «key element of intra-Community solidarity». In this regard, 
Portugal has sought to make the «revised Treaty on European Union pay 
greater attention to the issues of the Outermost Regions.»32 
In September 1996, at the Dublin European Council, Spain formally 
presented to the Intergovernmental Conference a far-reaching project. In 
December 1996, it would be replaced by a different project jointly presented 
by Spain, France and Portugal33, with a view to: 1) strengthen the concept of 
outermost region, as defined in Declaration no. 26 of the Treaty on EU; 2) 
carry on with the priority assistance agreed by the EU in the framework of 
economic and social cohesion; 3) admit the possibility of adjusting EU 
policies to the regional realities, in order to address development needs.34 In 
this way, the ORs hoped to reach their goals by including in the Treaty a 
provision that would recognize their Special Status, allowing Community 
institutions «not only to adopt specific measures favoring the ORs but also to 
lay down special conditions for the aplication of the Treaty to these 
territories».35 As set out in the conclusions of the aforementioned Summit, the 
Council took note of this proposal and passed it to the ICG for further 
analysis. The subsequent presidency (Netherlands) committed to continue to 
look into this dossier. It was on this basis that, during the first half of 1997, 
the Conference carried out its work on the status of the ORs. 
It is also worth remembering the reunion of the representatives of 
the ORs, held on February 3 and 4, 1997, in Funchal, within the framework 
of the cooperation projects between the islands. It is also important to note 
the common position of the Presidents of the ORs, delivered to the 
European Parliament on February 26, 1997. Alongside these considerations, 
many others can be pointed out. In fact, the concept of outermost region 
involves both the recognition of the structural particularities of certain 
regions of the EU, as well as the response given by the Community policies 
to the same particularities, in order to enable a full integration, on an equal 
basis, of these regions in the European space. 
The 3rd Conference of the Presidents of the ORs was held in Saint 
                                                                                                                       
permanent attention to the special and unfavorable situation of the island region of 
Madeira and its extreme remoteness from the European continent».  
32 See Portugal e a Conferência Intergovernamental para a Revisão do Tratado da União Europeia, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, March 1996, p. 30. 
33 See CONF/2501/96; CONF/3999/96.  
34 See. JARDIM, Alberto João - «A Região Autónoma da Madeira», in Eipascope, 
Instituit Européen d’ Administration Publique, no. 1997/1, p. 19-35. 
35 Alberto João Jardim, art. cit., p. 22.  
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Denis, in Réunion, on April 17, 1997.36 On this meeting, the Presidents spoke 
with Commissioner Wulf Mathies, responsible for regional policy, and were able 
to raise her awareness to the specific problems of the ORs, namely the inclusion 
of the new article in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the organization of the banana 
market and the WTO rules, as well as regional policy and derogations favoring 
the ORs37. 
In fact, the three Member States were strongly suported by the 
Commission, which defended the project. In turn, in March 1997, the 
European Parliament voted a resolution38 fully endorsing the text, after 
finding a compromise between the legitimate needs of the ORs and the 
safeguarding of the coherence necessary to Community integration.39 
This was how, forty years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the 
ORs became an integral part of the Treaty on European Union. In fact, the 
new article has a broader scope of aplication than Article 227(2). Henceforth, 
in addition to the «French overseas departments, the archipelagoes of Azores, 
Madeira and the Canary Islands would also be covered. » This new Article 
299(2) provides a clear and strong legal basis for measures favoring the ORs40. 
                                                     
36 During this Conference, it was decided to draft a “memorandum” or “White 
Paper” of the ORs, with the goal of identifying, in practical terms, the priority axes 
that underpin Community policy with regards to the ORs, on the basis of the new 
Article 227(2) of the Treaty on European Union. Within the scope of the 
Monitoring Committee, the regions of the Canary Islands and Réunion were 
instructed to organize the drafting of the mentioned document. 
37 On the same meeting, it was also decided to mandate the Technical Committee to 
press forward with the preparatory work for drafting a joint memorandum of the 
seven regions. This document should be presented to the European Commission 
after the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
38 Resolution A4-0128/97; Resolution on the development problems of the European 
Union’s ORs, Official Journal no C150 of May 19, 1997, p.0062. 
39 Still on the subject of the negotiation process, the importance of the protocol 
initially requested by Portugal and Spain, and later by France, should also be noted. 
This legal instrument gave these three Member States some room for negotiation, 
which proved to be extremely useful in safeguarding their interests. In the adopted 
proposal, the protocol is mentioned in summarized form on the third paragraph, 
taking the form of a EU action program concerning the ORs. 
40 The text of the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on October 2, 1997, is in the interest 
of the Portuguese ORs (Azores and Madeira) since, assuming the overall 
Community regime applies to the ORs, it provides for the possibility of the Council 
adopting positive discrimination measures which, by taking into account the 
particularities of the ORs, constitute a permanent exemption system for those 
regions. In this respect, the Technical Committee, gathered in La Rochelle, in 
October 1997, defined the methodology and timetable for the drafting of the joint 
memorandum. 
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This excerpt is very clear. Article 227(2) is replaced by the following: 
«2. The provisions of this treaty aply to the French overseas 
departments, Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands. 
However, taking account of the structural social and economic 
situation of the French overseas departments, the Azores, Madeira and the 
Canary islands, which is compounded by their remoteness, insularity, small 
size, difficult topography and climate, and economic dependence on a few 
products, the permanence and combination of which severely restrain their 
development, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from 
the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, shall adopt 
specific measures aimed, in particular, at laying down the conditions of 
aplication of the present Treaty to those regions, including common policies. 
When adopting the relevant measures referred to in the previous 
paragraph, the Council shall take into account areas such as customs and trade 
policies, fiscal policy, free zones, agriculture and fisheries policies, conditions 
for suply of raw materials and essential consumer goods, State aids and 
conditions of access to structural funds and to horizontal Community 
programs. 
The Council shall adopt the measures referred to in the second 
paragraph, taking into account the special characteristics and constraints of 
the outermost regions without undermining the integrity and coherence of the 
Community legal order, including the internal market and common policies». 
As seen above, this article introduces three aspects which are worth 
highlighting.               
 
1) The new Treaty emphasizes the political commitment of the 
Union in identifying solutions for the problems of the ORs. 
2) Since this is a new article of the Treaty and not a Declaration, it 
provides a legal basis for concrete actions.  
3) This article commits the EU to pursue and strengthen its action 
involving the concerned countries through specific measures adjusted to the 
economic and social development of these regions. 
To summarize, as we saw earlier, the concept of outermost region 
represents a special status for certain regions of the European Union sharing 
certain common characteristics. In fact, this is a legal status that gives political 
guarantees concerning the participation of these regions in the process of 
European integration.  
To clarify this point, it should be kept in mind that the Treaty of 
Lisbon, which amends both the Treaty on European Union and the founding 
treaty of the European Community, now renamed Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU (TFEU), strengthens the legal status of the outermost regions and 
restates the model for their full integration through Articles 349 and 355. 
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There are currently nine outermost regions: 
 Five French overseas departments — Martinique (in the 
Caribbean Sea), Mayotte, Guadeloupe and Réunion (in the Indian Ocean), 
and French Guiana (an enclave in the Amazon forest);  
 One French overseas collectivity — Saint Martin (in the 
Caribbean Sea); 
 Two Portuguese autonomous regions — Madeira and Azores (in 
the Atlantic Ocean); 
 One Spanish autonomous community — the Canary Islands (in 
the Atlantic Ocean). 
It should be mentioned that, until the end of 2011, the French 
overseas collectivity of Saint Barthélemy was also an outermost region of the 
European Union. However, due to its remoteness from mainland France, its 
special legal status, its close economic relations with partners in the American 
continent and a focus on tourism, France requested a change in the status of 
Saint Barthélemy, converting it into one of EU’s overseas countries and 
territories (OCT). This amendment came into force on January 1, 2012. 
The OCTs comprise 26 countries and territories (including, until the 
end of 2013, Mayotte) — most of them small islands — outside the European 
continent, which maintain constitutional ties with the following Member-
States: Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the Un0ited Kingdom.  
Article 355 of the Treaty of Lisbon provides that the European 
Council may change the status of the OCTs of France, Denmark or the 
Netherlands to the status of ORs, without changing the Treaty. 
 
4. “From Problem region to Region of oportunity” 
However, one should not think that the importance of the ORs can 
be limited to their demographic weight, agriculture or the number of visiting 
tourists. The value and richness of the ORs lies also in their extraordinary 
cultural legacy, their varied geographical contexts and the strategic role they 
play in protecting Europe’s sea routes and defending EU’s external borders.  
Therefore, the ORs should be defined not only by their remoteness 
from Europe but also by their proximity to third countries. 
It is worth noting that, in an article titled “La actualización del marco 
normativo europeu específico para la ultraperiferia”, Carlos Português Carrilo 
and Júlian Zafra Diaz stated the following: «It is safe to say that the ORs serve 
as real European bridgeheads in their environments, fostering cooperation in 
other regional fields and enabling a real and close presence of Europe in 
geographic areas far from the European continent».41 
                                                     
41 Carrilo, Carlos Português; Zafra, Júlian Diaz - “La actualización del marco 
normativo europeu específico para la ultraperiferia.” In Movilidad y Gran Vecindad en 
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In other words, in the context of globalization, the European Union 
is the only continental entity with a presence in the heart of the Indian Ocean 
and the Caribbean Sea, as well as in South America, thanks to its ORs. These 
serve as privileged platforms for the EU to develop its policies across its own 
borders and within their corresponding geographical scopes. 
In 2004, this new intellectual paradigm inspired the so called 
“European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)”, whose main goal was precisely to: 
«prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and 
its neighbors, and strengthen the prosperity, stability and safety of all. This 
policy is based on the values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human 
rights, and aplies to 16 of the EU’s closest neighboring countries: Algeria, 
Armenia, Palestinian Authority, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Moldavia, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. The 
ENP is basically a bilateral policy between the Union and each third country, 
which is complemented by regional cooperation initiatives, such as the 
Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean».42 
Since then, emphasis has been placed on the role of the ORs as 
regions of oportunity, active frontiers of Europe and territories of European 
influence in non-European areas. This new understanding is reinforced 
through the implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy in the ORs. 
These regions build real bridges between the EU and Africa, 
MERCOSUL (an agreement signed between the Argentine Republic, the 
Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Republic of 
Uruguay, on March 26, 1991), and the USA. 
The ORs represent a European presence in their geographical 
environment, giving it a global dimension and constituting its furthest 
frontier. They also serve as “Europe’s bridgeheads” in the development of 
trade relations with their respective neighbors, as well as privileged sites for 
implementing certain high-tech activities (for instance, the European Space 
Agency, in French Guiana, and the Astrophysics Institute, in the Canary 
Islands). 
In terms of sea area, the ORs make up more than half of the EU’s 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), with a potential reserve of marine resources of 
aproximately 15 million km². This represents a unique deep-sea laboratory, 
which the EU can explore in fields such as food safety, the fight against climate 
change, energy and biotechnology. Thus, on account of the ORs, the European 
Union has the world’s largest maritime territory, with an economic zone 
                                                                                                                       
las Regiones Ultraperiféricas de la Unión Europea. Tenerife: Cabildo Insular de Tenerife. 
Área de Empleo, desarrollo Económico, Comercio y Acción Exterior, 2014, p.17. 
42 European Neighborhood Policy. Last accessed on August 30, 2015. Available at: 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/cape_verde/what_eu/neighbourhood_poli
cy_eastern_partnership/index_pt.htm 
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covering 25 million km2. This territory is of vital importance due to its rich 
resources and great potential. Thanks to their exceptional natural and cultural 
environments, the ORs are also valuable assets in terms of tourism oportunities. 
The ORs harbor a variety of unique species and ecosystems of great importance 
to Earth’s biodiversity. Along with the overseas countries and territories, these 
regions are home to more endemic animal and vegetal species than those found 
in the whole of continental Europe, including more than 20% of the world’s 
coral reefs and lagoons. Their biodiversity holds a potential to be developed in 
the fields of health, biomedicine and biopharmacy, cosmetics and many others, 
such as the industries of timber and ecological building materials. Several 
regions also offer conditions for the development of renewable energy sources, 
from biofuels to wind, solar, geothermal or photovoltaic energy. In terms of 
human capital, the ORs have a more qualified and educated workforce, as well 
as more advanced public services and know-how than their neighboring 
countries, which gives them the possibility of providing services and expertise in 
high added value sectors. 
Hence, the ORs constitute a European territorial presence in strategic 
areas of the globe and have exceptional geographic and geological features 
that make them privileged laboratories for research and innovation in 
forwards-moving sectors, such as biodiversity and the terrestrial and marine 
ecosystems, pharmacology, renewable energies and space sciences, for 
example. 
Consequently, it can be said that the specific features of these 
territories must translate into the exploitation of their potential for integration 
in the EU. Moreover, these specific features must be seen as added values for 
the European Union in various fields and recognized and assumed as such by 
the Member States. In essence, it is necessary to acknowledge the richness of 
these regions’ diversity and the unique contribution they offer due to 
characteristics paradoxically associated with difficulties. 
Thus, it is necessary to reinforce the Community strategy for the 
development of these regions, in an effort to create synergies and coherence 
between several Community policies focusing on the ORs. Above all, this 
strategy should maximize the originality of the ORs and take advantage of 
their unique position. 
 
5. Conclusion  
For all these reasons, it can be inferred that the European integration 
significantly changed the development of the outermost regions.  
In the case of the Portuguese ORs (Azores and Madeira), this model 
of development and change is based on two key facts of the Contemporary 
Portuguese History: the achievement of the status of Autonomous Regions, in 
1976, and the accession to the European Community, in 1986. These two 
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moments left a decisive mark on the history of the Portuguese autonomous 
regions, both in the Portuguese and in the European frameworks.  
In fact, nowadays, the EU offers the best framework for the 
autonomous island regions, both concerning their political theory of 
decentralization, arising from the principle of subsidiarity, as well as with 
regards to their financial autonomy and their own economic development, 
which result mostly from Community policies and actions directed to the 
outermost regions and from the side-effects of the principle of European 
economic and social cohesion coupled with the economic and social cohesion 
inscribed in the Portuguese Constitution. 
The socio-economic development and progress of the ORs 
contributes to the defense of the concept of outermost region. On one hand, 
by signaling its existence within the formal framework of the European Union 
and due to the need for balanced and creative solutions satisfying the 
requirements for real practical effects and reinforcing the spirit of solidarity, 
which has always been a key element of the Community spirit. On the other 
hand, by acting boldly so that the ORs may also present themselves as a unity 
within a political dimension, with an active involvement and a voice in the 
Community bodies. 
Additionally, the specific nature of these territories can and should 
drive the exploitation of their potential. The ORs should be seen as added 
values for the EU and assumed and recognized as such by the Member States, 
as highlighted by the European Council in March 2011.  
In light of this panorama, and within a globalized world, the ORs are 
Europe’s outposts «called upon to fully participate in the role the EU aspires 
to play at a global level»43 Their geostrategic locations make them real active 
frontiers of the EU from which the latter can develop its external action. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Portugal and Spain’s accession to the European Communities in the 1980s opened up a 
new geopolitical dimension within the process of European construction. As a result, on account of the 
Autonomous Regions of Azores and Madeira, and the Autonomous Community of the Canary 
Islands, the European Community gained a privileged position in the Atlantic (at the crossroads 
between the European, American and African continents). This article proposes a reflection on the 
importance of the Atlantic outermost regions within the framework of the EU, particularly through 
their role as furthermost frontiers of the European project. In particular, the European integration 
process of the Portuguese outermost regions will be also outlined. 
 
                                                     
43 See. COM (2009) 647. 
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BREXIT Case – from Individual Idiosyncrasies to a 
Collective Answer  
 
 
 
Melania-Gabriela CIOT* 
 
 
I. Introduction 
When I first thought of writing this article I was intended to analyze 
the idiosyncrasies of the British decident David Cameron, as the risky leader 
who played – for personal electoral purposes - the EU membership of his 
country, in a dangerous game named BREXIT – which suposed to be the 
tangential earthquake for the European leaders with a sort of a “hapy ending” 
(meaning the victory of the REMAIN suporters). In both situations, I was 
almost sure that I will analyze the idiosyncrasies of the PM David Cameron 
and the important messages from Brexit campaign, from the view of 
European integration and in both situation I was wrong. Today I have to 
speak also about the new-to-come PM – Theresa May and of the challenges 
left by BREXIT on European agenda, especially on European integration 
perspective, and that means that instead of speaking about “whether” we will 
have to speak in terms of “when” the 50 Article of Lisbon treaty will be 
activated. And maybe, the most emblematic idiosyncrasy is the song that 
David Cameron was humming after he announced his successor. 
But my final decision was to analyze the context and the factors 
which determined the results of Brexit referendum. 
We are living tormented times, in which European Union is 
reconfiguring, relaunching and reloaded. More than ever, Europe needs its 
elites involved in European construction. The result of Brexit showed the 
failure of European political elites and the fact that we have to apeal to the 
values that keep us together (unity, responsibility and vision). We have to see 
how we reached to this point and how we will find our way forward.  
Brexit demonstrated the crisis of trust, and the fact that Europeans 
are less apreciative toward what European Union brought them – free 
movement, stability, peace – and more apreciative toward what European 
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Union could take from them – solidarity. Wherever European Union is 
redrawing, there is a vacuum that could be filled with dangerous elements, 
such as greed and lack of perspective. It is time to see what the causes were in 
order to find better solution for the European future. 
 
II. European Integration - British Contribution 
We could mention three main areas in order to evidence the British 
contribution to the European construction: European Policies, Parliamentary 
scrutiny and Constitutional differences. 
Regarding the first one, the European Policies, going from a historical 
perspective, the relation between Great Britain and European 
Union/Community was not an easy one. The accession from 1973 was 
shadowed by two sets of events: the decision not to join as a founder member 
in the 1950s and the “humiliation of the vetoes1” by General de Gaulle in the 
1960s. Both events had negative consequences: economic, political and 
psychological; at economic level on agricultural and budgetary policies, at 
political level regarding the participation in European decision-making process 
and at psychological level (maybe with the most influence on the British 
European behavior), flowing from political one, the image of an outsider, who 
is not for real at the decision-making table, contesting in this way everything 
which came from Brussels bureaucrats, who are not taking into consideration 
the British interest. So, it was a matter of controlling the decisions with 
consequences on British citizens. This psychological explanation could be one 
of the reasons for which the slogan from Brexit campaign for the LEAVE 
camp, “Take back control”, had success instead of the slogan of REMAIN 
camp, which was saying about the advantages of being part of a project, of 
European values. 
The first important British contribution to the European integration 
was on Single Market: “from the early 1980s onwards, when Margaret 
Thatcher took up the cudgels on its behalf, and with the notable leadership in 
the Commission of Arthur Cockfield and in the European Parliament of Basil 
de Ferranti and his Kangaroo Group2”. Of course that there is plenty of space 
for Single Market reforms and improvements, but we have to mention the 
British contribution to the Single Market services, in framing the digital 
economy, the energy union and a capital market union3. 
                                                     
1 David Hannay, ”Britain's contribution to the EU: an insider's view”, in: Graham 
Avery, Robert Cooper (et al.), Challenge Europe, Issue 23, Britain and Europe: a new 
setllement?, European Policy Center, Bruxelles, 2016, p. 12. 
2 Ibidem. 
3 Ibidem. 
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One of the most affected areas of European reconfiguration is the 
Enlargement Policy. In a recent study, the prestigious Graham Avery4 said 
about the Enlargement Policy that “it results from the magnetism of the 
integration process and the wish of outsiders to join”. Britain, as any other 
European state aplying for EU membership had economic and political 
interest, and the former EU negotiator for Britain, Edward Heath, assumed 
this political importance. At that time it was clear for everybody that the 
Community will create a common market, from which UK cannot missed and 
the British leaders understood that. Avery apealed to the words of Margaret 
Thatcher from 1975: “The European Community is a powerful group of 
nations. With Britain as a member, it is more powerful; without Britain it will 
still be powerful5”. And that mean to have a prospective leader, who knew 
which the country’s interests were, and who was not directed by personal 
desires. 
It is to be mentioned the British questioning of Greece admittance 
too soon and without the domestic reforms, foreseeing at that time the 
dangers that could come after that. And they were right about it. But Britain 
suported the enlargement and was “an active and effective leader6” of Spain, 
and Portugal, Austria, Finland and Sweden, the twelve countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, and Croatia. 
The British attitude to enlargement results “from a desire to weaken 
and dilute the European project: 'widening' has been pursued because it was 
seen as an antidote to 'deepening': with the addition of new members the 
intergovernmental method would defeat the supranational method7”. But not 
the British were the ones who intended to weaken the EU decision-making 
process and integration. We have several examples that focused our attention: 
referendums in France, the Netherlands and Ireland that “killed the European 
Constitution and delayed the Lisbon Treaty8”. 
The main arguments in sustain the European enlargement (especially 
for neighboring countries) by the Brits were its geostrategic interests on 
enhancing European security and the transformative power of EU 
membership “as the best way of ensuring stability and prosperity for the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe9”. Practically, the British were the 
ones who understood the responsibility to security for this part of Europe 
(between the EU and Russia). 
                                                     
4 Graham Avery, ”The European Union and the wider Europe”, in Graham Avery, 
Robert Cooper (et al.), op. cit., p. 48. 
5 Ibidem, p. 48. 
6 David Hannay, op.cit., p. 13. 
7 Graham Avery, op. cit., p. 49. 
8 Ibidem. 
9 Ibidem. 
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Another British argument in favor of Enlargement was the moral 
one: “We must make Europe not only in the interest of the free countries, but 
also to be able to welcome the peoples of the East who, freed from the 
subjection that they have suffered until now, will ask to join us and request 
our moral suport10”. Another argument in favor of the previous one was the 
expression “closed club”, introduced by Graham Avery in 1992, in the report 
Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement, underlying the fact that Europe has the 
duty to include the states from the East. The expression used by Graham 
Avery was borrowed from a speech of Queen Elizabeth II and became a 
“common-place of the rhetoric of EU enlargement11”. 
British suport for European construction was present in the 
elaboration of Neighboring policy. The reason was, again, geostrategic, aiming 
to improve European security by “creating a circle of friendly neighbors12”. 
This was another instrument of encouraging European economic integration, 
but without a prospect of accession. There were a lot of failures who putted 
aside for the moment the Neighboring Policy. 
And then Hannay13 is asking for attention on future enlargement 
challenges: Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, all of them in need for “a positive response if that region on the 
European Union's doorstep is not to risk sliping back into nationalist and 
ethnically-fueled instability and even conflict. Nor should Turkey be 
abandoned […].” Hannay thinks that without a Britain suport, “the EU's 
enlargement agenda is all too likely to languish14”. 
Another important British contribution was on Trade Policy15, on 
multilateral trade liberalization (Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay rounds), which 
increased the international trade for Europe. The British contribution was on 
the framing the negotiating position for these agreements. On the European 
agenda now there are bilateral agreements: agreements with South Korea and 
Canada - negotiated; agreements with the US, Japan, India, Australia, New 
Zealand and Mercosur are in the offing. 
Great Britain was the one who pressed Brussels for the development 
of and aid budget, committed to allocate 0.7% of its Gross National Income 
to aid, earning in this way a leadership role. 
The climate change and the framing of Environment policies were on 
the British preoccupations and their contribution to the limitations of carbon 
emissions and of the negotiating position on climate change were substantive. 
                                                     
10 Ibidem. 
11 Graham Avery, op. cit., p. 50. 
12 Graham Avery, op. cit., p. 50. 
13 David Hannay, op.cit., p. 13. 
14 Ibidem. 
15 Ibidem. 
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Even though we are not so positive in evaluation of European 
Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy, it is good to mention the 
British contribution in negotiations with Iran to roll back its nuclear 
programs. The negotiations conducted on a European-sponsored template 
initially facing the US resistance. Then, the European economic sanctions on 
Russia on Ukraine issue was “a key element in quelling Russia's new 
assertiveness16”. 
The above mentioned author presents other ways of British 
contribution to the European integration: Competition Policy (for example: 
roaming charges, cheaper air fares and less compartmentalized energy 
market), consumer protection and animal welfare with British advocacy, 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Common Fisheries 
Policy. 
Despite all of the positive arguments of British suport of European 
construction, the inflow of migrants generated by the post-enlargement and 
the bad management of the Migration Policy was the on the top of popular 
concern and one of the main topic of debates during the referendum. Instead 
of following its role of defender of European Union and architect of 
Enlargement and Neighboring Policy, British people felt the urgency of 
assuring their own security in their homeland.  
The second main area of British contribution to the European 
integration, Parliamentary scrutiny, Hannay17 mentioned two important 
committees: European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons and the 
European Select Committee of the House of Lords and their activity. The first one has 
a limited mandate - it can only recommend that an EU policy or proposal be 
debated by the whole House and was dominated by eurosceptists, “focused its 
efforts mainly on harassing the government of the day” and done little to 
work with European institution (Commission and Parliament) or the national 
parliaments of the other Member States. Instead, the second committee - 
European Select Committee of the House of Lords has a flexible mandate and 
influenced the shaping of EU policies and legislation. It set-up 6 sub-
committee (economic affairs, external affairs, home affairs etc.) which worked 
on of the main sectors of EU policy making, having as results valuable report 
which were taken into consideration by Brussels. 
The third important British contribution to European integration was 
in the sphere of constitutional differences. It is referring to the contribution to the 
institutional change, even though the attitudes were sometime hesitant or 
hostile. British attitude regarding the institutional reform and on focusing on 
European policies, asking all the time “It will work?”, was different than the one 
                                                     
16 Ibidem. 
17 David Hannay, op.cit., p. 14. 
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of Brussels when they were speaking all the time about federal or quasi-federal 
structure for the EU, about an institutional response to all problems and 
challenges and about more powers to institutions. Hannay18 was speaking about 
a tendency of being labelled as un-European because of the British aproach of 
favoring pragmatic, incremental solutions. But this comes from British historical 
legacy (a contribution to European legacy) in which, from 17th century, they 
were accommodating the two aproaches: pragmatism and incrementalism and 
European Union has to face now the ways in which it could accommodate 
these two ways. 
 
III. Cognitive Aproach on Decision-Making and Idiosyncrasies 
– Framing the Context 
Psychological aproaches challenge the concept of rationality in the 
decision-making process19 because they focus on human factors and the 
influences that shape the responses that the decision-makers use for the 
outside world20. 
Jackson and Sorensen, showing the aproaches used in the analysis of 
foreign policy, identify the psychological and cognitive processes aproach21. 
This is done individually, with particular attention to the psychological aspects 
of the decision-makers, especially the perception of the actor. Working on the 
research of Jervis, from 1968 and 1976, and Margaret Hermann, from 1984, the 
authors point towards important elements to consider in the analysis of foreign 
policy decision-making: the misunderstanding of the intentions and actions of 
other actors and the underlying reasons–actors seeing what they want to see, 
not what is really going on, being guided by pre-existing beliefs (hence the 
tendency to perceive other states as more hostile than they really are); their 
engagement and confusion of desires with reality (wishful thinking)22. Margaret 
Hermann studied the personality characteristics of fifty-four prime ministers, 
claiming that factors such as leadership experience in foreign affairs, political 
style, political socialization and a broader view of the world must be taken into 
                                                     
18 Ibidem. 
19 Gabriela Ciot, Negotiation and Foreign Policy decision Making, Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne,  2015, p. 135; D.R. Kinder, J. A. Weiss, ”In Lieu 
of Rationality: Psychological Perspectives of Foreign Policy Decision-Making”, in 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 22, no. 4, December 1978, p. 708. 
20 Gabriela Ciot, op. cit., p. 135; R. Saikaly, Decision Making in U.S. Foreign Policy: Applying 
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model to the 2003 Iraq Crisis, doctoral thesis, Kent, Kent 
State University, 2009, p. 11. 
21 Gabriela Ciot, op. cit., p. 133; R. Jackson, G. Sorenson, Introduction to International 
Relations. Theories and    approaches, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 234. 
22 Gabriela Ciot, op. cit., p. 134; R. Jackson, G. Sorenson, op. cit., p. 235. 
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account in the decision-making process to truly understand how leaders 
conduct foreign policy23. 
The cognitive aproach explores the effects of beliefs and perceptions on 
the individual and the impact that these have on the decision-making 
process24. 
Cognitive psychology has shown the importance of the differences 
between the desires of rational decision models and the awarding, estimating 
and reasoning processes used frequently by the individuals25. It explains these 
differences by the need for simple rules for processing information and 
reasoning, necessary for making sense of uncertainty and a complex 
environment. The human mind has a preference for simplicity. Also, 
individuals are against ambiguity and want, in exchange, consistency. 
Moreover, they misunderstand the essence of probability26, being weak 
estimators. Finally, individuals have a risk profile that moves them away from 
rational choice models, and as a result, we are more averse to loss than to 
gain. All of these four attributes compromise the ability of rational choice, 
being the key factors that influence the decision-making of foreign policy. 
Jackson and Sorensen27, addressing the individual level of the 
decision-making process, draw attention to the influences and constraints that 
they need to cope with, suggesting different modes of analysis. Quoting 
Holsti28, the authors state that among the cognitive constraints of rationality 
are also included limitations on the ability of the individual to receive, process 
and assimilate information about a situation, the inability to identify the entire 
set of alternative policies and insufficient knowledge connected to the 
consequences of each option29. Basically, these limitations are related to how 
individuals perceive and process information. The aforementioned authors 
resort to the research results of George, according to which each individual 
acquires during his development, a set of beliefs and personal constructs 
                                                     
23 Gabriela Ciot, op. cit., p. 135; M. G. Hermann, Defining the Bush presidential style, Ohio, 
Ohio State University, 1989, p. 57. 
24 Gabriela Ciot, op. cit., p. 135. 
25 J. S. Stein Gross, Foreign Policy decision-making:rational, psychological, and neurological 
models, in: S. Smith, A. Hadfield, T. Dunne, (eds.), Foreign Policy. Theories, Actors. Cases, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 104. 
26 P.E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good is It? How Can we Know?, Princeton 
University Press, 2006; R. Dawes, ”Behavioral Decision-Making and Judgment”, in: 
D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske, G.Linzey, (eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology, vol I, 4th 
edition, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1998, p. 497. 
27 R. Jackson, G. Sorenson, op. cit. 
28 O.R. Holsti, Theories of International Relations, 2004, www.duke.edu/-p.feaver/holsti, 
accesed on  
29 Idem, p. 27. 
The European Space. Borders and Issues 
 
252 
about the physical and social environment30. These beliefs provide for the 
individual a relatively consistent way to organize and make sense of what the 
world would otherwise be–a series of signals and clues collected from the 
environment. Basically, these beliefs and constructs simplify and structure the 
outside world. 
Knowledge is at the heart of international relations31 and emphasizes 
the importance of concepts such as power and interest. But despite the 
importance, the methodologies of systematic psychological analysis of 
knowledge have only recently been developed. In research conducted by the 
authors mentioned above, they attempted to identify the role that knowledge 
plays in international politics, the challenges raised by the need to assess 
knowledge and how technology suports the use of these challenges. The 
essence of their study focuses on operational code analysis, conceptual maps, 
the theory of the image and conceptual theory32. Each area is examined, 
taking into account the theoretical developments, methodological aproaches 
and the correspondence of predictions with the observed behavior. The two 
researchers advocate for understanding the role of knowledge in international 
phenomena. 
Saikaly believes that cognitive aproaches take into account the 
definition of the situation by the leaders, how they perceive the outside world 
and how they receive and transmit information, all affecting the decision that 
they will make33. Leaders can have deeply rooted beliefs, and lives full of 
experiences that influence how they perceive the outside world34. Rosati 
criticizes the rational actor model and argues that states are made up of 
individuals who develop foreign policy. Individuals are those who act, not the 
states, what matters is human knowledge and the psychological characteristics 
of decision-makers, with a profound impact on policy outcomes35. He suggests 
several ways in which human cognition (addressed as the process of acquisition 
of knowledge through the use of reasoning, intuition and perception) and the 
beliefs of policy-makers matter. 
                                                     
30 A. George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy, CO Westwood Press, 1980, p. 57. 
31 M. Young, M. Schafer, ”Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways of Assessing 
Cognition in International Relation”, in Mershon International Studies Review, no. 42, 
1998, p. 63. 
32 Idem, p. 64. 
33 R. Saikaly, Decision Making in U.S. Foreign Policy: Applying Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model 
to the 2003 Iraq Crisis, doctoral thesis, Kent, Kent State University, 2009, p. 212. 
34 Th. S. Mowle, ”Worldviews in foreign policy: Realism, liberalism, and external 
conflict”, in: Political Psychology, vol. 24, no. 3, 2003, p. 562. 
35 J. A. Rosati, ”The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics”, in: 
International Studies Review, vol. 2, no. 3, 2000, p. 53. 
In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga 
 
253 
In the study he made based on Kingdon's multiple stream model, 
Saikaly considered three important elements of the cognitive aproach: beliefs, 
perceptions and contextual interactions36. Some scholars tend to understand 
the content of beliefs as operational codes, which provide a perpective image 
of the outside world37. Other researchers are trying to understand the content 
of beliefs as a conceptual map that provides a small set of representations for 
a specific situation38, or are trying to address beliefs as tools for knowledge or 
an understanding of the social and psychological functions of the action39. In 
addition, some scholars organize beliefs in schemes that provide mental 
images, shortcuts and simplifications about other players40 or personal 
meanings of social and historical events41. 
Perceptions are cognitive mechanisms which relate to stereotyping, 
simple causal inferences and historical analogies that create patterns of 
thought to help leaders in the decision-making process42. Contextual 
interactions are able to show that the perceptions and beliefs of the leader 
towards the contextual factors, rather than individual factors, make the 
difference in the interpretation of the situation by the leader. Hermann 
suggests that predominant leaders are either insensitive to context, guided by 
their own beliefs and predispositions, or sensitive to context, guided by 
pragmatism and contextual factors43. Keller states that different leaders have 
different interpretations of the same internal constraints: some respect 
                                                     
36 R. Saikaly, op. cit., p. 138. 
37 S.G. Walker, ”Psychodynamic processes and framing effects in foreign policy 
decision-making: Woodrow Wilson’s operational code”, in: Political Psychology, no. 16, 
1995, p. 697; B.G. Marfleet, ”Symposium at-a-distance psychological assessment: The 
operational code of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis: A comparison 
of public and private rhetoric”, in: Political Psychology, vol. 21, no. 3, 2000, p. 546. 
38 A. H. Eagly, S. Chaiken, The psychology of attitudes, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1993, 
p. 78. 
39 R. Jervis, ”Understanding beliefs”, in: Political Psychology, vol. 27, no. 5, 2006, p. 642. 
40 S. T. Fiske, S. E. Taylor, Social cognition, 2nd edition, Random House, New York, 
1991, p. 16. 
41 L. E. Duncan, ”Personal political salience as a self-schema: Consequences for 
political information processing”, in: Political Psychology, vol. 26, no. 6, 2005, p. 965. 
42 O. R. Holsti, ”Cognitive Process Approaches to Decision-Making – Foreign 
Policy Actors viewed Psychologically”, in: American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 20, no. 
1, septembrie/octombrie 1976, p. 11; Y. F. Khon, Analogies at war: Korea, Munich, 
Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam decision of 1965, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 
17;  K. L. Shimko, ”Metaphors and foreign policy”, in: Political Psychology, vol. 15, 
no. 4, December 1994, p. 655. 
43 M. G. Hermann, ”Leaders and foreign policy decision-making”, in: Dan Caldwell, 
and Timothy J. McKeown, (eds.), Diplomacy, force and leadership, Westview Press, San 
Francisco, 1993, p. 78. 
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constraints and therefore lead a peaceful foreign policy, others accept the 
challenge and lead a more aggressive foreign policy44. 
In addition to the above, Holsti adds a socio-psychological 
perspective, represented by public attitudes, images and stereotypes, but also 
by the effect of travel, personal contacts or other forms of interactions 
between the states45. 
The cognitive aproach to the foreign policy decision-making 
process opens a new perspective. Considering personal elements such as the 
personality traits of the decision-maker, his belief system, images, 
stereotypes, prejudices, values, but also socio-emotional elements, related to 
the environment in which he was reared and educated, influence decision-
making and explain the decisions which cannot be analyzed through the 
rational actor model and its alternatives. It adds the explanation of the 
influence of irrational beliefs, creating a link with the idiosyncrasies involved 
in the decision-making process. Knowledge of these elements contributes to 
an increase of the predictive power of decisions to be made46. 
The role of information processing, as well as classification and 
idiosyncrasies, have indicated the need for a psychological aproach to foreign 
policy decision-making47. 
The psychological elements that may influence foreign policy 
decision-making. Specialists bring to our attention factors such as the 
personality, beliefs, leadership style, emotions, images, intelligence and how 
they influence decision-making and the results expected. These factors call 
into question the power of the rational model48. But this does not mean that 
decision-makers are irrational49, but rather, that they are limited by their 
abilities to follow through all the stages of the rational model. The presence of 
idiosyncrasies (personal and social factors)50, influencing decision-making can 
lead towards more complex-realistic aproaches of decision-making, which are 
                                                     
44 W. Jonathan Keller, ”Leadership style, regime type, and foreign policy crisis 
behavior: A contingent monadic peace?”, in: International Studies Quarterly, vol. 49, no. 
2, 2005, p. 206. 
45 O. R. Holsti, op. cit., p. 78. 
46 Gabriela Ciot, op. cit., p. 158. 
47 A. Mintz, K. Jr. Rouen, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p. 97. 
48 A. Mintz, K. Jr. Rouen, op. cit., p. 97. 
49 Ibidem. 
50 F. Campanale, B. Shakun, Behavioral Idiosyncracies and How They May Affect Investment 
Decision, 1997, p. 13, www.aaii.com 
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different from the "classical" rational model51. Fagen mentioned two styles of 
decision-making in foreign policy: calculated and emotional52. 
The idiosyncrasies refers to the personal characteristics, made and 
influenced by internal and external factors (social)53. 
Goldstein and Pevenhouse mention the levels at which individual 
idiosyncrasies may occur: the first level is that of misperceptions and selective 
perceptions (when the filtering of information is performed); the second is 
that of affective idiosyncrasies (emotions felt by the consequences of actions 
related to the like or dislike of a person) and the third level, that of cognitive 
idiosyncrasies (cognitive balance and cognitive dissonance)54. 
Thompson, Neal and Sinaceur organize the psychological factors 
(idiosyncrasies) that influence decision-making (those that occur during a 
negotiation) in four categories: cognitive, social, motivational and emotional 
idiosyncrasie55. 
Cognitive idiosyncrasies are systematic deviations from the normative 
models which prescribe rational behaviour, as articulated in game theory and 
other normative principles56. They result from heuristic information 
processing, such as framing, anchoring and overevaluation57.The authors 
mentioned above identify two aproaches which have characterized research 
on the presence of cognitive idiosyncrasies in the processes of negotiation. 
The fundamental argument identified by them is that the decision-
maker/negotiator suffers from perceptive errors or misperceptions when 
assessing risk, the value of a game or other circumstances. This aproach 
identifies the economic model of expected utility. The second aproach derived 
from the concepts of schemas or cognitive maps58 or from the cognitive-
                                                     
51 A. Mintz, K. Jr. Rouen, op. cit., p. 97. 
52 R. F. Fagen, ”Calculation and emotion in foreign policy: the Cuban Case”, in: 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. VI, no. 3, 1962, p. 214. 
53 D. Meams, B. Thorne, Person-Centred Therapy Today: New Frontiers in Theory and Practice, 
Sage, 2000, p. 15. 
54 J. Goldstein, J. Pevenhouse, ”Foreign Policy”, in: International Relations, no. 7/E, 
Pearson, Longman, 2006, p. 145, www.pearsonhighered.com/.../samplechapte. 
55 L. Thompson, M. Neale, Sinauceur, ”The evolution and Biases in Negotiation 
Research. An examination of cognition, social perception, motivation and emotion”, 
in: M. J. Gelfand, J.M. Brett, (eds.), The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture, Standford 
University Press, 2004, p. 8. 
56 L. Thompson, M. Neale, Sinauceur, op. cit., p. 10. 
57 M. A. Neale, M. H. Bazerman, Cognition and rationality in negotiation, Free Press, New 
York, 1991.  
58 T. Gilovich, ”Seeing the past in the present: The effect of associations to familiar 
events on judgements and decisions”, in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, no. 
40, 1981, p. 797. 
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mental models developed by cognitivist psychologists59. These structures 
(schemas, maps and models) operate directly on information processing, 
including attention, categorization and withdrawal. 
 
IV. Conceptual maps  
Axelrod brings conceptual maps to the attention of the foreign policy 
decision-making process, with a different meaning from the traditional, 
psychological one60. A cognitive map (conceptual) is a graphical deployment 
of the system of beliefs, using figures or numbers61. In other words, cognitive 
maps are diagrams of individual decisions and causal assertions. The arrows 
represent causal directions that connect points within the cognitive maps. 
Maoz62 provides the example of Kissinger's conceptual map, with its two 
nodes: "the Soviet concept of the balance of powers" and "foreign policy 
leadership". Causal arrows go from the first to the second node. The value of 
this conceptual map is in influencing Kissinger's belief system on the Soviet 
Union and the overview it offers on the structure of the decision. Conceptual 
maps suport decision theory by exposing the nexus between what the 
decision-maker states as a choice and the results it expects from these choices. 
Conceptual maps are aplicable in the following situations: (1) 
decisions that are vital to national security, such as those involving situations 
of war, (2) decisions that are made at the highest level by leaders 
unconstrained by bureaucracy, (3) long-term policy planning, with a high 
degree of uncertainty, (4) decisions made in ambiguous or uncertain 
situations, resulting from inadequate information, and (5) where decision-
makers are constrained by stress63. 
Conceptual maps enable a determining of the most satisfactory 
strategy or other strategic decisions by the decision-makers. The greatest 
benefit provided by this technique is a "glance" into the structure of beliefs of 
the participants involved in making a decision. 
                                                     
59 J. S. Evans, ”The cognitive psychology of reasoning: An introduction”, in: Quaterly 
Journal of Experimental Psyhology: Human Experimental Psyhology Special Issue: The Cognitive 
Psychology of Reasoning, no. 46, 1993, p. 561. 
   P. Tabossi, V. A. Bell, P. N. Johson-Laird, ”Mental models in deductive, modal, and 
probabilistic reasoning”, in: G. Rickheit, C. Habel, (eds.), Mental Models in discourse 
processing and reasoning, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1999, p. 299. 
60 R. Axelrod, ”The Cognitive Mapping Approach to Decision Making”, in: R. 
Axelrod, (ed.), Structure of Decision, Princeton University Press, 1976. 
61 Z. Maoz, National Choices and International Processes, Cambridge University Press, 1990, 
p. 116. 
62 Idem, p. 117. 
63 O. R. Holsti, op. cit., p. 30. 
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Valuable research by Findlay and Thagard has identified emotional 
change, using a new method of graphic representation, the cognitive-affective map 
to analyze emotional changes occurring during the negotiations in 1978 at 
Camp David, which led to an agreement between Egypt and Israel. The two 
authors have used this technique to model the mental states of the two 
negotiators Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin, based on details provided by 
the memoirs of Jimmy Carter. This account has enabled the measurement of 
the emotional states of the Israeli and Egyptian leaders, generating maps that 
showed how Sadat’s and Begin’s attitudes changed during deliberations, 
eventually leading to a settlement of the major conflict. This method for 
facilitating the recognition and reconciliation of emotional differences 
between the disputants can contribute to peaceful agreements. Selecting the 
concepts which drew the cognitive-affective maps have followed this method: 
1. Identifying the main concepts, beliefs, goals and emotions of the 
person who will be analyzed; 
2. Identifying these elements as emotionally positive or negative and 
representing them through ovals or hexagons. The ovals are positive 
emotional elements and the hexagons negative ones. The rectangles 
are neutral elements or those having positive and negative aspects; 
3. Identifying the relationships between elements that are 
complementary, mutually suportive (thicker lines) or conflicting and 
incompatible (dashed lines); 
4. Introducing the resulting cognitive-affective map to others, to see if 
they understand the presentation of the situation. 
 
The figure below renders these conventions by graphic 
representation: 
 
Fig. 1: Conventions for the cognitive-affective map64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
64 S. D. Findlay, P. Thagard, ”Emotional Change in International Negotiations: 
Analyzing the Camp David Accords Using Cognitive-Affective Mapps”, in: Group 
Decision Negotiations, DOI 10.1007/s10726-011-9242-x, Springer Science+Business 
Media B.V., 2011, p. 5, cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/.../Findlay-Thagard.inte... 
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Cognitive idiosyncrasies filters are some of the theoretical filters for 
the study of the behavior of the decision-maker. The cognitive aproach is the 
individual aproach to an inherent social situation65  
 
V. Conceptual maps for BREXIT Case  
Much has been said or written on Brexit in the attempt of explaining 
the unprecedented of the situation, and much will be said and written in the 
future. For us, specialists in the international relations and European studies it 
is important to see the relevance of the emotional factors that contributed to 
this collective decision. 
 
Figure no. 2: The cognitive-affective map of Brexit decision 
 
From a winner of political game (May 2015), David Cameron exit the 
post-war political scene with an emblem that will follow him his whole life. 
From the intention of winning the internal election, the promise of organizing 
a British referendum on the apurtenance of EU proved to be the sign of 
improving the political process of decision-making and the sign on putting 
much more importance of the effect of personal idiosyncrasies of individual 
decident. In today title of politico.eu, David Cameron’s gift to May: A Dominant 
Tory Party, Tom Mc Tague was speaking about a success of an internal politics 
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In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga 
 
259 
example, saying that Cameron “suicide to save the party”. Quite 
ironically….It seems that an internal politics issue (of winning the general 
elections) tormented the whole European Union and now the circle is closing 
and we are speaking again about an internal politics issue. It is a signal that the 
British citizens are trying to frame their future position in the tough 
negotiations that will come. And, of course, “Brexit means Brexit”, and the 
psychological training is started….First, by apealing to the figure of reformist 
Margaret Thatcher and her discourse from 1988 and then with comparison 
with the new PM Theresa May. For sure, we are living tormented times, and it 
is important to learn from our past mistakes and to improve our behavior in 
order to reduce the intensity of the effects on future generations.  
The aim of cognitive-affective maps is to underline the importance 
and role of certain factors that acted in favor of a certain individual decision. 
In this article, we will try to configure a cognitive map for the context that 
lead to the result of LEAVE.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
The present study tried to underline the importance of emotional 
factors that determined individual actions of an individual decident (in our 
case David Cameron) and the emotional effects on his/hers action (Brexit 
referendum and the collective answer – LEAVE result). The individual 
idiosyncrasies of David Cameron – desire to win with any price and keep the 
power, ambitious to be an emblematic leader, doubled by un-prospective 
capacity, wrong emotional slogans and lack of pragmatism in apreciation of 
the real political internal and external climate lead to an unexpected result: the 
victory of the LEAVE camp. He should took into consideration the 
uncertainty factor that put him in a winning position, in order to explain the 
lack of public listening to his messages during the Brexit campaign. 
The subchapter dedicated to cognitive aproach of decision-making 
process tended to rise a signal for all political analysts and decidents to pay 
more attention to their own personalities, and to their idiosyncrasies. By 
taking into account the internal and external climate, future leaders will know 
how to deal with the interdependence of today’s world.  
Above all, the British contribution cannot be contested and the 
subchapter dedicated to it tried to emphasize that briefly. In the end, the 
words of Hannay66 are synthetizing the efforts that British experts, diplomats, 
officials had put years and years for the European construction and there is 
not a better way to conclude this study: “Since I first became involved in 
European matters in the run-up to and during Britain's accession negotiations 
I have from time to time examined my conscience and asked myself whether 
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Britain should not be ashamed of the amount of trouble it has given its 
partners over the years, asking them to make space for British exceptionalism. 
I do genuinely regret some things: the way in which the vagaries of our 
domestic party politics have imposed two renegotiations and two 'In/Out' 
referendums; the raucous and disrespectful tone towards the EU and its 
institutions in our press; the lack of interest in and understanding of the 
workings of the EU which matter so much to us. But I do not regret, nor am 
I ashamed of, the contribution Britain has made and is still making to the 
European Union, of which I have attempted to give some account in this 
essay; and I am very sure that we would all be worse off without it67”. 
 
Abstract 
 
The present study is trying to emphasize the role of individual idiosyncrasies in the 
decision-making process. The particular case for it is the BREXIT case. After framing the 
interdependent context of the particular event and underlying the British contribution to the 
European integration, the study is focusing on the cognitive aproach of decision-making process and 
on cognitive-affective map, as one of the cognitive idiosyncrasies. The innovative element of the study 
is the elaboration of cognitive-affective map of BREXIT. 
 
Keywords: cognitive aproach of decision-making, cognitive idiosyncrasy, cognitive-
affective map, BREXIT 
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EU and Cyberspace - a Plea for the Fifth              
Freedom of Movement 
 
 
 
Mirela MĂRCUŢ* 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The European Union has undergone several process of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization across its six decades of existence. 
The cornerstone of this evolution was inscribed in the Treaty of Rome as 
such: “The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common 
market and progressively aproximating the economic policies of Member 
States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development 
of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in 
stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations 
between the States belonging to it” 1. The essence of the Common Market, 
as it was called then, was the freedom of movement of goods, services, 
labor and capital. The Common Market has evolved, transformed into an 
Internal Market and, finally, into the Single Market. However, it has become 
evident in the past three decades that the initial Common Market project 
requires a boost. This was done in 1985, when then president of the 
Commission, Jacques Delors, streamlined an initiative to complete the 
Internal Market. It was also done in 2011 and 2011, when Mario Monti 
delivered two important papers on the future of the Single Market. These 
documents have one important thing in common: a realization by their 
authors that the freedom of movement is paramount to the economic and 
social development of the European Union, but that it does not function 
properly. Monti called this “market fatigue”, as “suport for the market 
economy has become less broad and less deep than it had been since the 
Eighties” 2. 
                                                     
* PhD lecturer at the University of Oradea, Department of International Relations and 
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1 “The Treaty of Rome,” 1957,  
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf. 
2 Mario Monti, “A New Strategy for the Single Market. At the Service of Europe’s 
Economy and Society” (European Commission, May 9, 2010), 24, 
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So, why would we need another freedom of movement, if the 
European Commission has asked for a report concluded that there is market 
fatigue and the Single Market is not functioning properly? What other 
freedom of movement do we need to establish? The four fundamental 
freedoms have created a new type of space, but its functioning suffers. We 
must talk about the erection of a new type of space where information 
resides, namely the digital space. Information travels freely in the World 
Wide Web, but we shall see in this paper that this is not always the case for 
the European digital space. Hence, the need for the regulation of a new 
freedom of movement, the freedom of movement of information. In the 
context of the rethinking of the make-up of the European Union due to 
terrorist threats and migration, borders are reanalyzed. Their existence is not 
questioned anymore, but new types of borders are erected. The answers to 
the question from above seem rather problematic given the hard threats 
existent in the European Union. Thus, it also seems redundant to discuss 
about the need to regulate the freedom of movement of information. This 
should come as a given, but information does not travel freely and users 
suffer from geo-blocking, while digital content is maped according to its 
point of origin. The main point of this paper is to emphasize the need for a 
top-down initiative in this sense in order to enable the proper functioning of 
the European virtual space entitled now the Digital Single Market. 
Hence, both the Single Market and the Digital Single Market 
(established by the Digital Agenda for Europe) do not function properly. 
One of the triggers of the change of paradigm in the functioning of the 
Single Market is the information and communication technology revolution, 
because it was never really fully accounted for in the original design of the 
Common Market, or in the 1985 White Paper. Statements by European 
bureaucrats claiming that this revolution is changing our world and that 
‘data is the new oil’ seem to provide us with enough proof to show that the 
Internet is a major influence in the development of the Single Market 3. But 
how are these new economy, new oil and ways of communicating 
specifically working in the European Union? How is the Single Market 
coping with this challenge? Such an answer can be found directly in one of 
the most recent policy documents discussing the influence of the Internet in 
the European Union, namely the Digital Agenda for Europe: “Europe is still 
a patchwork of national online markets, and Europeans are prevented by 
solvable problems from enjoying the benefits of a digital single market. 
                                                                                                                       
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/monti_report_final_10_05_20
10_en.pdf. 
3 Neelie Kroes, “Digital Agenda and Open Data From Crisis of Trust to Open 
Governing Bratislava,” European Commission - Press Release, March 5, 2012, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-149_en.htm. 
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Commercial and cultural content and services need to flow across borders; 
this should be achieved by eliminating regulatory barriers and facilitating 
electronic payments and invoicing, dispute resolution and customer trust” 4. 
Essentially, the Digital Agenda and this quote show that the Internet does 
not create a fully-functional digital economy and change out of scratch, but 
rather it only creates the conditions for development and growth, the virtual 
space where more and more activities are taking place these days. We also 
see that it does not function properly, given that Europe is considered a 
patchwork of digital markets and information and content do not travel 
freely. 
 
2. The evolution of territoriality – cyberspace in the European 
Union today 
“Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not think that 
you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. You 
cannot. It is an act of nature and it grows itself through our collective 
actions. Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought 
itself, arrayed like a standing wave in the web of our communications. Ours 
is a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies 
live”5. This rather optimistic description belongs to the founder of the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, who issued a declaration on the 
independence of cyberspace in 1996, aimed at countering any initiatives of 
governments to try to control the cyberspace. However unrealistic this 
endeavor might have been in its day as well as today, it does point to some 
useful information regarding the definition and the evolution of cyberspace. 
This is useful to understand how the European Union has been dealing with 
this new type of space determined by the evolution of territoriality due to 
globalization. 
Firstly, cyberspace grows itself “through our collective actions”. 
More specifically, users working together in a network to build the 
cyberspace. So, the more users partake in this space, the more it grows and 
develops, so we can conclude that it requires not only collective action, but 
also individual initiative. 
Secondly, he marks the consistency of cyberspace, as it is created of 
transactions, relations and thought. The latter refers to information, which 
                                                     
4 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions. A Digital Agenda for Europe,” August 26, 2010, 5, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0245R(01)&from=EN. 
5 John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, 8 1996, https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence. 
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we consider to be the cornerstone of this space and which also is the basis 
for the transactions and relations. Here, Barlow points to the fact that the 
cyberspace has social – represented by relationships – and economic – 
represented by transactions – connotations.   
 Thirdly, cyberspace “is a world that is both everywhere and 
nowhere, but it is not where bodies live”. Barlow clearly differentiates 
between the real and virtual worlds, as the latter is everywhere surrounding 
individuals with the ability to connect, but it also does not exist when users 
can’t or are not able to connect to it. In asserting this difference, he 
proclaims the independence of the virtual world, claiming that “bodies” 
should not have authority here. The difference between real space/territory 
and the virtual space, the cyberspace is emphasized poignantly in the first 
sentence, claiming that cyberspace does not lie within borders. Here, Barlow 
refers to the traditional meaning of borders, as separations between 
different territories. He means to say that cyberspace is free from real world 
constraints related to territory. However, by using the marker ‘your’ before 
‘borders’, he does open a new discussion. We might ask: if cyberspace does 
not exist between ‘our’ borders, does it have its ‘own borders’? This is the 
essence of this interpretative discussion on the evolution of territoriality 
towards cyberspace. Like in the case of the real space, digital space also has 
its barriers and borders, either created individuals or by political or 
economic entities trying to hinder access to cyberspace and hence to 
information. However, the markers of cyberspace – collective action and its 
socio-economic potential for growth – fight against these constraints.  
Barlow brings up an interesting point in the discussion on 
controlling and designing the cyberspace, namely regarding the initiatives by 
states to regulate the functioning of the cyberspace. He emphasizes that this 
is not necessary, given that it is built on the basis of the collective actions of 
individuals and only they are in charge of what hapens: “You have not 
engaged in our great and gathering conversation, nor did you create the 
wealth of our marketplaces. You do not know our culture, our ethics, or the 
unwritten codes that already provide our society more order than could be 
obtained by any of your impositions”6. In his view, cyberspace has its own 
logic of functioning and it is naturally free from constraints, bottlenecks and 
infringements. His view deeply contrasts what has hapened in the past years 
in relation to Internet censorship, especially in countries like China or 
Turkey, to mass surveillance in the USA and perhaps all over the world. Of 
course, we have seen that this is not entirely accurate, given that the logic of 
cyberspace has changed deeply once the Internet has developed across the 
world and billions of people have been using it.  
                                                     
6 Ibidem 
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What is clear is that there is indeed a new type of space, the digital 
space, which was created on the basis of the real space, given that hardware 
and infrastructure are real life constructs. It is also influenced by real life 
socio-economic conditions that ease access or make it difficult and this gap 
has been called ‘the digital divide’7. In a sense, the cyberspace mirrors the 
real space and this is evident in Sir Tim Berners Lee’s speech on the idea of 
a Magna Charta for the web: “What I want one which is not fragmented 
into lots of pieces, as some countries have been suggesting they should do 
in reaction to recent surveillance. I want a web which has got, for example, 
is a really good basis for democracy. I want a web where I can use 
healthcare with privacy and where there's a lot of health data, clinical data is 
available to scientists to do research. I want a web where the other 60 
percent get on board as fast as possible. I want a web which is such a 
powerful basis for innovation that when something nasty hapens, some 
disaster strikes, that we can respond by building stuff to respond to it very 
quickly”8. The inventor of the World Wide Web, who created the new type 
of space where information travels with the speed of light and 
communication is enhanced, advocates for a free and open cyberspace, 
which “is not fragmented into lots of pieces”, as the basis for freedom, 
democracy and innovation. Such figures, like Tim Berners Lee and Barlow, 
represent the private sector side of the argument with regard to the future of 
cyberspace. 
What is the view of the public entities, in this case the European 
Union and European states, with regard to cyberspace? This view is evident 
in the EU’ cyber security strategy published in February 2013, where the 
principles of cyber security and hence cyberspace are enshrined: “the EU's 
core values aply as much in the digital as in the physical world, protecting 
fundamental rights, freedom of expression, personal data and privacy, access 
for all, democratic and efficient multi-stakeholder governance and a shared 
responsibility to ensure security”9. Firstly, the EU acknowledges the 
existence of the digital world, which mirrors the physical one considering 
the principle claiming that its core values aply in the former. Moreover, it 
                                                     
7 Mirela Mărcuţ, “Social Inclusion and Social Frontiers in the Digital Age - How Can 
EU’s Digital Agenda Help?,” in Eurolimes, vol. 17, 2014, 53–67.( 
8 Tim Berners-Lee, A Magna Carta for the Web, 2014, 
https://www.ted.com/talks/tim_berners_lee_a_magna_carta_for_the_web?languag
e=en. 
9 European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions.Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure 
Cyberspace,” 2013, 4, http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-cyber-
security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf. 
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promotes “access for all”, which correlates to the feature of the cyberspace 
drawn from Barlow’s declaration of independence, according to which 
cyberspace grows through collective action. There can be no collective 
action, if the expansion of Internet access is not actively pursued and the 
principles enshrined by the EU emphasizes this: “limited or no access to the 
Internet and digital illiteracy constitute a disadvantage to citizens, given how 
much the digital world pervades activity within society. Everyone should be 
able to access the Internet and to an unhindered flow of information 10”. 
This last phrase evokes the need for a free space where information should 
flow freely and that is the essence of a functional cyberspace that can work 
in favor of democracy, of the citizens and of the economy, as Tim Berners 
Lee envisions it. 
The issue of free flow of information is central to the Digital Single 
Market. The next section will focus on the architecture of cyberspace in the 
European Union and how it can and should function. 
 
3. Shortcomings of the Digital Single Market 
Before discussing the idea that the Digital Single Market is flawed, 
we must analyze the basic features and its functioning across Europe. The 
Digital Single Market builds on the heritage created by the architecture of 
the Single Market, which is the cornerstone of the European Union as we 
know it today. The emergence of online service and e-commerce moves the 
focus on cyberspace, which has become a more and more important market, 
where commercial and information flow must travel without any barriers. At 
first sight, such an aproach might seem redundant and totally unnecessary, 
given the inherent ability of the Internet and its information to transcend 
borders. Indeed, the Internet is a global communication network, but we 
connect to it willingly and we take advantage of its benefits depending on 
our socio-economic context and state. Thus, we can assert that, in the 
European Union, the Internet creates a digital economy divided into a series 
of digital markets, where users who connect voluntarily are the main players. 
The mechanism of this market is similar to traditional markets, where there 
are suply and demand for finite resources.  
The Digital Single Market is based on the freedom of movement as 
is the Single Market, as it is emphasized also in the core principles of the 
cyber security strategy, whereas the core values of the European Union aply 
also to the digital world. In order to adequately define the Digital Single 
Market, we must emphasize the aparent paradox within this term created by 
bringing together the qualifiers “digital” and “single”. Essentially, the digital 
market manifests entirely in cyberspace, in a space with no aparent barriers, 
                                                     
10 Ibidem 
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borders or other types of roadblocks for movement of information. 
Information is the main good. The qualifier “single” emphasizes the idea 
that there is one space without roadblocks. In this context, we must 
emphasize again that the digital market is deeply rooted into territory and 
depends on the socio-economic context. The European space is still marked 
by barriers, but they manifest at the level of the digital market. This idea was 
acknowledged by several policy documents issued by European institutions 
with regard to the socio-economic influence of information and 
communication technology in Europe, but the Digital Agenda for Europe 
was the first to propose the term “Digital Single Market” in an attempt to 
promote the need to truly unify the digital space. So, the Digital Agenda 
emphasizes that there are more digital markets, one for each Member 
State11. The new Commission emphasizes the need for the Digital Single 
Market in the 2015 Digital Single Market strategy in the following manner, 
considering the challenges between “the immense oportunities for 
innovation, growth and jobs” and the lack of policy coordination at the EU 
level and adequate means at national level: “All Member States are wrestling 
with similar problems but on a national basis which is too limited to allow 
them to seize all the oportunities and deal with all the challenges of this 
transformational change. For many issues the European level offers the 
right framework”12. The strategy goes on to offer the first proper definition 
for the Digital Single Market that is “one in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured and where individuals and 
businesses can seamlessly access and exercise online activities under 
conditions of fair competition, and a high level of consumer and personal 
data protection, irrespective of their nationality or place of residence”13. So, 
place of residence and nationality should not be key factors when 
participating in the Digital Single Market, as is the case for the Single Market 
nowadays. 
Still, we must discuss about shortcomings of the Digital Single Market, 
especially regarding the paradox existing between the idea that the Internet does 
not recognize borders and the fact that digital markets are fragmented. There is 
a basic principle of the Internet entitled ‘net neutrality’, defined as such “the idea 
                                                     
11 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions. A Digital Agenda for Europe,” 5. 
12 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions.  A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe,” 2015, 3, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0192&from=EN. 
13 Ibidem 
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that Internet service providers (ISPs) should treat all data that travels over their 
networks fairly, without improper discrimination in favor of particular aps, sites 
or services”14. While this is upheld and it is actually how the Internet works 
nowadays and regulates the relation between users and service providers, its 
basic idea of fairness should also be upheld in the relation between sites, 
services, governments and citizens, users. However, we shall see that the Digital 
Single Market suffers in this respect mainly because of geo-blocking.  
While this was not a specific target of the initial Digital Agenda for 
Europe strategy, geo-blocking has become one in the Digital Single Market 
strategy, defined as “practices used for commercial reasons by online sellers 
that result in the denial of access to websites based in other Member States. 
Sometimes consumers are able to access the website, but still cannot 
purchase products or services from it”15. When analyzing this issue in 
connection to the principle of net neutrality, we can’t help notice this is a 
serious network issue, but it does not depend actually on users or on the 
specific architecture of the Internet as is the case for net neutrality, but on 
specific service providers. However, the principle of fairness enshrined in 
the net neutrality principle should also be the basis for the specific way in 
which information, data, services, aps and content travel across the markets. 
Territorial bias in the age of the Internet is not justified, especially in a 
common, internal and single market created in the European Union. The 
danger posed by this bias is explicitly stated in the strategy: “by limiting 
consumer oportunities and choice, geo-blocking is a significant cause of 
consumer dissatisfaction and of fragmentation of the Internal Market”16. It 
takes three specific forms, the first referring to blocking access to a website 
based on the location from where the user accesses it. The second entails 
the automatic redirection to a local website that might contain limited 
options for content for users and the third is price related, namely when 
users cannot buy products or pay higher prices for some goods, services 
(such as car rental) and content depending on their physical location. This is 
a serious shortcoming to the architecture of the Digital Single Market, which 
was built on the core values of the European Union and also on the model 
created by the Single Market. Geo-blocking is the digital age equivalent to 
the maintenance of physical borders well after the establishment of the 
Common Market in the decades following the Treaty of Rome, because it 
                                                     
14 “Net Neutrality,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, accessed May 11, 2016, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/net-neutrality. 
15 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions. A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe,” 6. 
16 Ibidem 
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does not respond to the basic architecture of cyberspace as it was 
envisioned in the first place. 
With this in mind, the Commission has held a consultation on geo-
blocking aiming to “gather opinions on unjustified commercial barriers 
which prevent from buying and selling products and services within the 
European Union”17. Geo-blocking related to copyright is not covered, 
however the Commission aims to investigate this discrimination as it 
considers that “there are indications that businesses themselves establish 
barriers to cross-border online trade, with a view to fragmenting the EU's 
Single Market along national borders and preventing competition”18. The 
initial results of this consultation have confirmed that “geo-blocking is 
widespread across the EU [..] due to unilateral decisions by companies not 
to sell abroad but also contractual barriers set up by companies preventing 
consumers from shoping online across EU borders”19. Geo-blocking works, 
according to the study, in two ways. Firstly, it is enforced by an official 
decision of a content or service provider on the Internet and, secondly, it is 
also manifested by a contractual obligation posed by content supliers to 
providers. The methods used to aply geo-blocking depend on the retailers 
vary from complete refusal to allow access to the website to refusal to 
accept payment or delivery of the ordered goods20.  
Geo-blocking is the root of the shortcomings of the Digital Single 
Market because the relation between users, goods and services providers 
and intermediaries is riddled with roadblocks, when in fact this situation 
should not hapen in cyberspace. This brings forth new types of barriers that 
further fragment the Digital Single Market. This situation mirrors the 
difficult evolution of the Common Market to the Internal Market, whereas 
frontier controls were kept in place years after the establishment of this new 
space. In 1985 White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, the authors 
specify that “most of our citizens would regard the frontier posts as the 
most visible example of the continued division of the Community and their 
removal as the clearest sign of the integration of the Community into a 
                                                     
17 European Commission, “Press Release - Have Your Say on Geo-Blocking and the 
Role of Platforms in the Online Economy,” September 25, 2015, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5704_en.htm. 
18 Ibidem 
19 European Commission, “Press Release - Antitrust: E-Commerce Sector Inquiry 
Finds Geo-Blocking Is Widespread throughout EU,” March 16, 2016, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-922_en.htm. 
20 Ibidem 
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single market”21. Like in the case of the Internal Market in the 1980s, the 
first things to be eliminated should be divisions on the Internet according to 
geographical location, because they are the most obvious marker of 
fragmentation in cyberspace. Moreover, the 1985 benchmarking initiative 
for the elimination of barriers in the Internal Market emphasizes that these 
physical barriers “continue to exist mainly because of the technical and fiscal 
divisions between Member States”22. Not only was this a serious economic 
shortcoming of the Community back then, but it was also a symbol of the 
failure to actually unite.  
Getting back to cyberspace, it is engulfed in the same crisis, as 
fragmentation has been linked to losses in the digital economy and cross-
border e-commerce, which we consider to be the true measure of the 
success of the Digital Single Market. According to the Commission reports, 
“in 2015, more than 50 per cent of the EU population shoped online, but 
only 16 per cent shoped online from a seller based in another EU Member 
State”23. These numbers do not point to a functional European digital 
market, but rather, as the Digital Agenda put it, to a patchwork of digital 
markets. This fragmentation has other ramifications to other types of 
barriers, similar to the ones existent in the 1985 White Paper. Cyberspace 
also has technical and fiscal barriers, mirroring the evolution of the Internal 
Market, but these barriers which point also to legal and social issues. These 
barriers are further detailed in Table no.1, based on the types of barriers 
identified in the 1985 White Paper for the Internal Market24.  
Technical barriers refer to the architecture of the Internet across 
Europe, starting from the need for a secure cyberspace in order to help build 
user trust to the need to create actual European content platforms that can be 
accessed by users from every corner of the European Union. The latter is 
complicated by the intricate statute of intellectual property rights in 
cyberspace, which can also result in geo-blocking content for some users in 
the European Union. 
                                                     
21 Commission of the European Communities, “Completing the Internal Market. 
White Paper from the Commission to the Council,” 1985, 6, 
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com1985_0310_f_en.pdf. 
22 Ibidem 
23 European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Document. Geo-Blocking 
Practices in E-Commerce. Issues Paper Presenting Initial Findings of the E-
Commerce Sector Inquiry Conducted by the Directorate-General for Competition,” 
March 18, 2016, 7, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/ecommerce_swd_en.pdf. 
24 Mirela Mărcuţ, “Permeabilitatea şi Impermeabilitatea Frontierelor Socio-Economice 
În Uniunea Europeană. Studiu de Caz: Frontiera Electronică” (Babe ş-Bolyai 
University, 2015), 134. 
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Table no.1  Types of barriers for the Digital Single Market 
Physical barriers Technical barriers 
Fiscal/economic 
barriers 
Lack of Internet 
infrastructure, especially 
in remote areas 
Lack of adequate security in 
cyberspace leading to low 
trust in e-commerce, e-
government 
High costs of data 
roaming  
Lack of uniform high 
speed Internet 
infrastructure across 
Europe 
Lack of online European-
wide content platforms 
Higher fees in cross-
border e-commerce 
and higher shiping 
costs 
Geo-blocking as blocking 
access to content for 
some Internet users from 
some EU Member States 
Complicated statute of 
intellectual property rights, 
which does not allow for the 
uniform movement of 
content across Europe 
 
Geo-blocking as higher 
prices of failure to deliver 
goods based on users’ 
geographical location 
Uncertainties related to 
consumer and user rights in 
cyberspace 
 
 
Apart from geo-blocking, roaming was another marker of the 
fragmentation of cyberspace in the European Union. Every time a user left 
national territory and left the space of the national communication carrier, 
s/he connected to another carrier from the country of destination. Roaming 
triggers high fees, especially when connecting via mobile to the Internet and, 
which, according to the European Commission, “are a market distortion 
with no rational place in a single market”25.This issue was tackled by the 
former Commissioner for the Digital Agenda, Neelie Kroes, who 
campaigned for the removal of roaming fees and a single tariff for 
communication within the Digital Single Market. In 2015, the European 
Parliament voted to end roaming charges and a transitional calendar was put 
in place with June 15, 2017 as the end point for all roaming charges. The 
current Commissioner for the Digital Single Market praised this success by 
saying that “this is not only about money; this is about bringing down 
barriers in the Digital Single Market”26. These barriers are starting to get 
                                                     
25 European Commission, “Roaming - Digital Single Market,” April 29, 2016, 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/roaming. 
26 European Commission, “Press Release - Bringing down Barriers in the Digital 
Single Market: No Roaming Charges as of June 2017,” October 27, 2015, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5927_en.htm. 
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down, helping cross-border communication, online startups and businesses, 
but also reducing costs in the Digital Single Market.  
Speaking of costs, cross-border e-commerce perpetuates a 
fragmented Digital Single Market because users ordering from other EU 
Member States are forced to pay higher shiping fees or higher transaction 
fees. The Commission acknowledged this state after performing certain 
states with regard to the fragmentation of digital markets. One of the 
conclusions was that consumers “do not have equal access to cross-border 
offers: for consumers in some countries it is highly unlikely that they will 
find foreign shops that are prepared to accept an order. While offers are 
technically accessible to consumers who are searching for them online, at 
some point during the ordering process, websites will terminate the 
transaction”27. The same report cites also other types of barriers that derive 
from the actual geographical location of the consumer or user, such as 
different languages, culture, “demographics, individual preferences, 
technical specifications or standards, internet penetration or the efficiency 
of the postal or payment system”28.  
 
4. A plea for the freedom of movement of information 
The previous section referred to barriers that hinder the proper 
functioning of the construction entitled Digital Single Market. However, we 
must notice that there are several initiatives aimed at removing the 
roadblocks, such as the elimination of roaming charges. The previous 
section also highlighted the need for further action in preserving the 
freedom and neutrality of the cyberspace when users come into contact with 
it. If net neutrality refers mainly to “no blocking or throttling of online 
content, aplications and services”29, then why doesn’t it fully work in the 
Digital Single Market? 
The answer lies in the debate between the regulation of cyberspace 
and the emphasis on the fact that the Internet and the World Wide Web are 
creations of private individuals and they should remain out of governmental 
and public sector intervention. Other researchers on the subject even 
                                                     
27 Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Cross-Border Business to 
Consumer E-Commerce in the EU,” October 22, 2009, 6, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
consumers/archive/consumer_research/market_studies/docs/COM_2009_0557_4
_en.pdf. 
28 Ibidem, 2. 
29 European Commission, “New Rules on Roaming Charges and Open Internet,” 
Digital Single Market, October 27, 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/new-rules-roaming-charges-and-open-internet. 
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emphasize a basic question: can cyberspace even be regulated or rather is 
there a model for its regulation?30. Considering the fact that cyberspace and 
the Internet that created this new space are extremely different than 
anything the governments have ever know, the answers for these questions 
are quite problematic, “given the increasingly complex and rapidly changing 
commercial and social usage patterns of the Internet, with the World Wide 
Web being their trans‐border platform, we cannot even expect to find a 
tightly‐knit web of regulatory rules.”31. The same article emphasizes that 
currently there are “patchworks of partly complementary, partly competing 
regulatory elements in the form of legal rules and ordinances, mandatory 
and voluntary technical standards and protocols, international and national 
contracts and agreements, and informal codes of conduct and 
‘netiquette’”32. These patchworks of regulatory elements are present in the 
European Union that have been put in place in the past two decades as the 
influence of the Internet has increased in society and economy. In the 
beginning, the emphasis of the regulatory issues was mainly economic, 
culminating with the adoption of the Directives on Data Protection in 1995 
and on eCommerce in 2000, currently the focus is on privacy and security 
due to terrorism risks and surveillance issues, as well as on fragmentation of 
the digital markets. Privacy, security and fragmentation are some of the 
reasons for the advocacy on regulation of cyberspace, in this case the Digital 
Single Market.  
While the European Union has proclaimed that the core values of 
the EU aply also in the digital world, the Union has indeed focused on 
building user privacy and security in order to strengthen the cyberspace. A 
poignant example is the “right to be forgotten”, which was upheld by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union and which claims that “individuals 
have the right - under certain conditions - to ask search engines to remove 
links with personal information about them”33. Another similar regulation is 
the ePrivacy Directive, where the main provision “requires prior informed 
consent for storage or for access to information stored on a user's terminal 
equipment. In other words, you must ask users if they agree to most cookies 
and similar technologies (e.g. web beacons, Flash cookies, etc.) before the 
                                                     
30 Jürgen Feick and Raymund Werle, “Regulation of Cyberspace,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2010), 524, 
//www.oxfordhandbooks.com/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199560219.001.0001/oxfo
rdhb-9780199560219-e-21. 
31 Ibidem, 525. 
32 Ibidem 
33 European Commission, “Factsheet on the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Ruling,” 2014, 1,  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf. 
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site starts to use them”34. Users should constantly be informed about the 
collection of their data and this comes into contradiction with counter-
terrorism efforts such as the initiatives to store passenger data across the 
European Union space. Privacy initiatives in relation to the regulation of 
cyberspace are welcomed by users, but this does not do enough to mitigate 
the challenges that they face in the Digital Single Market.  
In light of the recent revelations on mass surveillance of 
communication on the Internet, privacy has become the mainstream issue to 
discuss in the equation between the Internet, users and governments. The 
framework for regulation in the cyberspace created by the Digital Single 
Market tries to balance these privacy concerns with the need to encourage 
innovation and remove barriers 35. The latter part of this equation is the 
basis for this plea for guaranteeing the freedom of movement of 
information across the European Digital Space. However, the obvious 
question to be asked beforehand is the following: why guarantee such a 
freedom, like the other four freedoms, which were not respected for 
decades after implementation? The answer lies in the example brought 
about by the 1985 program to complete the Internal Market, which perfectly 
streamlined the barriers hindering the functioning of the Internal Market. 
Establishing freedom of movement of information contributes to the exact 
streamlining of the barriers existent in the digital space within the European 
Union, which brings together all the relevant issues, rather than scattering 
them under the umbrella of the Digital Single Market. This name does not 
exactly fit the functioning of the digital space within the European Union, 
given the geo-blocking and legislative barriers still prevalent between EU 
countries. Discussing these barriers under one single initiative that would 
have the freedom of movement of information as a terminus point provides 
a clearer picture of the situation of the Internet and ICT in the European 
Union. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study has been focused on portraying the evolution of 
territoriality in the European Union and has explained the current situation of 
cyberspace in terms of barriers and oportunities for development both for 
society and economy. Given this situation, we have offered a point of view in 
favor of declaring freedom of movement of information as one of the 
fundamental freedoms of the European Union, which is the basis of the 
                                                     
34 European Commission, “Cookies,” February 16, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/ipg/ 
basics/legal/cookies/index_en.htm. 
35 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions.  A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe,” 9. 
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Single Market. This is especially valid, considering the points of view 
expressed by the European Commission on the Fourth Industrial Revolution 
whose aim is “to leverage differences between the physical, digital and 
biological sphere” 36. Digitization has been the subject of recent initiatives of 
the European Union and this justifies the urgent need to provide new 
momentum to the freedoms of the European Union, which should contain 
the freedom of movement of information. 
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Beyond the Minimum Common Denominator between 
the EU and Russia. Study Case: Ukraine 
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Introduction 
The present article aims to analyse the concept of rationality as a 
possible generator of predictability in what regards the behaviour of EU 
member states and Russia in the case of the Ukrainian crisis. A special 
emphasize is dedicated to the second level sanctions that the EU imposed 
against Moscow, since they were seen as more than the minimum common 
denominator that was traditionally achieved in what concerned Russia. In 
terms of research question the article intends to respond to the following: 
Did the Ukrainian crisis change the behaviour of EU member states 
regarding Russia? In terms of methodology there will be developed a 
conceptual analysis using the concept of rationality, its characteristics and 
limitations, and the role of perceptions over it. Moreover, theanalysis will be 
developed on the basis of variables set analysis. Also, there will be used 
document analysis (primary and secondary sources). Regarding the limits of 
the paper, the analysis will concentrate of the sanctions that the EU 
imposed against Russia after the Ukrainian crisis erupted and on the relation 
between the EU, the EU member states and Moscow.  
The variables that are going to be used are: the geographical 
characteristic, historic relationships and the characteristic of the regional 
dynamics- crisis or peace. The first variable refers to the fact that the 
position of a country/ organisation is important since always it develops its 
external relations by relating first to the region that it is placed in and 
afterwards to the international, global level. Moreover, the first aspect that is 
generally taken into consideration when developing a foreign policy strategy 
is referring to the neighbourhood since the region sets its security agenda 
because the regional level may be the place where the immediate threats may 
emerge. This variable is also important especially in the case of the EU, 
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since both the Southern and the Eastern neighbouring regions are 
characterized by instability and insecurity, these dynamics putting pressure 
on the security of the EU (e.g. Ukrainian crisis and the migrants’ crisis). The 
second variable that will be taken into consideration is the historical aspect, 
more specifically the history of relations between, on one hand the EU and 
Russia, and on the other, the relations between the EU member states taken 
individually and Moscow. The choosing of this variable is due to the fact that 
predictably states tend to be bound by their previously relations, in the sense 
that states that cooperated in the past have higher chances to cooperate in the 
future and states that developed relations based on enmity or competition 
may choose to defect more often, or at least to trust each other less. In the 
case of the EU member states, the future cooperation between Lithuania and 
Russia for example may differ from the cooperation between Russia and 
Germany, since the authorities from Vilnius tend and will tend to defect or be 
against agreements that may favour Russia due to their historic enmity based 
relationship. At the same time Germany has more than once shown its 
willingness to be more cooperative. Thus, the shadow of the past is equally 
important as the shadow of the future1, since the previous behaviour may 
influence the future one. The last variable that will be taken into consideration 
is referring to the regional dynamics, in the sense that players that are part of a 
heterogeneous group and that have different interests tend to defect more 
when there are no external threats since their general agenda is pursued and 
tend to cooperate more within the group when an external threat emerges and 
changes their security agenda in order to exclude that threat.  
The research represents the beginning of an extended analysis over 
the relationship between the EU and Russia and the constant behaviour 
patterns that may emerge from the Russia’s international behaviour, thus 
reaching to the predictability of the Ukrainian crisis. The present article will 
analyse as the theoretical framework the concept of rationality and will aply 
it on two international events that changed the behavioural pattern of the 
EU towards Kremlin: the Geneva agreement and the second level sanctions 
that the Union imposed against Russia, taking into consideration the 
traditional divided policy of the EU member states vis-à-vis Moscow. 
Further I will put the basis on the theoretical aproach that is going to be 
used in order to extract the possible predictability patterns regarding the 
aforementioned relationship.  
 
                                                     
1 The term defines a situation in which cooperation can emerge due to the belief that 
the two players will meet in the future. For more information Robert Axelrod “The 
Evolution of Cooperation” available from 
http://www.cultureofdoubt.net/download/docs_cod/ 
evolution%20of%20cooperation,%20axelrod.pdf, accessed in 20 September 2015, 4. 
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The concept of rationality 
Theoretically, given the fact that ultimately the international system 
in anarchic2, the units of analysis will be the member states of the EU and 
the Russian Federation and to an extend the organization seen as a whole, 
but also as the result of the sum of its member states ‘strategies. Of 
particular focus will be their interests, how do they perceive other states 
(especially non-EU member states like Ukraine and Russia), how they are 
perceived by other states, which is the Union’s strategy regarding the 
Eastern European region, which are the partners’ assets (political and 
economic ones), how can their interaction with other players from within, 
but also from outside can be characterized (it may consist of: combat, 
rivalry, trade, communication, and partnership3). 
In order to see how and why states develop and maintain their 
interactions with each other, we must address first the concept of rationality, 
an element that gives predictability and meaning in states’ behaviour. Thus, 
a rational player has mainly three characteristics:  
1.  It has its own interest which is individually and selfishly 
established and pursued. Additionally, a state is not automatically 
interested in other players, in the sense that it does not have as its 
objective to deliberately harm others, but to achieve its interests. At the 
same time it has no interest and will to accomplish others’ interests4. 
Keeping this characteristic at abstract level, then states’ interests would 
not collide and create conflicting situations between them, but 
empirically speaking, the international system is characterized by a high 
level of interdependence among its units, thus it is practically impossible 
to have interests that do not intersect (both in terms of cooperation and 
competition), generating a situation in which one cannot accomplish its 
interests without influencing other states’. At the same time the case of 
the EU is rather unique in the sense that over the years it has developed 
supranational competences that may influence states’ interests, like for 
example the economic sector. The EU is entitled to sign trade 
agreements with external players, fact that influences the behaviour of its 
members, element that puts UK is a rather difficult position after the 
                                                     
2 Andrei Miroiu, Simona Soare, „Realismul”, in: Manual de Relaţii Internaționale, coord. 
by Andrei Miroiu, Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu, Bucharest, Polirom Publishing, 2006, 
p. 103.  
3 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, New York, Basic Books Publishing, 
1984, 
http://www.cultureofdoubt.net/download/docs_cod/evolution%20of%20coopera
tion,%20axelrod.pdf, accessed in 20.09.2015, p. 3. 
4 Adrian Miroiu, Fundamentele politicii. Vol. al II-lea. Raționalitate și acțiune colectivă, Iași, 
Polirom Publishing, 2007, p. 11. 
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referendum results regarding its trade agreements with US. At the same 
time, regarding the foreign and security policy, the organization has 
limited power, since it still is an intergovernmental area.  
2. It has at its disposal perfect information and it is a perfect 
rational actor. This is the perfect scenario characteristic in which a state 
does not only supose that others are rational actors as well, but it has at 
its disposal all the information in order to conduct a cost-benefit analysis 
and decide the best conduct for itself. At the same time it knows that 
others have the same information about them and about itself, thus 
generating a predictable behaviour5. At the same time, empirically 
speaking, a state is not a perfect rational actor, since it is practically 
impossible to have the entire information at its disposal all the time, the 
level of interaction at global level being too high and the sources of 
information too many. Moreover, the policies are done by political 
figures that depend of the voters’ choice, thus altering the objectivity of 
the cost benefit analysis. 
Moreover, the characteristic of being rational, although it confers 
predictability, it is seen also as an impediment for the development of a 
relationship based on cooperation. The most common example in this sense 
is the Prisoner’s Dilemma6. Although it could be easily solved if neither of 
the parties defect, the common situation is in which both defect7. Analysing 
the empirical level, let us supose the prisoner’s dilemma among all the EU 
member states and Russia. Within this situation if one state is rational it 
would not cooperate with other states so that they all reach a common 
solution, which can be seen as a compromise that will be beneficial for all (a 
win-win solution). It will not cooperate, not in order to impede the other 
reach a suitable solution, but for its own interest if the others’ success will 
influence its interests. Thus, it tends to see for example security in relative 
terms, which means that the other’s gain is its loss (a zero sum game). This 
is an often met perception because as Prisoner’s Dilemma reveals there is a 
conflict between the individual/national rationality and the rationality of a 
group, making this characteristican impediment for the emergence of 
cooperation8. At the same time, a state’s interest is not an objective and 
non-changeable fact. Rather than that, it is based and defined by perceptions 
                                                     
5 Ibidem. 
6 Barry Krusch, „The Prisoner’s Dilemma”, 2010, http://www.krusch.com/articles/ 
Dilemma.pdf, accessed in 12.03.2015 
7 Ibidem. 
8 Adrian Miroiu, op.cit., p. 44. 
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upon one self and the others. In this sense Axelrod and Keohane9 wrote 
that ultimately“beliefs, not realities... conduct”. This outcome is reached 
especially since there is no perfect information available, hence the actors 
are not perfect rational players. Seen in this light, the Dilemma reveals that 
“the greater the conflict of interest between players, the greater the likelihood that the 
players would in fact choose to defect”10. Therefore, if we are in a conflictual 
situation, the expected and predictable result would be defection by at least 
one player. Moreover, where there is a situation in which the number of the 
players is large, the likelihood of someone defecting or free raiding is higher. 
But at the same time, the mutual interest can also be met, as prisoner’s 
dilemma is not a non-exit situation or it should not be especially in the case 
of international relations. Nevertheless, the framework of interaction can be 
changed at certain levels. For example, although it is an anarchical 
international system, the EU is a regional organization that developed 
punishment mechanisms for those that may choose to free raid or defect in 
certain areas like the economic market or implementation of treaties. As 
aforementioned, in the case of the common foreign policy, it still pertains to 
the intergovernmental level, meaning that there is no institutional 
mechanism that can make states cooperate more among themselves, than 
with the outside. This does not mean that the cooperation between the 
member states cannot emerge for cooperation occurs in a context of shared 
norms and principles among players11, elements that are very developed in 
the case of the EU. Cooperation can be achieved for example if the costs of 
defection are too high. Relating to the relationship between the EU and 
Russia, we could say that the game is played on two levels simultaneously. 
The first level is the relationship that each state has developed with the 
Russian Federation bilaterally and the second one is referring to the 
relationship of all member states within the EU umbrella therefore between 
the organization as a whole and Moscow. In this sense rationally if a state 
has a bilateral conflicting relationship with Russia, predictably it would not 
cooperate with the other states that have bilateral strategic partnerships with 
it if the negotiation at the EU level generates a benefit for Russia or in the 
case of Ukraine a compromise that results in the non-punishment of 
Russia’s behaviour. At the same time, given the fact that Ukraine is at EU’s 
Eastern frontier, its security can affect the security of the entire 
organization, even those that have a strategic partnership with Russia, thus 
making Moscow a possible threat to them. In this situation, the EU parties 
                                                     
9 Robert Axelrod, Robert O. Keohane, ”Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: 
Strategies and Institutions” in: World Politics, vol. 38, No. 1, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Publishing, 1985, p. 228-229. 
10 Idem, p. 228. 
11 Idem, p. 226-238. 
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would more likely cooperate among themselves under the EU’s umbrella in 
order to balance the perceived external threat, the costs for defection within 
the EU framework being too high.  
 
The EU and the Russia: beyond the minimum common 
denominator?  
If in its 2003 Security strategy, the EU proclaimed itself as a global 
power12, thus the accent being on the outside of the Union, in the Global 
Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy the EU13 the 
aproach is very different, the internal level being more accentuated as it can 
be seen from the first pages of the strategy: “We need a stronger Europe. This is 
what our citizens deserve, this is what the wider world expects. We live in times of 
existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under 
threat”.Although the title of the document is referring to the global aproach 
suggesting that the EU must have and is entitled to be a global player, the 
aproach is rather from within to outside, recognizing the crises through 
which the EU is currently passing, the Eastern European security dynamics, 
namely the Ukrainian crisis, being the first threat to the EU security. At the 
same time, the relationship with Russia is acknowledged as a “key strategic 
challenge”14. Moreover, Moscow is viewed as a revisionist player that does 
not follow anymore the international laws and principles, in front of which 
the EU must maintain “a consistent and united aproach”15, thus indirectly 
pointing to the fact that the organization’s behaviour was not always united, 
or unique, its member states adopting different aproaches in their relations 
with the Eastern power.  
Regarding the Ukrainian crisis, as in the case of the Georgian war 
from August 2008, the EU’s first reaction consisted in a minimum common 
denominator, due to the fact that its member states kept their distinct 
preferences relating to Russia. The common decision was represented by the 
Geneva Agreement, which as it can be seen below, did not have binding 
                                                     
12 European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World 2003, 12 December 
2003, Brussels, p. 1, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms 
Upload/78367.pdf, accesed in 23.03.2015 
13 European Union Global Strategy, Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe A global 
strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy, June 2016, p. 14, https:// 
europa.eu/globalstrategy/ sites/globalstrategy/files/ eugs_ review_web.pdf, accesed 
in 30.08.2016  
14 Idem, p. 33. 
15 European Union Global Strategy, Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe A global 
strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy, June 2016, p. 33, https:// 
europa.eu/globalstrategy/ sites/globalstrategy/files/ eugs_ review_web.pdf, accesed 
in 30.08.2016 
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actions against Russia. Even more, OSCE was nominated as the suitable 
regional actor that will play a leading role in settling the crisis, although 
Russia has maybe the biggest negotiation power within the organization. 
Last but not least, Russia was not seen as the sole responsible player in the 
Ukrainian crisis, since the agreement condemned both parties, hence both 
Moscow and Kiev were seen on equal positions regarding the violent 
events.Last but not least, the agreements make references to the 
constitutional changes that were to be implemented but at the same time it 
failed to deliver clear methods through which this reform would have been 
conducted. 
 
“The Geneva meeting on the situation in Ukraine agreed on initial concrete 
steps to deescalate tensions and restore security for all citizens. 
All sides must refrain from any violence, intimidation or provocative actions. 
The participants strongly condemned and rejected all expressions of extremism, racism and 
religious intolerance, including anti-semitism. 
All illegal armed groups must be disarmed; all illegally seized buildings must be 
returned to legitimate owners; all illegally occupied streets, squares and other public places 
in Ukrainian cities and towns must be vacated. 
Amnesty will be granted to protestors and to those who have left buildings and 
other public places and surrendered weapons, with the exception of those found guilty of 
capital crimes. 
It was agreed that the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission should play a 
leading role in assisting Ukrainian authorities and local communities in the immediate 
implementation of these de-escalation measures wherever they are needed most, beginning in 
the coming days. The US, EU and Russia commit to suport this mission, including by 
providing monitors. 
The announced constitutional process will be inclusive, transparent and 
accountable. It will include the immediate establishment of a broad national dialogue, with 
outreach to all of Ukraine’s regions and political constituencies, and allow for the 
consideration of public comments and proposed amendments. The participants underlined 
the importance of economic and financial stability in Ukraine and would be ready to 
discuss additional suport as the above steps are implemented.”16 
 
The division between the EU member states regarding Russia can 
be viewed more like a traditional behaviour that they adopt in their 
relationship with Moscow. Some of them have developed strategic 
partnerships based on economic gains due to their natural gas needs like 
                                                     
16 The European Union External Action, Geneva Statement on Ukraine 2014, doc no. 
140417/01, Geneva, 17 April 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/ 
04/224957.htm, accesed in 05.05.2015 
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Germany or Italy17. Other member states have developed an antagonistic 
view although there are net importers of gas like the Baltic States18 due to 
their historic negative relations with Moscow and an antagonistic political 
factor like for example is Lithuania.Moreover, the geographical factor is also 
important in settling the relations that the EU member states have with 
Russia, in the sense that Western countries tend to develop firstly economic 
preferences towards Kremlin and to be more cooperative, while the Eastern 
ones which are also frontier states and closer to the Russian borders tend to 
develop more political-strategical grounded preferences19. Keeping these 
constant types of behaviour in mind, we will take into consideration the fact 
that states are rational players, in the sense that they ultimately follow their 
own national interests, but at the same time they have limited information at 
their disposal. Although it would be better for the group if the European 
Union has a united position regarding Russia in general, thus increasing the 
negotiating power of the organization, and ultimately of all its members in 
relation with a difficult partner as it is Russia, the general trend isfollowing 
the logic of the prisoners’ dilemma. 
In order to develop a veridic analysis we must add the regional 
context since the game is not played on an abstract level. At regional level, 
as predictably the Geneva agreement was not the suitable form to settle the 
crisis from Ukraine, especially since Crimea remained annexed to Russia. 
Since then the situation in Ukraine soon depreciated and culminated with 
the downing of the Mh17 in July 2014, turning the economic gains from the 
relationship with Russia in political losses, since Russia was perceived as a 
perpetrator to the European security and stability. Ultimately, “states felt 
threatened by Russia’s expansionist moves; therefore the EU’s preference stoped reflecting 
the diversity of state’s preference and the political driven ones took the leadership in 
establishing the common view of the entire organization. For the first time since the crisis 
erupted, the EU went further and passed beyond the minimum common denominator that 
reflected the will of the most powerful state20” and for the first time the EU, as a 
whole, adopted in September economic sanctions against Russia and 
extended the list of persons21 although these actions would have economic 
                                                     
17 Mark Leonard, Nicu Popescu, A power audit of EU-Russia relations, p. 30, 36-37, 
http://www.fride.org/uploads/file/A_power_audit_of_relations_eu-russia.pdf, 
accesed in 05.01.2015 
18 Ibidem. 
19 Ana-Maria Costea,  East versus West: When Politics collide with Economics, Tritonic 
Publishing, Bucharest, 2015, p. 179-180 
20 Idem, p. 175. 
21 “Council Regulation (EU) No 959/2014 of 8 September 2014 amending Regulation 
(EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions 
undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of 
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repercussions against some member states. Taking into consideration these 
actions and the traditional divided strategies of EU member states towards 
Russia, why this changein the pattern of behaviour? Being under the logic of 
rationality that was previously analysed and taking into account the context, 
we could say that the EU member states still acted rationally.Although they 
might have registered economic losses, they needed to limit the political 
image losses given the fact that the EU was and still is a unique organization 
that has through its member states the capacity and will to be a global player 
and that Russia was perceived as an external security threat that may disturb 
the status-quo of the group, since alone neither of the member states would 
have internationally a status that it holds under the EU umbrella. At the 
same time adopting sanctions against Russia is a clear signal for the 
authorities from Kremlin that the organization is ready to balance it 
although some costs were to be registered. “On the other hand, given the 
multitude of national preferences towards Russia, the EU umbrella played a disruptive 
role, since it delayed the emergence of a common and comprehensive answer before and after 
the violent acts erupted in Ukraine22”. 
 
Conclusions 
Thus the EU succeeded in passing beyond the minimum common 
denominator is its relationship with Russia, one of the most active and 
unpredictable actors of the current international scene. The economic 
sanctions proved to be a suitable solution in the case of Iran, at the same 
time they are not for North Korea and it remains to be seen how much time 
they will be maintained given the fact that there are some member states 
that are in favour of lifting them due to economic losses. Regarding Ukraine 
the sanctions may prove to come too late in the sense that the Minsk 
Agreement is still breached by Moscow and the annexation of Crimea seems 
to be a non-reversible act from Moscow’s part. At the same time the 
multitude of crises that the EU is passing through may pose additional 
pressure on its unity, affecting its international behaviour especially in 
relation with external regional powers. 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                       
Ukraine” and “Council Regulation (EU) No 960/2014 of 8 September 2014 
amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of 
Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine”, Official Journal of the 
European Union, 12 September 2014, available from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L: 
2014:271:FULL&from=EN, accessed in 20 September 2015 
22 Ana-Maria Costea, op. cit., p. 178. 
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Abstract 
 
The article tackles the issue of rationality in the context of the relationship between the 
European Union and the Russian Federation with a special emphasis on the Ukrainian crisis, 
namely the second level sanctions that the Brussels imposed against Moscow since they were seen as 
more than the minimum common denominator that was traditionally achieved. In terms of research 
question the article intends to respond to the following: Did the Ukrainian crisis change the 
behaviour of EU member states regarding Russia? In terms of methodology there will be developed 
a conceptual analysis using the concept of rationality, its characteristics and limitations, the role of 
perceptions. In terms of methodology there will be developed a conceptual analysis using the concept 
of rationality, its characteristics and limitations, the role of perceptions. Moreover, the analysis will 
be developed on the basis of a variable set analysis. Also, there will be used document analysis 
(primary and secondary sources). 
 
Keywords: the EU, predictability, rationality, Russia, Ukraine 
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Leadership debate in the United Kingdom as a result 
of the Brexit vote 
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Introduction 
The need to develop this subject further is given by the implications 
of the Brexit event on a larger scale, within the European Union. It is for 
the first time that an EU member state decides, through popular vote, to 
leave the EU in order to pursuit a future outside of it. During its 
membership of the EU and up until 2016, the United Kingdom has been 
perceived as Eurosceptic, showing various degrees of inflexibility towards 
European policies.  
The referendum for Brexit has define a very crucial debate for 
Britain on an internal level given the leadership scenario during the 
campaign and the very close score at the poles. We can safely assume that 
the Brexit vote has divided the UK population on matters such as EU 
membership and control over national legislation.  
 
Changes in the British political scene. Succession of the 
Labour and Conservative governments 
The political landscape in Britain has suffered a number of changes 
over the last 15 years, mainly in terms of political succession of different 
forces in executive power. The most extended period of political leadership 
in these years is represented by the Labour governments between 1997 and 
2010, a period of relative stability, both in terms of ideology as well as 
leadership. The effects of this period as well as its relevance on the larger 
scale has had an influence on the result of the Brexit vote.  
During this period the longest continuity was held by prime-
minister Tony Blair between 1997 and 2007. Blair’s policies before the 
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attacks on 11 September 2001 resonated with the party policies of New 
Labour, the party he helped steer since 1994: an emphasis on ethical foreign 
policy through the doctrine of the international community, as well as unity 
and consistency in external affairs. Since the terrorist attacks Blair has 
created a closer bond with the US, giving the UK’s foreign policy specific 
themes such as fighting against terrorism. More specifically to this situation, 
Tony Blair pushed for immediate action in Iraq arguing that the UK needs 
to enforce independence and rule of law as part of its foreign policy 
attempts. This emphasis on Iraq brought into question a new theme in 
Blair’s foreign policies, the international community: the state is no longer 
the only entity responsible for building the international system, creating 
durable partnerships that are defined by complex relationships and 
interactions push the state towards a less regulatory role and more towards 
being a part of the exchange system1. 
The overall context during Tony Blair’s terms as prime-minister aided 
in developing a strong relation between the UK and the US and as such 
focused much of Britain external politics towards building this partnership 
and less so towards the EU. This redirection in the UK’s external policy 
comes at a time of significant changes within the EU as during this period the 
biggest expansion hapened with new states becoming members in 2004 and 
2007; at the same time Tony Blair’s image as prime-minister started to suffer 
as a result of the war efforts, determining a significant erosion in the party’s 
image as well. Some authors also attribute this erosion of New Labour to its 
interaction with the previous Conservative governments, most notably that of 
Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s2. In their attempt to reposition the party on 
the political scene, Labour leaders made a series of concessions, bringing the 
party closer to the right. This rearrangement of the party is not representative 
of something new in the British system given the alternation of Labour and 
Conservative governments, each having more than one mandate, sometimes 
more3. Tony Blair is held responsible for the way he influenced the ideology 
of the Labour party: by accepting some of the changes implemented by 
Thatcher, Blair reinterprets issues such as public property – by embracing part 
of the Conservative stance on public property, Blair effectively moves the 
Labour party closer to the right4. These attempts at repositioning parties in 
the political scene have left plenty of room for other movements to make 
                                                     
1 Marie - Claude Smouts - “Some thoughts on international organizations and theories of 
regulation”, International Social Science Journal, 138/1993, p. 443-451 
2 Richard Heffernan, New Labour and Thatcherism: Political Change in Britain, 
Palgrave, New York, 2001, p.132-133. 
3 Ibidem, p. 147. 
4 Richard Heffernan, op.cit. p. 164. 
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their way to occupy the space left by big parties in their transition towards a 
more centrist ideology.  
The Thatcher government had been harshly criticized for the way it 
implemented its neo-liberal ideology, having impacted traditional Labour – 
voting communities, especially in the northern part of Britain. At the time of 
the Conservative governments in the 1980s, the economic model for the UK 
made a transition from Keynesianism. The new macro-economic priorities of 
the Thatcher leadership showcased this transition: budget balancing and fiscal 
policy became more important than addressing unemployment rates. 
Monetary policy replaces fiscal policy as a macro-economic tool, with 
emphasis on boosting monetary rates5. The argument used by Conservatives 
in favour of this change relates to the increased frequency of economic 
anomalies in the Keynesian model (the inexplicable increase of inflation and 
unemployment rates)6. 
Labour governments that succeededhave adopted this economic 
model pushed forward by Thatcher, with a willingness to improve on it but 
not change it all together. This willingness to embrace central politics as well 
as criticism that addressed Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (prime-minister 
between 2007-2010) as leaders of the executive have started to erode party 
backing by the beginning of 2010. After two terms as prime-minister, Tony 
Blair steps down amongst heavy criticism for engaging the UK in the Iraq 
war. His successor, Gordon Brown presents much of the same ideas that 
Blair had, but tries to temper criticism by detaching himself and his cabinet 
from some of the actions of Blair (he institutes an inquiry on the actions of 
the UK as part of the Iraq war effort). In terms of foreign affairs, Brown 
remains a loyal suporter of the strategic partnership with the US and also 
encourages reform within the EU, being a suporter of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Gordon Brown’s limitations as a prime-minister as well as the long term 
erosion caused to the Labour party lead to changes in the British Parliament 
at the 2010 elections. Although apt to become prime-minister, Gordon 
Brown lacked some of the qualities needed to keep the power for the 
Labour party: changes in British politics in the last 20 years makes it almost 
impossible for an unpopular candidate to remain in power, an issue that 
plagued Brown’s term quite heavily (he was perceived as being stubborn)7. 
What followed after was a coalition government lead by the 
Conservative party. The results of the 2010 election meant failure for the 
                                                     
5 Peter A. Hall, Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State. The case of 
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1993, New York, p. 284. 
6Ibidem, p. 285 
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Labour party: Conservatives get 36.1% of the votes, Liberal-Democrats 
23% and Labour 29%8. The coalition government that takes power is 
formed between the Conservatives and the Liberal-Democrats, with David 
Cameron as prime-minister.  
In the public space we can also see a resurgence of a Eurosceptic 
movement, given the rise in popularity of UKIP (United Kingdom 
Independence Party). This movement can be associated throughout the 
period the UK has been part of the EU, with varying degrees of intensity, as 
the relation with Brussels has sometimes been difficult. David Cameron also 
used this sentiment in order to garner suport for his party; being a self-
confessed Eurosceptic, Cameron advertised the idea of renegotiating 
Britain’s stance within the EU by leveraging a “in-out” referendum9. 
 
The Brexit ideal 
The origins of the Brexit movement can be traced to different 
sources within the last 30-40 years. In 1994 the Referendum Party emerged, 
created by Sir James Goldsmith, a party that wanted a serious debate on the 
relation between the UK and the European Communities (at that time), 
beyond the debates on the Euro that were going on at that time10. This 
movement encompassed a lot of the Eurosceptic movements that were 
mostly in the Conservative party at the time. Even before 1994, authors like 
Alan Sked were pleading for a less Eurocentric aproach of Britain in terms 
of foreign policy and more emphasis on Atlantic partnership and market 
economy beyond the scope of the EU11. It is worth noting that the 
Eurosceptic sentiment from within the Conservative party grew during the 
Thatcher years, as focus was given towards internal politics and the 
economic model of neo-liberalism which needed to succeed. 
The rift among Conservative MPs on the topic of Britain and the EU 
was speculated by Alan Sked who created a movement called the Anti-
Federalist League, to stop further EU integration attempts. The first elections 
where this movement takes part in end in failure and in 1993 the movement is 
relaunched under the banner UKIP, a political construction that will last in 
time12. Under this iteration the party will coexist with the Referendum Party 
                                                     
8 BBC Election results, see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/election2010/results/ 
9 Britain and the EU. David Cameron: we eurosceptics are only trying to help, The 
economist, 14.11.2011, see: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/bagehot/2011/11/britain-and-eu-0 
10 Anthony Heath, Euroscepticism and the Referendum Party, in British Elections and 
Parties review: the 1997 general election, p. 95. 
11 Richard Seymour, UKIP and the Crisis of Britan, in: The politics of the Right: 
Socialist Register 2016, p. 25.  
12Ibidem, p. 26 
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and would have the same electorate base for a while. Most of the members of 
these movements at the time were considered as conservative (with some 
members being actual ex-Conservative Party members), but their ideas were 
more along the line of protectionism for the UK in face of a growing 
European Union.  
 
Table 1: Euroscepticism in the UK electorate (1992, 1994, 1997) 
 
Source: Anthony Heath, Euroscepticism and the Referendum Party, in British 
Elections and Parties review: the 1997 general election, p. 98. 
 
The UKIP movement starts to gather some momentum by the 
1997 elections, the moment when leadership changes: Nigel Farage becomes 
the UKIP leader. The party keeps its doctrine intact even though the merger 
with the Referendum Party hapens at around the same time. The party will 
continue to push further away from EU integration. 
The 1997 elections need to also be viewed in terms of the level of 
Euroscepticism amongst the electorate. As we can see at the time of the 
survey represented by the table above there was an ambivalent perception of 
the UK and EU relations: very few citizens were warm to the idea of leaving 
the EU, but there were quite a few that voiced concerns about the 
implications of the Maastricht Treaty and the push for further integration. 
At the time there were growing levels of Euroscepticism present amongst 
the electorate.  
Under the new leadership UKIP works to strengthen its presence 
towards the public and their members as during Alan Sked and Nigel 
Farage’s leadership the party grew in numbers. They also managed to 
speculate on the weak state of the Conservative Party between 1997 and 
2010, being a constant presence as the oposition. In this way they managed 
to sway conservative voters towards the movement. Their plea was also 
aided by the move set in motion by the EU with the 2004 and 2007 
expansion towards central and eastern Europe; the biggest extension of the 
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EU, the concern for immigration started to grow and as such gave greater 
importance to protectionist ideas that were heralded by Eurosceptics13. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of votes amongst British parties in 2010, 2015 
 
Sursa: The Economist, A background guide to Brexit from the European Union, 
see: http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/graphics-
britain-s-referendum-eu-membership 
 
While the growth of the UKIP movement didn’t manage to translate 
into effective acts in power, some of the issues that they raised were taken up 
by the Conservative government that came to power in 2010. David Cameron 
as prime-minister for two terms (part of a coalition and then as leader of an 
all-Conservative government) embraced some of the themes of UKIP. The 
Scottish independence referendum from 2014 gave a bigger impulse to these 
ideas, ultimately culminating with Cameron’s proposition for an “in-out” 
referendum as part of the Conservative campaign from 2015. Through this 
political move Cameron hoped to gain greater suport from members of UKIP 
and their electorate base in order to remain in power. The suport for the 
referendum was conditioned by a bid to renegotiate part of the deals with the 
EU.  
The referendum from the 23rd of June 2016 comes as a result of this 
plan. Before the actual referendum, prime-minister David Cameron opens up 
negotiations with the EU in exchange for suporting the “remain” campaign. 
What follows this move is characteristic to the lack of cohesion between the 
UK parties system, its members and the electorate: two campaigns are 
organised, backed by various fragments of MPs, parties – one for “leave”, one 
for “remain”.  
 
                                                     
13Richard Seymour, UKIP andtheCrisis of Britan, in: The politics of theRight: Socialist 
Register 2016, p. 30-31. 
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Table 3: The perception of the EU by the UK electorate 
 
Sursa: The Economist, A background guide to Brexit from the European Union, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/graphics-britain-s-
referendum-eu-membership 
 
It is worth noting the effects that oposition and the rise of the 
Eurosceptic movement has had on the Labour party as well. After the more 
recent failure at the 2015 election, the competition for new leadership came 
into full swing in the Labour Party. Ed Miliband resigned as party leader and 
there was a surge of new membership from the population in suport of a 
new leader: Jeremy Corbyn. The success of this movement within the 
Labour party is very relevant as the policies and ideology proposed by 
Corbyn transitions the party back towards the left of the political spectrum. 
The leadership election saw 4 candidates out of which Jeremy Corbyn came 
first with quite a margin over his competition (251 000 votes over the 80 
000 in second place)14. The leadership debate in the Labour party was 
exceptional give the high number of young voters and suporters, 
disillusioned with traditional party politics, who suported Corbyn’sideas and 
his authenticity15. This repositioning of the party towards the left has come 
into conflict with many Labour MPs, more accustomed to the centre politics 
of Tony Blair.  
 
UK collaboration with the EU in the future 
At the moment of writing this article the formal procedures for the 
UK to leave the EU have not started. After the failure of the “remain” 
campaign, the resignation of David Cameron spurred a leadership debate in 
the Conservative as well as Labour parties. Given the history of the UK 
with the EU it is uncertain what the next step will be. 
 
  
                                                     
14Peter Dorey, The longest suicide vote in history’: theLabour Party leadership election of 2015, 
British Politics, MacmillanPublishers, 2016, p.16. 
15Ibidem. 
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Table 4: Evolution of British GDP / person since 1957 
 
Source: The Economist, A background guide to Brexit from the European Union, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/graphics-britain-s-
referendum-eu-membership 
 
It is interesting to note the position taken by the EU leaders in 
response to Brexit: there is a consensus towards starting procedures and 
negotiations as soon as possible, but there is also an urge to have a strong 
hand in negotiating with Britain. The issues raised by this vote also put into 
perspective plans for a reform within the EU, with leaders pushing for 
further political and monetary integration16. These points have been 
highlighted even during the first meeting of national and EU officials 
without the participation of Britain in Slovakia in the middle of September.  
As show in Table 4, the evolution of the UK as part of the EU has 
been positive in the most part especially after 1990. The favourable situation 
presented in the last 15 years of evolution have been irrespective of the 
changes in politics and economy on an international level (with reasonable 
economic effects due to market crash in 2008). We can safely assume that 
any future negotiation between the EU and the UK government in the 
future will need to address the topic of free market and free movement of 
people, an issue that might undermine the efforts of the “leave” campaign in 
terms of their goal of limiting and controlling immigration.  
 
 
Abstract 
 
The results of the Brexit vote in Britain has launched a powerful public debate both 
internally and externally. The European Union leaders fear that similar movements to Brexit will 
                                                     
16 Bloomberg, Howthe EU leadersshouldthinkaboutBrexit, 15.09.2016, see: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-09-15/how-the-eu-s-leaders-
should-think-about-brexit 
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gain exposure in other countries and thus want to limit the effect of spill-over. On an internal level, the 
United Kingdom is going through an acute leadership struggle after prime-minister David Cameron 
resigned and the country is in need of a firm plan post-Brexit. The options available to the UK at this 
point in time are unclear as leaders of the Brexit campaign would have wanted to start informal 
negotiations; these were promptly rejected by the EU leaders. Once article 50 TEU is invoked it’s 
expected that EU leaders would rather close the chapter on Britain’s membership sooner rather than 
later. 
 
Keywords: Brexit, leadership, European Union, economic model. 
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The Social - Economic Reasons of the Hungarian 
Peripherial Regions’ Formation 
 
 
 
Istvan SÜLI-ZAKAR* 
 
 
Introduction 
The regional development has been started by the European 
Economic Community in the 1960s, when the leaders of the Common 
Market realized that the global economic structure changes had a negative 
effect to the rural areas and their population. The more and more 
industrialized agriculture had less and less demand for man hours (in the 
most of the Western European countries the ratio of the agriculture means 
less than 1-2% on the labour market). So the agriculture had less and less 
role in the maintenance of the rural settlements. The price gap between 
agricultural and industrial products widened, therefore the European 
Economic Community (the predecessor of the European Union) has started 
to build-up a conscious agricultural suporting policy1. The possible 
problems urged the specialists of the EU to consider the regional 
development as a complex activity. The regional development was drawn up 
as a new territorial policy, and the agriculture is only one component of this. 
The rural areas have nature protection, culture land protection, recreation 
roles, which have been apreciated. During the building-up of the social 
market economy, significant funds were deprived from the urban areas, and 
were forwarded to rural development2. 
According to the Hungarian scientific literature, the regional 
development means those economic, social, cultural and ecological factors, 
which develop the whole nation via the rising of the economic, cultural and 
living standard in the area. At the same time save and protect the natural 
                                                     
* Prof. Dr. István Süli-Zakar DSc, University of Debrecen, E-mail: suli-
zakar.istvan@science.unideb.hu 
1 I. Süli-Zakar, A magyar területfejlesztés az EU regionális politikájának tükrében, In: 
Társadalomföldrajz – Területfejlesztés I.-II. (Szerk.: Süli-Zakar I.) Kossuth Egyetemi 
Kiadó Debreceni Egyetem, Debrecen, 2003, p. 639-666. 
2 GY. Enyedi, Falukutatás a falufejlesztésért, In: Földrajzi Közlemények XXIII. 3-4., 
1975/a, p. 269-276. 
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resources, the environment, the landscape as well as the local cultural 
heritage3. The aim and also the tool of the rural development is the 
integration between the sectors, the back-to-back developments, the 
cooperation of the local entrepreneur, civilian and self-governmental 
sectors, and building up an active, viable rural society4.  
In the last centuries, the regional inequalities of Hungary became more 
and more determined, and as a part of this, the rural areas droped behind faster 
in socio-economic sense5. Presently, there are pronounced territorial differences 
in the country. The different parts of the country adjusted to the varied 
circumstances in different ways, and it resulted that the regional differences 
became more and more conspicuous6. In spite of this, in the Hungarian public 
life, the territorial policy does not get enough emphases, however a number of 
scientists tried to call attention to the serious signs of the crisis and the regional 
problems7. 
On the basis of the investigation of the Hungarian society and 
economic life, we can observe a deeper and deeper gap between the capital 
(and its surroundings), the northern part of Transdanubia and the other 
parts of the country. Thus the country was divided into two or three parts in 
the daily media and in the scientific literature and this has its own basis8. 
Those areas which lie south and east of Budapest and the centrum area 
(especially the rural areas without the cities) have a deeper and deeper 
territorial crisis. The socio-economic backwardness of the rural Hungary is 
not new problem, but its acceleration and generalization is more and more 
                                                     
3 A. Buday-Sántha, Agrárpolitika- vidékpolitika, Kiadó: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 
Budapest-Pécs, 2001, 464 p. 
4 GY.Enyedi, A magyar falu átalakulása, In: Földrajzi Értesítő XXIV. évf. 2. sz., 
1975/b, p. 109 -124. 
5 I.Süli-Zakar, Mélyülő szakadék két országrész között, In: Juss IV. évf. 2. szám, 
Hódmezővásárhely, 1991, p. 18-23. 
6 J. Rechnitzer, Szétszakadás vagy felzárkózás (A térszerkezetet alakító innovációk) 
MTA RKK, Győz, 1993, 208 p. 
7 J. Nemes Nagy, Centrumok és perifériák a piacgazdasági átmenetben, In: Földrajzi 
Közlemények CXX. (XLIV.) kötet, 1. szám, 1996, p. 31-48; R. Mészáros, A falusi 
átalakulás alapvető térfolyamatai a Dél-Alföldön, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1982, 
p.141; I. Süli-Zakar, Kelet-Magyarország társadalmi-gazdasági leszakadása, In: 
Regionális politikák és fejlesztési stratégiák az Alpok-Adria térségében, XXXIV. 
Georgikon napok (Szerk.: Ligetvári F.-né), Keszthely, 1992, p. 97-110.  
8 P. Beluszky, Területi hátrányok a lakosság életkörülményeiben. Hátrányos helyzetű 
területek Magyarországon, In: Földrajzi Értesítő XXV. évf. 2-4. sz., 1976, p. 301-
312; GY. Barta, GY. Enyedi, Iparosodás és a falu átalakulása, Közgazdasági és Jogi 
Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1981; I.  Bartke, A regionális válság és a piacgazdaságra való 
átmenet, In: Válságtérségek Magyarországon, (Szerk.: Lackó L.), Budapest, 1991, p. 
79-84. 
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perceptible nowadays. By the end of the 1980s, the economy of the 
Hungarian Great Plain, the southern part of Transdanubia and the Northern 
Hills depreciated in the competition9. The areas of the crisis areas became 
bigger since 1920. The “victims” of the redistribution, the rural areas of the 
county-borders, the internal peripheries and the market towns of the Great 
Plain are connected to the frontier peripheral areas, which lost their centres.  
The earlier small trade and agricultural trade roles of the market 
towns of the Great Plain eclipsed, and the industrial investments of the last 
decades also preserved their backwardness10. If we consider the structure 
and the technological composition of the industrialization, the policy of the 
rural industrial investments of the 1960s and 1970s strengthen the 
backwardness. The infrastructure development of Hungary was determined 
mainly by the demands of the heavy-industries, thus the infrastructural 
backwardness of our agricultural areas was preserved. It affected the life-
conditions of the population negatively, so this and the collectivization 
generated a significant migration – demographic erosion in the 
underindustrialized areas11.  
The leaders of the regional policy in the Rákosi and Kádár regimes 
considered that the socialist industrialization (which absorbs the rural 
unemployment) and the socialist transformation of the agriculture can solve 
the development problems of the whole country satisfyingly. Under the 
pressure of necessity, the leaders of the country observed in the 1980s, that 
the socio-economic problems didn’t decrease in the mass of the rural areas 
of Hungary. Thus the leaders of the Party and later the Council of Ministers 
were forced to admit the existence of the backwardness of rural areas, or 
“accumulated disadvantageous areas”, as it was declared12 a little bit 
mannered (Figure 1). 
                                                     
9 A. Böhm, A hátrányos helyzetű térségek helyi társadalmának néhány időszerű 
vonása, In: Válságtérségek Magyarországon (Szerk.: Lackó L.), Budapest, 1991, p. 
67-70; I. Süli-Zakar, Mélyülő szakadék két országrész között, In: Juss IV. évf. 2. 
szám, Hódmezővásárhely, 1991, p. 18-23; J. Tóth, Az Alföld elmaradottsága, In: 
Tisza-klub füzetei 1. (Szerk.: Rakonczai J.), Békéscsaba, 1991, p. 16-18. 
10 I. Bartke, Az iparilag elmaradott területek ipari fejlesztésének közigazgatási kérdései 
Magyarországon, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1971; GY. Barta, GY. Enyedi, 
Iparosodás és a falu átalakulása, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1981. 
11 R. Andorka, I. Harcsa, A községi népesség társadalomstatisztikai leírása, In: A falu a 
mai magyar társadalomban, (Szerk.: Vágvölgyi A), Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 
1992, p. 179-236; Z. Dövényi, Munkanélküliség az Alföldön, In: Alföldi Társdalom 
IV. kötet, Békéscsaba, 1993, p. 107-121. 
12 L. Laczkó, A területi fejlődés jellege,  
In: Területi Statisztika XXXVI. 3., 1986, p. 205-220. 
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Over the agricultural areas, the “rust areas” were also in a very bad 
condition. The industrial areas of Borsod and Nógrád – they were the pride 
of the socialist industrialization – ran into a very hopeless situation by the 
years of the transition. If the structure change is delayed – on the basis of 
European instances – the significant budget aids are also ineffectual, this 
caused mainly by the difficultly modifiable the structure of the employment 
of the heavy industry areas and the mining districts13. The crisis of the state-
owned industry was very spectacular in the case of the territorial 
“contraction” of the industry of Hungary, when the industrial enterprises of 
the eastern part of the country went bankrupt and stoped their production 
first. The collapse of the “giant factories” of the “rust areas” and the 
outworker industry of the market towns of the Great Plain caused 
significant unemployment firstly in the counties of the eastern part of 
Hungary and Southern-Transdanubia14. 
 
Figure 1: Accumulated disadvantageous rural areas in the middle of the 80s 
 
Edited by: István Süli-Zakar 
 
The pauperizations of the peripheries of Hungary 
As a result of the transition, the collective farms were liquidated, the 
individual farming was started again. However, in conjunction with the 
                                                     
13GY. Enyedi (szerk.), Társadalmi-területi egyenlőtlenségek Magyarországon, 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1993. 
14 I. Süli-Zakar, A mezőgazdasági kisvállalkozások szociálgeográfiai hatásai Kelet-
Magyarországon I.-II., In: Comitatus, Önkormányzati Szemle II. évf. 4-5. szám, 
1992 a, p. 19-23;35-38.  
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collapse of the Soviet Union, the CMEA has also collapsed, so the 
Hungarian agriculture ran into a serious distributive crisis. The problems 
were piled on, because the large-scaled unemployment and pauperization – 
caused by the transition – meant a drastic decrease the inner consumption. 
(The Hungarian agribusiness lost their market, its 40% was caused by the 
decrease of the inner consumption) On the other hand, the fast extension of 
the transnational store chains – they marketed the accumulated food suplies 
of Western Europe on a dumping price – caused that the pauperized 
consumers preferred the cheap import goods.  
Naturally, the Hungarian agribusiness, which was deprived from the 
donation, couldn’t compete with the dumping prices. However, a significant 
part of the Hungarian food industry has been privatized by foreign 
companies; the food industry activity was stoped in the factories and the 
buildings operate as logistic, cooling and warehouse bases. The privatization 
of the Hungarian food industries and the closing of the factories (for instance, 
only one sugar factory produces in Hungary nowadays) increased the rural 
unemployment significantly15. More the three-fourth of the area of the 
country became internal or external periphery after the transition, and the 
rural population had less agricultural incomes there, and they became inactive 
members of the society as a retired, unemployed or assistance16. By the middle 
of the 90s, the spatial structure has been changed in Hungary: the earlier 
“industrial axis” has disapeared; an exact formation of external and internal 
peripheries was noticeable in a conclusive part of the country (Figure 2). 
The future development significantly depends on the state, 
initiativeness and innovation-sensitiveness of the local society. According to 
some opinions, the achievement of middle-class status in the market towns 
was built upon the autonomic peasant-properties in the past, so the middle-
class traditions can be regenerated quickly after the transition, and the 
societies of the market towns can adapt the changes very quickly. However, 
after 1990, the Hungarian smallholder culture and lifestyle couldn’t be able 
to regenerate and reborn. Nevertheless, a new farmer level – in western or 
American sense – also couldn’t be able to emerge17. Namely, after the 
collectivization, rural masses lost their affection for the agriculture; they 
worked in the household farming and cooperated with the collective 
                                                     
15 I. Süli-Zakar, L. Komarek, A Kárpát-medence élelmiszer-gazdasága, In: A Kárpát-
medence földrajza (Szerk.: Dövényi Z.) Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2012, p. 562-602. 
16 M. Molnár Nagyné, A területi egyenlőtlenségek főbb összefüggései, In: Regionális 
gazdaságtan (Szerk. Káposzta József), Szent István Egyetem, Gödöllő, 2012, p. 200-
250.  
17 S. Kopátsy, Nagyüzem Kisbirtok Farmergazdaság, In: Társadalmi Szemle XLVI. 
évf. 11., 1991, p. 24-34. 
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farms18. However, they did not follow a multi-coloured small-scale farming, 
but they contracted solely for one production – mostly for fattened pigs. 
The collective farms assured the feeding stuff and the young animals to 
them. Basically, the earlier small-scale farming went on only in the 
household farms, also the small- and middle-class farming had been almost 
totally disapeared. The peasant lifestyle remained only in those small areas, 
which were avoided by the collectivization and were peripheries almost in 
the second half of the 20th century. They are mostly hill-country areas with 
small settlements or fragment farms, which are absolutely disadvantageous 
in social and physical geographic sense19.  
 
Figure 2: Centrum and peripheries of Hungary in the middle of 1990s 
 
Edited by: István Süli-Zakar 
 
Among the circumstances of the market economy, the direct 
intervention of the state is small-scaled; it doesn’t take place directly in the 
economy, and not through the public administration, but with the 
integration of banks, development institutions. The intensive development 
of the infrastructure has to be the primary aim of the intervention of the 
state. It undoes the insolation and creates the human basis of the uprising 
                                                     
18 I. Süli-Zakar, A vállalkozás-élénkítés agroökonómiai , szociológiai és 
szociálgeográfiai problémái hátrányos helyzetű alföldi térségekben (Szerk.: Süli-
Zakar I.) KLTE Társadalomföldrajzi Tanszék, Debrecen, 1994, 119 p 
19 L. Faragó, L. Hrubi, Az elmaradott falusi térségek felzárkóztatásának lehetőségei, In: 
Tér és Társadalom 4., 1987, p. 72-80. 
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with the help of the educational and retraining preparation20. The forming 
of a network of small- and middle-scaled growing centres has to be 
accelerated with the help of government subsidy and the foreign capital. 
These “oases” catch and transmit the innovation impulses, mobilize the 
local sources and undo the insolation (Figure 3).  
The transformation created a new situation in Hungary, as a result 
of that, the peripherization of the rural areas has accelerated. The loosing of 
the internal and external markets, as well as the liquidation of the producer 
collective farms resulted significant changes. There are some positive 
phenomena, for instance the decreasing amount of the used toxic chemicals, 
but the commodity production of the cultivation and livestock production 
declined drastically in the 1990s. This recession hardly apeared on the 
surface, because the Hungarian agriculture had a huge loss of markets after 
the transition. The western European agricultural goods outplaced the 
Hungarian products from the post-soviet states, the impoverished 
Hungarian customers bought cheap, western European foodstuff21.  
 
Figure 3: Development types of the settlements in Hungary 
 
Edited by: István Süli-Zakar 
 
In the years of transition an intense impartiality apeared toward the 
agricultural activity. The croplands were very cheap, and it was evident from 
                                                     
20 Z. CSéfalvay, A modern társadalomföldrajz kézikönyve, Ikva Könyvkiadó, 
Budapest, 1994. 
21 I. Süli-Zakar, L. Komarek, op.cit., 2012. 
The European Space. Borders and Issues 
 
312 
the inflation of the compensation coupons. The offspring of the peasant 
economies practically wasted the compensation coupons. It can be 
experienced, that particular urban intellectual or upstart entrepreneur groups 
abused this inflation, and a real landlordism formed in a few years in the 
Hungarian rural areas. As a result of this the fate of the Hungarian village 
and the agriculture was divided. The villagers lost their industrial jobs (they 
reached it by commuting), but simultaneously the croplands around them 
got out of their hands. The owners, who live far away, frequently in cities, 
adopted extensive agricultural monocultures (maize, wheat, etc.) on their 
latifundia, which can be cultivated effectively with intense mechanization. 
On these latifundia, the demand for living-labour is extremely low because 
of the modern agricultural machines, i.e. the manpower of the villagers is 
unrequired22. 
Nowadays, the cultivation reached again – moreover, concerning 
some grains (maize, oil-seeds) it exceeded – the crop of the 1980s. However, 
the achievements of the livestock production decreases for the present day, 
thereby projects an extremely unfavourable image. Compared to the 
livestock of cattle in the 1980 (about 2 millions), this number is didn’t reach 
the 700 thousand in Hungary in 2010; and the poultry stock decreased to its 
two third. The decrease of the pig population is really drastic: it was 8.330 
thousand in 1980, nowadays it is 3.169 thousand. In 2013, the Hungarian 
agriculture closed a successful year. The cultivation exceeded the preceding 
year with 17%, still the livestock production decreased with 3%. In 
comparison with the field cultures – this can be cultivated extensively with a 
maximal mechanization – the demands for living labour of the livestock 
production and the greengrocery production is much bigger. Also the real 
answer can be the large-scale development of these sectors from the point 
of view of unemployment. The real tragedy for the future of the Hungarian 
rural areas is the disinvestment, since the profit, which produced here, isn’t 
utilized significantly in the rural areas, because of the not local owners.  
A considerable ethnic exchange has been proceeding in the 
geographical peripheries of Hungary. The villages have been emptied, and 
Roma population moved there, mainly because of the low house prices. 
This ethnic exchange meant a deeper pauperization for the rural peripheries, 
and it raised the level of the poverty.  
 
Aspirations of the regional development for the liquidation of 
the poverty and the peripheral situation  
The local society became one-sided and its structure depreciated in 
the villages of the peripheral areas and the former so-called socialist 
                                                     
22 I. Süli-Zakar, op.cit., 1994. 
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industrial towns. Masses become resigned to their fates, wait for the social 
benefits from the state and vegetate in the rural Hungary. The only 
employer is the local authority in our small villages in the hilly countries in 
the north-eastern and South-Transdanubia areas. In these villages, the public 
work-program means the sole job oportunity. 
 
Figure 4: Spatial structure of Hungary (2016) 
 
Edited by: István Süli-Zakar 
 
The level of the Hungarian labours falls behind from the 
requirements of the global economy. Nowadays, at least 1,2 million people 
(are in working age) live in Hungary, who don’t have that abilities and 
chances, which can help them to produce the sources of their subsistence. 
Excluding some ghettos in the cities, these people live in the rural 
peripheries. Not only the lack of work, but also the lack of ability to work 
hinders the development on the most underdeveloped peripheries. 
Consequently, this means that if there is (or could be) capital for job 
creation, there won’t be real receptiveness on the major part of the 
settlements. The idea of the free enterprise zones (also known as special 
economic zones) emerged in Hungary in June 2012 in the Ministry of 
National Economy. According to the original plans, the companies – 
operates in the enterprise zones – can obtain tax concession on very easy 
terms. The extramural government meeting decided about that in 23rd 
January, 2013 in Vásárosnamény (Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County). The 
earlier plans contain 903 settlements, but finally, further 177 settlements 
became favoured (Figure 4). With the help of law-defined provisions, the 
government want to participate in the economic development of the free 
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enterprise zones by the provision of development resources for the 
employment and investments23. 
Radical changes occurred in both the educational system of the 
globalized world and Hungary in the near past. These changes in the school 
education and higher education move on generally the international trends. 
The certain countries and their regions/settlements are colourful, so they 
are heterogeneous also form educational geographical point of view. We can 
declare that the level of the education and the real chance of taking part in 
it, significantly determine the competitiveness of the people and their 
geographical surroundings. By the progress of the technical-technological 
development, it became more and more true. 
The government see clearly the key role of the education in the 
uplift of the rural areas. The investments in the education means a special 
activity, which return long time, and the positive proceeds occur sometimes 
15-20 years later. 
 
Summary 
The essential say of our study is: a deep and serious regional crisis 
and poverty emerged in Hungary, mainly in the peripheral territories. 
Because of the decades of the redistribution, the peripheral territories’ 
economy and society has a degraded and unhealthy structure. After the 
change of regime high number of regional differences in development plans 
and measures have been taken. Naturally, the ideas were doomed without 
long-term political and financial suport, in the storms of the Hungarian 
Parliament rotation. It shouldn’t be forgotten that the maintenance of rural 
cultural landscape is a national interest, but it should be recognized that 
rural Hungary's political weakness is also responsible to enforce their 
interests that the regional differences and the social divide are growing in 
our country from year to year. It can be concluded that in order to uplift the 
rural areas the system of regional preferences should be aplied, and 
especially strengthen the fundamentals of human advancement through the 
education. The geographical peripheries should have a development path, 
where the higher economic level of the expected socio-economic 
sustainability would be effective. We have to consider the decisions of the 
Government Program of Vásárosnamény as the most important new 
phenomenon, but the next few years will decide that the regional 
development, and the "work instead of grants" program, as well as 
education reorganization how much will be able to help the uplift of the 
disadvantageous masses of poverty people. 
 
                                                     
23 B. Tafferner, op.cit., 2012. 
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Abstract 
 
In Hungary the socialist industrialization of systems of Rákosi and Kádár absorbed the 
surplus of rural labour, but the industrialization meant the redistributive exploitation of the 
agricultural areas and the further impoverishment. After the transition, the rural Hungary could 
not be the "pantry of the CMEA", and the final crisis of Hungarian agricultural sales finalized 
the deformation of the three-quarters of Hungary, the major part of the rural areas in Hungary. In 
the recent decades the brain drain worked in the Hungarian peripheries, the disinvestment and the 
pauperization. The emerging of the new latifundia and the monoculture commodity production 
operate independently, separated from the Hungarian rural people in the sense of ownerships and 
production. As a result of these negative processes a significant part of the peripheral areas of the 
society declassed. In this hopeless situation awareness only a conscious regional policy and above all, 
a very well-considered education is only able to offer a chance for break. 
 
Keywords: geographical periphery, multiply disadvantageous situation, rural areas, 
brain-drain, pauperization, poverty, segregation, Roma integration, human resource development, 
regional politic.  
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Ukraine-Romania Dialogue: Moving ahead from 
Distrust and Suspicions  
 
 
 
Anatoliy KRUGLASHOV* 
 
 
Introduction 
It is very important to discuss widely and timely vital issues like all-
European security, European ethno-cultural dialogue and interrelations of 
the neighboring countries from different points of views. The fruitful 
dialogue of Romanian and Ukrainian Societies is critically important for the 
sake of regional stability and overcoming the threats which are plenty of for 
now. Taking into account the historical experience, Romanians and 
Ukrainians have a lot in common. They both belong to nations which for a 
long time lacked their statehood and national unity. They are more or less 
peripheral nations in the framework of European policy and politics. They 
had been peripheral also for the central imperial authorities, which grabbed 
up their territories once upon a time in History. They seemed not to be 
central for the world of Grand politics and European civilizations key stone 
events like Renascence, Reformation etc. Dealing with the project of 
Greater Europe they are rather peripheral too, despite the fact that Romania 
is included in the EU and NATO but hardly as an important actor there as 
yet. Ukraine fights for this inclusion, but still is far away of reaching the goal 
of European and Euroatlantic integration.  
 
Threatening beginning of bilateral relationship 
Thus, there are many near identical or very similar aspects of their 
history and culture, including the spiritual life of both neighboring nations. 
It does not mean that they are quite similar. But they are very close to each 
other not only in a sense of the territorial and geographical proximity. 
Moreover, it’s worthy to stress that Ukrainians and Romanians have been 
cooperating friendly and complimentary for ages and it’s the most valuable 
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and solid foundation of their mutual perception.  Nonetheless there are 
same historically determined issues, making images of both nations in each 
other conceptions corrupting or threatening. I’d like to place as the first of 
them territorial claims inherited from the period, when Romania was called 
“Romania Mare” or “Great Romania” and where the territories’ acquisition 
made many of Romanians to be proud with the borders of their country. 
Still, this period had been pretty short indeed, since 1918 till 1940 and again 
since 1941 till 1944.  But for some Romanians this time being imprinted in 
collective memories regarding Bessarabia and Bucovina shaped some kind 
of collective trauma and phantom pains for the lost felling of somewhat 
Greatness. Discussion on the belonging of these territories clouded a lot 
Ukrainian-Romanian, and Romanian-Ukrainian relations, sometimes 
overweighting centuries of the good neighborhood and cultural cooperation. 
Ukraine does not claim any territories from Romania as well as any other 
countries. But Romanian political elite did it. Especially it was very hot issue 
in national discourse when to consider the aftermath of the Ceausescu 
regime brake-down in Romania and the early period of Ukrainian 
independence.  
For Romanian side in my opinion an attempt to revise existing state 
borders was very important instrumentally in order to consolidate Romanian 
society upon ‘Grand narrative’ of National Unity political goals. It’s not 
specific to Romania only. Many of European nations claim the same, 
moving back to their Ideal, imagined Golden Age of the History. Thus 
wide-spread nostalgia for the lost ‘historical homelands’ could be easily 
converted into some actual political claims to regain them back from their 
“illegitimate” possessors. Let us recall conflicts and tensions of Lithuania 
and Poland in XX century, for instance. They look at their history and 
discovered their ‘Golden age’, but in the very same frontiers. More bloody 
and dangerous mix of claims on territories is lands and countries of former 
Yugoslavia. For Romania is golden age was the Great Romania. Despite a 
very short existence this period has been perceived collectively as the best 
one in the National History. The Big and the Best of the country past 
suddenly intertwined and eclipsed each other in public perception.  
After the bloody collapse of Communists rule in Romania in the 
very end of 1989, the country faced with a deep and all-comprehensive 
economic and political crisis. It had affected negatively both the Society and 
political elite, opening up the Pandora box of mutual distrust and mass-
protests, threatening domestic stability. Lack of the positive consensus on 
some principal issues of country’s further prospect encourages part of 
intellectual and political elite to look back in the History.  They were trying 
to mobilize resources of symbolic capital as the reconciliation instrument 
for ideologically split down Romanian people. While the positive image of 
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European and Euroatlantic future remained unclear, the Society had been 
seduced with the spirit of National Might, excavated under ruins of 
Glorious past time. So, instead of granting ordinary people with the solution 
of their everyday life problems, this form of political elite communication 
via the Great Romania ideals’ restoration was set in force1.  
So, the President of Romania I. Iliescu, Parliament of the country 
had questioned existing borders and territorial integrity of both Ukraine and 
Moldova in spite of all previous international documents signed up and 
repeatedly tried to mobilize public suport under the new Reunification 
process flag. And at very least partially these ideas and ideals were echoed 
with some public suport, Romanian Orthodox Church including. So, 
nationalist sentiments got certain momentum in Romania public agenda and 
political discourse.  Of course, it made Ukrainian relations with Romania 
worsened and fueled them alongside with some other factors radical 
answers from some Ukrainians2. So far, for Ukrainians it was rather a 
marginal discourse on the territorial issues, including a kind of ‘Greater 
Ukraine’ project with some territories of Poland, Russia, Belarus and 
Romania included. Sure, in Ukraine the breakdown of the USSR unlashed 
political radicalism also. Social disorder and moral crisis affected ordinary 
people of Ukraine also. It led towards apearance of such formation like 
UNA-UNSO, Socialist-Nationalist party and some else radical right-wing 
political forces. As usually, they proclaimed this ideal of ‘Greater Ukraine, 
meaning Ukraine from Lublin to Kuban, because once upon a time they 
were ethnically Ukrainians. Still, this course did not hapen to be the official 
one in Ukraine? There are some other minor or marginal political forces, 
but none of the official declaration and official suport for this Greater 
Ukraine idea has been protracted by Ukrainian Presidents, Parliament and 
Government for the years of Independence.  
Fortunately, this debates about ‘questioned’ territories and borders 
became diminishing in the official language of Romania on the eve and 
resumed after 1997 Treaty, which settle down these territorial issues in 
general. After having this Treaty ratified, Romania and Ukraine’s images of 
the neighboring Other subsequently underwent gradual transformation 
                                                     
1 Tatiana Bezeha, “Ukraino-Rumun’ski territorial’ni superchnosti: istorychnyi analiz ta 
suchasnyi stan” [Ukraine-Romania territorial disputes: historical analyses and current 
situation], in Naukovyi visnyk Uzhgorods’koho Universytetu: Seriia: Istoriia, t. 29 [Scientific 
herald of Uzhgorod University, History, ed. Мykola Vegesh (Uzhgorod: Goverla, 
2012): 36 - 42. 
2 Anatoliy Kruglashov, "Troublesome Neighborhood: Romania and Ukraine 
Relationships", New Ukraine. A Journal of History and Politics, 11 (2011): 114 - 125. 
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toward less negative and unfriendly one3. I would state it did not undergo 
complete betterment but went out of some previous extremes. If to recall 
the dominant tone of Romanian media while Ukraine and Ukrainians were 
being concerned, they often tended be very negative. Ukrainians got not so 
welcome perception on newspapers and TV as a kind of troublemakers for 
Romania itself or for Romanians in Ukraine4. They had been portrayed 
either as criminals in Romania, or supressors of Romanians who live in 
Ukraine. Subsequently, many of stories, narrated by then-time newspapers 
or TV (radio), should they anyhow mention Ukraine tended to blackmail 
neighbors of were biased towards them. Yet, the Ukraine and topic related 
were not a mainstream for Romanian media. The latter is true about 
Ukrainian media. They were not concentrated on Romania’s fabulous most 
and foremost. The topics regarding the Romania and Romanians were 
rather rare guest on the front pages of national newspapers or headlines of 
Ukrainian TV. There prevailed also negative information about Romania 
territorial claims towards Ukraine. Reports and other texts calculated threats 
of such an unfriendly positions of Bucharest towards Ukraine, contain 
counter-replays against Romanian’ accusations on Kyiv mistreatment of 
Romanian minority with vise-verse accusation towards Bucharest policy 
regarding Ukrainian minority in the country and so on, and so forth.  
Much more attention to Romanians topics could be observed into 
neighboring with Romania regions of Ukraine, like Chernivtsi, 
Transcarpathia and Odessa oblast. This media picture in general mirrors 
fears about neighbors as they existed in Romania. Here one could state a 
much greater concern and suspicious about Romanians territorial claims 
against Ukraine. It could be explained with the historical memories in the 
regions as well as the fear of military conflict between two countries should 
the conflict would go too far.  In the same time, one might acknowledge 
that some of the regional newspapers had occupied alarmist position with 
regard to Ukraine-Romanian relations, making sometimes any problem in 
bilateral relation a reason to portrait the neighbor in overtly negative, dark 
colors. This kind of practice from both sides of the border did not suit well 
                                                     
3 Nataliya Nechayeva-Yuriychuk, "Coping with the Challenges of Ukrainian-
Romanian Border Security Issues", in Eurolimes 15, A Secirity Dimensions as Trigger of 
Frontiers Modifications, Edited by Guliana Laschi, Alexis Vahlas and Dorin I. Dolghi, 
Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2013: 117. 
4 Teophil Rendiuk, "Ukrains’ka tematyka u ZMI postsotsialistychnoi Rumunii (1990-
2007 rr.) [Ukrainian topics in post-socialist media of Romania", in Visnyk Kamianets-
Podil’skoho natsional’noho universytetu imeni Ivana Ohienka: Istorychni nauky [Herald of 
Kamianets-Podilski National University, History], 4 (Kamianets-Podils’ky: 
Vydavnytstvo Universytetu, 2011): 141 - 149.  
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the necessity of aproaching better mutual understanding and overcoming 
distrust accumulated for the previous confronting period of relations. 
 
Raprochement and beyond 
So, while the bilateral Agreements, which came into forth on the 
threshold of XX – XXI centuries between Romania and Ukraine made the 
raprochement of their relations possible, the wholesale atmosphere of the 
bilateral relations, popular opinions included, remained somewhat tense and 
contradictory for much longer period of time after this diplomatic 
regulation. The very important fact is that these agreements had been 
attacked in Romanian Parliament and Society and a kind of treason as far as 
National Interests of the country are concerned. For instance, it is the 
position of Greater Romania party which won a good deal of MPs seats in 
Romanian Parliament then time. Thus, an important part of Romanian 
Society did not accept the diplomatic solution of disagreements with 
Ukraine as fair and just for the country’s sake. When Romania got some 
important profits in sea shore after the International arbitrage on the Snake 
Island5, it hapened to be a turn for the considerable part of Ukrainian 
Society a sort of disillusionment and frustration about the territorial lost6.  
With the current of time and mainly because of going in-depth 
Euroatlantic7 and European integration of Romania, the political tensions of 
both countries gradually but steadily become less visible and determining 
their actual mutual perception8. The ghost of History grasp upon public 
mind has been making less tough and suffocating year by year.  Luckily, it 
                                                     
5 Galina Kopachnyska,"Political-Geographical Features of the Ukrainain-Romanian 
marine border definition and establishment within the Black Sea", Revista Română de 
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7 Stefan Purich, “Rumunia-NATO: v ocikuvanni prazhs’kykh rishen’” [Romania-
NATO: anticipating Prague’s decisions], in: Bezpeka ta stabilnist’ krain 
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[Security and stability of post-socialist Europe in the context of NATO 
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with Eastern European countries under conditions of European integration], in:  
Mizhnarodni vidnosyny ta polityka derzhav v umovakh hlobal’nykh transformatsii: analiz 
suchasnoii politychnoi dumky [International relations and States’ policy under the 
conditions of Global transformations: analyses of contemporary Political Thought] 
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seems that for now it’s not a key factor of our bilateral relations as for 
recent years9. I do hope for years to come too.   
Another level of communication of Ukraine with Romania does 
exist in the sphere of inter-regional relations and Cross-border cooperation. 
Despite the political dimension it is a problem of this kind of cooperation to 
be developed and contribute into the betterment of both States relations 
and their Society’s reciprocity. Hereby it’s worthy to limit the observation of 
the CBC mainly with the case of Euroregions activity, which does some 
activity alongside Ukraine-Romania borders. The very idea of establishing 
Euroregions like Uper Prut and Low Danube belongs to the initiative of 
Bucharest10. That was a suggestion this Euroregions would serve the kind of 
communicating channels for local peoples, making their everyday existence 
more comfortable, and cooperation more effective. In the same time, 
Bucharest nourished plans of Euroregion usage as a tool of promoting 
Romanian culture, language and influence, taking into account that the 
major part of compatriots are leaving right in the border region, included 
into both Euroregions territorial framework. Ukraine hesitated certain time 
with the positive decision on the Euroregion establishment but finally 
decided to move forward with this type of cooperation. Amidst other 
speculation it would be provable of expecting that images of both nations 
could benefit from the success of new CBC form11. 
However, as it’s widely recognized in many papers on the 
Euroregions topics these expectations and precipitations hardly came true in 
general12. It might be too strong to say about them that they are dead born 
children” but what is for sure true they didn’t work properly. This is 
                                                     
9 Anatoliy Kruglashov and Marin German, "Problemni pytannia suchasnykh 
ukrains’ko-rumun’skykh stosunkiv” [Debatable issues of contemporary Ukraine-
Romania relations], accessed at 30 November, 2016, http://dc-summit. 
info/proekty/ukraina-rumuniya-moldova/1356-problemni-pitanya-suchasnih-
ukrainskorumunskiv-2. 
10 Sergiy Gakman, “Evrorehion “Verkhniy Prut: vid idei do konstruiuvannia” [Upper 
Prut Euroregion: from idea towards establishment], in  Transkordonne sprivrobitnytstvo 
u polietnichnykh rehionakh Skhidnoii ta Pivdenno-Skhidnoii Evropy [Cross-border 
cooperation in the multiethnic regions of South and East-South Europe], 
(Chernivtsi: Zoloti lytavry, 1999): 105.  
11 Pavlo Molochko, "Current Trends of Cross-Border Cooperation of Ukraine and 
Romania", in Eurolimes 16,  Cross-border Governance and the Borders Evolution,  Edited by 
Alina Stoica, Carlos E. Pacheco Amaral, Istvan Sulli-Zakar, Oradea: Oradea 
University Press, Autumn 2013: 179. 
12 Anatoliy Kruglashov, "Euroregion Upper Prut: Studies and Activities", Eurolimes 16 
Cross-border Governance and the Borders Evolution,  Edited by Alina Stoica, Carlos E. 
Pacheco Amaral, Istvan Sulli-Zakar, Oradea: Oradea University Press, Autumn 
2013: 27 - 39. 
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routinized construction of certain agreements and papers, delegations and 
meetings but in the fact they don’t affect anyhow the borderland people 
from two countries. Ii is rather a platform for acquiring some more status 
and prestige for regional leaders engaged, and it helps of promoting a sort of 
local and regional diplomacy. Both types of activity are of certain 
importance and should not be overtly degraded and neglected. Still, all of 
these elitists’ movement and communication change not elite, nor the so-
called ordinary people in the administrative units comprised with the 
abovementioned Euroregions.          
Putting aside economical and social benefits of CBC, which is 
another topic to discuss, let’s mention some new institutional incentives in 
Uper Prut Euroregion. The regional elite of Romanian and Ukrainian side 
try of developing some new ideas like joint sessions of Regional Council. 
The precedent had been laid in Chernivtsi and Suceava, consequently. That 
was the idea of meeting regional representatives (deputies) every year in 
order to discuss the agenda of CBC and promote closer cooperation in the 
regions.  Of course, this form of institutionalizing the cooperation of the 
representatives’ bodies bears more symbolic than practical value, but it 
makes both regions more opened each other and images of neighbors 
improving. One could notice another shape of executive power and regional 
elite communication, called “Bukovynian Dialogue”. There were three 
sessions: one in Chernivtsi, another in Suceava and one in Vienna. It’s 
certain flavor of intrigue, that this dialogue is being sponsored with Austria. 
Maybe because this country inherited positive repute for both parts of 
former Bukovyna and it make possible to renew this traditional moderator 
role. 
 
Ukraine and Romania uniting while facing common challenges   
Now after the political crisis of 2013 - 2014 and War in Ukraine, 
enflamed with Kremlin direct and indirect interference new regional and 
local initiatives are not observed as yet. But the common threats unite most 
urgently and effective. It might be stated that dangerous political currents in 
Ukraine, provoked with Russian accession of Crimea and so-called hybrid 
war in Donbas, seems to be united factor for both Nations and States, 
Ukraine and Romania.  
After making Russia’s pretence on Great power role obvious as 
ever, many of Romanians reconsider the concept of Ukraine and Ukrainian 
perception in Romanian official discourse and media became evolved to 
more sympathetic and friendly. Romanians, especial political elite and 
intellectuals first of all, had to think carefully who could be the next victim 
of aggression and annexation. Nobody wants to be next and therefore 
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Romania itself has to think about the replay to these new challenges13. That 
is not specifically Ukrainian threat and challenge, but dangerous situation for 
the whole region, the EU, and Europe by large14. While Mr. Putin cherishes 
his ambitious plans, he has to keep in his mind the fate of some more 
famous and talented predecessors. For instance, a case of Napoleon could 
be a case. He indeed united Europe, but against himself. Suddenly, 
nowadays Russia apears as uniting factor, even for some countries with 
complicated history of their relationship. But the united response still is on 
the way to be not invented in the EU15.  
Comparing attitude of Romanians towards Ukrainians and vice-
verse we have to take into consideration a factor of European and 
Euroatlantic integration also. The situation on Ukraine is not the same as in 
Romania with regard to this process16. While major part of Ukrainians does 
suport European integration as the National strategic goal, still the solid 
agreement on the necessity of Euroatlantic integration is not reached in the 
country. The Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2014 has been 
forcing many Ukrainians to reconsider their pervious indifference to 
National security issues and stimulate them to aprehend the NATO 
importance as well. But this process seems to be incomplete for now and 
need much more attention of the Government and Civic Society in the 
country. The case of Romania is much more favorable for the country 
geopolitical stance and domestic mutual consent on both aspects of foreign 
policy priorities. If in the previous years, authorities plus political elite 
sometimes filled themselves in the uper position vis-à-vis Ukraine, from the 
point of view of countries NATO and the EU membership, now they look 
more pragmatic and less arrogant on this aspects of Romania international 
status. Bucharest is persistent with the suport of Ukrainian claims to be the 
                                                     
13 Aurescu Bohdan, “Romania and security challenges at the limits of the European 
and Euro-Atlantic area. Risks, opportunities and diplomatic actions”, in The 
Romanian Journal of Society and Politics, 10, No. 2. Issue 19, Bucharest, NUPSA, 
December 2015: 138.  
14 Ioan Horga and Ana-Maria Costea, “The Ukrainian Crisis: Between National 
Preferences/interests of EU Member States and EU Security”, Eurolimes 18, The 
Security Dimension of European Frontier vs the Legitimacy of Political Priorities of EU and EU 
Member States National Preferences, Edited by Dorin I. Dolghi & Octavian Tacu, 
Oradea: Oradea University press, Autumn 2014: 190.  
15 Bernard Barthalay, Olivier Dupuis, “Ukraine – let’s think European”, in GeoPolitica 
57, Bucuresti, 2014: 85 – 86.    
16 Viktor Pavlenko, Sergey Sveshnikov, and Victor Bocharnikov, "An Analysis of 
Romania’s Foreign Policy Relations in the Context of Ukraine’s European 
Integration", in Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 31, (2014), accessed at 2 December, 
2016, http://lfpr.lt/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFPR-31-Sveshnikov.pdf 
In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga 
 
327 
member of the EU in the future and member of NATO17. And Romania 
makes some steps forward realization of these promises. Here is the new 
and promising prospect for closer cooperation and, thereafter the space 
where the image of the Other might be reconstructed and filled in with 
more positive content.     
Another problem worthy to attend is the underestimated potential 
of economical cooperation between two countries. It’s noticeable that after 
the break-down of Communist regimes, both Bucharest and Kiev weren’t 
eager to promote effective economic cooperation. Romania while marching 
westward did not see a preferable economic partner in Ukraine, and Ukraine 
overtly ignored Romania as a good economic partner. Sure, the lack of 
common interests in the field of economy and trade led to the estrangement 
of neighboring States and their business elite. It contributes negatively into 
mutual trust and understanding of each other. Now seems to be coming 
into existence some new ideas and different project of economic 
cooperation, including energy security and some aspects o CBC.  Should 
they succeed, both countries will be more consolidated in front of some 
common challenges and chances of getting involved into making new 
platform for their better communications and joint partnership actions.  
Considering the role of policy, politics and economy I would like to 
mention also briefly the media importance. If to touch upon the media 
content one might observe that Ukrainian and Romanian media for the 
period after Communist regime breakdown did not contribute in a 
systematic manner into raprochement of both countries relations and better 
understanding amidst neighboring States. As usually stories told there are 
colored with rather a negative tone, containing sometimes provocative 
statements, making accent on criminal cases etc. Many of them are biased 
and kept on unbalanced aproach towards rather complex mutual relations. 
It’s true especially, when the quality of some regional media are concerned. I 
want our journalists to be more accurate with labeling some dangerous and 
disgusting but statistically miserable facts as the ’true image of the Other’. 
For instance, I ask them in Chernivtsi to avoid reporting that police officers 
detained Romanian or Moldavian smuggler (in ethnic sense of the word).  
One can say that the violation of the border’s regime has been made of 
Rumanian, Ukrainian or Moldavian citizen. Please, don’t mark as Romanian 
or Moldavian by stock, because it characterizes the image of nation and 
neighborhood. Nevertheless this practice is wide spread, so no wonder is 
that negative publications and video records are prevailing in the media, and 
                                                     
17 Mihaela Buse,"Romania’s External Relations in terms of Status of EU Member 
country", The International Annual Scientific Session Strategies, XXI, 1 (2013): 267. 
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they do not try to analyze or systematically balance the image of another 
country. 
So, as for recent years media didn’t play important role in the 
process of reconsideration of Ukrainian-Romanian relations and they do not 
tend to organize their professional cooperation in order to overcome 
existing estrangement and lack of mutual trust and apreciation. For instance, 
in the framework of Uper Prut Euroregion activity took place some 
initiatives on creating some new forms of media-cooperation like bilateral or 
trilateral web-site for regions and thus make possible regular exchange of 
news and other information, promoting cross-border journalism and 
building-up professional networking inside bordering regions of Ukraine, 
Romania and Moldova. Unfortunately, these ideas and moves remain 
unrealized till now. So, the cooperation of journalists and media across 
States bodies is very infective and in very best case episodic.  
 
Conclusions 
And finally what one could conclude of Ukraine-Romania 
cooperation in general? Both countries got faced with several confrontations 
periods, which left behind them dubious legacy of distrust and suspicions. It 
is another task to define who is wrong, and who is right of them, when one 
would like to come to the well-balanced opinion on the origin of these 
conflicts. Gradually, this confrontation aproaches has been diminishing and 
now seemed to be disapearing off the political agenda for both countries. 
However, the potential of both countries to cooperate closer and establish 
effective partnership is far away of being reached and used adequately from 
now. Alongside with some inertia and ineffectiveness in the sphere of their 
political and economical cooperation, there are a lot of joint projects 
successfully realized, especially with the suport of the EU. And there two 
sectors which might be labeled as the locomotive of their further 
advancement, namely Civic Society sector and some academic institutions. 
For instance, some promising results might be observed in joint projects 
and actions, implemented with Chernivtsi Jury Fedkovych National 
university and Suceava Stefan cel Mare University, Chernivtsi and University 
of Iasi, some Odessa’s Universities and Iasi, Uzhgorod and Satul Mare etc. 
Hopefully, the network of regional political and administrative leaders from 
both sides seems to be more and more growing up and paying some more 
attention towards CBC cooperation.  
Of course, there are other problems behind the scene of this 
cooperation. I mean first and foremost a problem of heavy dependency on 
European funds suport, which remains unbalanced with the contribution of 
Romanian and Ukrainian partners into making the overall evolution of their 
relations a true success story. There are a lot of good projects and 
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atmosphere of cooperation and a good reason to expect them getting much 
better in the near future. In fact, the current situation of Ukraine-Romania 
relations contrasted with the one existed two decades ago. But steel a lot of 
problems have to be resolved too. For instance, we have to deal with a long-
standing discussion on some humanitarian issues, like comparison of our 
countries minorities’ protection18. Previously these disputes revolted around 
where minorities are protected better. Every party tries to use the arbitrary 
selected criteria on what is good and wrong with them. Any attempt to 
organize the same survey all around the borderland territories, where the 
minorities are situated, to make a poll with the same questions, the same 
methodology and so on failed. We operate with different and incompatible 
aproaches, with different standpoints and so far we have clear ground to 
compare objectively the problems of minority and National and regional 
resources of granting better protection to them.  So, it looks like each other 
of us is a kind of mirror, and this mirror could be right and plane and 
nevertheless even the best mirror make the one damage of the image, 
because right  and left  should be alternate to the objective reality. So, we 
have not just to mirror each other but make the common optics available 
and aplied them to the common problems resolution.  
Finally, we have to overcome a lot of stereotypes which obstruct 
the way of our cooperation19. It’s worthy to mention that Ukrainians’ 
stereotypes about Romanians are predominantly not negative. Not now but 
generally for the period after acquiring Independence, some of Ukrainians 
regarded Rumania from the very absurd position embodied into public 
opinion in USSR. That stance has been grounded on the assumption that 
Romania is minor state and Romanians perceived as a kind of less important 
nation. The similar situation occurred when Romanians entered NATO and 
the EU. Indentifying themselves with those Global actors they become 
seeing Ukrainians from the positions of certain superiority.  So far we have 
now different political and other conditions in our countries and the 
perception and self-perception of our citizens differ a lot sometime. It 
means a lot of issues are to be discussed by the experts, politicians and civic 
activists, and a lot of instruments, mechanisms and chances could be 
invented or aplied for the sake of making this perception of each other 
                                                     
18 Serhiy Gakman, “Derzhavne rehulivannia entonatsional’nykh protsesiv na 
ukrains’ko-moldov’sko-rumunsk’omu prykordnonni) [State regulations on the 
Ukraine-Moldova-Romania borders regions], in: Vlada ta upravlinnia (Administration 
and Management], ed. Mykola Jarmystyi and Anatoliy Kruglashov, Vol. 3, 
(Chernivtsi: Bukrek, 2014): 260 - 275.        
19 Oleksandr Parfenov, "Uklrains’ko-Rumuns’kyi dialoh: bez prava na pomylku” 
[Ukraine-Romania dialogue: without a right to make a mistake”, 4, Politychnyi 
menedzhment (Political management), (Kyiv, 2005): 141 - 147. 
The European Space. Borders and Issues 
 
330 
better, less corrupted with some previous historical suspicious, fears and 
stereotypes. We have to keep our dialogue up opened and proactive. I hope 
the way we are going now seems to be very promising and we are able to 
move to the right direction away of the bad time. I am sure that not only 
Kremlin dangerous wrong-doings make us united for now. There are many 
of regional, national and supranational interests, which prompt Ukrainians 
and Rumanians work together and overcome the negative impact of some 
former distrust and suspicions.   
 
 
Abstract 
 
 This article considers the stages of Ukraine-Romania dialogue since the breakdown of 
Communist rules. It is outlined main problems, which clouded both countries relations, making 
them estranged and suspicious towards each other. European and Euroatlantic integration of 
Romania contributed a lot into the process of cleaning up mutual relations out of territorial disputes 
and challenging existing state borders legitimacy. It has been opening up a new prospect to closer 
cooperation and mutual trust. 
However, there are some problems unattained for both countries elite and societies. The 
actual level of partnership of Romania and Ukraine remains inadequate with their potential and 
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Cultural Collaboration on the Western Border of 
Interwar Romania. Case Study: The Main Editorial 
Concerns of the Great Cultural Reunion “Cele Trei 
Crişuri” in Oradea 
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The interwar spiritual landscape has recently become a fertile 
research field, a fully justified fact, since it is the most prolific period of 
Romanian culture, art and science. We are assessing a distinctive historical 
period, with defining features and elements, comprised between the years 
1919 and 1940, when Bihor, a western region in Greater Romania, became 
part of the mutual flow of national culture, a reality on which both people 
and institutions worked together, in an ardent impetus to progress, an 
unprecedented phenomenon in our national history. Alexandru Dima spoke, 
in the pages of Familia review published during the interwar period, about 
the creative localism that animated both the spiritual efforts made by the 
Transylvanian society and the political ones in order to survive and for 
cultural-historical assertion1. 
The release of creative energies was marked by the unification of 
Transylvania with the motherland as a milestone for the cultural, literary and 
artistic emancipation of the Romanian people living in the reunited 
territories, and - in this case - in Bihor County. Then followed the disputes 
on cultural, literary ground, fuelled by creative effervescence, the so-called 
“conflicts between generations”, which had a common goal at that time, 
namely, the advancement, the cultural and, implicitly, the social and 
economic progress. All acts of culture complemented one another to create 
here, at the western gate of the unified Romania, a cultural centre that 
disseminated humanism and peaceful spirituality, with successful attempts to 
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1 Alexandru Dima, Localismul creator, în „Familia”, 1935, nr. 2, p. 3-5. 
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connect to the great movements of ideas of the interwar period2. As a result, 
the interwar realities made the Romanian cultural life more dynamic, thus 
entering a new phase of its existence, with the declared intention to 
modernize and enlighten more and more substantial strata of society. 
Gradually, this purpose was taken on and amplified by the intellectual 
groups in Bihor, and especially the ones in Oradea. During the entire period 
between the two world wars, through ongoing connection with the national 
cultural bodies, these groups struggled to practice a spiritual opening 
towards all the inhabitants, irrespective of their social status, this way 
representing a recipe for widespread dissemination of cultural activities. 
Thus, a new cultural structure emerged that had to withstand a rather large 
range of obstacles, among which the most prominent was the financial one. 
The historical moment of 1918 made it possible the active, 
unrestricted and immediate participation of Bihor County to the Romanian 
cultural life. From the beginning, the general trend was that of asserting and 
developing the national culture, especially in urban centres, of turning them, 
and particularly Oradea, into hearths of Romanian culture. This natural 
trend had to surpass the preponderance of Hungarian expression culture 
that had never experienced obstacles in its goals until 1918, and neither 
would it encounter any after the Union. Only afterwards, through a 
sustained and diverse cultural life, the transformation of cities into strong 
Romanian cultural centres was to be achieved, thus raising the cultural status 
of the village. The Great Union Generation was aware of this necessity, as 
well as of the fact that the Union had to be strengthened in all the cultural, 
economic, social and political fields. 
Outstanding associative events were held in Oradea and Bihor 
County as a result of free expression meant to state the spiritual availability 
of the inhabitants who had constantly been harassed by the authorities of 
the dualist state in the period before the First World War. Moreover, a 
simple comparison between the activity of the Romanian cultural 
associations throughout the modern era and the one carried out during the 
interwar period is definitely favourable to the latter, both from a qualitative 
perspective and, especially, from a quantitative one. It is essentially about 
the most important cultural traditions that were continued, in a favourable 
climate, by the residents of the western regions of the country during the 
interwar period. 
As a result, the Great Cultural Reunion “Cele Trei Crişuri” founded 
in the autumn of 1919 in Oradea, aimed at conducting, with the help of the 
                                                     
2 Olimpiu Boitoş, Progresul cultural al Transilvaniei după Unire, Editura Cartea 
Românească, Sibiu, 1942, p. 26; Grigore Georgiu, Istoria culturii române moderne, 
Bucureşti, 2002, p. 223-225. 
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most representative intellectuals, an important activity of “national 
restoration” in the Romanian territories united with the Old Kingdom in the 
memorable year of 19183. 
The Reunion in Oradea brought its contribution to the promotion 
of Romanian culture by an intense activity of printing some magazines, 
propaganda brochures and books, written both by some leading members 
and personalities of the cultural life in the capital city or university centres of 
Greater Romania4. 
Undoubtedly, the Great Reunion best expressed its views, in the 
interwar editorial landscape of Bihor County, in the Cele Trei Crişuri review, 
which became its cultural propaganda organ starting with its apearance on 
April 15th, 1920. George Bacaloglu, the manager, stated his intention to 
publish the review in the tradition of Familia, edited by Iosif Vulcan5. 
Since its foundation, the publication presented its cultural creed to 
the readers: “In such difficult times when everyday needs and problems 
increase, Cele Trei Crişuri review will continue to conduct its Romanian and 
Latin activity, to further impose the consciousness of a fulfilled good work, 
of an achievement that is felt to be increasingly urgent day by day”6. 
The perseverance with which it was led by George Bacaloglu turned 
Cele Trei Crişuri into an elite review well apreciated at national and 
international level. The most various topics were addressed in its columns. 
Several historical and literary articles were published, complemented by 
illustrations drawn from everyday life and from the interwar Romanian 
landscape. The review did not neglect political, social and cultural events 
that had taken place in the country and abroad, which were grouped under 
the title “Today’s News”, the emergence of various cultural reviews in 
Romania, the printed books of some Romanian and international publishing 
houses, all the information being analyzed and commented on in a balanced 
and professional spirit7.  
Each issue of the review contained a specific topic, held and 
suported by articles signed by writers from all across the country. Thus, it 
                                                     
3 Viorel Faur, Contribuţia Reuniunii „Cele Trei Crişuri” din Oradea la configurarea unor 
semnificative tradiţii muzeistice, în „Revista Muzeelor şi Monumentelor”, 1982, nr. 5, p. 
50-51.  
4 Ion Bradu, Reuniunea „Cele Trei Crişuri” din Oradea, în „Contribuţii culturale bihorene”, 
Comitetul de Cultură şi Educaţie Socialistă al Judeţului Bihor, Oradea, 1974, p. 190. 
5 Viorel Faur, Contribuţii la istoricul bibliotecilor româneşti din Crişana (1830-1940), Editura 
Fundaţiei Culturale „Cele Trei Crişuri”, Oradea, 1995, p. 101. 
6 „Cele Trei Crişuri”, 1936, nr. 3-4, p. 55. 
7 Ibidem, nr. 9-10, p. 155. 
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foreshadowed a spiritual emulation, which not only the population on the 
western border, but also the rest of the country benefited from8. 
At first, the editorial staff consisted of only a few personalities 
willing to revive the cultural atmosphere in Crişana region. The name of the 
initiators (Roman R. Ciorogariu, Gh. Bacaloglu and Al. Pteancu) 
intermingled with the destiny of the review. 
During the two decades of its existence, one can highlight two 
periods: the first one lasted from 1920 to 1933, while the other took place 
between 1933 and 1940. The review apeared sporadically in Bucharest in 
January-February 1941, respectively March-April 1944. Starting with 1933, 
the review was marked by the transformation of its profile into Cultural 
Annals as its rubrics had been specialized in problems requiring only 
scholarly interventions. However, excerpts of literary fragments and folk 
poetry were published during 1933-1940.  
The first stage is definitely the boom period of the review. In a very 
short time, the number of collaborators became impressive. We mention 
here only the most recognized names in the cultural life of the time: Lucian 
Blaga, Ion Agârbiceanu, Mihail Dragomirescu, Eugen Lovinescu, Gala 
Galaction, Victor Eftimiu, Cincinat Pavelescu, Emil Isac, Emanoil Bucuţa, 
Constantin Rădulescu-Motru. Among the local collaborators were Aurel 
Lazăr, Eugeniu Speranţia, Gh. Tulbure, Gh. Ciuhandu. Thus, the review got 
the look of a land where ideas and artistic formulas were debated, opinions 
were aproached, all in a balanced environment. 
When this publication reached its peak in 1933, although the review 
had been published in Craiova in the previous year with some difficulty in 
writing materials, articles signed by other prestigious names were published 
in its pages: I. Al. Brătescu-Voineşti, Gh. Bogdan-Duică, I. Bianu, Ovid 
Densuşianu, D. Gusti, Cezar Petrescu, Sextil Puşcariu, Ion Pillat, George M. 
Zamfirescu, Elena Farago etc9. Moreover, since its establishment, the 
Reunion had been acting so as to attract writers from across the country to 
its most important publication - Cele Trei Crişuri. This fact emerges from a 
document issued on 16 September 1920 and sent to the officials in 
Bucharest, from which it follows that the desire of the cultural society in 
Oradea was to popularize all the writers in the country10. 
                                                     
8 Ibidem, 1931, nr. 5-6, p. 75. 
9 Viorel Horj, Semicentenarul revistei „Cele Trei Crişuri”, în „Crişana”, 1970, nr. 80, p. 2 ; I. 
Hangiu, Dicţionar al presei literare româneşti (1790-1982), Editura Ştiinţifică şi 
Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1987, p. 74; Nae Antonescu, Scriitori şi reviste din perioada 
interbelică, Editura revistei „Convorbiri literare”, Iaşi, 2001, p. 42. 
10 Lucia Bieltz, Un document inedit referitor la Marea Reuniune “Cele Trei Crişuri” din 
patrimoniul Muzeului Naţional de istorie, în „Crisia”, 1987, p. 353-355. 
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As a result, the editorial office received, from various parts of the 
country, works that belonged to different genres such as novels, stories, 
poems, along with folk songs, articles on geography, history, literary 
criticism, philosophy, technology and medicine. Cultural information from 
all over the country was grouped into suggestive categories: Letters from 
Banat, Maramureş, Sălaj and even Bucharest, reviews from Satu Mare etc11. 
The review established an editorial office in Bucharest as well (on 
18 Royal Street) after having gained greater momentum and noticing its 
readers’ increasing need for culture. In this way, it managed a faster 
connection to the cultural life that throbbed in the capital city, hence the 
review reached Cernăuţi and Chişinău in a shorter time12. Glimpses of life all 
across Bukovina and Bessarabia were mirrored in the pages signed by the 
most authorized names13. 
In a relatively short time, Cele Trei Crişuri managed to become one of 
the most advanced reviews, both as form and substance, not only in the country 
but also abroad. The review, which aimed to strengthen the spiritual life on the 
western border of the country, tackled the fate of Romanians abroad and, in 
particular, that of the Transnistrian Romanians, besides Romanian matters of 
national interest. The publication had spread its influence in that region since 
1928, primarily due to local socio-political factors, which prevented the normal 
development of Romanian cultural life14. 
On 28 January 1926, the review received from Prague another offer 
of cultural cooperation between the review in Oradea and a 
Czechoslovakian Press Agency, with branches for the countries in Central 
Europe and the Balkans. This also had a Romanian division, established on 
15 November 1925, which edited a daily newsletter for the Romanian 
newspapers, which had been sent to Cele Trei Crişuri review ever since the 
first issue. This section also gathered the propaganda news from the 
Romanian newspapers, which was then published in the press of the foreign 
countries. To this end, the news agency called for “the newspaper (review – 
our note) regularly”15. 
Despite some shortcomings and financial difficulties, the Reunion 
continued to become conspicuous in the Romanian cultural landscape. 
Thus, when commemorating 60 years since the foundation of the Universul 
newspaper, the review and the Reunion from Oradea sent a congratulatory 
                                                     
11 Arhivele Naţionale-Serviciul Judeţean Bihor, fond Reuniunea culturală Cele Trei Crişuri, 
dos. 23, f. 220. 
12 „Cele Trei Crişuri”, 1930, nr. 3, p. 50. 
13 Ibidem, 1937, nr. 7-8, p. 152. 
14 Ibidem, nr. 11-12, p. 238-239. 
15 AN-SJBh, fond Reuniunea culturală Cele Trei Crişuri, dos. 23, f. 3. 
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telegram to the oldest Romanian newspaper, which was the bearer and 
promoter of national ideals16. 
The review was also “sensitive” to the official paper of the 
Romanians living in the United States and Canada, which celebrated 30 
years of existence in 1935. Enlivened by this festive event, the review 
devoted a special issue to the Romanian newspaper America17. 
The review stood by its readers in difficult moments as well, 
disseminating the belief in a better future. When it came to the events of 
1932 related to the Hungarian revisionist claims, the editorial staff took a 
firm stand against the status quo, criticizing Hungary’s unjustified political 
riotousness. The great anti-revisionist demonstrations on the western border 
and Bucharest were widely presented in its columns. The Reunion did not 
reject the idea of working together with the minority element on a common 
cultural platform, but the revision of the Trianon Treaty could not be 
discussed. The attitude of the review remained firm in this respect: “... peace 
must be respected and it can only live by obeying the Treaties ... which 
fulfilled the holy law of nationalities”18. 
The international media also acknowledged the efficiency of the 
activity on national ground carried out by Cele Trei Crişuri review. After 16 
years, following the articles devoted to international events, the assessments 
of the foreign countries were as expected: in a letter sent to the editor, the 
bookshop Plon in Paris requested an exchange of publications and expressed 
its desire to tighten relations with the review and the cultural institution in 
Oradea; the newspaper Il Messaggero in Rome highlighted in an article the 
propaganda of the Reunion for spreading Italian culture in Romania. In its 
turn, the University of California (Los Angeles) asked that the review be 
sent to the United States, stating its readiness for collaboration between the 
two institutions19. 
We should also mention the special issues dedicated by the review 
to the Latin and Interparliamentary Congress, to France, the watchmen, the 
Romanian theatre, the Romanian Pavilion and Exhibition in Paris, and to 
other cultural events20. 
The Reunion was greatly apreciated in the country, as well. 
Numerous Romanian political and cultural personalities visited the offices 
of the Reunion and of Cele Trei Crişuri review, as a sign of recognition of the 
role played by the cultural institution of Bihor in Transylvania and in the 
national cultural landscape. Among the most prestigious guests we mention: 
                                                     
16 „Cele Trei Crişuri”, 1933, nr. 5-6, p. 71. 
17 Ibidem, 1935, nr. 7-8, p. 114. 
18 Ibidem, 1932, nr. 11-12, p. 110. 
19 Ibidem, 1935, nr. 7-8, p. 116. 
20 Ibidem, 1938, nr. 3-4, p. 77. 
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Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, Constantin Angelescu, Nicolae Iorga, Gh. Crişan, 
Ştefan C. Ioan, Gh. Bogdan-Duică, Victor Antonescu, Iosif Pop, Titu 
Constantinescu, Maria and Cella Delavrancea-Lahovary, C. Naumescu, 
members of a Czechoslovakian choir, C. Bacaloglu, etc21. 
A particular significance in the media landscape of Bihor during the 
interwar period was played by Aurora review in Oradea. It is actually the 
fruit of the endeavours made by the leadership of “Cele Trei Crişuri” 
Cultural Reunion, among which, besides Colonel George Bacaloglu, there 
were figures of two great fighters for the Union: Aurel Lazăr and Nicolae 
Zigre. They got involved with generosity in an extremely current issue, that 
of knowledge and raprochement between the Romanians and Hungarian. 
Moreover, they were joined by significant names of the time, such as 
George A. Petre, Keresturi Sándor, Salamon László, Tiron Albani and 
Korda Béla. 
Thus, on 24 December 1922, the literary, artistic, theatrical and 
social review Aurora apears in Oradea. The manger was G. Bacaloglu and 
the editors were A. Petre, Keresturi Sándor and Salamon László22. 
The enthusiasm of this initiative is reflected in the first issue of the 
review: “... We are setting off ... We are young, but we are scions grafted on 
the common core of Eminescu and Petöfi. We will sip food for both 
nations from the roots of this trunk. Being convinced of the new purposes 
of the time, we faithfully saw the seed of brotherhood and mutual 
understanding. May this seed germinate and bear fruit in a human field 
without any soul …”23. 
Open to all serious collaborations, as the manager of the review 
stated in the article-program at the beginning, the publication aimed at 
publishing as many translations as possible from both literatures and social 
life as a whole was within its area of interest. 
In the socio-cultural and historical post-war context, the emergence 
of the review in Oradea correlates with a realistic political guidance from 
both the Romanian intellectuals and the Hungarian ones. It was becoming 
clear to both sides that, in the new conditions created by the Union in 1918, 
only a sustained and principled interethnic dialogue could solve the 
conflictual situations. The humanist aproach of the group of Aurora is part 
of the ensemble of outstanding cultural achievements of the interwar period 
that aimed at getting a Romanian-Hungarian raprochement. The review 
wanted to be a communication bridge and the motivation of that endeavour 
                                                     
21 Ibidem, 1935, nr. 1-2, p. 40-41. 
22 „Aurora”, 1922, nr. 1, p. 1. 
23 George, A. Petre, Noui orizonturi, în Ibidem, p. 2.  
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is understandable in a time when people’s memories still keep alive the 
memory of the horrors of war that had just ended. 
The intellectuals of the time were naturally concerned with the issue 
of Romanian-Hungarian relations and the columns of Aurora review 
graciously hosted their positions. Thus, Daday Loránd believed that “what can 
be noted about this problem is not the establishment of some mutual spiritual 
relations, but the mutual gift giving without any particular explanation”24. 
Sending the editorial office a reply to the questionnaire launched by Aurora 
and Cele trei Crişuri reviews, Gömöry Jenõ considered that “cultural proximity 
was a priority”, because it is the only solution in the first stage.  
In the grouping Opinions about closeness25, some personal letters 
addressed to one of the editors are published, and the reason of their 
publication, explained in a note to editors, lies in their quality as “interesting 
documents, almost historical, on the formation of mentality”. The 
signatories of the letters were Cezar Petrescu, Franjo Zoltan, Benedek Elek 
and Emil Isac. The penultimate, which was proposed to be the Hungarian 
chairman of an association of Hungarian and Romanian artists, replied 
warmly: “This step hapened according to my heartbeats. But for me to be 
the Hungarian chairman of this society? Brother, do you not know that I 
would not be a good president? I have never been the president in my life ... 
But still, if you force me, your work will be done. I will do it for the holy 
cause”. Cezar Petrescu, editor of Gândirea review in Cluj, also believed, in his 
letter, that “great writers and great artists, in addition to their homeland, 
have humanity as a second home”. Franjo Zoltan, prestigious poet, 
translator and publisher, Herder prize laureate, responded promptly to the 
request for collaboration, sending several translations of Romanian poetry. 
The article titled Vicinity?26 pleads with conviction for the joint efforts of all 
those who understand the oportunity of building a united international front 
of the “Red Cross soul”, that would complement the political struggle for 
peace. The intellectuals were seeking solutions noticing the explosive 
political situation of interwar Europe. 
A consequence of the fact that Aurora was firmly involved in the 
complex process of efforts to achieve knowledge and Romanian-Hungarian 
raprochement is the publication of some opinions that, overcoming a 
declarative and convenient level, are realistic and - beyond reserves – 
suggest solutions. It is the case of the article Difficulties about the Romanian-
Hungarian Raprochement of the writer Legeni Ernö accompanied by the 
                                                     
24 Daday Loránd, Observări inoportune apropierii româno-maghiare, in Ibidem, nr. 9, p. 1.  
25 „Aurora”, 1923, nr. 8, p. 12. 
26 Pál, Simandi, Apropiere?, in „Aurora”, 1923, nr. 9, p. 5; Mircea Popa,  Apropieri literare 
şi culturale româno-maghiare, Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1998, p. 144-149. 
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editorial office comments: “His opinions seem rather pessimistic and that is 
why we, Romanians, must review our cultural policy towards minorities, 
because, with some indifference, we might throw some intellectuals like him 
in the camp of those who fight against raprochement. Mr. Ligeti Ernö finds 
some healthy proposals of interest; we are drawing the attention of 
competent people”27. 
The review was trying to be on an equidistant position, and so was 
the protest note which considered void the order to put an end to the review 
Tüz from Vienna, a publication that “encouraged the raprochement program 
from the beginning”28. On the other hand, Aurora either disaproved the 
propaganda that was made in Budapest for a luxurious anthology of 
Hungarian irredentist poetry or expressed its bewilderment towards ignoring 
the valuable translations of Octavian Goga’s and Şt. O. Iosif’s poetry, by the 
Petöfi Company in Budapest. In order to organize a show of poetry, the society 
had collected all translations into foreign languages after the work of art by 
“the great man who had disapeared from Sighişioara”29. 
Representing a natural option in cultivating the exchange of values, 
translations have a high share in the columns of the review. Thus, Venus and 
Madonna written by Eminescu apeared in the first issue, having been 
translated by Keresturi Sandor and next to it I feel a fear in my soul that would 
spread, by Petöfi Sándor, translated by O. Goga. They also published 
translations of works by Arany Janos, Biró Lajos, Szép Ernö, Győni Géza, 
Babits Mihály, Reinhand Piroska, Szombati Szabo István, especially Jokai 
Mór and Ady Endre. 
From the Romanian literature, poems by Lucian Blaga, N. Crainic, 
Al. Vlahuţă, Adrian Maniu, Şt. O. Iosif, Panait Cerna, Victor Eftimiu, and 
Ion Pilat were published in the pages of this review, many of them for the 
first time. Of the Romanian novelists, the following were translated into 
Hungarian: Al. Brătescu-Voineşti, I. L. Caragiale, Liviu Rebreanu, C. 
Moldovan, Constanţa Hodoş, Eugen Speranţa, I. Slavici, I. Agârbiceanu. 
The original literature is scarce and of no special value. The poems belong 
to G. A. Petre, Salamon Laszlo, Ioan Sângeorgiu and the poetess Keresturi 
Diamandi Victoria, and published with parallel texts: in Romanian and 
Hungarian. The poetess signed a special column, which addressed topics 
about fashion, marriage or moral conduct, interesting in terms of the study 
of mentality at that time.  
Aurora review represents an exemplary experience in itself, still valid 
today, to the extent in which it exceeded its era, and was the expression of 
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28 Ibidem, nr. 2 , p. 9. 
29 Ibidem, nr. 4, p. 1. 
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the most sincere and open aspirations of social and ethnic peace and 
harmony. Half a year later (in June 1923) its publication was ended, not so 
much because of financial difficulties, but because of mistrust and 
suspicions coming from both sides. 
Undoubtedly, the experience of the review published in Oradea was 
not isolated. There were other bilingual publications particularly in the 
interwar Transylvania: Culisele (Cluj), Cimbora (Satu Mare), but aparently 
Aurora review became known by its program that was aplied constantly. It 
was not its fault entirely, but the circumstances of the moment. 
After this brief presentation of the publishing activity of the 
Reunion, it is necessary to formulate some comments on the role of Cele Trei 
Crişuri review in the cultural interwar landscape, being a veritable means of 
literacy for all Romanians. 
What Familia review, edited by Iosif Vulcan, represented in the 
Romanian modern society, a source of strengthening national consciousness 
turned into, in another time and from a different respect, Cele Trei Crişuri 
review under the unified Romania. 
When social sterile unrest captured the interest of the great public 
eager for sensational, the review knew how to open its columns to the many 
problems of the Romanians in the western parts of the country, 
demonstrating with facts and figures that there were national vital issues that 
needed to be solved beyond political ephemeral interests30. 
The chronicles of the review suported the cultural movement on 
the western border, where “the fiercest battle was fought between what was 
and what was suposed to be”. They represented newsletters trying to 
stimulate the Romanian public opinion in the sense formulated by the new 
requirements of the time31. 
The emergence of Cele Trei Crişuri review brought the power of 
example in the interwar area of Bihor and it proved that a cultural program 
could be achieved where deep and tenacious belief pursues a noble ideal32. The 
review was not only a Romanian arena in the western part of the country, but 
also, a Romanian book with good teachings for those who must remember their 
nation and culture, but especially for those called to get to know and adjust to 
the realities of the Romanian national unitary state. 
To be more convincing, the review inaugurated a series of numbers 
on a single issue, giving the reader the possibility to penetrate into the depth 
of national spirituality manifested in art, literature, politics, economics etc33.  
                                                     
30 „Cele Trei Crişuri”, 1939, nr. 9-10, p. 183. 
31 Ibidem, 1927, nr. 5, p. 89. 
32 Ibidem, p. 182. 
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Although the tragic events of the year 1940 led to a decrease in the 
activity of the editorial staff, the review continued to apear, but with some 
irregularity. 
In the new political conditions, the columns of the review presented 
the most diverse foreign regions. It was a strategy aplied by Cele Trei Crişuri 
review in order not to attract the adversity of those who held political 
power, hostile to Romanian interests. 
When north-western territories of Romania were freed (in the 
autumn of 1944), the review returned to Oradea34. 
The Reunion and the review stood out for two decades by the desire 
firmly expressed and aplied to embrace and suport everything that was feeling, 
thought and Romanian letter on the western border of the country. 
Intellectuals and peasants found a moral guide in the pages of the 
review, but also a powerful means of promoting national culture on the 
western border of the country35. 
The cultural discourse of the intelligentsia was subsumed to the 
national desideratum, with double purpose, that is: to culturally enlighten 
the population, and to disseminate political ideas. A fully justified accent was 
laid on the need to improve the living conditions of the peasantry, to 
increase the education level, etc. The cultural elite at the western border of 
the country understood its aim, and therefore it acted to promote the 
national language and culture through some cultural associations meant to 
unite the interwar Romanian society around some viable cultural projects. 
Simultaneously, a significant aim was also to raise the overall 
development level of the Romanian society according to the time requirements, 
its adjustment to the social-economic and cultural developments of Western 
Europe, from which it was separated by a significant gap. In such context, of 
relentlessly “burning” some sequencing gaps, great emphasis was placed on 
cultural and material emancipation of society. This phenomenon manifested 
itself with features and defining elements also in the interwar Bihor, a western 
region of the unified Romania, which became part of the mutual flow of 
national culture, a reality that worked together both people and institutions in a 
ardent start toward progress and synchronization, an unprecedented 
phenomenon in our national history. 
 
 
  
                                                     
34 Eugeniu Speranţia, 50 de ani de la întemeiere - Cele Trei Crişuri, în „Familia”, 1970, nr. 4, 
p. 17. 
35 „Cele Trei Crişuri”, 1940, nr. 1-2, p. 3. 
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Abstract 
 
The local authorities realized that after 1918 they had begun a new stage of the national 
history requiring a rapid connection of the Bihor County space – regarded from a political, social, 
economic and cultural point of view - to the realities of the Great Romania, and implicitly to the 
European ones. During the entire inter war period, the local authorities had to “burn the stages” of 
discrepancy as against the West in a fast rhythm so that the Bihor County’s Romanian society to 
reach a stage of development being in concordance with the time exigencies.  
Founded at the end of the 1919, the “Cele Trei Crişuri” Cultural Reunion aimed from 
the very beginning to enlighten the areas from the Western border of the country. The reunion was 
conscious of the importance of a cultural co-operation with the other similar societies and with the 
values of the minority cultures (especially that of Hungarian expression). Only under such 
circumstances they could gain the local spiritual aptitudes going to guarantee the success of the 
actions initiated to perform the enlightenment.  
Thus, the Reunion attended to carry out an immediate contact with Europe, especially 
by means of the “Cele Trei Crişuri” review -, being already read in Rome, Paris, Berlin, Prague, 
Sophia and even on the American continent as a result of the co-operations concluded by the above 
mentioned reunion with the European cultural associations and institutions. 
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European integration and the new frontiers of Europe 
 
 
 
Luminiţa ŞOPRONI* 
 
 
Introduction 
The research perspective considering the region as the growth 
nucleus in contemporary international relations, is part of "new 
regionalism", which is defined as a "complex process of change involving 
states and non-state actors and is produced as a result of the action of 
global, regional, national and local forces"1. Regarding the actors involved in 
the regional process, if the nation-state played the main role in case of old 
regionalism, the new regionalism entails actions and interactions of several 
players, such as regional and local authorities, civil society, along with actors 
in the business world and non-governmental organisms. 
The concept of "region" was frequently used in association with 
notions such as "frontier" or "limited space", given that most of the 
attempts to define it emphasized "territory", "functionality" and 
"leadership". Research has been focusing on determining which types of 
regions are the most functional and efficient, considering the region as a 
natural given, which already exists and is defined by particular political, 
institutional and administrative frameworks. The constructivist and 
reflectivist doctrines have changed the aproach, considering the region as a 
process, an entity in continuous evolution, with frontiers that are 
constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed from the inside and the 
outside, as a result of collective actions of people and the identity formation 
process2. 
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2 Fredrik Söderbaum, „Exploring the Links between Micro-Regionalism and Macro-
Regionalism”, in Mary Farrell, Björn Hettne and Luk Van Langenhove (eds.), Global 
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The European Frontiers 
Professor Iordan Bărbulescu states that the frontiers of Europe "are 
not defined by physical geography, but by human geography, as they are 
represented by common values and world views. Thus, frontiers are 
determined by a series of norms that must be respected in order to enter the 
European Union"3. Fabienne Maron also considers that the definition of 
EU frontiers is tied to the "sense and essence of the European project", as 
they express the values and the finality of the Union4. In their analysis on 
European frontiers, Anderson and Bort talk about "invisible frontiers, 
founded on historical experiences and cultural values", which play an 
important role in forming the image of Europe5. 
Starting from these interpretations, we consider that integration into 
such a macro-region with unique features and history, entails the fulfillment 
of several categories of criteria, some imposed by European institutions; 
some coming from the tradition, as well as the cultural and historical 
evolution of Old Europe nations. Thus, economic, political, and judicial norms are 
intertwined with cultural and democratic values promoted along the European 
construction process. These structural components contribute to the definition 
of European frontiers as dynamic, permeable lines, which limit a space permanently 
reconstructed by the interdependencies and interactions between its members (we are 
framed into the spirit of the constructivist and reflectivist doctrines that define the 
region as a process).  
The complex system of norms and values mentioned above actually 
forms the European identity, which ensures regional cohesion, but at the 
same time determines the fragility of the connections between its members 
and functional imbalances (generated by incompatibilities, overlaps or even 
conflicting speeches and actions from regional or state actors). Even so, the 
entirety of European principles and policies express the idea that the 
frontiers of Europe, be they internal or external, "are limits of cooperation 
and not of separation"6, they are "open" frontiers with important 
implications on the nature of the EU as a political community7. 
The definition and analysis of European frontiers are based on a 
complex and multidisciplinary aproach, given that frontiers influence 
economic development, security, freedom and justice in the European space 
                                                     
3 Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, Uniunea Europeană. Politicile extinderii [European Union. 
The policies of enlargement], Tritonic, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 499 
4 Fabienne Maron, „Les nouvelles frontières de l’Europe: repenser les concepts”, in 
Eurolimes, vol.4/2007, p. 112 
5 Malcolm Anderson, Eberhard Bort, The Frontiers of the European Union, Palgrave, 
Basingstoke, 2001, p. 15 
6 I. Gh. Bărbulescu, op.cit., p. 450 
7 M. Anderson and E. Bort, op.cit., p. 113 
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and integrate aspects tied to European diversity, intercultural dialogue, 
deepening or enlargement processes8. If we take into account the consumer 
habits, national legislation or signed bilateral or multilateral agreements, we 
uncover new sectorial frontiers, which are reconstructed or are diluted: 
judicial, administrative, commercial, monetary, fiscal or budgetary ones9. 
In this paper, we will only focus on the way in which economic 
norms define the European frontier and space, conditioning access to the 
Union and shaping the behavior of states with regards to economic policy.  
The EU's economic frontier is shaped by the norms and criteria that 
limit and, at the same time, build the European economic space, namely:  
- the economic criterion for EU accession (a functional market 
economy, capable to endure competitive pressures and markets forces 
within the EU),  
- convergence criteria conditioning access to the monetary union 
(representing the economic test of evaluating the preparedness of an 
economy to participate in the Economic and Monetary Union) 
- common economic policies governing the behavior and actions 
of Member States.  
Considering the criteria defining the impermeable character of a 
frontier, we assert that the economic frontier is the most permeable of all 
forms, continuously generating interdependencies between economic actors, 
a fact which forms the uniqueness of the European market and shapes the 
economic space of the community. 
To exemplify, we will analyze the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU)/Euro zone accession process, which entails certain conditions to 
prove the economic stability of state actors and their ability to maintain a 
healthy economic environment. These criteria follow economic 
convergence, which must be accomplished on two plans, the nominal and 
the real one.  
Nominal convergence refers to the fulfillment of monetary and 
budgetary convergence conditions that were introduced as part of the 
Maastricht Treaty, which impose the following: government deficit should 
be not more than 3%; the consumer price inflation rate should be not more 
than 1.5 percentage points above the rate of the three best performing 
Member States; the long-term interest rate should be not more than 2 
percentage points above the rate of the three best performing Member 
States in terms of price stability; the exchange rate should remain within the 
                                                     
8 F. Maron, op.cit., p.112-113 
9 Rémi Colliat, Fabien Labondance, „Européanisation des frontières économiques: le 
cas franco-allemand”, in Trajectoires, 2 (2008) - Frontières en question, 
http://trajectoires.revues.org/196#ftn7, accessed August 8, 2015 
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ERM II for at least 2 years without severe tensions. All these criteria lead 
towards a common objective: a high convergence rate of economic and 
monetary policies of Member States to strengthen the credibility of the 
European economic system.  
Real convergence aims to accomplish a high level of cohesion of 
the structure of the states wishing to integrate in the EMU by diminishing 
the gaps between countries in terms of prices and productivity, implying the 
growth of the income of the developing countries to the level of developed 
countries. Thus, real convergence expresses "the convergence of life 
standards of the real GDP per capita towards the Euro zone level"10. Real 
convergence, as a component of the EU specific economic norms, is 
measured with the following criteria: the degree of openness of an economy 
(expressed in the share of imports and exports in the GDP), the share of the 
bilateral trade between the EU Member States in the total of external trade, 
the structure of the economy (expressed in the share of different sectors in 
the make-up of the GDP) and the GDP per capita.11 
The convergence criteria mentioned above suport the idea that the 
creation of the UEM was based on the desire to coordinate the European 
economic policies in order to reduce or eliminate the externalities between the 
Member States12. Thus, the hypothesis stated in the beginning is confirmed, 
namely that the European frontier is open, forming a dynamic economic space 
based on collaboration and interdependencies between state and non-state 
actors. Within this space, the structural and macroeconomic policies are 
defined by the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines of the European Union, which aim 
to increase the compatibility between different European policies through the 
coordination of Member State policies. At the same time, the guidelines 
suport the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy, whose main instrument is 
the European Semester 13 – a coordination cycle for budgetary and economic 
policies within the EU, which aims to align the budgetary and economic 
policies of the states to EU-wide objectives and norms. 
                                                     
10 Mugur Isărescu, „Convergenţa nominală versus convergenţa reală” [„Nominal 
convergence versus real convergence”], Bucureşti, aprilie 2015, p. 22,  
http://ec.europa.eu/romania/images/20042015_mugur_isarescu.pdf 
11 Mugur Isărescu, „România: Drumul către Euro” [„Romania: Road to the Euro”], 
2007, p. 6, http://www.ugir1903.ro/download/BNR_Drumul_catre_euro.pdf, 
accessed February 28, 2008 
12 Andrew Brociner, Europa monetară. SME, UEM, moneda unică, [Monetary Europe. 
EMS, UEM, Single currency], Institutul European, Iaşi, 1999, p. 65 
13 European Parliament/Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV), Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines and Employment Guidelines, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/542652/IPOL_ATA
(2015)542652_EN.pdf 
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The European Semester covers three blocks for economic policy 
coordination: structural reforms (focused on the promotion of economic 
growth and employment in accordance with Europe 2020); budgetary 
policies (to ensure the sustainability of public finances in accordance with 
the Stability and Growth Pact) and prevention of excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances14. 
The economic policy guidelines are part of the guiding and 
monitoring process within the European Semester. The national reform 
programs, presented to the Commission every spring, are based on 
guidelines, which are references for the adoption of country specific 
recommendations as a result of the program evaluation. In case the 
Commission sees incompatibilities between the economic policies of a 
Member State and the EU economic guidelines or sees threat to the 
functioning of the EMU, it may issue a warning15. Thus, the guidelines 
constitute an additional instrument in order to ensure economic cohesion 
and cooperation between European actors. 
Another instrument part of the framework of norms defining the 
EU economic frontier is the Growth and Stability Pact (GSP), formed of a set 
of norms meant to guarantee that the EU Member States do due diligence 
to have solid public finance and coordinate fiscal policies. This has two 
components: a preventive one (mandating EU Member State governments 
to respect the commitments made regarding the aplication of solid fiscal 
policies and coordination measures, establishing a budgetary objective for 
each of them) and a correction one (aimed at correcting excessive budgetary 
deficits or excessive public debt)16. 
Convergence criteria, Economic policy guidelines, the European 
Semester, the Growth and Stability Pact, they all converge to the idea of a 
dynamic economic frontier, aimed at ensuring the cohesion of members 
instead of separating different regional and national economic spaces. The 
economic frontier of Europe gains a new and novel function, namely that it 
is the main convergence instrument of the EU's economic policies and a 
defining one of the economic identity specific to this macro-region. It 
contributes to the creation of the external image of the European Union, as 
major regional bloc, with a well-built and clear external trading policy that 
integrates and sustains intra-Community economic policies. Furthermore, 
                                                     
14 European Council, Council of the European Union, European Semester 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-semester/ 
15 European Parliament/Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV), Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines… 
16 European Commission, Growth and Stability Pact,  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/index_en.htm 
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the EU's role as a prime global economic actor is one of the strengths in the 
studies on the perception of the macro-region in the external environment. 
 
The European model of economic integration 
The European Union is a successful project in the field of 
economic integration, which followed the model of regional organization 
focused on the common market (unlike NAFTA, which adopted the free 
trade agreement model), characterized by the complementarity between the 
negative integration mechanisms (liberalisation of markets) and those of 
positive integration (coordination and harmonisation of policies). The 
European integration is considered by many a model of economic 
coordination, characterized by a closed and powerful institutional 
coordination17. And the EU enlargement rhythm differentiates it from the 
other integration areas, being considered as a really fast one18. 
The European model of regional organization followed a 
progressive path (representing a variation of the linear integration model 
suggested by Balassa19 in 1961, with different levels of integration - free 
trade area, customs union, common market, economic union and complete 
economic integration), passing through the following steps: customs union 
(that requires the removal of the tariff and non-tariff barriers from the trade 
relations between Member countries and the adoption of a common 
customs tariff in the relations with the third countries); common market (a 
customs union in which all restrictions on the free movement of persons, 
goods, services and capital are eliminated); economic union (characterized 
by a high level of coordination of the economic policies of the Member 
States); monetary union (an economic union with a common currency for all 
Member States).  
The uniqueness of the European Union's regional governing system 
is insured by the following characteristics:20 
- a political system with own legislative, executive and judiciary 
structure; 
- a lower autonomy of the Member States, as a result of the 
legislative harmonization determined by the adoption of the "Community 
acquis"; 
                                                     
17 Jan-Erik Lane, The European Union and NAFTA as Models of Regional 
Organization , in Nikolai Genov (ed.), Global Trends and Regional Development, 
Routledge, New York, 2012, p. 47 
18 Willem Molle, Economia integrării europene [The Economics of European 
Integration], Editura Epigraf, Chişinău, 2009, p. 37 
19 Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration, Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, 1961, 
p. 2 
20 J. E. Lane, op.cit., p. 51 
In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga 
 
353 
- the implementation of a decision-making system within which 
each Member State exercises a considerable influence using soft and hard 
coordination methods; 
- the clear identification of regional competences; 
- the determination of the States' influence degree at government 
and parliamentary level; 
- the distancing from the principle of humanity, which generates 
very high transaction costs in the case of other regional organizations. 
Today, the European Union represents the largest trading bloc in 
the world, having 28 Member States, a functional single market with over 
500 million people, making aproximately 30% of the global GDP and 20% 
of the worldwide trade21. Its influence on the global trade is considerable, 
since it is the biggest importer and exporter of the world. EU's evolution as 
global actor also influenced its policy in the field of the external trading, 
ranking it not only as a global economic superpower, but also as an 
important player in the multilateral trade system22. 
The European Union uses within the external trading policy three 
major types of trade agreements23, through which it offers to partner 
countries special access to the EU market for most non-agricultural 
products: 
- Preferential agreements (concluded with the Maghreb countries- 
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia - with the Mashreq countries - Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Syria - and Israel) that grant trade concessions on the basis of 
reciprocity. Through these agreements the common external tariff is 
eliminated or significantly reduced for industrial goods, except for textiles. 
Most agricultural products are not included in these agreements, not being 
object of the trade liberalisation between EU and these countries. 
- Association agreements (concluded with Turkey, Israel, Moldova, 
Ukraine). These agreements allow the access of industrial goods from the 
signatory countries on the European market. In many cases these 
agreements have represented the first step for the accession of different 
states to the EU, and subsequent to these countries' accession to have 
complete access to the European single market.  
- Trade relations, which occur between EU and former colonies of 
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific, being regulated through the Lomé 
                                                     
21 European Commission, Economic and financial affairs, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/index_en.htm 
22 Megan Dee, The European Union in a Multipolar World: World Trade, Global Governance 
and the Case of the WTO, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2015, p. 46 
23 Phil Harris, Frank McDonald, European Business and Marketing, Sage Publications, 
London, 2004, p. 56 
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Convention of 1975. These agreements involve the liberalisation of trade 
with industrial products (except for textiles) and free access to the single 
market of agricultural goods not included in the Common Agricultural 
Policy. Many other developing countries are subject of the Generalised 
System of Preferences of the WTC, which grants them preferential access to 
the EU market. 
Western Europe countries that are not EU members concluded 
special agreements with the Union by means of which they undertake to 
comply with the community provisions on the free movement of goods and 
services for most products, except the agricultural ones that are covered by 
the Common Agricultural Policy. 
The agreements which the EU concluded with third countries 
prove its will to expand its influence and to promote globally its economic 
interests. At the same time, we note (especially in recent years, in the 
international context marked by the financial crisis) the distancing from the 
multilateral negotiation framework and the multiplication of the bilateral 
initiatives in the relations with the outside. The exact and individual aproach 
of the non-member states is preferred by the officials from Brussels not 
only in the economic field, but also in that of the neighbourhood policy or 
communication actions. 
If initially the European Union was constituted as a response to 
globalization, out of the wish to profit from its advantages and to counteract 
the power and influence of other regional poles, through the characteristics, 
structures and relations it has created on the path of its evolution, this 
transformed in a powerful stimulus of the globalization process, 
representing a symbol of liberalisation, a global actor at economic, social 
and political level. The strategic position of the UE on the global stage is 
one of "power beyond power", associated to the concepts of "civil" or 
"normative" power, according to which it uses the forms of civil or 
normative influence to convince the others and to determine them to act in 
accordance with its purpose and actions24. The instruments used by the EU 
in order to accomplish this role at international level are persuasion and 
communication, and its style in the multilateral negotiations is a soft one 
oriented towards consensus.  
In the negotiations from the trade policy field, when the position of 
key-actor is recognized at global level, EU has in most cases a proactive 
role25: it actively follows the objectives to be negotiated, most times it makes 
the first step, it formulates requests that can establish the tone of the 
negotiations, and when necessary, it works together with the others to reach 
                                                     
24 M. Dee, op.cit., p. 33 
25Ibidem, 35, 42 
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a consensus so as to successfully complete a negotiation and to conclude the 
agreement. Thus, the EU pro actively defends its internal interests 
(especially in the agricultural field) and at the same time has initiatives that 
circumscribe to the promotion of its reformist objectives for continuing 
trade liberalisation. However, in recent years the EU evolved progressively 
from the pro active position to a reactive one, noticed by the experts within 
the Doha Round of the WTC's multilateral trade negotiation. Having in 
sight the new global context marked by multipolarity and the positions of 
the new emerging countries within the international negotiations, the role of 
the EU within the WTC underwent changes, the union changing from a 
reformist and pro active leader into a spectator or observer (roles specific to 
the negotiation reactive strategy). Now, its aproach includes elements 
characteristic to both orientations (pro active and reactive), in order to meet 
the new geopolitical realities of the world26. 
EU's position and image in the world still is the subject of lively 
debates. Due to the fact that the European Union is not an ordinary state, 
but a complex and multidimensional organization, its structure, policies, 
actions and strategies can create confusion for the outside environment. In 
her analysis related to the measure in which the EU is perceived as leader in 
world politics, Sonia Lucarelli presents the strengths and weaknesses of the 
EU's global leadership27. The author considers as positive the perceptions of 
the EU as model of regional integration, global economic power and 
promoter of human rights, development and multilateralism (thanks to its 
own values), while the negative perceptions are related to the inconsistency 
between EU's policies and attitude in the diplomatic negotiations (being 
perceived as having a subordinate position to the USA). Its soft style of 
negotiation is apreciated in some cases, but at the same time it is criticised, 
being considered much too weak or denoting a condescending attitude. 
According to Lucarelli, there is an obvious discrepancy between recognizing 
EU's leadership potential (from the economic perspective and that of the 
values) and the perception of leadership that manifests itself in real life, the 
EU being perceived as unable to transform itself from a potential leader into 
a real one. 
 
Conclusions 
The emergence of the regional blocs, as growth poles of global 
economy, represents a new step in defining and structuring the economic 
                                                     
26Ibidem, 91-92 
27 Sonia Lucarelli, The EU s Leadership in Global Governance: Perceptions from 
the Others , in Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland (eds.), Communicating Europe in 
Times of Crisis, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2014, p. 45-64 
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frontiers, especially in the era of instantaneous communication and of 
capital market liberalisation, which generated serious issues regarding the 
governance model both of the states, as well as of the organisms that 
undertake global governance. 
If initially the European Union was constituted to counteract the 
effects generated by globalization (the increase of the power and influence 
of some regional poles), through the structures and relations it has created 
on the path of its evolution, this transformed into a powerful stimulus of 
the globalization process, representing a symbol of the liberalisation, a 
global actor at economic, social and political level. 
The dynamic and fluent economic frontiers of the European Union 
define a macro-regional structure with unique characteristics in the world, which 
has enough power to globally promote its economic interests, but encounters 
problems at political level regarding the capacity to exercise leadership.  
The economic frontier of Europe is the main convergence 
instrument of the EU's economic policies and a defining one of the 
economic identity specific to this macro-region. It contributes to the 
creation of the external image of the European Union, as major regional 
bloc, with a well-built and clear external trading policy that integrates and 
sustains intra-Community economic policies. Furthermore, the EU's role as 
a prime global economic actor is one of the strengths in the studies on the 
perception of the macro-region in the external environment. 
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Identity as frontier in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
case of the Republic of Moldova 
 
 
 
Mircea BRIE* 
 
 
Beyond the many facets of the identity, the one perspective of the 
identity cleavage in Central and Eastern Europe often apears to be very real 
and proven time and time again by more or less recent historical realities. 
Identity, be it that of an individual, of a group or of a community can 
generate both convergence and divergence in a raport with the other. The 
other one, a true dichotomy, becomes the expression of the “one beyond” -
- beyond what is specific to me, to my identity. A border, be it symbolic or 
ideological, can thus be identified around such identity constructions. The 
region of Central and Eastern Europe not only is no exception to this rule, 
but in our assertion it is the space that requires perhaps the most among all 
European states such identity frontiers. 
Methodologically, the focus of our analysis falls primarily on the 
borders of identity arising from ethno-religious or cultural specificity, but 
also on the nature of mentalities specific to this area. Theoretically and 
methodologically we must emphasize the fact that our attention is drawn by 
both general European identity together with the more particular one, that 
of the national, regional or local identity. The conceptual perspective gives a 
clear demarcation and establishment of policy analysis, just to make the 
operationalization of concepts easier and more useful in terms of achieving the 
set overall objective. 
Our analysis undertakes, from a spatial standpoint, to consider the 
realities of identity recorded in the area of Central and Eastern Europe, with 
an emphasis on identity aspects from the Republic of Moldova space.  
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1. Identity at European, national and regional level - conceptual 
perspective1 
Starting off from the general aproach of the social sciences 
concerning the identity as being the description of features and the 
expression of the individuality of a person affiliated with a group or 
community, we find the existence of a construction both subjective and 
objective in relation to the common identity. This assertion involves aspects 
which are both universal and specific, introduced by the particular, often by 
the local-regional mentality constructions, so important in defining identity. 
Identity construction aparently placed on the same level of analysis can have 
different connotations. 
Identity, irrespective of the level (European, national or 
regional/local), is reflected as a form of public expression despite the 
universalist trends, despite globalization or uniforming the values, the 
characteristics or the expressions of a community. Ethno-religious identity 
elements are found in the public global space and also in forms multiplied 
through the channels of propagation of the global. So not only the global 
multiply, but also the particular the specifics. The latter, often taking forms 
of extremism, nationalism, ethno-religious violence, are multiplied by 
gaining followers at thousands of kilometers away. Then the national and 
ethnic state associated to the national territory, has managed not only to 
survive the pressures of “global society”, but has demonstrated a greater 
affiliation capacity. The identity globalization has proven proved to be stronger 
in urban and industrialized societies; where there are consistent rural areas 
with rich cultural heritage and traditions a strong resistance to globalization 
has developed2. Thus the local identity, the one at national-cultural level, is 
preserved stronger within rural-agrarian areas and within the areas of 
proximity to cultural reference sites. Such a fact does not preclude parallel 
development and strengthening of a supranational European identity. 
Conceptually, we witness this relation seemingly antagonistic: European 
identity versus national/local identity. A causal relationship, seen in both 
directions, can be observed regarding the deepening of European identity 
construction and in connection with economic development, social welfare, 
with confidence in the economy. The period of prosperity and economic 
growth at the beginning of the process of European integration has 
strengthened the European identity and the feeling of European belonging. In response, 
                                                     
1 See for further details the chapter Image of identity in Europe. Antagonism of interpretations 
din studiul Identity rematch in the European space elaborat împreună cu Daniela Blaga 
(2015), various references have been made to the cntents of this study. 
2 Florin Poenaru, Republica Moldova: complexul de superioritate al României, 
http://www.criticatac.ro/18342/republica-moldova-ca-sindrom/, accesat în data de 
26.06.2015 
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in the context of current economico-social and geopolitical crises we have 
been witnessing the „identity rematch” and „the feeling of returning to the historical, 
national and cultural identity”. The perspective can be catalogued as rigid and 
difficult to prove as long as both the European Union and the nation states 
are interested in the welfare and prosperity within the EU. But the 
discussion makes room for political and media elements. The theory of 
„scapegoating” quickly finds its aplicability while the other is to blame for the 
decline in living standards, for the high unemployment (in these 
circumstances it may be the guilty EU, the guilty nation states, other 
peoples, immigrants, etc.). Or this is precisely here where we identify the 
potentiallly negative effect on the European identity building process3.  
The equation of debates on European identity can be extended to 
analyze European interests versus national interests of countries that make 
up the union. Common interests can bring to the discussion table national 
states. The European construction, also in terms of identity, can benefit 
from the negotiations and compromises between states. When the 
discussion reaches issues related to the vital interests of the states 
everything4 can change, and the common edifice begins to falter. The effect 
can be both positive (in the sense that states are more conciliatory and 
cooperative when their primordial interests are threatened from outside). 
„National interests combine usually security with material concerns, on the 
one hand, and moral and ethical concerns, on the other hand”5. Beyond 
national or European interests, the question can open to national 
preferences or the EU’s preferences, as an international organization. 
Andrew Moravcsik makes reference to the three levels of analysis (internal / 
domestic, inter-state and supranational) and proposes a model regarding the 
                                                     
3 Mircea Brie, Dana Blaga, Identity rematch in the European space… 
4 For more details, see the typology of national interests done by Hans Morgenthau, 
who proposes to group them on vital interests (geered on the existence, security and 
survival of the state) and secondary interests (political, economic, cultural, social, 
human, ethno-religious or environmental). Hans Morgenthau, Politica între naţiuni. 
Lupta pentru putere şi lupta pentru pace, Iaşi. Polirom. 2007; Apud Petre Duţu, Cristina 
Bogzeanu, Interesele naţionale şi folosirea instrumentelor de putere naţională pentru promovarea şi 
apărarea acestora. Cazul României, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I”, 
Bucureşti, 2010, p. 8-13. Anastasia Cujba, Cristina Ejova, Repere istoriografice şi teoretico-
conceptuale ale cercetării interesului naţional, in Studia Universitatis Moldaviae, Revistă 
Ştiinţifică a Universităţii de Stat din Moldova, 2013, nr.3(63), p. 32-38. 
5 S. Huntington, The Erosion of American National Interests, in Foreign Affairs, Published 
by: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997, vol.76, no.5, p. 28-49. 
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impact of national preferences on economic realities6, which can be 
extended to a wider framework, that of the decision-making7. 
Beyond the economic realities, we propose three levels of analysis 
in regard to the concept of identity: the European level, the national level 
and the regional level. A European citizen can be Italian, German or 
Romanian. At the same time an Italian citizen can be Sicilian, Neapolitan, 
Venetian, Piedmontese, Tuscan etc. A German citizen can be a Bavarian, 
Saxon, Prussian or Austrian. Likewise, Transylvanians, Oltenians, Banat or 
Moldovans can together express the feeling of Romanian belonging. 
The specialised literature captures the dispute over establishing the 
identity of a person or community. The process consists of two dimensions: 
self-identification and hetero-identification. In both cases, own identification 
and the identification done by someone else, the debate on the identity involves 
elements which are both objective and subjective. Unlike the concept of national 
origin, which refers to something given, inherited by birth, national identity is, 
above all, the expression of the awareness of belonging to a cultural community 
that is defined as a political community. This is the reality to which Ernest 
Renan refers when characterizing nation, suggestively, as a „daily plebiscite”8. 
National identity in this case is linked to the concept of nation, the latter 
understood as a population which shares a territory (to which it reports through 
the historical dimension), shared myths and historical memory, a mass culture, a 
common economy, and rights and legal liabilities common to each member (the 
latter making reference to the state political organization).  
This analysis suposes the existence of: 1. a segment of population living 
on a certain territory; 2. a certain type of relation that expresses the awareness of 
identity and belonging, a real “community space”9. such a perspective on the 
nation is in agreement with the Westphalian state philosophy that places at the 
core the idea of a state-nation-territory.  
Conceptually, the whole edifice identity comprises at least two specific 
elements from the time of its construction: 
- National identity born of ethnicity 
                                                     
6 Andrew Moravcsik Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach, in Journal of Common Market Studies, 1993, vol. 31, issue 4, 
p. 497-498.  
7 For more details, see Ana Maria (Ghimiş) Costea, “National Preferences of the EU and 
NATO Member States at the Eastern Border. Study Case: Romania and Poland”, doctoral 
thesis, Babeş-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca, 2015. 
8 Apud Gábor Flóra, Identitate şi ideologie naţională: o perspectivă socio-istorică, in Balogh 
Brigitta, Bernáth Krisztina, Bujalos István, Adrian Hatos, Murányi István (coord.), 
Identitate europeană, naţională şi regional. Teorie şi practică, Editura Partium, Oradea, 2011, 
p. 114.  
9 Ibidem, p. 115 
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- National identity born of civic affiliation / citizenship 
In the first case, the national identity serves a particular ethnic group 
often found in competition with other ethnic groups (most often present in the 
same space reference). The prospect gives rise to expressions of nationalist-tribal 
expressions that may involve exclusion of representatives of other ethnic groups. 
In the second situation, the civic dimension serves the state, often 
leading to patriotism (a rather positive outlook if compared against the first 
situation when we are dealing with a negative connotation perspective!). 
The analysis of the two dimensions lead some analysts to identify the 
major differences in the conceptual debate about the identity in Central and 
Eastern Europe versus the USA. The essential difference is that the European 
national identity answers the question of who is Romanian, Hungarian, Slovak 
etc. (so what makes us different from one another), while the American national 
identity seeks to identify those elements that are common to citizens (what 
makes citizens who are different in various situations in ethno-cultural contexts 
be Americans?)10. This conceptual dispute between national identity / 
European and American nation can be extrapolated to the European space as 
well. The idea of nationality is perceived differently in the Western Europe and 
Central Eastern Europe. In most Western countries the national identity has 
been built mainly around the idea of citizenship, and the state territory of the 
term has become therefore the fundamental reference for “national territory” - 
the civic dimension of national identity. Eastern Europe took a different path of 
development, in which ethnicity has had a fundamental role in building the 
national identity - the ethnic dimension of national identity11. Thus, the western model 
of nation stresses the centrality of national territory or homeland of the nation, 
while the Eastern model is concerned with ethnicity and cultural ties. A 
fundamental characteristic of state construction of the Eastern European type is 
permanent lack of legitimacy or rather, their incomplete legitimacy. By identifying 
the state with a single national identity, other national communities inevitably 
found themselves outside this process of legitimization, which was a fundamental 
source of inter-ethnic tension. This reality has led to the sacralisation of the state 
territory considered national territory12 (property of the one nation / nationalities!) 
and the cultural-historical philosophy is to un-legitimize as much as possible the 
contribution of other national community13. Reported to the European level of 
analysis on the concept of European identity, the legitimate question is whether 
we are talking about a common European identity or, in contrast, about the 
                                                     
10 István Bujalos, Identitatea personală şi naţională în filosofia americană, în Balogh Brigitta, 
Bernáth Krisztina, Bujalos István, Adrian Hatos, Murányi István (coord.), Identitate 
europeană, naţională şi regional. Teorie şi practică, Editura Partium, Oradea, 2011, p. 79-91. 
11 Gábor Flóra, op. cit., p. 116. 
12 Ibidem, p. 118-128. 
13 Mircea Brie, Dana Blaga, Identity rematch in the European space… 
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presence of identity borders in Europe. Some identity cleavage can be observed 
between western and eastern Europe. This reality is given by the historical, 
cultural, religious and political heritage. 
The borders of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) today are the result 
of a complex process carried out in recent decades after the fall of communist 
regimes in this part of Europe. During the Cold War, Europe was divided in 
two by the two military blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Pact). The line between 
the two military blocs emerged as a hard border, closed, called the Iron Curtain. 
Subsequently, the enlargement of the EU and NATO’s eastward through the 
integration of most former communist states in this part of Europe, led to the 
disapearance of this barrier that separated Europeans from Europeans. This 
process did not remove the distinct identity of the West against the East14. 
Moreover, in our opinion, the last decades of the communist period and the 
post-communist transition exposed a separate identity of Central Europe 
compared to western and eastern European continent15. The possible identity 
cleavage in the European space can be extended to an analysis such as north 
versus south. The current context of financial crisis, the sovereign debt crises, 
exposed to the media and public opinion, a European North more rigorous and 
more attentive with their money, more interested in accumulating, more 
protestant if we are to refer to the Weberian theory16, and an European South 
more spendthrift, indebted, more wasteful, more catholic and orthodox (in its 
east part - with direct reference to the Greek state to state that has been in the 
public attention in recent years)17. 
Without claiming to exhaust all conceptual disputes regarding the 
European identity, the regional-European or national identity, we conclude by 
referring to the diversity recorded in Europe, and to the distinct manner, 
sometimes antagonistic, in which the European identity has evolved as a east-
west or north-south dichotomy, with particular emphasis in Central Europe. 
This space, in relation to identity, acquires specific meanings given its location 
between Catholic Europe, Protestant Europe and Orthodox Europe; between 
Germanic, Latin and Slavic Europe.  
 
  
                                                     
14 Mircea Brie, European enlargement and new frontiers Central and Eastern Europe, in Studia 
Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, Series Europaea, Cluj-Napoca, LIX, 1, 2014, p. 113-130. 
15 For more details on this topic we recommend consulting the doctoral thesis signed 
by Alexandra Tieanu, Europa Centrală, 1989-2004: perspective culturale şi geopolitice, Cluj-
Napoca, 2012.  
16 See the main theses of Max Weber from his famous work Etica Protestantă şi spiritul 
capitalismului, published in Germania in 1904.  
17 Mircea Brie, Dana Blaga, Identity rematch in the European space… 
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2. Identity realities on the eastern border of the European Union 
Positioned in the eastern part of the EU, the former communist 
states of Central and Eastern Europe have faced problems arising more 
often from the presence of a wide variety of ethno-confessional diversity on 
their own territory. This structure of the population, with numerous and 
consistent minority communities, has been the center of debate regarding 
not only the socio-economic balanced climate, but also the societal or even 
existential security of these countries. Most often minorities are seen as 
factors of instability and less as integrators. 
Ethnic and cultural boundaries do not overlap with those of the 
states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). We identify symbolic 
“frontiers” of the identity type that separate more or less human 
communities on ethnic or cultural criteria. 
The Euro-Atlantic integration of these countries has led to political 
cooperation and openness in the management of minority-majority relations. A 
key element of the accession agreements of most states in Central and Eastern 
Europe was linked to the treatment of national minorities, including the 
management of the “border” between minority and majority18.  
The Roma issue, or the issue of the Russians in the Baltic countries, 
the “inheritance” left by former multinational empires present in past 
centuries in this space are just some of the sensitive issues. The EU has 
identified these problems acting both before and after the accession of CEE 
countries to the EU. 
The attachment of these states to the EU is strongly linked to the 
development of a strong European identity to these people. Most often this 
feeling does not come into oposition with the attachment to the national or 
regional / local identity; this is despite the fact that over the last decade we 
could see an oscillation demonstrating close links between the three types of 
identities (strengthening of one weakened the other and viceversa). 
Amid crises that have become structural, during in the last decade 
the European identity of EU citizens, linked to the attachment to the Union 
has been steadily eroded. In parallel, the European citizens have found 
refuge in national or regional identities. Unfortunately for the EU, these new 
                                                     
18 For more information, see Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, Le frontiere europee – espressioni 
dell’identità, in Transylvanian Review, ISI Journal, vol. XXIII, supliment nr.1, 2014, p. 
202-216; Mircea Brie, European enlargement and new frontiers Central and Eastern Europe, 
în Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, Series Europaea, Cluj-Napoca, LIX, 1, 2014, p. 113-
130; Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, Europa: frontiere culturale interne sau areal cultural unitar, în 
Moldoscopie, nr. 3 (L), 2010, Chişinău, p. 123-143; Alina Stoica, Mircea Brie, The 
Cultural frontiers of Europe. Introductory Study, în The Cultural frontiers of Europe, Eurolimes, 
vol. 9, volum editat de Alina Stoica, Didier Francfort, Judit Csoba Simonne, Oradea, 
2010, p. 5-8. 
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ways of expressing identity have lead to the strengthening of 
Euroskepticism, to the development of extremism, nationalism and 
xenophobia. 
The ethno-religious identity brings more cleavages -- borders -- 
between people. 
In what follows we propose an analysis of the influences that 
various crises have had during the last decade on European, national or local 
attachment19.  
If in 2007 the average commitment of European citizens towards 
the EU was 53%, in 2014 it droped to 45%. With few exceptions (including 
Poland and Romania - two countries in the East, one in which there has 
been economic recession during the crisis and another, Romania, where its 
citizens have got to have more confidence in Brussels to tackle corruption 
and poverty only its own state institutions), in European countries the 
proportion of those who feel attached to the EU declined. It is interesting 
to note, however, how this decline has occurred in some states. In 2007 we 
have a high level of adherence to the EU for citizens of countries like Italy, 
Spain, Belgium, Hungary and Poland. By 2014, the citizens of this state 
attachment evolved very differently. Poland is the only country where the 
EU attachment is on the increase slope. Hungary and Belgium are two states 
which show similarities because although knowing a significant decline in 
the level of attachment to the EU, they do not seem to be cases concerned 
to transfer that attachment to their countries or places of residence (see 
comparative Annexes 2-4). Of these five countries, Spain and Italy 
constitute a special group. In these countries, which have benefited greatly 
from membership of the European Union, there is a very strong local and 
regional identity, but also with significant immigrant communities. The drop in 
devotion to the EU is very steep in Italy (from 62% - 2007 39% - 2014) and 
Spain (from 62% - 2007 46% - 2014). In these countries, hit hard by the 
recession, with serious problems of over-indebtedness, where large 
communities of immigrants accept jobs poorly paid, with high levels of 
unemployment among natives, attachment citizens are not transferred even to 
own countries (the attachment in one’s country is among the lowest in the EU) 
but in places of residence, at local or regional level. The strong local or regional 
identity captures the citizens’ attachment to these countries (see Annex 4). 
By comparing the two times (2007 and 2014) we found that the 
attachment to the European Union moves to two categories of states: states in a 
geographically central axis and to Eastern states. This group of states includes 
France, Belgium and Germany (central states in the process of European 
                                                     
19 This study develops ideas and conclusions previously shown in the study Identity 
rematch in the European space (2015), elaborated together with Dana Blaga. 
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construction), to which, in the same central axis, we would place also Poland, 
accompanied from the eastern axis by Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and the 
Baltic States. The logic compels us to accept that in crisis situations, countries 
such as Germany, France and Belgium and their citizens understand the 
meaning, role and importance of the European Union. In this equation of 
confidence in the Union we can place the newly entered EU member states 
from the east. We wonder, is this the same in the case of identity? The essence 
and the future suport of Europe lies in the New Europe? 
By comparison with the attachment to the European Union, the 
attachment to their own country reveals a different behaviour of citizens of 
European states. Note that this attachment is high in all European countries, 
the EU average being 91% in 2014. In the group of countries with a higher 
share of the population who feel attached to their country except for Austria, 
the other countries are geographically positioned at the EU’s periphery, in the 
west, north, south and east. We note the geographical distribution of these 
countries compared to the somewhat compact middle position of countries 
where the population feels attached to the European Union (2014). 
A strong attachment to home settlements, to local or regional area, 
is obvious in the countries of southern and eastern flanks. Together with 
Portugal, Poland, Austria, Slovakia and Greece, whose populations are 
proving to be very attached to their country, the group of countries with the 
population attached to the local factor lie countries like Italy, Bulgaria and 
Romania. These latter countries are found to be related to the local 
community also because of the failure of national policy. 
CEE countries generally prove to be attached to the EU now than 
in 2007. The national and local attachment, even if it strengthens the most 
part, they are influenced by realities related to domestic politics, to the 
public confidence in the governing act etc.  
 
3. Identity realities in the Republic of Moldova 
Without proposing to analyze the full spectrum of identity in 
Moldova, during this study we wish to identify possible identity cleavages that 
shape the borders of identity. 
Our hypothesis is that in this state there are realities that converge 
towards the daily expression of community and identity frontiers. These 
frontiers can be identified both in terms of ethno-national identity, and in 
terms of religious identity. In both situations the political and geopolitical 
implications are very important and acquire the value of critical factors in 
the development of identity. 
Methodologically, we mention that during this study we do not aim to 
resolve fundamental issues in any way, nor to clarify possible existential 
dilemmas of identity or controversy, older or newer. Our objectives are to 
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analyze possible identity realities that can generate at the societal level some 
cleavages which take the form of identity borders. As such, our debate is 
geared towards identifying these borders, to argue them through the possible 
cleavage they produce. The fact remains that in our assumption, the 
existence of a border identity does not necessarily mean a dislodging, a 
discontinuity, but can be interpreted as a contact area for cultural identity. 
Such contact area can generate not only a multicultural expression but also 
the development of an intercultural society in which cleavages fade. 
During this analysis, we propose a general discussion on issues of identity, 
often of great sensitivity in the area of the Republic of Moldova. As it is 
understandable, such an analysis could stir emotions born of latent 
manifestations in the public space. From the beginning, we highlight the fact 
that we do not intend to find truths or answers, but to identify possible 
identity borders. We do not wish to position ourselves on one side or 
another of the debates (the existence of identity borders requires the 
presence of at least two identity construction that meet, often located at 
oposite ends!). 
Each of the general themes identified as generators of identity 
borders/frontiers have constituted in themselves fundamental thesis that 
require complex analyses, both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
 
3.1. National identity, or about being Moldovan  
A controversy arises, like the case of Macedonia, in regard to the 
very name of the state east of the Prut. The Principality of Moldova, by the 
Treaty of Bucharest between the Ottoman and Tsarist Empires lost the east 
bank of the Prut. After this date the state continued to exist only in the west 
of the river, and then by uniting with the Romanian Country (1859) that 
statehood was transferred to the Romanian state. 
The territory between the Prut and the Dniester, called Bessarabia 
(indeed, more by the Romanians from Romania) recorded several steps in 
the period following the Russian annexation: 1. till 1918, belonging to the 
Tsarist Empire; 2. the period from 1918-1940, when Bessarabia was part of 
the Greater Romania; 3. period 1940-1991, the Soviet period; 4. aftermath 
of the proclamation of independence of the Republic of Moldova.  
The symbolism of the Moldovan statehood, despite the more recent 
rhetoric, goes back to a glorious early Middle Ages of the first Moldavian 
rulers (claimed to be Romanian by the Principality of Moldova which was 
not occupied by the Russians in 1812). 
Being Moldovan, as an identity construct, has brought many 
polemics and controversies regardless of where it was viewed and analyzed. 
But it was used each time for political or geopolitical reasons. The 
controversy lacks clarification at home, without having to extend this debate 
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in other geographical areas whose geopolitical interests do not converge 
towards the same goals. The Moldovenism versus Romanianism debate has 
ignited spirits east of the Prut often fueled more or less from the west to the 
east. The two perspectives seem to be diametrically oposed. The Romanian 
perspective includes the Moldovans together with Transylvanian, Oltenians, 
Muntenians, among Romanians (being Moldavian is not an ethno-national-
linguistic identity, but a regional and geographical one!). The Moldovenism 
perspective excludes the common identity, of nation and language, or any 
superimposed identity like the Bavarians are Germans, and Germans are 
Europeans (to be Moldovan means de facto not to be Romanian and 
viceversa!). 
Without much importance that moldovenism was created and fed 
by the Tsarist or Soviet partisans, it massively served the political interests of 
the government from Chisinau after the proclamation of independence . 
Initially it tried to create a nation-state in which the Romanian 
language was recognized as the official language and the doctrine of “one 
nation, two states” was officially accepted by both sides of the Prut. The 
national minorities, with intense external suport reconciled hard with this 
reality and reacted. “Imaginary dangers” of the union between the young 
Moldovan state with Romania and discrimination according to ethnic or 
linguistic criteria generated the beginning of a dual secession process in the 
eastern and southern regions of the republic, a process that culminated in 
the outbreak of armed conflict on the left bank of the Dniester”20. 
The Moldovan President Mircea Snegur officially renounce this 
doctrine on 29 July 1994 with the adoption of the new Constitution21. The 
thesis regarding the Moldovan identity, different from the Romanian 
identity, is repeated and amplified. Used by Tsarist and Soviet partisans to 
justify separation from the Romanian state, now it serves political interests 
that talk about national interest, namely preserving the Moldovan statehood 
that would be threatened. 
In theory, the moldovenism as identity construct is used in the 
sense of developing a national identity of civic-related citizen. Its new 
identity aims to pull together all Moldovan citizens regardless of their ethno-
national or linguistic options. 
Even if the new authorities who took power in Chisinau from the 
Communists after 2008 changed the logic of argument identity, the 
                                                     
20 Radj Cărbune, Identitatea naţională a Republicii Moldova,  
https://radjcarbune.wordpress.com/2010/12/02/identitatea-nationala-a-republicii-
moldova/, accessed in November 8, 2016. 
21 See the text of the new Constitution adopted by the Moldovan state in 1994,  
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/mo/md/md046mo.pdf, accesed in 
November 10, 2016. 
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moldovenism remains a factor that generates controversy. While some 
Moldovans proclaim their ethno-national identity and language to be 
Romanian, others with minorities present in this space, suport the 
moldovenism, as distinct from the Romanian identity which they see as a 
threat of undermining the Moldovan statehood. So, in one country, the 
Republic of Moldova, we talk about Romanian Moldovans and the 
Moldovan Moldovans. 
 
3.2. The Romanian language versus the Moldovan language  
This controversy hinges on promoting the moldovenism as identity. 
The Moldovan language, as a language distinct from the Romanian 
language, serves the same political or geopolitical interests and objectives. 
Whatever the origin of this dispute, the Moldovan society is divided not 
only in relation to linguistic minorities, but also in relation to the language 
options of the ethno-national majority group. 
The process of Russification of the tsarist and soviet periods was 
served by the implementation of the doctrine of two different languages: 
“Romanian” and “Moldovan”. Imperial multinational states, they in turn 
pointed fingers at the Romanian “imperialism” on to other people: the 
Moldovan people speaking another language, the Moldovan language.  
The Moldovan Declaration of Independence (1991)22 makes clear 
reference to the “establishment of Romanian as a state language”, language 
that Moldovans used it and felt that it was identical to theirs.  
For reasons explained briefly above, promoting the Moldovenism has 
become the official policy of the Chisinau authorities after 1994, deepening the 
confusion and controversy. The official language of Moldova is according to the 
new constitution, the “Moldovan language” in Latin script23.  
The contradiction has continued despite the attempts made by the 
new government to restore the rights of the Romanian language as the 
official language. 
Only on 5 December 2013, the Constitutional Court of Moldova 
solved this dilemma and interminable dispute regarding the official language. 
Judges, in discussing the text of the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution decided that the text of the document take precedence over the 
Constitution and “the state language of Moldova is Romanian”. “The 
Declaration of Independence is the legal and political fundamental of the 
Constitution so that no provision of the latter can exceed the Declaration of 
                                                     
22 See the text of Law no. 691 from 27.08.1991 on the Declaration of Independence of the 
Republic of Moldova, http://istoria.md/articol/573/Declara%C5%A3ia_de_Independen% 
C5%A3%C4%83_a_Republicii_Moldova, accessed in November 10, 2016. 
23 Constituţia Republicii Moldova din 29.07.1994, art. 13. 
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Independence. The Court concluded that, in case of divergence between the 
text of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, the 
constitutional text of the Declaration of Independence primarily prevail. 
The decision is final and can not be subject to any apeal”, according to the 
president of the Constitutional Court, Alexandru Tanase24. 
Beyond the intervention of the Constitutional Court, controversy 
and disputes regarding the Moldovan identity are able to perpetuate this 
symbolic border, often used for ideological purposes. 
 
3.3. Being a Romanian in the Republic of Moldova 
Identifying an individual in Moldova as “Romanian” requires some 
nuances. Specificity given by the realities of this country make this 
identification to highlight several categories of “Romanians”. 
The dispute between Moldovans and Romanians is based on the 
need to find an identity for residents east of the Prut. They are Moldovan 
citizens naturally. But there are ethno-national Romanian? Who are those 
who declare themselves to be Romanian? Naturally for many of them to 
identify as Romanian does not conflict with their status as Moldovan (civic 
identity, regional and geographic identity and so on). 
We identify at least for categories of “Romanians” in Moldova: 
a. those born in Romania, Romanian citizens or not, who have 
chosen to settle in this state for various reasons but preserve their identity as 
Romanians 
b. those of Moldovan citizens who believe they are ethno-linguistic 
Romanians and asked for Romanian citizenship (the Romanian state has 
encouraged and promoted in the last decade the policy of granting dual 
citizenship to Moldovans) 
c. those of Moldovan citizens who believe they are ethno-linguistic 
Romanian, but have not the Romanian citizenship (did not ask for it or did 
not get it!) 
d. Moldovans who have received Romanian citizenship, although 
they identify as something other than Romanians (in this case to obtain 
Romanian passports has rather a socio-material motivation). 
For a long time, long after the delaration of independence, a person 
declaring themselves Romanian may have been classified as unionist and as 
someone who attempted to destroy Moldova’s statehood. 
                                                     
24 Curtea Constituţională: Limba de stat a Republicii Moldova este limba română, în 
Timpul.md, 5 Decembrie 2014, http://www.timpul.md/articol/ curtea-
constituionala-limba-de-stat-a-republicii-moldova-este-limba-romana-67053.html, 
accesat în data de 10 noiembrie 2016. 
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Then, being Romanian was not being part of an elitist group that 
represents power, a group that is extending a state’s grand power. Instead, 
there are many nostalgic imperialist dating back to the Soviet era, when 
Moldova - always called “the poorest European state”, was part of a global 
superpower. 
The subject is broader and more complex. The Moldovan citizens’ 
opinions are often able to give way to disputes and controversies regarding 
identity. During the documentation for this study we have had the 
oportunity to read various reviews posted on various forums to which we 
have access today thanks to globalization. For a better understanding of the 
nuances that we do not afford to analyze during this study, we recommend a 
forum where Moldovans were called to answer the question “Why are we 
not Romanian?” where there are over 2,300 comments pro and con to 
Moldovenism / Romanianism25.  
 
3.4. Being a Russian in the Republic of Moldova  
The Russian community in Moldova was formed and developed in the 
years following the Treaty of Bucharest with the Moldovan territory east of the 
Prut being annexed by and to the Czarist Empire. From just a few thousand in 
1820, the Russian community had grown to over 550,000 members in 1989, for 
a later decrease mainly due to migration to the Russian Federation. The census 
from 200426 (the latest made public) recorded the presence of a number of 
201,218 Russians in Moldova (5.9% of total population), not including 
Transnistria (with the Russians here, this community adds up to 369,896, 
representing 9.4% of the population). This community, where the natives 
declared themselves Moldovan (with some declaring themselves Romanians) 
and Ukrainian, is the third in size and weights.  
The Russian community became increasingly influential during the 
Soviet period, favored by Moscow’s policies, including the “transfer” of 
people from one side to another of the USSR. Newcomers to Moldova, 
many originating from various Soviet republics had in common with the 
others the Russian language, which in time they adopted as their mother 
tongue. Most of them identified themselves as Russians.  
The Russian language was a swinging factor in the identity in Moldova. 
                                                     
25 http://www.moldovenii.md/md/forum/posts/topic/179/page/1, accesat în data 
de 10 noiembrie 2016. 
26 Biroul Naţional de Statistică al Republicii Moldova, Recensământul Populaţiei 2004, 
http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=295&id=2234, accesat în data 
de 11 noiembrie 2016. 
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Moreover, the phenomenon is still ongoing. Many individuals who 
have declared Moldovan nationality (63,290 people) and Ukrainians (89,853 
people), even Romanian (571 people) chose Russian as their mother tongue27.  
Russian is selected as the mother tongue of 380,796 people while 
the Russian nationality was chosen by only 201,218 people28. A significant 
difference between those who declare themselves Russians and those who 
choose Russian as their mother tongue -- that is without counting the fact 
that a large share of the population (Moldovans, Ukrainians, etc.) currently 
use Russian in everyday life. 
Our debate is not about the Russian language, but about being 
Russian in Moldova. The Russian language made many of them feel like 
they have Russian identity. 
The Russian minority in Moldova, as well as other former Soviet 
states was not like other minorities. Collective mind, various templates and 
stereotypes often lead us to position some communities on higher pedestals 
compared to other groups. The Russian community has benefited greatly 
from the fact that it was not only a minority, but the extension of a majority, 
more or less discontinued. 
This was and is an extension of power, of a symbolism, an imperial 
voice, an identity considered superior even through the privileged position 
that was fortunate enough to occupy. Or, all peripheral and marginal 
communities have always been tempted to aspire to a better societal 
position. See the case of the Gagauz, but also of the Ukrainians (the latter 
despite the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine) which, under the 
influence of the Russian media obviously tend towards an aproach to 
Russian identity. 
Trends have not been recorded in only one direction, many 
Russians accept the realities of the last quarter century or new statehood, the 
new language etc. 
 
3.5. Orthodoxy in the Republic of Moldova: between 
Bucharest and Moscow  
The law on freedom of conscience, thought and religion29 provision preserves 
the old religion law in Moldova, which makes the state to register any 
religious organization that has at least 100 members. This reality has led to 
the emergence of parallel Orthodox religious organizations, each claiming 
                                                     
27 Ibidem 
28 Ibidem 
29 Law No. 125 din from 11.05.2007, Legea privind libertatea de conştiinţă, gândire şi de 
religie, published in 17.08.2007 in Monitorul Oficial nr. 127-130, art. 546, available at 
http://lex.justice.md/viewdoc.php?action=view&view=doc&id=324889&lang=1, 
accessed in 11.11.2016. 
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their authenticity and legitimacy. We do not intend on this occasion to 
discuss those “autocephalous” communities which have a small number of 
parishioners30, but we would like to bring forth the largest: 
- the Moldovan Orthodox Church (also called “Moldovan 
Orthodox Church”), affiliated to the Moscow Patriarchate 
- the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Exarchate realms, 
independent church, part of the Romanian Patriarchate 
The former, with most parishioners registered in Moldova in 1993 
is claimed to be the successor of the Diocese of Chisinau founded in 1812 
by the Russian Church31.   
The latter is declared successor to the Metropolitan Church of 
Bessarabia which existed between 1918 / 1924-1940 and 1941-1943, heir to 
the Romanian Orthodoxy that existed in Bessarabia from start till 181232. 
The two churches often challenged themselves, while maintaining 
strained relations which were transmitted down to the parishioners. 
Moreover, this organization has reflected geopolitical trends from Moscow 
and Bucharest. In Moldova, the two churches bore the banners of a fight 
that the two patriarchs do not allow them to show. 
 
3.6. The Gagauz community - an identity on the border  
An issue of a high sensitivity in Moldova is the Gagauz community. 
Beyond their controversial origin, their identity carries over significant 
nuances of historical stages which marked their existence. Increasingly this 
community identity was transformed into what today is a russo-oriented 
community, systematically suported by Moscow. 
Without being very large (according to the 2004 census, the 
community had 147,500 members, of whom 127,835 were living in the 
                                                     
30 The website ortodoxia.md, which introduces themselves as “an Orthodox 
community” from the Republic of Moldova, in the study Câte Biserici Ortodoxe avem în 
Moldova?, http://www.ortodoxia.md/2011/04/cate-biserici-ortodoxe-avem-in-
moldova/, accessed in 10.11.2016, identifies 5 parallel jurisdictions which each 
pretend to be canonical. To them it also adds the Cultul religios Ortodox pe Stil 
Vechi din Republica Moldova (Old Style Orthodox religious cult in Moldova). 
31 See the official website: http://mitropolia.md/.  
32 For more details of its history, we recommend the documentary material prepared 
by Stelian Gomboş regarding the Romanian Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia, 
http://www.crestinortodox.ro/religie/mitropolia-ortodoxa-romana-basarabiei-
122930.html, accessed in 11.11.2016.  
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Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia33), this community is 
distinguished by the importance that had in the history of Bessarabia.  
The most accepted theory concerning their origin is that they are 
descendants of Turkic tribes, or even possible Oghuzii Seljuks. Other 
historians speak of Cuman origin, Peceneg or Bulgarian34. Of certainty are 
their still Turkish origin of their language and the fact that they were 
Christianized, giving up Islam under the influence of Byzantium35. Their 
presence in Bessarabia space is linked to the migration from Bulgaria to 
Dobrogea and Bessarabia areas at the end of the eighteenth century. The 
annexation of Bessarabia by the tsarists and their transformation in their 
dispute often with the Turks but also for the control of the new province, 
turned them into the Orthodox Christian allies increasingly willing to accept 
cultural and political proximity. In turn, the Russians granted them 
privileges, exemptions from taxes and military service and so on36. The 
Soviet period drew them closer to the Russian identity because the Russian 
language is now assumed collectively. After gaining state independence by 
the Republic of Moldova, the Gagauz along with other minorities have 
campaigned for the creation of an autonomous region of Gagauzia, 
culturally backed by Ankara which opened here a Turkish Cultural Center 
and Turkish Library . 
All this transforms this community into a border identity, into one 
of contact between culture and identity.  
 
*** 
 
In addition, Moldova faces and the so-called Transnistrian crisis. 
Tiraspol officials are also involved in a process of constructing an identity, 
also on the border. 
Identity dilemmas and controversies in Moldova, as well as others 
in the area of Central and Eastern are determined / fueled by geopolitical 
                                                     
33 Biroul Naţional de Statistică al Republicii Moldova, Recensământul Populaţiei 2004, 
http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=295&id=2234, accessed in 
16.11.2016. 
34 The Bulgarian historians consider them as simple Turkish Bulgarian who 
maintained their religious identity as Orthodox Christian, 
https://romaniabreakingnews.ro/cine-sunt-de-fapt-gagauzi-cei-folositi-azi-de-rusia-
pe-post-de-unealta-geostrategica-si-amenintare-permanenta-la-adresa-suveranitati-
integritatii-teritoriale-a-r-moldova/, accesed in 16.11.2016. 
35 Nicu Pârlog, Găgăuzii: rătăciţi prin istorie, http://www.descopera.ro/cultura/ 
9145873-gagauzii-rataciti-prin-istorie, accessed in 16 .11.2016. 
36 Ibidem. 
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interests of some states / powers they have used for purposes of extending 
or maintaining influences. 
Identities, only occasionally were able to establish divisions in the 
true sense of the term. Borders were given identity or symbolic form of 
ideological frontiers. 
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Annex 
 
Annex 1. Attachment towards the European Union (2007) 
 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 67. Public opinion in the European Union, April - May 
2007, p. 8537 
 
  
                                                     
37 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb67_en.pdf, p. 85, 
accessed in 28.06.2015 
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Annex 2. Attachment towards the European Union (2014) 
 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 82. European Citizenship, Autumn 2014, p. 1038 
 
                                                     
38 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_citizen_en.pdf, p. 10, 
accessed in 29.06.2015 
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Annex 3. Attachment towards own country (2014) 
 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 82. European Citizenship, Autumn 2014, p. 739 
 
  
                                                     
39 Ibidem, p. 7 
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Annex 4. Attachment towards the locality of residence (2014) 
 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 82. European Citizenship, Autumn 2014, p. 640 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
40 Ibidem, p. 6 
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Les Relations Diplomatiques et Consulaires comme 
Partie des Relations Internationales 
 
 
 
Iordan Gheorghe BĂRBULESCU* 
 
 
Modest hommage à mon ami et distingué collègue,  
Professeur des universités, docteur Ioan Horga à l'âge de 60 ans 
 
 
1 Préambule  
Cet article ne veut pas être une analyse des relations internationales 
en général, mais se concentre uniquement sur les relations interétatiques qui 
visent l’acteur international classique, l’État et ses relations avec d'autres 
États (interétatiques) ou avec d'autres acteurs non étatiques 
(transnationales). Même ainsi, il faut faire une nouvelle démarcation utile, en 
disant que ce que nous analysons dans ces quelques pages représente la 
relation interétatique officielle et formelle entre les États, c’est-à-dire les 
relations diplomatiques actualisées par l’intermède des missions 
diplomatiques et consulaires, un sujet qui mérite plus d'attention étant 
donné son importance dans la vie internationale, d'une part, et de l'autre, 
étant donné le grand nombre de Roumains vivant à l'extérieur de la 
Roumanie et qui ont besoin de savoir ce qui peuvent et ne peuvent pas faire 
pour eux les représentations diplomatiques nationales. Certes, et sans 
représenter le sujet de notre étude, dans le cas des citoyens roumains, ceux-
ci peuvent bénéficier, avec l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne, de 
l'assistance diplomatique de l'UE dans les pays tiers où l'UE a également des 
missions diplomatiques (apelées Délégations de l'UE) ou de l'assistance 
diplomatique de tout État membre de l'UE, si notre pays ne dispose pas de 
mission diplomatique ou consulaire dans ce pays1. 
 
                                                     
* PhD Professor, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, 
Bucarest. 
1 Conformément à l’art. 20 et 23 TUE, respectivement art. 221 TFUE, in Union 
Européenne, La version consolidée des Traités. Charte des droits fondamentaux, OPUE, 
Luxembourg 2010. 
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2. Les relations interétatiques et la place des missions 
diplomatiques et consulaires des Etats 
En l'état actuel de l'étude des relations internationales2, il est 
généralement entendu que celles-ci représentant la multitude de relations des 
différents types qui dépassent les frontières territoriales ou les domaines de 
compétence des entités juridiques internationalement établies. Dans la 
littérature de spécialité, ce type de réseau est connu sous le nom «d’un 
complexe de relations internationales» ou simplement de «la vie 
internationale»3. Truyol y Serra4 définit les relations internationales comme 
«les relations entre les individus et les communautés humaines qui, dans 
leurs origines et leur but, ne se terminent pas au niveau d’une communauté 
différenciée et considérée comme un tout unitaire, qui, essentiellement, est 
la communauté politique ou de l'État, mais dépassent ces limites». 
 
En d'autres termes, les relations internationales, comme le témoigne 
la réalité et la doctrine, comprennent, d'une part, les relations interétatiques, 
et d'autre part les relations transnationales5. 
 
Ainsi:  
- Les relations interétatiques sont établies par les États entre eux, 
perçus comme sujets du droit international, par le biais de leurs institutions 
spécialisées; 
- Les relations transnationales sont, au contraire, celles établies entre 
les entités privées, les individus ou les groupes - perçus comme toute entité 
qui n’est pas sujet du droit international - de nationalités différentes, qui se 
raportent à d'autres entités privées, individus ou groupes et ne sont pas 
soumis à l'autorité de l'État. 
 
Ou, autrement dit: 
- les relations interétatiques sont représentées par les relations 
diplomatiques et consulaires, ainsi que par les divers contacts ou réunions 
officielles entre les diverses institutions ou les responsables de 
                                                     
2 Un ouvrage de référence par le biais duquel nous pouvons comprendre la 
problématique des relations internationales et la théorie des relations internationales 
reste, après presque 10 ans depuis sa première édition, Miroiu, A., Ungureanu, R. S., 
Manuel de Relations Internationales, Polirom, Iasi, 2008; en ce qui nous concerne, nous 
avons fait un examen de la doctrine des relations internationales dans le chapitre 2, 
intitulé «Grands courants de pensée en relations internationales», de l’ouvrage 
Barbulescu, I. Gh., «Nouvelle Europe. Identité et modèle européen, Polirom, Iasi, 2015. 
3 Merle, M., La vida internacional, Tecnos, Madrid, 1965 
4 Truyol Y Serra, A., La sociedad internacional, Alianza, Madrid, 1993 
5 Reuter, P, Combacau, J., Institutions et relations internationales, PUF, Paris, 1980. 
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l'administration des États ainsi que, encore, par la participation de ceux-ci à 
des organismes d'intérêt6 commun; 
- à leur tour, les relations transnationales sont diverses, allant d'un 
mariage entre deux personnes de nationalités différentes, jusqu’aux contrats 
commerciaux entre des entités apartenant à des différents États ou des 
relations établies entre des organisations sportives, culturelles, scientifiques, 
artistiques, humanitaires, religieuses en provenance des différents États, 
directement ou par le biais des fédérations internationales, et, en fin, les 
relations entre un État et une entité se trouvant en dehors de ses frontières. 
 
De toute façon, comme le disent Reuter et Combacau, tant dans les 
relations interétatiques que transnationales, l'État continue à occuper une 
place centrale dans les relations internationales, parce qu’il est: 
- d'une part, à travers ses institutions, l'instrument principal et 
unique de relations officielles interétatiques; 
- d'autre part, l’organisme de réglementation globale de celles-ci, 
l'État étant celui qui fixe les règles en vertu desquelles les individus exercent 
leurs libertés indispensables pour l’établissement des relations 
internationales, tout en déterminant ainsi les limites et les conditions de leur 
déroulement. En d'autres termes, les États les contraignent à recourir à leurs 
institutions et leur système juridique. Ou, comme le disent Reuter et 
Combacau7, «il est très difficile pour relations transnationales de se situer 
dans un monde juridique totalement indépendant du droit des États» 
 
Il est tout aussi vrai que les relations internationales ne se terminent 
pas avec les États8, mais ceux-ci demeurent toutefois un élément essentiel de 
la société internationale et, en fin de compte, l’acteur international qui peut 
prendre des décisions majeures pour soi-même, indépendamment de la 
capacité de décision d'un autre ou de plusieurs États, de même que l'État 
peut prendre des décisions qui le concernent sans qu’il puisse être influencé 
                                                     
6 Nous nous trouvons ici dans le domaine des acteurs internationaux multinationaux, 
tels que les organisations internationales, parmi lesquels, ici et maintenant, nous 
citons l'UE, l'ONU, l'OTAN, etc. qui organisent de nombreuses réunions auxquelles 
participent les représentants des États qui ont des intérêts communs, à savoir en 
sont membres ou membres associés. 
7 Reuter, P, Combacau, J., idem. 
8 Un autre type de relations internationales sont celles établies entre les États et les 
organisations internationales ou seulement entre ces dernières, mais nous ne nous 
proposons pas d’examiner la diplomatie multilatérale, comme on l'appelle, mais de 
rester dans l'analyse de la coopération bilatérale. 
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ou conditionné par d'autres acteurs9. De toute évidence, nous parlons de 
conditionnements formels, stipulés par le droit international ou les traités 
internationaux et non pas de ceux circonstanciels que les États, notamment 
les grandes, utilisent dans la vie réelle afin d’imposer des idées et des actions. 
 
Cette présence de l'État dans la réalité de la société internationale 
rend difficile la démocratisation de ladite société, les autres acteurs de la vie 
internationale ne parvenant pas encore à être aussi important que les États. 
C’est ainsi que, de façon générale, lorsqu’on parle de la démocratisation des 
relations internationales, c’est toujours aux États qu’on fait apel, soit 
directement, soit indirectement. Ainsi, dans le cas de l'UE on ne peut pas 
parler d'une organisation internationale régionale démocratique sans faire 
mention de la démocratisation de ses membres. De ce fait, la progressivité 
de l'adhésion à l'UE de nouveaux États provenant de l'ancienne zone 
d'influence soviétique qui, au fur et à mesure qu’ils répondaient aux normes 
démocratiques, aux valeurs de l'UE10, pouvaient démarrer le processus de 
raprochement et d'adhésion à l'UE. Autrement dit, nous ne pouvons pas 
parler d'une société internationale démocratique sans l’existence d’États 
démocratiques. 
 
Les relations interétatiques peuvent ou non être pacifiques. Si les 
relations non-pacifiques impliquent l'utilisation de la force, les autres sous-
entendent la coopération politique et économique, culturelle, scientifique, 
etc. À leur tour, celles-ci peuvent toutefois traverser des périodes positives, 
ou, tout au contraire, tendus, sans toutefois aboutir à des conflits militaires. 
Les relations interétatiques pacifiques sont diverses et peuvent aller de la 
délimitation des frontières ou des cours d’eau frontaliers jusqu'à 
l’établissement des relations formelles bilatérales à caractère permanent. Tel 
est le cas des missions diplomatiques et consulaires, qui représentent la 
forme suprême des relations interétatiques établies entre les sujets de droit 
international. À l’exception de la guerre, qui était aussi, comme je le disais, 
une expression des relations interétatiques, les relations diplomatiques entre 
les États renforcent l'idée générale que l'État continue d'être le principal 
instrument pacifique de la vie internationale et des relations entre les États. 
Autrement dit, jusqu'à un certain point, les relations internationales se 
confondent avec les relations diplomatiques, étant donne que le réseau des 
missions diplomatiques et consulaires est devenu indispensable pour la 
                                                     
9 Voir par exemple le cas de la Grande-Bretagne qui a décidé de quitter l'UE suite au 
référendum qui a eu lieu cette année. 
10 Union Européenne, La version consolidée des traités. Charte des droits fondamentaux, 
OPUE, Luxembourg 2010, art. 2 et 3.  
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transmission d’informations, la négociation permanente et les actions 
mutuelles des États, du moins depuis l’aparition de la diplomatie 
permanente. C’est en ce sens que Merle dit que «les relations diplomatiques 
et consulaires sont essentiels dans les relations internationales»11. 
 
Les relations diplomatiques et consulaires sont par conséquent des 
relations officielles et formelles que les États établissent avec d'autres sujets 
de droit international, dévelopées par l’intermède des institutions spécifiques 
pour le domaine des relations extérieures telles que: 
- les ministères des affaires étrangères en tant qu’institutions 
centrales; 
- les missions diplomatiques permanentes ou temporaires et les 
bureaux consulaires, en tant qu'institutions domiciliés à l'étranger. 
 
Ces missions diplomatiques ou consulaires sont ouvertes et, 
respectivement, fermées, sur la base d'accords bilatéraux spécifiques ou 
d’accords plus généraux, tels que les traités bilatéraux de nature politique qui 
traitent également ce type d’aspects. Il y a aussi d'autres relations 
interétatiques entre les différentes institutions des États, qui, 
quoiqu’officielles, elles n’engagent pas au même niveau que les ministères 
des affaires étrangères ou les missions diplomatiques et consulaires. Par 
conséquent, lorsqu’on veut connaître la position officielle d'un État, on se 
tourne vers les ministères des affaires étrangers et les missions 
diplomatiques. 
 
3. Analogies, différences et la coordination des missions 
diplomatiques et consulaires  
Les relations diplomatiques et consulaires répondent aux certaines 
caractéristiques communes, mais il est à remarquer aussi des différences, de 
même que la nécessité d'une coordination permanente de celles-ci dans le 
cadre de l’État de résidence, coordination qui a pour but l’amélioration de 
l’action extérieure de l'État de provenance12. 
 
 
 
                                                     
11 Merle, M., idem 
12 Dans la littérature roumaine de spécialité, il a y quelques ouvrages fondamentaux 
pour le domaine de la diplomatie, parmi lesquels je cite Malita, M., La Diplomatie, 
Editura Didactica si Pedagogica, Bucuresti 1975, un véritable ouvrage scientifique 
qui a constitué, pendant des décennies, „la bible” de la diplomatie roumaine, ainsi 
que Anghel, I., M., ,, Le Droit Diplomatique et Consulaire”, Lumina Lex, Bucuresti, 
1996. 
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Similitudes: 
- les relations diplomatiques et consulaires sont établies et se 
déroulent par la décision des institutions autorisées à cette fin et en vertu de la 
législation interne de chaque sujet de droit international. Les missions 
diplomatiques et consulaires font partie intégrante des ministères des affaires 
étrangères des États ou, le cas échéant, d'autres organismes publics habilités à 
cet égard et visent à faire converger l'action extérieure des États. En d'autres 
termes, les missions diplomatiques et consulaires suivent la ligne tracée par les 
autorités de tutelle, soit le ministère des affaires étrangères, soit une autre 
institution habilitée, et reçoivent des instructions de leur part; 
- les missions diplomatiques et consulaires font partie du système de 
relations internationales, étant établies sur la base d'accords entre les sujets 
de droit international et en vertu du droit international;  
- l’établissement des relations diplomatiques et consulaires donnent 
lieu à des obligations, des facilités et des oportunités; 
- les États ont personnalité juridique de droit international, en 
d'autres termes, ils peuvent envoyer et recevoir des missions diplomatiques 
et consulaires; 
- les missions diplomatiques et consulaires sont généralement 
ouvertes entre les États qui se reconnaissent mutuellement et se 
reconnaissent aussi de façon réciproque les formes de gouvernement; 
- les relations diplomatiques et consulaires se déroulent, à présent, 
par le biais des missions diplomatiques et consulaires permanentes qui sont 
composées de personnel diplomatique et, respectivement, consulaire, qui va 
et vient, tandis que la mission diplomatique et, selon le cas, consulaire 
conservent leur caractère de permanence;  
- normales, qui régissent les relations diplomatiques et prévoient 
certaines conditions juridiques particulières, telles que l’immunité, les 
privilèges, les prérogatives et les facilités spécifiques, sans lesquelles l’activité 
diplomatique et consulaire pourrait être entravée dans son déroulement 
normal13. 
 
                                                     
13 Voir par exemple l'immunité, dont le but est uniquement celui d'assurer un cadre 
normal pour le déroulement de l'activité des diplomates accrédités dans un État, 
sans que ceux-ci puissent être soumis à des pressions de n’importe quelle nature de 
la part des institutions de l'État de résidence ou des ou certaines entités non 
étatiques appartenant à l'État respectif. L’immunité n’est pas un paravent à l’abri 
duquel les diplomates peuvent commettre des violations de la législation nationale 
de l'État de résidence ou de la législation internationale sur la base de laquelle 
fonctionnent aussi les missions diplomatiques, dans le cas contraire ceux-ci étant 
rappelés dans le pays de provenance, à l’initiative des ministères des affaires 
étrangères ou à la demande des autorités de l'État de résidence.  
In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga 
 
391 
Différences: 
- bien que toutes les deux visent à établir et à renforcer les relations 
bilatérales entre les sujets de droit international, il existe de nombreuses 
différences entre les deux, la plus important étant que, alors que les 
diplomates des ambassades représentent juridiquement l’État qui les a 
accrédités, ceux qui travaillent dans les consulats ont plutôt une mission 
technique (activité notariale, par exemple, ou encore d'autres tâches 
concrètes liées au visa, au commerce, etc.) qui est exercée, normalement, sur 
une fraction du territoire d’un État, tandis que l'ambassade a compétence 
sur l'ensemble du territoire de l'État où elle fonctionne14 ; 
- tandis que les agents diplomatiques (les diplomates des 
ambassades) représentent juridiquement, dans toutes ses fonctions de 
relations internationales, l'État accréditant auprès de l'État accréditaire, le 
consul représente les intérêts de l’État qui l’a accrédité dans les limites de ses 
fonctions et attributions, et, notamment, dans la fraction du territoire dont il 
est chargé et uniquement auprès des autorités locales de la région; 
- des différences peuvent être identifiées aussi dans les modalités de 
nomination et dans les documents nécessaires. Ainsi, les chefs des missions 
diplomatiques sont nommés par le président de l’État par le biais des lettres 
de créance remises au chef de l’État accréditaire, alors que le consul est 
nommé par le gouvernement sur la base de certains documents bien 
différents par raport aux lettres de créance. Si la nomination est différente 
en ce qui concerne les composantes des missions diplomatiques et ceux des 
missions consulaires, la fin de la mission est à son tour différente pour les 
uns et les autres; 
- même si les missions diplomatiques et consulaires ont 
pratiquement le même statut diplomatique (immunité, etc.), en échange, les 
membres respectifs des ces missions n’ont pas exactement les mêmes 
privilèges et immunités générales, dans le cas des missions consulaires celles-
ci se réduisant pratiquement à ce qui est directement lié à l'exercice de leurs 
fonctions et n’étant pas, par conséquent, générales comme pour les 
diplomates; 
- si les missions diplomatiques peuvent être permanentes et ad hoc, 
les missions consulaires ne peuvent être que permanentes; 
- si les missions diplomatiques déroulent une activité spécifique de 
droit international, les autres fonctionnent, en grande partie, dans les limites 
du droit national, par exemple, la délivrance des certificats de naissance, de 
décès ou de mariage pour les citoyens de l'État qu'elles représentent, la 
délivrance des passeports à leurs propres citoyens ou des visas pour les 
citoyens l'État dans lequel ils sont accrédités, etc.; 
                                                     
14 Gonidec, P.F., Relations internationales, Montchrestien, Paris, 1977. 
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- alors que l’activité diplomatique peut être bilatérale et 
multilatérale, celle consulaire ne peut être que bilatérale, à savoir entre les 
Etats.  
 
La coordination entre les missions diplomatiques et consulaires: 
- entre celles-ci il y a coordination, l'interconnexion et 
complémentarité; 
- mais il y a aussi une hiérarchie, de telle façon que, si dans le cadre 
du même État existent à la fois une ambassade et des consulats, la première 
est censée de coordonner l’activité déroulée par ses consulats dans les 
différentes régions de l'État hôte; 
- l’ambassade représente l'État accréditant auprès de l’État 
accréditeur, la nomination même des consuls s’effectuant avec la 
participation du chef de la mission diplomatique; 
- il y a quand même des situations où un État n’a pas de mission 
diplomatique permanente dans un pays, mais il a consulat général, situation 
dans laquelle, en vertu du principe de la perméabilité de deux types de 
missions, stipulé par la Convention de Vienne de 1961 et 1963, le consulat 
général peut substituer, dans certaines conditions, la mission diplomatique. 
En réalité, cette action du consulat général est complémentaire à celle 
déroulée en parallèle par une autre mission diplomatique du même État, 
accréditée dans un autre pays de la même région, qui reçoit l’accréditation de 
représenter de point de vue diplomatique son État d’origine auprès de l’État 
où il n’y a pas une mission diplomatique, mais il existe un consulat général. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Très souvent, on accorde plus d'importance aux consulats et aux 
consulats généraux qu’aux ambassades, et ceci pour une raison très simple: 
le citoyen, roumain dans notre cas, qui se trouve à l'étranger, a plus 
d’interactions avec l'institution du consulat, tandis que cela n’arrive que 
rarement qu’il a besoin des services de l'ambassade. 
La perception est toutefois différente si l'on considère la dimension 
officielle de la relation interétatique, qui se déroule plutôt par l’intermède 
des ambassades, que par celui des consulats, ces derniers ayant, comme je le 
disais, un rôle limité par les compétences spécifiques et la séquence 
territoriale qu’ils couvrent. 
On fait souvent de graves confusions entre les consulats et les 
consulats honoraires, qui ne sont pas, en fait, de missions officielles d'un 
État dans un autre État, mais plutôt l’expression de la bienveillance privée et 
ou de l’intérêt de promouvoir l'image d'un État dans un autre État, sans 
pour autant répondre aux exigences spécifiques d’une mission diplomatique 
officielle. Autrement dit, certaines personnes physiques, en profitant de 
In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga 
 
393 
l'absence de missions diplomatiques ou consulaires d'un État auprès d’un 
autre État, peuvent proposer à ces deux États - au premier pour de le 
représenter, à l'autre pour lui permettre cela – l’ouverture d'un tel bureau 
privé afin d’organiser, à ses frais et en nom propre, diverses activités de 
promotion (fête nationale, missions commerciales, par exemple.). En aucun 
cas, le consulat honoraire ne peut pas délivrer des documents officiels de 
l’État qu’il veut, de sa propre initiative et avec les moyens dont il dispose, 
servir. 
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The Status of Indigenous Peoples According to the International 
Law 
There is a false conception that the organization of indigenous 
peoples is in oposition to the state organization. Although they often rely on 
migration, indigenous peoples have a strong sense of belonging and a strong 
connection with their traditional land. Nomadic societies, considered a 
primitive form of organization, have been ignored for a long time by 
international law. Such territories were seen as vacant or terrae nullius 
therefore claims to ownership and sovereignty were out of place.1 From the 
16th century until the mid-19th century, the colonization of America by 
Europeans brought up the issue of indigenous people, many authors taking a 
stand against the injustices committed with them. For example, Francisco de 
Vitoria believes that "indigenous peoples possess natural rights, including the 
right to have independent political institutions and exercise exclusive rights of 
ownership and sovereignty over the territories."2  
After the Cold War, international law shifted its direction to protect 
human rights and the principle of self-determination. Therefore, the rights of 
indigenous peoples are now recognized and respected. 
The international law does not have a specific definition of 
indigenous people. Article 1 of the ILO Convention No. 169, tries to explain 
the term as:  
 “(a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural 
and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections 
of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly 
                                                     
* Babeş-Bolyai University, Department of International Studies and Contemporary 
History, E-mail: adrian_ivan2007@yahoo.com, nut_ruxandra@yahoo.com. 
** Babeş-Bolyai University, Department of International Studies and Contemporary 
History, E-mail: adrian_ivan2007@yahoo.com 
1 Marco Moretti, International Law and Nomadic People, p.2. 
2 Ibidem, p.3. 
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or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws 
or regulations; 
 (b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as 
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations 
which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which 
the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or 
the establishment of present state boundaries and who, 
irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own 
social, economic, cultural and political institutions.”3 
However, the representative variant is offered by Jose R. Martinez 
Cobo4 in Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Peoples: 
“Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed 
on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the 
societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. They form at 
present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, 
develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their 
ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in 
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system. 
This historical continuity may consist of one or more of the 
following factors: 
a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them; 
b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands; 
c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, 
living under a tribal system, membership of an indigenous 
community, dress, means of livelihood, lifestyle, etc.); 
d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, 
as the habitual means of communication at home or in the 
family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal 
language); 
e) Residence on certain parts of the country, or in certain regions 
of the world; 
f) Other relevant factors. 
                                                     
3 Understanding the Indigenous and Tribal People Convention, 1989 (No. 169) - Handbook for 
ILO Tripartite Constituents, Programme to Promote ILO Convention No. 169 (PRO 
169) and International Labour Standards Department, February 2013, p.32. 
4 The Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities of the UN. 
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On an individual basis, an indigenous person is one who belongs to 
these indigenous populations through self-identification as indigenous and is 
recognized and accepted by these populations as one of its members.”5 
Because it has its own culture, language, way of life and its historical 
and traditional link with the land and natural resources, meeting all these 
criteria, the Sami people should be seen primarily as an indigenous people, 
and then as a minority. 
 
National and International Representation of the Sami People 
Who are the Sami? Probably many would consider them a nomadic 
people, living in isolation in the distant and cold areas of the Scandinavian 
Peninsula, surrounded by ice and the aurora borealis, without knowing that 
behind this perception there is a special story to be told. It is a society with 
an old and rich history that did not remain forgotten in the past but is 
strongly anchored in the present, fighting for a future in which their culture 
may find its own place. 
Sápmi, the territory inhabited by the Sami, also known as Lapland, 
does not exist as an independent state and refers to an area of 47,000 km² in 
northern Norway, 116,000 km² in northern Sweden and 130,000 km² in 
northern Finland, with a population estimated at 70,000 inhabitants, of 
which the largest number, 45,000 are located in Norway.6 
Being a small country in size and population, Norway was formed 
and developed as a homogenous state with a strong national spirit. This let 
them believe that there is no culture superior to the Norwegian culture. The 
fear of an invasion that would jeopardize this culture resulted in a strong 
desire to supress any form of cultural manifestation of the minority peoples, 
especially the Sami, the largest and most representative. When the Sami 
identity consciousness began to take shape and the voice of the population 
has begun to emerge, drawing attention not only nationally but also 
internationally, the Norwegian state had no choice but to change its position, 
forced by the international agreements and conventions ratified as a member 
of various organizations. But translating and accommodating these provisions 
into national legislation was not easy. But perhaps the most difficult task was 
to change the mentality of the Norwegian people towards minorities, making 
them believe that the socio-cultural integration of the Sami does not 
jeopardize the integrity and security of the state, but is rather beneficial to the 
economic, social, political and cultural development, transforming their 
                                                     
5 Mattias Åhrén, Martin Scheinin, John B. Henriksen, The Nordic Sami Convention: 
International Human Rights, Self-Determination and other Central Provisions, Journal of 
Indigenous Peoples Rights No. 3/2007, p.62. 
6 Vasile Cucu, Dorin Iancu, Laponii, Bucureşti, Ed. Tineretului, p.10. 
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contribution to various sectors in a win game. Therefore, the Norwegian state 
redirected its policies to ensure equality of all citizens, and at the same time, to 
protect diversity. Among the many characteristics that determine the 
distinctive features of indigenous peoples, three pillars are essential to the 
preservation of identity: education in the mother tongue, access to traditional 
land and resources and national and international representation. Therefore, 
this article focuses on how the Norwegian state has chosen to address 
national and international representation of its Sami population, with a brief 
comparison of other Nordic Sami representation models. 
One of the central pillars in preserving the Sami identity is the 
establishment of national and international organizations. The first 
organization in Norway was created at Kvænangen in 1903 from the need to 
resist the Norwegianization process. After the Second World War, their 
number increased and dealt with issues ranging from promoting the 
interests of reindeer herders, to cultural and linguistic protection. 
The cooperation between the Sami from the northern countries 
began in 1956, by setting up a Nordic Sami Council, an NGO which 
includes Sami organizations from Norway, Sweden and Finland7, being the 
main political institution until the apearance of the Sami Parliament. The 
Council's goal is to suport and develop the economic, cultural, social and 
linguistic rights of the Sami, as well as their traditional rights to land, water, 
natural resources, by protecting them under the law of each state. Its 
objectives are to promote the rights and interests of the Sami, to consolidate 
a stronger sense of affinity among the Sami, to obtain recognition and 
maintain their rights in the legislation of the three states.8  
The legal basis for the Sami policy is the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Norway of May 17, 1814 (with amendments), which provides 
in Article 110a that " It is the responsibility of the state to create the 
conditions for the Sami people to preserve and develop its language, culture 
and way of life."9 
Law No.56 of June 12, 1987 regarding the Sami Parliament and 
other legal matters, the Sami Act, mentions in Chapter 1, that: " The 
purpose of the Act is to enable the Sami people in Norway to safeguard and 
develop their language, culture and way of life. The Sami people are to have 
their own nation-wide Sameting elected by and among the Sami population. 
                                                     
7 Harald Eidheim, Aspects of the Lappish Minority Situation, Oslo, 1971, p.42-43. 
8 www.saamicouncil.net, accesat la data de 8 septembrie 2016. 
9 The Constitution Of The Kingdom Of Norway, disponibil la: 
http://www.constitution.org/cons/norway/dok-bn.html, accesat la 16 octombrie 
2014. 
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[…] Sami and Norwegian are languages of equal worth. They shall be 
accorded equal status.”10 
The Sami Parliament is the main source of information and 
dialogue of the government regarding the Sami policy. It has also assumed 
the responsibility of administrative tasks and implementation of policy 
measures in certain areas. The Parliament has already received the task to 
deal with the cultural, economic and linguistic initiatives. 
Elections for the Sami Parliament are held every fourth year. 41 
representatives are elected from 13 constituencies with three representatives 
from each constituency. The representatives are elected from lists 
established by Sami national organizations, Norwegian political parties and 
local lists. The Sami Parliament is directed by a president and an executive 
council. The Sami being members of Norwegian parties is a characteristic of 
the Norwegian Sami Parliament compared with the Sami parliaments in 
Sweden and Finland.11 
The first Finnish Sami organization was established in 1931, having 
as members non-Sami people, concerned with this issue. The first 
commission on Sami issues was established in 1949, followed by the Sami 
Parliament in 1972. The difference in the establishment of the Finnish Sami 
Parliament is that in the case of Finland, the initiative to safeguard the Sami 
identity came from the state, while in Norway and Sweden was the result of 
Sami demands. The old Sami Parliament was replaced by the new one in 
1995, by an Act on the Sami Parliament, stipulating that the Sami have 
status as an indigenous people. The Sami Parliament has 21 representatives 
and four deputies who do not represent national parties. 12 
The Sami Swedish Parliament was established in 1993. It has 31 
representatives who are not members of any Swedish national party. The 
Swedish Government apoints a chairman for the Sami Parliament and the 
Sami Parliament elects a board with seven representatives and seven 
deputies. The Sami Parliament has financial, educational, linguistic and 
social responsibilities. Thus, the Sami Parliament is a governmental 
administrative authority and also an elected Sami body, making it a difficult 
task to represent an ethnic minority and the state at the same time.13  
 
  
                                                     
10 Act of 12 June 1987 No. 56 concerning the Sameting (the Sami parliament) and other Sami legal 
matters (the Sami Act), disponibil la: www.regjeringen.no/en/doc/laws/acts/the-sami-
act-.html?id=449701, accesat la 16 octombrie 2014. 
11 Eva Josefsen, The Saami and the National Parliaments-Channels for Political Influence, 
Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights No.2/2007, p.21. 
12 Ibidem, p.18-19. 
13 Ibidem, p.20-21. 
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Conclusions 
In conclusion, the Sami organizations are the primary means of 
Sami national and international representation. They apeared and developed 
since the early 20th century and aimed at either resistance to assimilation or 
cultural and linguistic issues. The Sami international cooperation began with 
the establishment of the Sami Council, the first Sami political institution, 
fighting for recognition in the three Nordic states and for legislative change 
to include economic, social, cultural and linguistic rights. At international 
level, it is an active representative in the World Council of Indigenous 
Peoples and the UN. 
But it should be noted that there is a possibility that the Norwegian 
state might not have been so open to recognize the indigenous status of the 
Sami if it had not attracted international criticism in the Alta controversy 
(the construction of a hydroelectric power plant on the Sami traditional 
lands), where the situation was out of control. But the outcome was 
favorable for the Sami. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway was 
amended by inserting an article that forces the state to take responsibility to 
protect the Sami language, culture and way of life. The Sami Law clarifies 
that the Kingdom of Norway was established on the territory of two 
peoples, the Norwegians and the Sami, therefore the latter must enjoy equal 
rights. Moreover, it consecrates the creation of the Sami Parliament, having 
a representative role in matters that concern them directly, such as cultural, 
economic, linguistic initiatives and functioning as a financial mediator. We 
can notice a decrease of other national Sami organizations’ influence with 
the development of the Sami Parliament, which took over all tasks.  
It is obvious that after the Second World War the Sami 
representation issue has changed, gaining local, regional, national and even 
international influence through the Sami Parliaments’ collaboration in the 
three Nordic countries and by bringing the Sami issues on the UN 
international agenda. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
After a long period of Norwegianization, the Sami people of Norway, Sweden and 
Finland began to develop a strong sense of belonging that made them more vocal and visible on 
national and international level. Thus, the relations with the national governments are 
characterized by another aproach. The states started to shape their policies in order to make the 
integration process easier. One important aspect of identity preservation is the establishment of 
Sami national and international organizations. Therefore, the present article intends to analyze 
how the Norwegian state has chosen to address national and international representation of its 
Sami population, with a brief comparison of other Nordic Sami representation models. 
 
In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga 
 
401 
Bibliography 
 
Act of 12 June 1987 No. 56 concerning the Sameting (the Sami parliament) and other Sami 
legal matters (the Sami Act), available at: www.regjeringen.no/en/doc/laws/ 
acts/the-sami-act-.html?id=449701, accessed at 8 September 2016.  
Åhrén, Mattias, Scheinin, Martin, Henriksen, John B., The Nordic Sami 
Convention: International Human Rights, Self-Determination and other Central 
Provisions, Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights No. 3/2007. 
Cucu, Vasile, Iancu, Dorin, Laponii, Bucureşti, Ed. Tineretului. 
Eidheim, Harald, Aspects of the Lapish Minority Situation, Oslo, 1971. 
Iancu, Dorin, Prin ţările aurorei boreale. 
Josefsen, Eva, The Saami and the National Parliaments-Channels for Political 
Influence, Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights No.2/2007. 
Moretti, Marco, International Law and Nomadic People. 
The Constitution Of The Kingdom Of Norway, available at: http://www.constitution.org/ 
cons/norway/dok-bn.html, accessed at 8 September 2016. 
Understanding the Indigenous and Tribal People Convention, 1989 (No. 169) - 
Handbook for ILO Tripartite Constituents, Programme to Promote ILO 
Convention No. 169 (PRO 169) and International Labour Standards 
Department, February 2013. www.saamicouncil.net, accessed at 8 
September 2016. 
 
 
  
403 
 
 
 
The Securitate/Security- a Scourge against Romania’s 
European Intellectual Message 
 
 
 
Adrian-Gabriel CORPĂDEAN* 
 
 
Our analysis focuses on one of the most damaging factors that 
played a major role in the opression directed against a considerable segment 
of intellectuals, many of whom being therefore obliged to flee Romania 
during the 44 years of communism. This factor is the feared Security, also 
known by its official title, The Department of State Security. The switch of sides 
adopted by Romania on the 23rd of August 1944, when the country joined 
the Allies in their fight against an ever less powerful Axis, was decisive in 
this regard. Thus, it triggered a massive, unprecedented invasion of the 
Ministry of the Interior by communist aparatchiks, undoubtedly obedient to 
the will of the Kremlin. In fact, one of the missions of the Soviet Union in 
its satellite nations was that of completely replacing their intelligence 
services with new structures, whose manipulation would prove to be 
uncomplicated and lucrative. 
The infamous NKVD, translated as The People’s Commissariat for 
Internal Affairs, which in 1954 became the KGB, or Committee for State Security, 
was given the task of overseeing the abovementioned transition, under the 
watchful eye of the famous SMERSH, namely Russian counter-espionage 
units. The latter had already been set in place throughout the territories that 
had been invaded by the Red Army.1After the official coming to power of 
the communist regime in Romania, the Great National Assembly, which was 
controlled by this Party, proclaimed the creation of the General Direction of the 
People’s Security, on the 30th of August 1948, by means of Decree no. 221. Its 
more common name was simply The Security. 
The functions of this new structure were deliberately formulated in 
too general a manner, in order to foster discretionary interpretations, in 
keeping with the line of the Party. Hence, according to its birth act, the 
Security was meant to protect the values of democracy and the Romanian 
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state against damaging intrusive factors originating from both within and the 
outside of its borders. Due to this generous formula, the instruments of the 
Security became almighty, all the more because this institution was given 
exclusive rights in the area of penal cases that fell into its area of 
competence. In fact, the Security made constant use of these provisions, so 
as to act in a discretionary manner. A relevant example could be the arrest, 
in 1951, of no fewer than 300 students from the Faculty of Medicine in 
Bucharest and their internment in labour camps, under the charge of studying 
in the French Library, for lack of speciality handbooks at their own faculty.2 The 
Security became one of the most powerful and widespread political police 
institutions, comparable in size with the famous Stasi, if we are to take into 
account its 11.000 agents3 and about 500.000 informants registered 
throughout the years within its structures.4 
The powers conferred upon the administrators of this service were 
also considerable, given the fact that its director participated by right in the 
meetings of the Romanian Government (called the Council of Ministers), 
having the rank of Minister. It is also worth mentioning the fact that the 
first person to have been apointed to this position was Alexandru Nicolschi 
(1915-1992), whose real name was Boris Grümberg.5 A former commander 
of SMERSH and a KGB agent, he made a habit of following guidelines 
issued by Moscow and of being merciless, a veritable tormentor of modern 
times, who was also responsible for the atrocities committed in Piteşti 
Prison. 
Before the turning point of 1956, when the attributes of the 
Security were redefined, the role of this institution had been major, chiefly 
in the case of the numerous trials directed against the enemies of the people. Its 
roles were basically those of information provider and evidence 
manufacturer. Moreover, the surveillance task given to the Security was 
assumed with tremendous ardour, so that the establishment of a consistent 
form of control over the Romanian society would soon become a reality. 
Needless to say, the officers of the Security did not hesitate to go beyond 
purely informative missions, as their involvement in a series of notable 
murders began since the first years of their mandates. Under the leadership 
                                                     
2 Archives of the Executive Political Committee of the Central Committee, no. 
264/18 February 1972, volume 4, p. 13. 
3 According to La Repubblica, Guilia Cerino, Romania, paese leader dello spionaggio. Neanche 
Ceauşescu aveva tanti 007, 28 January 2010. Last access: 21 June 2016. 
4 According to Ms Germina Nagâţ, Head of the Investigations Department of 
CNSAS, Ziare.com, http://www.ziare.com/stiri/frauda/l-express-securitatea-din-
romania-a-fost-mai-puternica-decat-stasi-978131. Last access: 21 June 2016. 
5 Jakab Albert Zsolt, Peti Lehel, Procese şi contexte social-identitare la minorităţile din 
România, ISPMN, 2009, p. 191. 
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of General Alexandru Drăghici, the Security underwent a bloody purging 
campaign amongst Party members and even within its own structures, by 
launching accusations of deviationism, so as to consolidate the communists’ 
position. It acted under the careful supervision of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-
Dej.6 The operations were conducted, without a doubt, in accordance with a 
Stalinist pattern that Dej was never capable of detaching from, in spite of 
the signals sent by the Kremlin in this respect, following the arrival of Nikita 
Khrushchev. 
The human potential of the Security was massively expanded during 
its first decade of existence, which resulted in an inclusion of over 50.000 
people within its ranks. Amid this increase in prominence of the Service, the 
new leader from Bucharest, Nicolae Ceauşescu, chose to keep relying on its 
mechanisms, in order to conduct his opression against intellectuals and 
other social categories. The removal of Drăghici from office, whom 
Ceauşescu profoundly disliked, triggered a restructuring period for the 
Security, under the leadership of Ion Stănescu, a close collaborator of 
Ceauşescu’s. This new director promoted intellectuals within the Security’s 
structures, without altering the purpose it had been designed for.7 In the 
eyes of Ceauşescu, the Security was a restive horse that nobody knows how to ride8, 
which basically meant it had to become fully submitted to him, personally. 
The restructuring of the Security, in the form of a Department for the Security of 
the State, was completed in 1972, following several attempts at rendering this 
institution more effective. The result was a clearer description of its 
prerogatives. Thus, the Department, which continued to be part of the 
Ministry of the Interior, became structured into six Directorates, 
corresponding to the need to control the most important areas of society 
and politics. 
These Directorates thus covered areas such as foreign and internal 
intelligence, counter-intelligence, economic and military counter-espionage, 
protection of dignitaries and penal investigations. Furthermore, in order to 
enhance the operational capacities of the Security, its special units were also 
given the task of overseeing communications, antiterrorism and external 
trade.9 
                                                     
6 Teşu Solomovici, Răzvan Theodorescu, Sorin Roşca Stănescu, Securitatea şi evreii: 
Despre călăi şi despre victime, Ed. Ziua, 2003, p. 53. 
7 Mark Stolarik, The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: 
Forty Years Later, Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2010, p. 257-259. 
8 Speech by Nicolae Ceauşescu before the Plenary Assembly of the Communist Party 
of Romania, 22-25 April 1968. See: Archives of the Executive Political Committee 
of the Central Committee, no. 268, volume 6, p. 18. 
9 Cristian Bocancea, La Roumanie, du communisme au post-communisme, L'Harmattan, 1998, 
p. 44. 
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With regard to the methods used as part of the Security’s 
procedures10, it is clearly noticeable an utter disrespect towards citizens’ 
rights and freedoms, since tortures, mutilations, rapes, forced labour, 
nocturnal operations, searches, questionings and arrests were conducted in a 
discretionary manner, one that was inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Penal Procedural Code. One of the most urgent priorities for the 
Communist regime was to infiltrate agents of the Securityinto all levels and 
social layers, with the aim of identifying people that would express critical 
views of the regime and of persuading them to denounce their peers. 
Obviously, all these cases that were often dishonestly processed arrived 
before courts of law, often on the desks of judges that were under the 
influence of the Party. Therefore, guilty verdicts and harsh sentences were 
mere formalities. Only after the adoption of the Geneva Convention by 
Romania, in 1955, and its UN membership aproval, towards the end of the 
same year, did the state begin to bring back some order to the judicial 
system. For instance, it started examining the situation of political prisoners, 
who had been awaiting their trials for a long time.11 
Within the Security itself, there was a Directorate whose aim was to 
censor the postal service, in what was one of the most despicable acts 
performed by the regime. It was mainly directed against intellectuals, who 
were thus prevented from transmitting information to the outside world, 
regarding their conditions within the country. Moreover, it was the same 
Directorate that exerted control over letters coming from abroad, in an 
attempt to cut off all the communication routes of the Disapora. This 
proved to be one of the most destructive hurdles against the spread of an 
anti-communist message at an interpersonal level. The psychosis was so 
prominent in this regard that the aforementioned Directorate was ordered 
to gather handwriting samples, so as to identify more easily those citizens 
who would exchange messages that were detrimental to the regime. In 
addition to this, it was the same Directorate that initiated a campaign meant 
to register all typewriters and copy machines - not very numerous at the 
time - with the help of the Militia services.12 
Another priority of the communist regime, achieved by means of 
the Security, was the surveillance directed against foreigners. A special 
Directorate of the Security was placed in charge of counter-espionage 
                                                     
10 Marian Stere, Arhivele Securităţii, volume 2, Ed. Enciclopedică, 2002, p. 435. 
11 Romulus Ruşan, Répression et terreur en Roumanie communiste, in Communisme 91-92 - 
Roumanie, un totalitarisme ordinaire, L’âge d’homme, 2007, p. 25-26. 
12 Henry W. Degenhardt, Revolutionary and dissident movements: an international guide, 
Longman, 1988, p. 312. 
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operations, including those conducted within the Army13, which normally 
focused on every foreign citizen who was located in Romania. It was 
mandatory for all Romanians to notify the Security directly after any contact 
with a foreign citizen, so that the risk factor of the situation would be 
assessed. It is to be mentioned that the role of the Counter-espionage 
Directorate was to prevent such contacts, as much as possible, since 
information exchange was regarded as a potential menace to the state, which 
could lead to Romanian citizens being determined to ask for political asylum 
by walking into western embassies in Bucharest.14 
In reality, this form of control was practised in the case of 
professional or scientific contacts as well, involving Romanian intellectuals 
and their western counterparts; if such an exchange did occur, the 
Romanian researcher (for instance) was automatically contacted by a 
representative of the Security and had to answer a series of questions 
pertaining to the joint scientific activity, the themes discussed and any 
foreign publications.15 
In order to attain this goal, the General Operations Technical 
Directorate completed the other structures of the Security through its 
surveillance instruments of all means of communication utilised by citizens. 
These included telecommunications involving a recipient that was located 
abroad, as well as the transmission of fax messages and telegrams. The 
human potential engaged in such missions was indisputably immense. 
The objectives of this Directorate are strictly connected to our 
argumentation, which emphasises the extraordinary difficulty encountered in 
the act of sending messages that were against the official line of the party 
beyond the frontiers – both communicational and physical – of a country 
that was becoming more and more isolated. Any message that may be 
qualified as anti-communist had to be subjected to censorship, which is why 
traditional means of communication could hardly be successfully used in 
this act performed by the Romanian Diaspora. 
With regard to the policies aimed at international travel, a National 
Commission dealt with visas and passports16 and established harsh 
mechanisms of surveillance in case of any attempt at immigrating. This 
transformed every citizen that submitted a request for a passport into a 
potential enemy of the system. Therefore, the conditions were formulated in 
such a way as to allow only high-ranking officials of the Communist Party to 
                                                     
13 National Central Historical Archives, Bucharest, Central Committee of the 
Romanian Communist Party collection, Chancellery, file 4/1950, p. 9. 
14 Ion Mihai Pacepa, Cartea neagră a Securităţii, volume 3, Omega, 1999, p. 34. 
15 C.N.S.A.S. Archives, collection I, file 6151, p. 48-49. 
16 Decision no. 800 from 10 April 1967, Art. 2, published in the Official Journal, no. 32 
from 13 April 1967. 
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undergo travel abroad. This is one of the factors that explain the relative 
stagnation in the number of Romanians within the western Diaspora, such 
as the ones in Britain and France, whose members encountered countless 
problems because of such policies. 
Inside the country, it was the same Directorate that dealt with the 
surveillance of communications at a particularly intimate level, through the 
installation of microphones not only in public spaces, such as offices and 
companies, but also in the houses of Romanians. This was a grave breach in 
the right to a private life, a principle which lay at the basis of western 
constitutionalism.In this way, the Security perpetuated a feeling that nobody 
could feel safe from the sharp hearing of the state, which translated to a 
serious violation of the intellectual condition, as the interruption of contacts 
with the outside world set boundaries to the breadth of knowledge 
horizons. Moreover, the Ceauşescu couple was informed, according to 
General Ion Mihai Pacepa, that the Security was able to operate ten million 
microphones simultaneously, by 1984, so as to meet the obsession of the 
dictator in this respect.17 
This situation was so grave that not even members of the Security 
and the state aparatus were immune to this wave of surveillance and 
opression. A Directorate of the Security, named Internal Affairs, made use 
of similar practices of censorship, in order to exert its control over members 
of the institution, taken as a whole. Government officials and high-ranking 
members of the Communist Party were not exempt from this either. This 
aproach is proof of a purely Bolshevik line influencing Romanian 
communists, characterised by fear and even anxiety towards treason and a 
suspicion that anybody may be playing a double role and, thus, plotting 
against the regime. Clearly, the army and police forces (referred to as the 
Militia) were not spared of this paranoia, as they played a strategic role in the 
protection and self-conservation of the regime. After General Pacepa, 
counsellor of President Ceauşescu, Secretary of State in the Ministry of the 
Interior and Head of the Foreign Intelligence Services, fled to the United 
States, in 1978, the pressure exerted by the communists on their own ranks 
became even more intense.18 
The information leak caused by Pacepa, who was sentenced to 
death in absentia and pursued by the Romanian Secret Service and 
Ceauşescu’s allies, was extremely severe. International terrorist Carlos The 
Jackal was employed by the Romanian President in order to assassinate the 
                                                     
17 Ioan Scurtu, Politica şi viaţa cotidiană în România în secolul al XX-lea şi începutul celui de-al 
XXI-lea, Mica Valahie, 2011, p. 348. 
18 Vladimir Tismăneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons: a Political History of Romanian 
Communism, University of California Press, 2003, p. 221. 
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General, for a one-million-dollar reward, a mission he failed to accomplish. 
Nevertheless, Carlos was responsible for the bombing of the Radio Free 
Europe headquarters in Munich, which occurred on the 21st of February 
1980, allegedly under the terms of the same contract.19 This undoubtedly 
proves that Ceauşescu would resort to anything so as to hunt down his most 
powerful oponents, in spite of the severe consequences this could have on 
an already badly shaken image in the eyes of the West. 
The Romanian people were so fearful of the omnipresence of the 
Security’s agents and informants that rumours were circulating, claiming that 
a quarter of the total number of citizens were part of this category. The real 
figures contradict this so-called myth, although informants were sufficiently 
numerous so as to prevent dissidents from creating viable organisation 
formulas against the regime and from engaging in frequent contacts with the 
Diaspora from countries like Britain, France and the USA. 
During the last decade of the Romanian totalitarian regime, the 
pressure increased to unbearable levels, mostly for intellectuals. The 
methods aplied by communists relied more and more on plots, public 
accusations, blackmail and humiliation. The Security often assigned a 
negative connotation to the term intellectual, by wrongfully associating it with 
felons, a phenomenon which greatly affected prominent personalities, as 
well as students, who became constant targets of the regime. 
The investigations undergone by the Security and its usual methods 
were genuine sources of aprehension, which further discouraged, through 
their mere existence, the emergence of a true oposition to the Party. Torture 
had become a household word, chiefly within the walls of communist 
prisons, where it manifested itself in two equally outrageous ways: the 
physical one and the psychological one20. False confessions extracted 
through tortures were naturally accepted by a justice system sympathetic to 
the Single Party and they represented one of the most commonly utilised 
sources for building penal cases by the prosecution. Some of the usual 
forms of torture, which intellectuals were also submitted to, included water, 
food and sleep deprivation, extreme threats directed to the person 
submitted to interrogation or his/her family and friends, along with 
constant harassment. 
The end of the Security came only with the Revolution of 1989, 
when its restructuring occurred and the last Director, General Iulian Vlad, 
was placed under arrest21. The National Council for the Study of the 
                                                     
19 John Follain, Jackal: The Complete Story of the Legendary Terrorist, Carlos the Jackal, 
Arcade Publishing, 1998, p. 131-132. 
20 Pierre Glaudes, Pierre Bayard, Terreur et Représentation, ELLUG, 1996, p. 153. 
21 Henry F. Carey, Romania Since 1989: Politics, Economics and Society, Lexington Books, 
2004, p. 504. 
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Archives of the Former Security (CNSAS) was created by Law no. 197 from 
199922, with the aim of making available for the public the files depicting the 
acts of this repressive institution. Moreover, the Council has the legal right 
to rule whether a person was involved in political police acts, in the interest of 
the communist regime. This represents a major step forward in uncovering 
the horrors committed by this instrument of a regime that was declared 
illegitimate and murderous by President Traian Băsescu, before the Romanian 
Parliament, on the 18th of December 200623, in an act that benefitted from 
considerable coverage throughout the continent. 
It is then explicable why the attraction of the exile was a reality 
during the time of the People’s, and later, Socialist Republic of Romania, if 
one takes into account both the physical threats and the psychological 
pressure intellectuals were subjected to. The lifestyle imposed by 
Ceauşescu’s regime, particularly after 1980, involving an exacerbated 
personality cult and a series of absurd, megalomaniac projects, took its toll 
on the population and led it to the brink of despair. The last five years of 
the regime were particularly rough, as they were placed under the auspices 
of rationalisation, in an obsessive attempt by Ceauşescu to pay the external 
debt of Romania and to further an irrational aproach to industrialisation. 
Starting with 1984, elementary foodstuffs started to be available in ever 
lower amounts, while the few that could be found on the market were of 
extremely poor quality. This triggered a steady increase in contraband. 
Furthermore, one year later, the rationalisation programme was expanded, so 
as to encompass the sale of fuel to the population, in spite of the exports 
Romania was undergoing in this regard.24 
The limits set to vehicle traffic, yet another severe violation of the right 
to free movement, was accompanied by the shortage of electricity, affecting 
households, stores, institutions and public lighting. Meanwhile, heating was also 
drastically reduced in winter, which led to more problems within a healthcare 
system that was already facing a lack of medicine and equipment. 
Romania’s foreign policy instruments became severely limited, as 
western countries voiced oposition to its obsolete regime. The tourism 
potential of the country also fell25, exports became non-profitable and the 
heavy industry exhibited the only signs of development, but without being 
able to exploit its full potential. The technology made available for the 
population was below minimal standards, especially in terms of telephone 
                                                     
22 Official Journal, no. 619 from 17 December 1999. 
23 Dorin Dobrincu, Vladimir Tismăneanu, Cristian Vasile, Raport final al Comisiei 
Prezidenţiale pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România (Final Report of the Presidential 
Committee for the Analysis of Communist Dictatorship in Romania), Bucharest, 2006. 
24 Ioan Scurtu, op. cit., p. 324. 
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lines and media access. The large factories triggered an abrupt increase in 
pollution levels, which left a deep imprint on urban environments, while 
rural ones were also undergoing damaging transformations. 
This is the overview of a context which had little to offer and became 
hostile not only to the intellectual elite, but to all social categories, with the 
exception of a few privileged pawns of the regime. Set against this outrageous 
background, there was the Security, a political police which constantly 
exceeded its already too permissive mandate, to the detriment of freedom of 
expression and the comfort of everyday existence. The negative consequences 
triggered by the prolonged exposure of intellectuals to the opression of this 
institution left scars that have not yet fully healed on the face of the Romanian 
intelligentsia. From the points of view of artistic creation, political expression 
and international openness, this segment of the population was severely 
opressed by the long, merciless tentacles of the hated Security. Had it not 
been for an active Romanian diaspora in the West, this repression would not 
have been portrayed with such accuracy in the media and the public debates 
that raised awareness about the precarious conditions beyond the iron curtain. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The article analyses the actions of the Romanian Securitate/Security against 
intellectuals and the population in general, during the communist period, with the aim of assessing 
the harmful effects it had on multiple aspects of the country’s social, political, cultural and 
international affairs. The structures within the Security were tailored according to the needs of the 
regime, so that it may exert its control over all potentially rebellious segments of society, while its 
means were unusually cruel. A general sense of anxiety was therefore created, which enabled the 
Communist Party to maintain the high ground, to the detriment of dissident voices and an ever 
more active Diaspora. However, the Security became so hated that it immediately turned into a 
target, following the Revolution of 1989. 
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Normative power faces Great Power politics. The 
European Union, Russia, and the Ukrainian crisis1 
 
 
 
Dacian DUNA* 
 
 
Introduction 
The comemoration of one of the most tragic moments of our 
history, the First World War, is marked by an athmosphere of distrust and 
disrupted solidarity between the West and Russia, following the Ukrainian 
crisis that began on 21 November 2013 when Viktor Janukovych, the then-
president of Ukraine, suspended the announced preparations for the signing 
of an association agreement with the EU. This resulted in a spiral of events, 
starting with the mass protests in the ‘Euromaidan’ (21 November 2013-
spring 2014) leading to what is already known as ‘the Ukrainian revolution’, 
followed by the ouster of Janukovych and his self-exile to Russia (February 
2014), the unrest in the largely Russian-speaking Eastern and Southern 
Ukraine (the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and Crimea), the annexation of 
Crimea by the Russian Federation, and the civil war in Donbass (an ongoing 
conflict) where the separatist Russophones suported by Russia started a war 
against the authorities in Kiev. The West reacted and accused Russian 
Federation of military intervention in Ukraine (February 2014) gradually 
imposing a variety of sanctions on Russia and Crimea, from interdictions to 
indidual citizens to economic measures. Russia retaliated imposing its own 
sanctions on the Western countries from Europe and North America, 
following the same logic. A repetitive action-reaction upset the relations 
between the West and Russia to unparalleled levels since the Cold War. A 
particular case shocked the West: the shooting down on 17 July 2014 of the 
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, a passenger flight from Amsterdam to Kuala 
Lumpur, claiming 298 lifes. 
The events in Ukraine and their internationalization could be 
regarded as a prelude to a ‘new’ conflict between the West and Russia, an 
                                                     
1 This is an update version in English to an article published by the same author in 
2015. 
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ideological conflict that once seemed to have receded after the end of the 
Cold War. The newest ‘avatar’ of the Cold War is the conflict between on 
one hand a post-Westphalian and Kantian West, a society focused on 
political and economic neoliberalism, and on the other hand a Russian 
Federation bringing once more in the scene an assertive and aggressive Real-
Politik, probably perceiving itself as the exponent of those oposing the 
international order based on the globalization suported by the West, or the 
exponent of traditional values rejected by the secular West. This Russia of 
Vladimir Putin seems to reverberate the times when the conservative 
principles of the Czarist autocratic imperialism had prevailed over the liberal 
ones not only within the Russian heartland, but also throughout Eastern 
Europe. Now it does not seem to be by chance that the crisis occurring in 
the Russian-Western relations has been previewed by the EU’s offer to 
Ukraine, to sign an association agreement at the meeting of the Eastern 
Partnership in Vilnius (28-29 November 2013). The Kremlin’s reaction to 
the violent removal of Viktor Yanukovych’s regime (after it’s unilateral 
renounciation to sign the association agreement with the EU), materialized 
by the annexation of Crimea, has surprised by its roughness and total 
desconsideration of the principles of the UN Charter and of the 
international conventions and treaties. It has also illustrated the considerable 
gap between the normative power of the European Union and the new 
Russian autocracy, packed in democratic clothes, yet presenting some 
similarities with other Russian historical manifestations of the same sort: 
Czarist autocracy and Soviet totalitarianism. 
Today’s Russia looks once again a power hunted by the ghosts of 
the past, by the proverbial fear of geostrategic encirclement, subversion and 
invasion from the West. The destabilization of Ukraine might have seemed 
for Russian leadership as preferable to the prospects of a European Ukraine 
that might have brought the issues of democracy, rule of law and human 
rights closer to Russia’s Western frontiers, hence closer to the Russian 
population. Not to mention the frontiers of the European Union and 
possibly NATO, even though the Western perspective on territoriality is 
considerably different.  
It seems rather obvious that Russia’s reaction to the fall of the 
Yanukovych regime and the establishment of a pro-Western government in 
Kiev looks a disproportionate one, standing more as a reminder of the 
Soviet invasions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) than as a 
modern 21st century policy.  
This situation has questioned from the beginning the willingness 
and capabilities of the West to solve such a crisis. The EU, a Kantian type 
of power, based on the rule of law, is confronted with a traditional Great 
Power, based on force and willingness to use military force, aproaching 
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global politics in geopolitical manner. The Ukrainian crisis maybe perceived, 
unfortunately, as a new illustration of the dialectical expression formulated 
by Nicolae Titulescu following Germany reoccupied the demilitarized area 
of Rhenania (1936): „the force of the right versus the right of the force”. 
This paper is not focused on analysing Russia as an international 
player, nor the Ukrainian crisis, as it might be expected after the previous 
paragraphs. It is rather interested in aproaching the position of the 
European Union as an international actor, manifested through its external 
action. An assumption already suggested in the title is the following: the EU 
is a civilian, normative or Kantian power confronting in the Eastern Europe 
a classical or traditional power based on geopolitical reasoning, or Real-
Politik: the Russian Federation2. It evaluates whether or not the CFSP-
CSDP mechanism developed under the auspices of the Lisbon Treaty can 
safeguard the interests of the European Union and succesfully promote the 
security and stability of the Eastern Partnership area, in the context of the 
regional destabilization promoted by Russia. Obviously, the aproach risks 
being perceived as superficial or speculative, given the volatility of the 
international situation, or biased since it views things from the perspective 
of a Member State of the European Union satisfied with the international 
status quo. However, under the current circumstances the risks are 
acceptable. Even if the regional situation stabilizes (it relatively did it after 
the Minsk agreement), in the medium run the tendency in EU-Russian 
relations seems not to be encouraging, at least during the mandate of 
President Putin. Under these circumstances, the EU should reconsider and 
reinforce its external action capabilities, especially in the military field, living 
behind the constraints of the civilian-normative model. 
Since the recent Russian enterprise in Crimea is an unprecedented 
challenge for the current international order since the 1990 invasion and 
annexation of Kuwait by the Iraqi forces, one may find necessary to redefine 
the concept of power in international relations, how it is aplied to the 
European Union, what are the defining and specific elements of the current 
external action mechanism of the EU (responding to the question of what 
the EU can do under the circumstances) and what the EU has done to solve 
the Ukrainian crisis, before drawing several conclusions. 
 
  
                                                     
2 This form of classical geopolitical reasoning may seem to be archaic to many in the 
post-Cold War world, or to what is today defined as appropriate behavior (or 
political correctness), but if it continues to be successful it could change the rules of 
the game with unforeseeable consequences.  
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Power and international politics 
‘Power’ remains a strong, yet controversial, concept in international 
politics since the beginning of written history. It marked and even shaped 
the ages in such manner that we are sometimes labeling the periods after 
important characters or important political entities or empires (e.g. the 
Roman age, the Victorian age). Its definition and the international status it 
implies are constantly changing, but some of its features endure.  
Power is both a material and an immaterial force, while it remains a 
contested concept, “with different interpretations held together more by a 
family resemblance than a core meaning”3. Power is rather a social 
convention rather than an objective feature of a certain actor or entity or for 
a better explanation, power is socially acknowledged and socially contested. 
All the ‘Great Powers’ of history had been both admired and envied by the 
lesser actors. However, besides these arguments, power has always been 
linked to status and prestige, or how an actor is acknowledged by the other 
actors in international relations. 
 
Great Powers  
The term ‘Great Power’ was probably first coined during the 
Congress of Vienna (1814-1815). Lord Castlereagh, the British Foreign 
Secretary during the Vienna settlement and one of the architects of the post-
Napoleonic balance of power system, used the term in a diplomatic letter 
addressed in February 13, 1814: “It affords me great satisfaction to acquaint 
you that there is every prospect of the Congress terminating with a general 
accord and Guarantee between the Great powers of Europe, with a 
determination to suport the arrangement agreed upon, and to turn the 
general influence and if necessary the general arms against the Power that 
shall first attempt to disturb the Continental peace”4. 
There is no one universal standard or definition for what labells a 
great or major power. However, there are some elements that can be 
considered as defining or ‘normative’ for a ‘Great Power’: international status 
or prestige, territorial/spatial size, military capabilities, population size, economic power, 
and cultural influence. Certainly, at least some dimensions are no longer as 
relevant as they used to be in defining the status of Great Power. 
Technology and especially the information revolution seem now to be the 
driving forces in the world. They are continously eroding the Westphalian 
                                                     
3 Felix Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams, eds., Power in World Politics, Londra şi New 
York: Routledge, 2007, p.1. 
4 M.A. Chaudhary and Gautam Chaudhary, Global Encyclopedia of Political Geography, 
New Delhi: Global Vision Publishing House, 2009, p.98. 
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state system5. Even though they are no longer easy to localize, these facets 
of power still continue to provide the main advantage for the Western 
societies (especially the US) in front of the rest of the world. Yet, this 
advantage is hard to maintain, and even illusory (even though there are 
voices that accuse the direct involvement of the West in the Euromaidan or 
the Arab Spring, the proofs are not substantiable, the movements using a 
globalized technology available to everyone – the social media - to advance 
domestic agendas rather than secretive foreign interests). Even so, it is 
seemingly important to stress that the modern and postmodern attributes of 
power are inextricably linked. Their presence can reinforce the position of 
the international actor, while the lack or precarity of one of them could 
create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by internal or external forces.  
Another related concept is that of ‘superpower’. The term was 
originally coined by Nicholas Spykman in a series of lecturers given in 1943 
and it was later developed in his famous book The Geography of Peace edited 
posthumously by Helen Nicholl (Harcourt Brace and Company, New York, 
1944). Superpower is traditionally considered to be one step higher than a 
great power6. In fact, the term regards the capacity to project power 
globally. According to Lyman Miller, superpower can be measured along 
four axes of power: military, economic, political, and cultural (the last being 
identical to Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power)7. Most scholars consider 
that only Britain, the US, and to a certain degree Soviet Union enjoyed 
during different epochs this status for limited periods of time. 
One may notice that delimitating ‘great power’ and ‘superpower’ 
seems rather superfluous in the age of globalization. The existence of 
superpowers certainly made sense in the Cold War period explaining the 
bipolar system. After the Cold War the trend towards a multi-polar or multi-
layered system is clear. Globalization forces international players to project 
power globally with a focus on soft rather than on hard power. 
Nevertheless, the military dimension still makes the difference between the 
United States and other powers in terms of global strategic reach. The US 
seems to have remained for now primus inter pares and the only superpower 
left after the Cold War, though the term remains too emphatic and rather 
vague. Yet, ‘superpower’ is still apealing. Many authors have already 
                                                     
5 One must remember the ‘Facebook revolutions’ spreading from the Middle East to 
Ukraine. For instance, the call for a rally of a Ukrainian journalist on its Facebook 
page (Mustafa Nayyem – born in Kabul, Afghanistan) in Maidan Nezalezhnosti 
(Independence Square) triggered the ‘Euromaidan’ movement which lead to the 
downfall of Viktor Yanukovych. 
6 Ibidem, p.221. 
7 Lyman Miller, “China an emerging superpower?”, in Stanford Journal of International 
Relations, Winter 2005, URL=< .stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.03_miller.html> 
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emphasizing the relative decline of America or predicted the rise of other 
‘superpowers’ such as the European Union, China, India, Brazil or Russia8. 
Perhaps, the most apropriate formula in the post-Cold War world to define 
such entities would be ‘global powers’. The formula acknowledges their 
global visibility and does not contradict their focus on the world’s macro-
regions (globalism coexists with regionalism). 
 
Prestige and international status  
Even though there still is anarchy in the international system9, a 
certain hierarchy is implicitly acknowledged by the participants to the global 
game. The status of global power comes as an international recognition of 
the power capabilities of the actor, as well as its active involvement in 
international politics. It is, in fact, a corollary for the other dimensions of 
global power. It can be maintained only by setting and respecting the rules 
of the game. 
Besides the recognition of the others, an actor must self-define itself 
as a global power: “A belief in great-power status, traditionally expressed in 
terms of imperial identity and pretensions, provided a crucial means to 
strengthen the legitimacy of states”10. Japan’s reluctance to harbor its global 
power status in the 21st century made most scholars ‘forget’ that not long 
ago this country was the second economic ‘superpower’ of the world after 
the United States (before 2010 when it was replaced by China). They base 
their premises on the dynamics of other actors and the relative stagnation of 
Japan during the last two decades (since the crisis of 1997).  
On the other hand, some actors (like North Korea or Iran) consider 
that international legitimacy can be obtained by joining the nuclear club. 
Thus, they are investing in acquiring nuclear vectors, believing that prestige 
and status can be obtained by threat. Of course, this course of action is 
considered outlawed by the powers favorable to the status quo, but apealing 
for the countries that reject the current settlement or international order 
(not only states). 
                                                     
8 Rockwell A. Schnabel with Francis X. Rocca, The Next Superpower? The Rise of Europe 
and Its Challenge to the United States, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005; Piya Mahtaney, India, China and 
Globalization: The Emerging Superpowers and the Future of Economic Development, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007; Steven Rosefielde, Russia in the 21st Century: The Prodigal Superpower, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005; John Redwood, Superpower Struggles: Mighty 
America, Faltering Europe, Rising Asia, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
9 Anarchy defined as the lack of a supranational authority limiting the national 
sovereignty.  
10 Jeremy Black, Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony: The World Order since 1500, 
Londra and New York: Routledge, 2007, p.12. 
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Territorial size 
The territorial dimensions of a major power are no longer as 
relevant as they used to be throughout history, since distances lost their 
meaning in the age of globalization and Internet. Nevertheless, size still 
matters due to indirect conditions. A sizeable territory increases the chances 
of having large populations and significant natural resources. Even the few 
exceptions of great powers that initially started from relatively small 
territories (most notably Britain and Japan) do not contradict the idea that 
major powers have huge territorial size. The UK, for instance, developed at 
its peak the largest maritime empire in history, covering a quarter of the 
globe. Presently, the territory matters not only for its symbolical or strategic 
load, but also for its resources in a world obsessed by energy. It is not by 
chance that Gazprom, the Russian energy giant, has already proposed 
shortly after the Crimean referendum of 2014 to exploit the oil and gas 
reserves of the newly acquired province of the Russian Federation11. The 
annexation of Crimea was proving to be also businessly connected. In fact, 
the EU strenghtened at the EU European Council of December 2014 the 
sanctions on investment, services and trade with Crimea and Sevastopol, 
indirectly linked to the energy issue. 
 
Economy, technology, and knowledge 
The traditional form of power dynamics includes the economic 
factor. Economic and technological capabilities are decisive for defining a 
major power. They are usually interlinked with military capabilities, 
influencing the ability to project power, even though it will be a mistake to 
establish a deterministic linkage12.  
A simple recourse to history could prove that there was no great 
power without a strong economy and a highly sophisticated technology in 
comparison with those of its neighbors. The economic determinants of 
power on the global scale are currently more important than ever. They 
seem even to surpass the military power up to a certain degree13. The 
powerful states (in terms of economy, technology and knowledge) are 
always capable in rapidly developing military capabilities when and if they 
deem necessary. On the other hand, the economic and technological decline 
                                                     
11 Reuters, „Gazprom proposes oil and gas development in Crimea – RIA”, 18 martie 
2014, URL=< http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/18/ ukraine-crisis-gas-
idUSL6N0MF1X020140318>. 
12 Jeremy Black, op.cit., p.22 
13 The cases of South Korea and Japan indicate that economic power is not sufficient 
to be considered Great Powers. These countries are dependent on the American 
military power to deter the external threats toward their defense (like the North-
Korean one). 
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downgrades if not totally eliminates a major power. This was the fact with 
the Soviet Union, starting its inexorable declin in the late 1970s. It was 
clearly visible also in the demise of the Ottoman Empire nicknamed in the 
mid-19th century “the sick man of Europe”, an expression attributed to Tsar 
Nicholas I of Russia.  
Technology, knowledge and especially information are fundamental for 
any Great Power and profoundly interconnected to the political-military factor.  
Intelligence capabilities are at the intersection of the mentioned 
factors and another source of power often used by the historical Great 
Powers to protect external interests, internal secrets and reveal the secrets 
owned by other states. There is not only an arms race between the states but 
also a power race and the technological and scientific edge achieved over the 
others is an important aim of state’s policies.  
 
The political-military factor 
The traditional and most enduring perspective on power in 
international relations comes from the realist-historicist tradition. According 
to it, military power and political preponderance (if not hegemony) are 
considered the most pervasive indicators of a ‘Great Power’, even though 
they should be backed by demographic, political, economic, and cultural 
indicators. Paul Kennedy’s analysis emphasizes the interaction of strategy 
and economy, noticing that the rise and fall of ‘great powers’ is the result of 
the wars fought by their armies and the more or less effective use of 
economic resources during wartime, or the way the economy of a certain 
nation state is progressing or regressing compared to other nations during 
the period between wars14. 
Having powerful armies has always been the most important way of 
acquiring power in the international stage. However, both Nazi Germany 
and Soviet Union have had huge and highly sophisticated armies to boost 
their grand strategies, yet they eventually failed in maintaining their power. 
Currently, the military balance is relatively favourable to the United States, 
the only state that can be labeled as military ‘superpower’. However, military 
might is not a guarantee for maintaining the great power status in 
international politics indefinitely. The other major powers that focus on 
economic capabilities could use them in building-up military arsenals. The 
peaceful industrial capabilities have always been used even by democracies 
to suport the military-industrial complexes and conversely. For instance, 
Britain, the US, and more recently China, have developed throughout 
                                                     
14 Paul Kennedy, Ascensiunea şi decăderea marilor puteri. Transformări economice şi conflicte 
militare din 1500 până în 2000 (The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000), Iaşi: Polirom, 2011, p.12. 
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history huge commercial fleets just to notice that they further needed navies 
to defend and protect them.15  
 
Population 
Not surprisingly, the rise of the European Great Powers coincided 
with a significant population growth caused by the development of superior 
technology in agriculture, industry and advances in medicine, allowing the 
accumulation of surpluses and the overcome of the subsistence economy 
specific to the Middle Ages. In wars, if all other conditions were met, 
numbers have always been the decisive factor. The European balance of 
power favored the most dynamic nations, with growing populations and 
strong societies. 
The French had dominated the continental balance of power during 
the 18th century when it sheltered the biggest European population16. They 
were declining in the 19th century while the Germans have become the 
largest European nation. With such arguments in mind, it is not surprising 
that Germany held the uper hand after its unification in 1870. Currently, 
Germany is momentarily keeping its demographic edge in front of the other 
European nations, even though the notion of power has become 
considerably more complex. However, there is another argument for 
maintaining the importance of the population factor. Numbers are 
important in accounting the votes held by the Member States of the 
European Union within the EU Council. At least, a sizeable population 
remains an important issue in the EU, partially explaining why Turkey is 
kept at bay by the great powers of the European Union. 
Certainly, the demographic element of power is not decisive. The 
rise of Europe and later the United States or the Soviet Union is not directly 
related to the population factor, but especially to other elements. Consider 
the position of China, East Asia, South Asia or even Africa in terms of 
demographic leverage in comparison with those of the US or USSR. 
Moreover, the demographic factor works only as far as the population 
maintains its dynamism, which means that it is progressing. The current 
population patterns are showing that most of the major powers and the rest 
of the developed world confront the prospects of an ageing population, 
                                                     
15 This was the finding of Admiral Mahan in the late 19th century. His masterpiece on 
geostrategy – The Influence of Seapower upon History: 1660-1783 (1890) – had soon 
become a handbook not only for the US Navy, but also for the navy of imperial 
Japan.  
16 The United Kingdom had maintained its domination over the maritime balance of 
power throughout the same period and even longer, during the 19th century and 
early 20th century. 
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which could worsen the current economic growth rates17. Hence, the 
population factor is both an oportunity and a vulnerability, depending on 
the context and actor. In future it may become necessary to revise the entire 
economic philosophy since the current economic orthodoxy is based almost 
exclusively on macroeconomic parameters, on constant and sustainable 
economic growth, which imply the constant demographic growth to suport 
the consume.  
 
Culture 
The cultural dimension of power is no less important. In fact, one 
might consider culture or cultural superiority to be the binder of all 
dimensions. Culture is the immaterial factor of power but strongly 
interdependent with the material ones. It is about influence, persuasion, 
admiration or seduction. A clear example was since 1945 the so-called 
“cultural imperialism” exercised by the US upon the Western hemisphere 
with reverberations across the whole world. Since culture is better explained 
by Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power18, we will aproach it in the following 
section of the paper. 
 
Joseph Nye’s views on power 
One of the most significant and instrumental classifications of 
power in international relations was proposed by Joseph Nye, one of the 
most prominent neoliberal IR theorists. Nye developed three concepts of 
power based on how power is exercised: hard, soft, and smart. 
The concept of ‘hard power’ is based on military capabilities and 
has a long history in the tradition of realist thinking. From Machiavelli and 
Hobbes to modern theorists such as Morgenthau, Kissinger or 
Mearsheimer, realists have always put an emphasis on military power. 
However, a neoliberal theorist such as Joseph Nye Jr. completed the image 
of hard power by adding the economic dimension to the military one: 
“military power and economic power are both examples of “hard” command power that 
can be used to get others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements 
(‘carrots’) or threats (‘sticks’)”19.  
Hard power is the ability of the governments to impose sanctions 
or exert threats, which is mostly similar to the negative definition of state’s 
                                                     
17 Neil Howe, Richard Jackson, “The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and 
Geopolitics in the 21st Century”, report by Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 23 mai 2008. 
18 Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power”, în Foreign Policy, nr. 80, 1990, p. 153-171. 
19 Idem, Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization, London, New 
York: Routledge, 2004, p.5. 
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power defined by Max Webber.20 In fact, the views of the German theorist 
on power have inspired Joseph Nye in defining the concept of soft power too. 
Weber created the tripartite formula of authority based on legitimacy: 
traditional, charismatic and legal-rational21. The charismatic legitimacy largely 
corresponds to Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power.  
While hard power is basically an expression of governmental policy, 
soft power is not necessary an exclusive instrument of the government22, 
but can also be used by a multitude of state and non-state actors and it is 
stimulated by the market economy. Essentially, soft power is linked to the 
ability of influencing and even shaping the preferences of the others or in 
Joseph Nye’s original words: “The ability to establish preferences tends to be 
associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, values, institutions, and 
a vision that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority. If a leader represents a 
vision and values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead. Soft power often 
allows a leader to save on costly carrots and sticks. Simply put, in behavioral terms, soft 
power is attractional power. In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets that 
produce such attraction” (Nye, 2006a:2). 
There are certain differences between the hard and soft avatars of 
power. However, the hard and soft dimensions cannot be neatly separated, 
just as Joseph Nye argues. The postmodern global powers have to use a 
complex mixture of hard and soft foreign policies, using “sticks”, “carrots”, 
and “seduction”. This intersection of hard and soft power is encrusted in 
the concept of “smart power”. Joseph Nye named it “the ability to combine 
them effectively”23. 
Certainly, power is a very complex concept of the international 
relations. The concepts of power explored above are instrumental for the 
objective of this paper, while the main focus still remains in measuring the 
EU as a would-be global power and attempting to respond to the questions 
many European citizens are raising: who are we, what is and what it should 
become the united Europe? Unfortunately, many European citizens do not 
seem to understand or want to understand what the EU stands for, since 
most of them “cannot see the forrest for a tree” like Hegel would say, or in 
                                                     
20 According to Webber, the state is “a human community that (successfully) claims 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Webber quoted 
by Dreijmanis, 1994: 156). 
21 They are formulated in the essay “The three types of legitimate rule” (Die drei 
reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft) published by Max Weber în Preussische 
Jahrbücher 187, 1-2, 1922.  
22 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public 
Affairs, 2004, p.14. 
23 Idem, “Think Again: Soft Power”, in Foreign Policy, 23 februarie 2006, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/22/think_again_soft_power. 
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other words have a limited perception of the march of history. The life 
obsessively anchored in the present is a characteristic of the Western 
thinking, which can put the West in front of certain dangers it cannot 
anticipate. 
 
The European Union: what kind of power? 
The EU is clearly not a traditional actor in international relations. 
Therefore, the defining rules aplying to a traditional ‘Great Power’ does not 
necessary aply to the EU. Only if the neorealist prediction that the EU will 
become a ‘superstate’ the realist predicaments for superpower capabilities 
and behavior could aply in its case. However, it is clear that there are few 
signs that the EU will become such an entity for the time being, if ever. 
Then, what formula can be considered to define Europe? 
If one considers the classical ‘norms’ for power (prestige, economy, 
technology, military, culture, population or territory) the EU could be 
considered as an emergent power of the contemporary world, only the 
military and economic factors questioning this statement. 24 
In terms of international prestige, it is clear that the EU has become 
a player in the international affairs. It already developed a structured 
dialogue with other global players, most notably with the US, China, or 
Russia (even though there are diplomatic settbacks). The major global 
players acknowledge the importance of the Union even in criticizing it. In 
terms of economy and technology the European Union is a giant in trouble, 
but remains one of the most developed entities in the world, a global 
competitor even for the United States. In military terms the EU is not itself a 
global power because the defense field remains clearly under the control of 
the Member States. However, it has potential: it brings together traditional 
former Great Powers such as France or Britain, the industrial power of 
Germany and actively involved states in conflict prevention and crisis 
management, like the Scadinavian countries, Italy, Poland and even Romania.  
In population terms the EU has about 500 million inhabitants (7% 
of world’s population), having the third population after China and India. 
Territorial dimensions are less impressive but significant – the greatest part 
of the European continent. However, a problem for the European Union is 
not the aggregation of these mentioned factors but the level of integration 
and cohesion. The indefinite postponement of the European federal project 
makes from the EU a virtual superpower, not a real one. Even so, the 
current Russian policy towards Ukraine is a reaction to the pro-European 
integration attitude exerted by the Ukrainian population – an attitude 
                                                     
24 One could argue here about the lack of a common European army and about the 
economic crisis still unsolved in the Eurozone (see the case of Greece for example).  
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leading to the fall of a pro-Moscow regime. This actually says a lot about 
other actors’ perception towards this potential global power, the European 
Union. The Europeans usually claim that the European integration is not a 
geopolitical one, yet the Russian policy of destabilizing Ukraine after the 
success of Euro-Maidan shows that Russia perceives the EU as a 
geopolitical threat to its ambitions of restoring the empire. Ukraine was 
indeed a historical part of Russia’s hinterland. This view is shared by several 
thinkers, not only from Russia. For instance, a leading Turkish think-tank 
apreciated that the EU is covering for the ambitions of Germany to build-
up a hinterland in Eastern Europe using its economic power25. 
 
Going back to the power concepts of Joseph Nye one could notice 
certain aspects regarding the case of the European Union: 
1. The hard power capabilities of the EU are quite limited and 
dependent on the limited willingness of the Member States to coerce 
certain states or entities. The experience of the crisis in Lybia (2011-
present) and the recent crisis in Ukraine are indicative. The terrible 
human tragedy in Syria and Iraq caused by ISIL/ISIS makes another case 
for the impression that the European Union exhibits a lack of political 
willingness and capabilities to undertain the whole spectrum of crisis 
management tasks. These all add to the previous experiences of the 
Union in different phases of crisis management that all have long 
demonstrated the limited hard power capabilities of the EU. The only 
significant hard power instrument remains the economic sanctions with 
their relative lack of effectiveness. 
2. The EU holds important capabilities of soft power, even though 
its attractiveness has relatively eroded following the European economic 
crisis (the sovereign debts crisis especially). Nevertheless, many of the 
European Union’s neighbours are still attracted by the prospects of a 
closed relationship with Brussels and have accepted EU conditionality to 
enjoy favorable trade and bussiness relations with the EU. The 
development of cross-border policies such as the ENP was instrumental 
in augmenting the EU soft power capabilities. Under these 
circumstances it is not by chance that many authors define the EU as a 
civilian power in conflict prevention and crisis management, which 
means using especially soft power capabilities. 
3.  The lack of significant hard power capabilities makes the EU 
not qualify for what Nye terms smart power. Yet, the industrial and 
scientific potential of Western Europe can easily be redirected for the 
purpose of developing hard and smart capabilities. In fact, many 
                                                     
25 Günay, 2014. 
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European companies specialized in weapons production are toping the 
worldwide arms deals. France, Germany and Britain are amongst the first 
6 arms supliers of the world, the US lead the global rankings with a share 
of 30% of the global arms sales, followed by Russia (26%), Germany 
(7%), France (6%), China (5%). Britain falling back to the 6th place in 
2012 (SIPRI, 2013). 
 
Jan Manners proposes an alternative concept, one that is probably 
more suitable to describe the European Union as an international actor: 
„normative power”. It assumes shifting the EU emphasis from military or 
civilian capabilities to normative power capabilities, defined as an “ideational 
nature characterized by common principles and a willingness to disregard 
Westphalian conventions”26.  
The idea of normative power is not actually new. Edward H. Carr 
named it once “power over opinion” to distinguish it from the military and 
economic power27. Johan Galtung identifies it with “power of the ideas” or 
normative power to distinguish it from “stick” (remunerative power) and 
“carrot” (coercive power)28. Robert Kagan does not even call it power but 
its oposite. According to Kagan, “Europe is is moving beyond power into a 
self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and 
cooperation”29. Instead, Manners focuses on the ability to change 
conceptions over what is “normal” or “conventional”, considering it the 
greatest power of all30. 
What is aparent in the case of the European Union is the 
willingness to ignore the Westphalian conventions. Its engagement towards 
universal norms and principles lies in the center of the relations between 
Brussels, the Member States and the rest of the world. This is illustrated by 
the set of common principles that should be met by any state wanting to 
join the EU – the so-called Copenhagen criteria: “Membership requires that the 
candidate country has achieved stability of institutions quaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union. Membership pressuposes the candidate’s ability to take 
                                                     
26 Jan Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms”, JCMS, 
Volume 40, Number 2, 2002, p. 239. 
27 Stivachtis, 2007, p. 45. 
28 Galtung, 1982. 
29 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, New 
York: Vintage Books, 2004, p.3.  
30 Jan Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms”, JCMS, 
Volume 40, Number 2, 2002, p. 253. 
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on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of the political, economic 
and monetary union”31.  
According to Manners the normative bases of the European Union 
are concentrated in five central norms: (1) the centrality of peace; (2) the 
idea of freedom; (3) democracy; (4) rule of law; (5) respect for human rights 
and liberties. These are accompanied by four minor norms: the notion of 
social solidarity; anti-distrimination and protection of minorities; sustainable 
growth and good governance32. 
The normative capabilities of the EU can be found in the policies 
and practicies related to relations with the neighbours, from the ENP to 
cross-border cooperation, the Euro-Mediteranean Union, the Eastern 
Partnership or even the enlargement. Yet, this conditionality can sometimes 
be a frustrating barrier to the development of relations with other states. 
The problem accentuates when dealing with actors less inclined towards 
normative commitments (such as Russia or China) and which, at the same 
time, are competing with Brussels for resources and markets. However, 
there are few analysts who would apreciate that the principles and norms 
sustained by the EU and its enormous economic attraction exercised over 
the neighbouring countries from Northern Africa or the Middle East has 
been stimulating the social upheaval in Lybia, Syria, Egypt and other states. 
Nevertheless, one can not overlook that the “Arab Spring” had unfolded 
after the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the 
global financial crisis. Some even argue that there is a clear normative 
influence from the EU over Israel, the Palestinian Authority or even the 
United States33. Unfortunately, the folow-up scenarios in Lybia, Syria, 
Ukraine and up to a certain extent Egypt actually harmed the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and its aim to develop a „ring of friends”. 
Even Manners noticed some limits of the normative power, even 
though he considers it superior to the material types of power. The main 
limit concerns the credibility gap between ideals and numbers. It is difficult 
for an entity to express itself as a normative power and succeed at the same 
time to impose its will upon other actors without credible forces (hard 
power). For these reasons, the power of the norms has to be suported by 
the “norms” (or dimensions) of power. The EU is currently an expression 
of the neoliberal order, without being a neoliberal empire such that of the 
United States of America. 
                                                     
31 EC, “Accession criteria”, Copenhagen European Council, 1993, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria
/index_en.htm 
32 Jan Manners, op.cit., p. 242-243. 
33 Roy Ginsberg, The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire, Lanham, 
Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001.  
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Power by institutional design: reforming the external action of 
the European Union after Lisbon 
The Treaty of Lisbon has proposed the strengthtening of the 
European Union after the great wave of enlargement of 2004 and 2007 and 
the failure of the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”34. The 
Lisbon Treaty, initially known as the “Reform Treaty” was – in the spirit of 
the European integration – a compromise between the sovereign wills of the 
Member States, the “mistresses of the Treaties”. Even this treaty came 
under threat when it was initially rejected by the Irish referendum and by the 
Polish position represented by the late President Lech Kaczinski, a Euro-
skeptical, during the intergovernmental negotiations leading to the signing 
of the treaty and the subsequent delay of the ratification process by the 
same country35. 
The Lisbon Treaty did not bring substantial changes to the 
framework and decision-making mechanisms of the CFSP. It actually 
confirmed once again the evolving character of this policy and the 
functionalist logic that can better explain it for the latest decades. To 
illustrate this, the repeated failure to develop a federal supranational 
construction has lead the European leaders advance the idea of 
progressively extending the area of political cooperation within the CFSP 
framework, creating the necesary synergies for deepening the integration in 
future. This is why the Treaty of Nice (December 2000) introduced the 
enhanced cooperation procedure in the field of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy and the Treaty of Lisbon it extended it towards the Common Security 
and Defense Policy (CSDP). 
The enhanced cooperation procedure involves at least nine Member 
States that have the willingness to advance more rapidly in areas that are not 
in the exclusive competence of the Union without requiring other Member 
States to join them. Moreover, the EU acquis also introduced an oposite 
procedure to that of enhanced cooperation, known as the opt-out clause for 
the states that refuse to join certain common policies (e.g. Denmark refused 
to participate in the CSDP, fact acknowledged as the opt-out clause in the 
Edinborough Agreement of December 199236). 
                                                     
34 In 2005 the French and Dutch electorates rejected the Constitutional Treaties. 
35 See also Alex Szczerbiak, Poland Within the European Union: new awkward partner or new 
heart of Europe?, Routledge, 2012. 
36 This agreement followed the initial rejection of the Treaty of Maastricht by te 
Dutch electorate in June 1992. The agreement confirmed the ‚national compromise’ 
negotiated by the Danish Parliament by which it was acknowledged that Denmark 
has the right to opt-aut in four fields, among which the defense one, Denmark being 
one of the most fervent supporters of the North-Atlantic Alliance.  
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Under the framework of the CSDP the enhanced cooperation 
procedure is known, according to the Lisbon Treaty, as the permanent 
structured cooperation procedure (PSC). This allows those Member States “whose 
military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments 
to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish 
permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework” (see art. 28A.6 and 
28E from the Treaty of Lisbon). Aplying here the functionalist logic specific 
to the European integration process one may notice that forming of strong 
synergies between some countries may even lead to a virtuous circle of 
integration if PSC is a successful experience. The same logic may be helped 
by a psychological characteristic of the human nature apliable also for the 
Westphalian system of state: states are gelous for the success of other states 
and if the success can be attributed to cooperation rather than to conflict 
they may be tempted to join the efforts of the successful group or alliance. 
This partly explains the successes of the NATO and EU enlargements 
towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The PSC might even 
attract the more Euroskeptical Member States if the perceived benefits of 
cooperation and integration are ranked higher than the costs. In a world 
increasingly preocupied with the reduction of governmental spending and 
with new external threats, the idea of advancing in the field of defense 
makes sense. 
The extending of the paserelle clause37 to the field of the CFSP by the 
Treaty of Lisbon is another important innovation for the European acquis. 
Under its auspices the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) is becoming 
increasingly important in the procedures of the Council, thus reducing the 
intergovernmental character of the decision-making process, while at the 
same time increases its potential effectiveness and strengthens the tendency 
of communitarizing the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
The most important elements brought by the Lisbon Treaty with 
the purspose of consolidating the CFSP-CSDP are the ”new” institutions 
and European jobs, resulted from the compromise between the Member 
States which allowed the signing of the Treaty: the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), the President of the 
European Council and the European External Action Service. 
The HR for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is apointed by the 
European Council by QMV(!). She/he is charged with coordinating and 
carrying out the CFSP and CSDP. The HR is “double hatted”, meaning that 
                                                     
37 The Paserelle Clause from the Treaties allows the European Council to decide 
unanimously to replace the unanimity procedure undertaken in the Council with the 
QMV procedure, in certain policy areas with the consent of the European 
Parliament.  
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she/he is also Vice-President of the European Commission. The HR must 
consolidate the tendency towards more coherence in the matters of CFSP 
between the two former pillars of the EU, both in terms of formulation and 
implementation.38 As Vice-President of the Commission the HR must defend 
the interests of this institution within the Council. Even though the reference 
to the right of legislative initiative in matters of the CFSP was eliminated from 
the text of the Lisbon Treaty, there is a provision that ’sweetens’ this aspect 
living for the Commission, the most communitarianized institution of the EU, 
an open door: “Any Member State, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, or the High Representative with the Commission's suport, may 
refer any question relating to the common foreign and security policy to the Council” (Art. 
15a of the Lisbon Treaty).  
A new permanent European function introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty within the institutional mechanism of the EU is the President of the 
European Council. The President is elected by a form of qualified majority 
called the double majority39 by the European Council for a mandate of 2.5 
years and for a maximum amount of two mandates. To strengthen his/her 
European commitment, the President may not hold a national office at the 
same time. The President chairs and ensures the preparation and continuity 
of the work of the European Council meetings in cooperation with the 
President of the Commission and ensures, based on his/her own capacity 
the external representation of the Union in matters of common foreign and 
security policy without prejudice to the powers of the HR (Art. 9B.6 from 
the Treaty of Lisbon). The President helps in facilitating the cohesion and 
consensus within the European Council and presents a report to the 
European Parliament after each European Council meeting. 
The establishment of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), an institution helping the HR is certainly essential for increasing 
the coherence of the external action of the European Union, bringing a new 
role for the European diplomats. The EEAS combines the former 1 and 2 
pillars of the European Union in matters of external action, bringing 
together personel staff from the General Secretariat of the Council, the 
European Commission, and from the national diplomatic services (since 
EEAS has a double mandate: to help the HR and work in cooperation with 
the diplomatic services of the Member States). 
                                                     
38 Here it is about the former European Communities pillar managed by the 
European Commission and the CFSP, one of the two intergovernmental pillars, 
governed especially by the Council of Ministers. 
39 Type of qualified majority voting requiring the agreement of at least 55% of the 
members of the Council, representing at least 65% of the citizens of the European 
Union.  
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The establishment of new bureaucratic structures within the 
European Union is not a danger for the representativeness and the 
democratic character of the European institutions, especially since they 
rather represent the result of an evolution than an institutional revolution. 
However, the HR, the President and the EEAS are institutions that better 
link together the great institutions of the EU: the Commission, the 
Parliament and the Council. The capacity of identifying the common 
interests of the European Union is amplified, not decreased. 
Unfortunately, the Treaty of Lisbon leaves still suspended the 
communitarization of the CSDP. This policy remains almost perfectly 
intergovernmental with unanimity still ruling the decision-making 
procedures. 
The European construction is still a precarious balance between the 
suporters of a united and powerful Europe (Euro-optimistics) and those 
oposing this perspective (Euro-skepticals). The geostrategic conditions in 
Eastern Europe following the Ukrainian crisis might still be a catalytical 
factor for deepening the European integration in the defense field. On the 
other hand, the complicated economic situation of the EU and of its 
Member States and the popular unhapiness with the austerity measures 
suported by the Commission and the governments of the Member States, 
amplify the success of Euro-skeptics, radicals and populists. The situation is 
shown by the increase of extreme right or left parties in Europe during the 
recent years.  
 
Remarks on the EU response to the Ukrainian crisis 
The Ukrainian crisis proves that the external action of the EU 
remains inhibited by the political will or willingness of the major Member 
States of Union, like Germany, France or Britain. The profound dependence 
on the energy provided by the Russian Federation makes some of the 
Member States extremely cautious when dealing with the issue of sanctions 
against Russia, even though the values and norms which stand at the 
European foundations would claim a more coherent and significant 
response of the European Union. In fact, the mild tone of the Europeans 
has aparently encouraged Vladimir Putin in pursuing the policies that led to 
the annexation of Crimea. The strategic calculus of the Kremlin probably 
started from the assumption of a weak initial Western reaction, which 
ultimately proved largely correct. 
The most clear reactions to the Ukrainian crisis belonged to the 
new institutions established by the Treaty of Lisbon. This demonstrates that 
the EU is starting to have a voice in the international politics and that the 
EU institutions have begun to understand the shared interests of the 
European Union, not those emanating from the national level. 
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One of the first Western reactions to the Ukrainian crisis was the 
one belonging to the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. In March 1, 2014, The HR 
stated: „The unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine must be respected at 
all times and by all sides. Any violation of these principles is unacceptable. More than 
ever, restraint and sense of responsibility are needed”40. The message was essentially 
similar to those lauched by Obama Administration, NATO, the EU 
Member States and other international organizations. So, the initial Western 
response was limited to moral sanctions. The denouncing of the Russian 
policy toward Ukraine and Crimea could not unfortunately deter the further 
escalation of the conflict. Gradual economic sanctions have been raised, but 
they were too weak in relation to the seriousness of the situation provoked 
by Moscow in Eastern Ukraine. They reflected the divergencies within the 
Council and the conciliatory attitude of Germany, a country frightened by 
the spectre of a return to recession if Russia would have decided to use its 
energy weapon against the West. The inhibitions exerted by Berlin in terms 
of foreign policy seemed to expand at European level. The strategic 
initiative seemed to belong to an increasingly assertive and provocative 
Russian Federation.  
The sanctions, a clearly hard power instrument, clearly influenced 
the economic situation of the Russian Federation. However, they were not 
able to determine Russia to renounce its plans for annexing Crimea or its 
help for the Russian separatists of Eastern Ukraine. The EU has not played 
a significant role not even in the negotiation phase. The response came from 
Great Powers politics, reminding the days of the European Concert: 
Germany, France, and Russia, with the participation of Ukraine, broke a 
deal known as Minsk II in February 2015 to end the hostilities in the 
Donbass region of Ukraine.41 The agreement signed also by the separatists 
left OSCE in charge together with the Trilateral Contact Group (composed 
by Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE) to assist the pullout of heavy weapons 
and monitor the ceasefire. 
The ambitious Eastern Partnership is a part of the implementation 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Polish-Swedish initiative has 
certainly been misinterpreted by Russia, a traditional geopolitical player. 
Moscow saw behind it a plot to control Eastern Europe and especially the 
former Soviet space by the Westerners, using soft power capabilities: 
economic inducements, including the prospects of economic integration 
                                                     
40 Catherine Ashton, "Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the 
developments in Ukraine's Crimea", Bruxelles, EU External Action, 1 martie 2014. 
41 The Minsk meeting was held after the failure of the Minsk Protocol signed in 15 
September 2014 to end the hostilities between Kiev and the separatists in Donbass 
region. Minsk I was a protocol signed by the Trilateral Contact Group. 
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with the European bloc for countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia or 
Moldova. The meetings of the Eastern Partnership have usually ended in 
statements proclaiming the positive steps made by the European partners 
from Eastern Europe towards the European ideals such as democracy, rule 
of law human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the principles and 
norms of international law. These are the landmarks of normative power.  
The 2015 Riga summit stated that the Partners „underline that 
strengthening democracy and enabling functioning market economies, 
improving macroeconomic stability and the business environment, as well as 
enhancing interconnectivity, mobility and people-to-people contacts open 
new prospects for cooperation, contributing also to trade, growth and 
competitiveness. This serves the shared commitment to stability, security 
and prosperity of the European Union, Eastern European partners and our 
entire continent”42 before condemning the „The acts against Ukraine and 
the events in Georgia since 2014” using the entire arsenal of the 
international law, including the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and 1990 Charter of 
Paris, UNSC Resolution 2202 of 17 February 2015 and UN General 
Assembly Resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine.  
The summit confirmed once again the progress made by the partner 
countries and their prospects of achieving some sort of economic 
integration with the European Union. It does not indicate any roadmap 
towards political integration for the countries involved in the Eastern 
Partnership, but this is not the whole story. The progressive establishment 
of normative and socio-economic interdependencies has the potential to 
strengthen the cooperation between the Eastern partners and the EU up to 
a point that could be described by the followers of Real-Politik as an 
alliance. The summit was careful to also indicate the convergence in CSDP 
matters, including the Ukrainian contribution to and EU Battlegroup in 
2014. Small steps can sometimes be more fruitful than big ones.  
Those who question the achievements of the European Union in 
foreign and security policy and proclaim the failure of the ENP are 
substantially realists or traditionalists. Those who argue in favor of the 
achievements in these fields are definitely liberals and constructivists. It is 
clear that the conflict in Ukraine is a conflict between the Russian hard 
power and the Western soft power. But will soft power prevail without a 
smart strategy that includes also hard power capabilities? Let us remind here 
the words of a great realist stateman, US President Theodore Roosevelt: 
“speak softly and carry a big stick”. 
 
                                                     
42 Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Riga, 21-22 May 2015): 
URL=< https://eu2015.lv/images/news/2015_05_22_RigaDeclaration_EaP.pdf>  
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Conclusions 
The proverbial expression “with greater power comes greater 
responsibility” describes the “burden” of any past or present Great Power. 
The complexity of the (post-)modern world amplifies this reality even more. 
The current tendency toward a multipolar or multi-layered world is evident. 
Global, regional and local threats are interconnected, especially due to the 
action of transnational actors. In such an environment, the notion of power 
shifts in a rather rapid manner. Even so, the classical attributes of power still 
remain important. One of these is military power. The events in Crimea and 
Eastern Ukraine confirm this statement. 
If one could perceive the European Union as a major power of the 
world, this remains tributary to a very specific field: the normative one. The 
EU is a powerful source of international law covering its full spectrum. The 
values and principles, or even the ideals defended by the Europeans ever 
since the time of the Enlightenment Age are by themselves a source of 
power if used for democratic aims. 
There are two pressures threatening not only “normative power 
Europe” (in Manner’s own words) but also the very survival of the 
European Union: internal pressures (from national or even subnational 
levels) and external pressures (systemic pressures or pressures exercised by 
other global powers). Both internal and external pressures are fed by the 
consequences of the global economic crisis and especially by its European 
side: the sovereign debt crisis partly solved by employing unpopular 
austerity programs. 
Regarding the Member States, one may notice the erosion of the 
Westphalian state order and the inability or unwillingness of the post-
Westphalian actors43 to save the classical state. There is also a societal reflux 
against globalization and its by-products: externalization of companies 
towards the ‘East’ for cheaper working force and resources; migration of 
labour force from poorer nations towards Western Europe etc. This societal 
reflux is marked by an increased hostile reaction towards the ‘other’, 
amplified by chauvinistic and xenophobic politicians and mass-media. Such 
phenomena increase the pressures on Brussels and its European institutions. 
Another set of challenges come from the systemic level. The 
emergence of new major/global powers with a more empirical, realist, 
assertive, interest-based rather than normative behavior is clearly a pattern 
in today’s international affairs. Most notably, China, India, Brazil, and the 
Russian Federation are closing the gap separating them from the West in 
                                                     
43 International organizations, INGOs, transnational corporations or international 
banks have all become much more assertive and autonomous in international 
politics. 
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terms of GDP, development and technology. This tendency would be 
acceptable under a relatively democratic and peaceful environment, 
favorable to market economy, such used to be the one after the Cold War. 
However, at least the Russian Federation has indirectly indicated – due to its 
involvement in the Ukrainian crisis and the annexation of Crimea – that it 
does not suport anymore the peaceful transition towards multipolarism. 
The global economic crisis is eroding the trust in the EU 
institutions, even though the European debts’ crisis is not directly the result 
of EU policies, but rather the result of faulty economic policy decisions 
made by the governments. However, the austerity measures suported by 
almost every government and financial institution in the world combined 
with the policies of deregulation and privatization will increase the pressure 
on the middle-class citizens, increasing social tensions that might even 
endanger democracy. Why? Because states can retreat from the arena only in 
the world of ideas, not in the world of facts. Lacking funds states will 
increase the existing taxes and invent others. We could end in choosing 
between democracy and free market capitalism. Not surprisingly there is a 
notable ascension of a right and left wings extreme parties in the European 
political spectrum, sharing a profoundly anti-European, anti-Semite, 
xenophobe and populist discourse. 
Another tendency is the rebirth of Great Power politics inside the 
European Union, most notably being the case of Germany, country that 
currently determines the most important decisions at European level. The 
European institutions have the tendency to act more like annexes or 
companions of the big Member States. Another one is the establishment of 
blocs: the French-German nucleus, and the Visegrad Group, a group of 
smaller powers yet increasingly dissatisfied with the decisions taken by the 
big Member States. 
There seem to be no perfect solutions to the problems the EU is 
now confronting. The current European leaders seem to be unable to offer 
such solutions. However, one thing is sure: any adopted solution should 
start from the assumption that the European societies cannot stand alone in 
front of the tsunamis of globalization. 
A new vision of Europe, whether federal, confederal or of any 
other nature should be made a reality but only acknowledging the normative 
power of Europe. Such vision should start from the basic principles of 
subsidiarity and solidarity. Why? Because European citizens must be able to 
control their destinies. The distance between citizens and Brussels is 
amplified by the elitary character of the European institutions and their 
reduced democratic legitimacy and representativity. The democratic deficit 
has not been diminished by the Lisbon Treaty. Member States tend to unite 
under the lowest common denominator as an alternative to no decision. 
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Frequently, this denominator is sub-optimal both for them and for their 
societies. The Member States want always to control the situation since their 
elected leaders are exclusively legitimized by the national electorates they 
represent. They are reluctant to make important commitments for fear of 
being rejected by others and for fear of the effects towards their economy. 
Hence, external powers, such as Russia, feel safe and receive an impunity 
clause for actions that would otherwise be absolutely unacceptable for any 
European state which would find itself in the situation of Ukraine. The 
historical lessons are confirming the realist assumption that apeassement 
brings aggression. 
An important source of power for Europe – one increasingly 
contested both by European and their American counterparts – is the 
transatlantic alliance. This alliance should be reevaluated and reinforced, but 
what will be hard to renew is the UE interest for Europe. Clearly, 
Washington reorientates towards Asia-Pacific and less towards Europe, 
both from strategic and economic reasons. However, in future the 
Europeans and Americans should take into account a closer relationship 
based on their natural bonds and shared values. This raproachement could 
become a necessity once an Asian bloc would emerge in future. The 
European normative power and the American superpower could 
complement each other. 
Europe should commit itself more profoundly toward the aim of 
achieving the knowledge society and improving living standards not only in 
the Eurozone but also in the European neighbourhood and the rest of the 
world (e.g. erradicating famine and diseases, promoting education in Africa 
and the Middle East could reduce the negative transnational flows from this 
areas bringing societal insecurity to Europe).  
Not everything is related to geopolitics and geostrategy, yet united 
Europe can no longer afford to ignore Russia’s return or revival as global 
strategic player, especially since this return could threaten the security, 
stability and peace of the European continent, especially in its most 
vulnerable part: Central and Eastern Europe. In this context, it is necessary 
to rethink the posture of the European Union, especially in matters of 
CSDP. Does the EU longer afford not to have a common defense policy? 
The lack of action in this field would encourage Russia to continuously 
destabilize the Eastern Partneship and even the Eastern frontier of the 
European Union. However, the EU should rethink and readjust its policies 
on the Russian Federation starting from a lucid analysis of the Russian 
foreign policy motivations and from the identification of its fundamental 
interests in Eastern Europe. One should acknowledge that the 
destabilization of Ukraine must not be solely imputed to Russia but also to 
the West, which at a certain time, signalled a decresed interest for states 
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such as Ukraine or Georgia or sacrificed this interest to apease Russia and 
obtain what Russia offered: oil and gas. This is what the Russian and 
regional mass-medias often named, not without totally unjustified, the 
”Western hypocrisy”. 
Finally, the most important question remaining is: what will be the 
future of Europe? United Europe might be a global superpower, but divided 
will not rival the US and the emergent global powers. The question is not 
one about power. It is one about will or willingness. Are the citizens of 
Europe willing to become European citizens without having to loose their 
national and not only national identities? Or do we have to return to 
ultranationalism, xenophobia and hatred? Whether or not we choose a path 
or another, one thing is sure: in the age of globalization and digital 
revolution isolation brings backwardness. 
The process of Europeanization must not necessarily mean the loss 
of personal, local or national identities, like some Euroskeptical politicians 
would argue. It does not require such loss. Quite the contrary, adding a new 
identitary dimension gives more power to all who define themselves as 
Europeans, the more so as globalization seems to be unavoidable to those 
who embrace the advancements of our modernity: technology and life style 
behaviors. Elsewhere in the world increasingly powerful transnational 
identities are being built as we write these words. The European 
construction moto „unity in diversity” remains as current as ever and should 
inspire more reflection and need of action to the political elite of the 
Member States of the European Union. The development of new EU 
linkage institutions such as the HR, the President of the European Council, 
or the EU’s External Action Service might prove to be instrumental in this 
endeavour. 
 
Implications of Brexit and the US presidential elections 
Clearly, the British referendum held on Thursday 23 June 2016 left 
the European Union in dissaray. One of the major players of the European 
scene decided to “Brexit” (leave the EU) with a majority of 52 to 48% of 
the participating citizens. This forces us to reevaluate the weight of the 
European Union compared to other major actors of the world. Certainly, 
Brexit left the EU less substantial in terms of GDP, population, and military 
capabilities (even though they never counted for the supranational level). 
The numbers speak a lot, but this was not the only significance of Brexit. 
The follow-up of the referendum is not yet fully comprehended. 
However, the Brexit proved that European politics is changing rapidly. 
While the Brexit has little to do with the Ukrainian crisis and more to do 
with the refugee crisis and the British mistrust in the German European 
leadership, it also underlines the increasing dissatisfaction of the European 
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citizens with the domestic and European establishments, capitalized by 
populist parties and politicians. There is a growing democratic gap between 
Brussels and the average citizen or at least this is the perception of the latter. 
The European leaders, even though they are elected by their nationals, are 
perceived as distancing themselves more and more from their voters in 
order to suport ideals and values that are not fully comprehended by and 
least not explained to the citizens of their countries. Societal security helps 
explain this emerging domestic cleavage. The fear of unknown, of foreigners 
threatening jobs and physical safety is just a part of the story. 
This domestic cleavage is accompanied by an international one. 
There are certain countries and political regimes that increasingly reject what 
they perceive as the Western corrupted values, immorality, obsecenity, and 
hypocrisy that are the pillars of the globalized world. Putin’s Russia has 
called itself to be their champion. It even mocked some of the Western 
principles, among which the principle of self-determination, used by the 
West to justify the independence of Kosovo and by Russia to justify its 
annexation of Crimea. 
The US presidential elections won by Donald Trump - a perceived 
outsider, against Hillary Clinton – the personification of the establishment, 
according to Trump’s voters, are another example of the political change we 
mentioned above. It is not yet known how many of the promises made by 
the future president Trump during the campaign will be upholded 
throughout his presidency, yet many people ranging ideologically from 
conservative to extreme right from across the world welcome his election 
and suport his claims. Donald Trump is regarded as a suporter of President 
Putin together with whom he wants to normalize the US-Russian relations. 
Does it mean that he would raise the US sanctions against Russia? In this 
case, the Ukrainian crisis might have a different turnout. 
There are pressures from inside the EU institutions to renounce to 
the policy of sanctions against the Russian Federation. The sanctions did 
worsen the conditions of the Russian economy, but also those of the 
European economies. The Brexit and the US presidential elections won by 
Donald Trump might be a „game changer” also for the European Union. It 
seems now that the chances that the EU will become a federation of states 
in the near future have almost faded away. Even the future of the united 
Europe is questioned. The trend of globalized markets might still be 
replaced by re-nationalization. We think that this is not the scenario that will 
prevail, but we fear another one even more perilous, this time for the small 
countries: the Great Powers will be less inclined toward establishing 
conditions for sharing the prosperity of globalization with all the peoples of 
the Earth. The global village maybe shrinking once again. The geographical 
and geopolitical maps of the world might be once again redrawn. 
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Abstract 
 
The Ukrainian crisis, followed by Brexit and the results of the presidential elections in 
the United States, are a few of the latest challenges facing the European Union, a normative actor 
of the international relations. They are unravelling a new ‘brave’ world questioning the status quo 
established since the end of the Cold War. The Ukrainian crisis showed the limits of the European 
Union in crisis management, the ineffectiveness of sanctions against a regional hegemon, Russia, 
determined to maintain its traditional control over the former Soviet space, and the return of great 
power politics in Europe and the world. It also underlines a new ideological conflict developing in 
and out, not only between the current players of the international arena, but also within societies. It 
is an irreductible conflict between liberal internationalist-cosmopolitans and conservative-
nationalists, each perceiving the other as threatening to the survival of humanity and society. The 
EU may survive only if it will overcome its political-military inhibitions and settle its own internal 
disputes regarding the same modernity-postmodernity cleavage. 
 
Keywords: EU, US, Russian Federation, Great Power politics, normative power, 
CFSP, CSDP, Ukrainian crisis, Eastern Partnership, Brexit 
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Complex Impact of Insecurity on Business 
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Introduction 
The researchers of Globalisation process have built their critical 
argumentation mainly using a pro-cons positivist perspective2 centered on 
post-Westphalian political regimes3, modern economic theories4 and the 
combined psycho-sociology of elites and masses5. 
The Security Studies have emerged in the XX century as a niche 
scientific area of International Relations in the context and by raport to 
major desequilibriums caused by the two classic world wars, followed by 
another one, equally global, but atypical - Cold. The accent has been placed 
mostly on the classic realist perspective which defined security as a public 
good of political and military essence6. Only the post Cold War 
reintepretative needs have generated meaningful contributions of complex 
                                                     
1 Professor, Ph.D. – The Department of International Relations and European Integration, Director 
of the Centre for European Studies, The National School for Political and Public Administration 
Studies, Bucharest – george@anglitoiu.ro  
2 T. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: Ramdom House, Updated and 
Extended Edition, Amazon Kindle edition, 2000; Idem, The World Is Flat: A Brief 
History of the Twenty-first Century. Picador, 3rd Edition, Amazon Kindle edition, 2007. 
3 A. Linklater, A., The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-
Westphalian Era. Cornwall: Polity Press & Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1998. 
4 J.E. Stieglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2002; Idem, Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, Amazon Kindle edition, 2010; Idem, The Price of 
Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future. New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, Amazon Kindle edition, 2012. 
5 A. Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives. London: Profile, 
1999. 
6 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations. Edinburgh: R.&R. Clark Ltd., 2nd Edition, .pdf version, 1946; H. 
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York NY: 
Alfred A. Knopf, .pdf version, 1948. 
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science7 and constructivism8 in order to reconfigure the use and content of 
security by the pluri-disciplinary insertion of soci(et)al, economic, cultural 
and environmental security in macroscopic interpretation of similar and 
interconnectable micro-structures. 
This paper aims to edit a explanatory contribution over the high 
degree of insecurity affecting economic enterprise worldwide; a secondary 
goal is to outline two scenarios for the future with the inclusion of possible 
remedies to the increased asymmetric and unconventional risks. 
 
1. Asymmetric Risks and Threats 
The aplied asymmetry to security is centered mainly on terrorism 
and organised crime. These two categories of risks and threats are not 
postmodern phenomena but have been part of the world powerplay since 
the Middle Ages. The post Cold War Era has nonetheless witnessed their 
expansion and acceleration.  
 
1.1. Terrorism 
The terrorism has caused by the sheer size of its impact the 
inception of a major chronological mark (both in the World and XXIst 
Century History), namely September 11, 2001. Terrorist events have 
occured before, but the different evaluation of 9/11 attacks is based on 
complexity, superior capacity for asymmetric force projection, vectors, 
casualties’ numbers and target significance. Other terrorist events followed 
in quick succession (Bali, October 12, 2002, Madrid, March 11, 2004 and 
London, July 7, 2005) that bolstered the importance of post-September 11, 
2001 as compared to the previous time milestone, the post-Cold War Era.  
The terrorism can be classified in different ways, but the most 
relevant to the topic at hand is the one that makes a clear-cut distinction 
between faithful and infidel social and ethnic communities. The religious 
terrorism is seeking to induce a combination of anxiety, fear and panic to 
                                                     
7 J.N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990; Idem,  Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring 
Governance in a Turbulent World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Idem, 
Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003. 
8 Copenhagen School, B. Buzan,. People, States & Fear: The National Security Problem in 
International Relations. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press (1991), 
Prentice-Hall, Amazon Kindle edition (2nd Edition, 1991), 1983, 1991; B. Buzan, O. 
Waever and de J. Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1997. B. Buzan, and O. Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of 
International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Amazon Kindle 
edition, 2004. 
In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga 
 
443 
the public sphere in order to secure the success of fundamentalist strategies 
aiming to overcome the political, military and economic order. The main 
difference to the End of XIXth Century’s Anarchism is based on the fatalist 
scenario of Judgement Day / Accession into Heaven and full implementation into 
the ordinary life of humankind of the non-negotiable principles of a certain 
(monotheistic) religion. 
To be more precise, we talk about Islamist terrorism, the most 
elaborate, systemic and radical form of this asymetric threat. Wahhabism, 
Salafism, Mahdism, Mujaheedinism and Jihadism represent as many 
denominations as possible for the literalistic and extreme aplication of 
Islam. Despite multiple positions stated by religious and political 
representatives of the Islamic world, the Quran, the holy book of the 
religious belief in Allah, has become the cornerstone to nulify the 
civilisational fundamentals of the West and the Globalisation process that 
the latter promotes.  
Sharia, the ethical section of Quran and later Islamic traditions, is 
considered to be the only legitime, necessary and sufficient guide to organise 
individual and collective life, since the Hegira (Prophet Muhammad’s flight 
to Medina, 622 A.D.) until present time. From such a viewpoint, any other 
antic or modern teachings, democratic or authoritarian ideologies are similar 
to the famous Library of Alexandria Dilemma of Caliph Umar.9  
The main Islamist terrorist organisations, Al Qaeda and newcomer 
ISIS, have taken the lessons-learned of the previous anti-Western 
                                                     
9 The Library is filled with books either opposed to the Quran, thus dangerous, or 
similar to it, thus futile; in both cases it should be destroyed. For the pro authenticity 
arguments, see Isya Joseph, Bar Hebreus and the Alexandrian Library, The American 
Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures, Volume 27, 1911, p. 335-338, 
https://archive.org/details/jstor-528668, and for the opposite thesis, see Bernard 
Lewis, The Vanished Library. In response to: Lost History of the Lost Library from the June 
14, 1990 issue, September 27, 1990 Issue, The New York Review of Books, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/ 1990/sep/27/the-vanished-library-2/ 
High-level representatives of the Islam faith have reiterated on several occasions the 
necessity to destroy by Jihad the ideas and books belonging to the unfaithful – see 
Abu-Hamid bin Muhammad bin Muhammad bin Muhammad Al-Ghazali (1058-
1111), apud Andrew G. Bostom (ed.), The Legacy of Jihad. Islamic Holy War and the Fate 
of Non-Muslims, Amherst NY, Prometheus Books, 2005, p. 199): [O]ne must go on 
jihad (i.e., warlike razzias or raids) at least once a year...one may use a catapult 
against them [non-Muslims] when they are in a fortress, even if among them are 
women and children. One may set fire to them and/or drown them...If a person of 
the ahl al-kitab [People of the Book – Jews and Christians, typically] is enslaved, his 
marriage is [automatically] revoked...One may cut down their trees...One must 
destroy their useless books. Jihadists may take as booty whatever they decide...they 
may steal as much food as they need... 
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radicalisation phases of the Arab world (Black September, Hamas and 
Hezbollah) and added the cross-objective, both political and religious, of 
returning to the Islamic pan-Arabic Caliphate which should be expanded 
beyond the historical lines reached at the time of the decisive battle of 
Poitiers (732)10. 
In this context, the Western type of capitalist entrepreneurship is 
considered to be a mortal sin, a major corruption of the Islamic faithful 
regardless of their location on Planet Earth, but especially in the Arab space. 
Corporatism, consumerism and commercial advertising11 are seen as Satan’s 
own doing with the primary purposes of allienating the Islamic believer 
from Prophet’s revelations and fully laicize his burgeois life as market client. 
The bi-directional structuring of business environment between 
private initiative and financial banking has generated another unacceptable 
consequence in the eyes of these fundamentalist gurus. The Quran forbids 
usury (riba), with cost plus shared profit, and spot payment for deferred 
delivery as the only viable financial solutions for entrepreneurship12. But the 
booming industry of Islamic banking, estimated at $ 2 trillion, has generated 
the paradox of Sharia-compliant consumerism13 fueled even by Western 
banks (e.g. Citigroup, Deutsche Bank)14, which have joined this financial 
market. 
The suport given by the West, mainly the United States, to Israel in 
detriment to the Arab Palastine is perceived and interpreted to be another 
proof of the imperative for extreme action against the Western infidels et 
alia, bought by the Jewish worldwide political and economic lobby. In 
conclusion, the business environment and the entrepreneurs are considered 
to be legitimate targets in the punishment actions against infidels who dare 
                                                     
10 See William Stearns Davis (ed.), Readings in Ancient History: Illustrative Extracts from the 
Sources, 2 Vols. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1912-13), Vol. II: Rome and the West, p. 
362-364, from the Internet Medieval Source Book, http://www.fordham.edu/ 
halsall/source/732tours.asp 
11 See the works of Sayd Qutb, one of the most influential Islamic thinkers of the XX 
Century, seen as a mentor by the Muslim Brotherhood organisation which is 
currently outlawed and labeled as terrorist structure by Egypt and other Arab states. 
For a recent analysis of the public and scientific profile of Sayyd Qutb, see John 
Calvert, Sayyd Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism, Columbia University Press, 2010 
12 E.g. Murabaha, Muajjal, Bai Salam, Istisna'a, Ijarah, Musharaka and Mudaraba 
13 See the advertising campaign of Al Rayan Bank (the leading Islamic bank in the 
United Kingdom) claiming to be “UK’s only wholly Sharia compliant retail bank” - 
http://www.alrayanbank.co.uk/useful-info-tools/about-us/ 
14 In principle, the customers of an Islamic bank have to be Muslims, and the 
compliance with Sharia to be certified by supervisory boards composed of religious 
experts. Capitalist competition rules have nonetheless generated the commercial 
reality of Sharia-like non-Islamic lenders to the Muslim faithful.  
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to infiltrate the Islamic space. Not without meaning was therefore the act of 
ISIS predecessor, Al Qaeda in Iraq and Mesopotamia (AQI), of beheading a 
businessman, Nicholas Evan Berg (2004), among the first, only to be 
followed by tens of other entrepreneurs, citizens of the countries 
participating in the US-led multinational coalition against Saddam Hussein 
regime. Many others were kidnaped and later on released either with 
millions of dollars-worth ransom payments per person or by the anti-
terrorist armed forces. The kidnapers have oftenly tried to negociate 
prisoner exchanges and formulated threats, included in the behading video 
recordings, against the coalition states.  
Another favoured target of Islamist terrorism remains the hotel 
industry. Either we analyse temporary resort residencies of politicians, 
military officials and businessmen, or consider popular tourist places, the 
entrepreneurs and their economic investments are constantly marks to this 
category of (suicidal) fanatics. 
The transportation companies are also directly or indirectly affected 
by the escalation of the Islamist threat. The increase of perimetral security 
standards has become a priority for the authorities of target states, with the 
automotive sector being the hardest to protect taking into consideration the 
2005 London terrorist attack when the fourth attacker activated his bomb 
after failing to access the already shut down subway system. By comparison, 
even if the explosion of an automobil is a financial loss by itself, it does not 
bear comparison in terms of terrorist attack evaluation to the hijacking or 
bombing of a plane. The insurance and reinsurance costs will rise 
exponently and similarly to colective psychosis, both to the significant harm 
of such transportation services. 
Generically, terrorism is very much depending on business and 
entrepreneurs. It needs massive finance for the success of its operations. 
Therefore, the most important form is the one of cash, taking into 
consideration the worldwide legislative restrictions on business and bank 
accounts that could help terrorism secretly or as front cover. ETA and IRA 
have long been using the „revolutionnary fees” on local businessmen. The 
democratic and multi-ethnic advance has fueled an increased oposition of 
the business environment against such forced payments, leading in turn to 
the substantial decline of the extremist power.  
Al Qaeda had long been based on the personal fortune of its leader 
Ossama bin Laden and the voluntary contributions of sponsor businessmen 
and states. ISIS managed to refine its financing methods by the effective 
control of energy-rich territories. Estimates15 indicate daily revenues of over 
                                                     
15 Luay al-Khatteeb, How Iraq's black market in oil funds ISIS, CNN, August 22, 2014, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/18/business/al-khatteeb-isis-oil-iraq/ 
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$ 2 million from black market sales of Iraqi and Syrian oil. Similarly lucrative 
activities are in progress in other areas under Islamist control, with Lybia as 
a forefront example. These actions are taking place to the detriment of 
rightful owners; the entrepreneurship by itself is also at high risk due not 
only to limited investment perspectives but also from a maintenance and 
environmental security viewpoint.  
Another very worrying development is given by the reccurent 
tendency of Islamist organisations to target industrial facilities whose 
destruction or fall under control would lead to severe consequences for the 
local population and economy, at least. The temporary control exerted by 
ISIS in July 2014 over the Mosul Dam was a major threat to the regional 
security and the lives of aproximately 1 million people. Destroying or 
damaging this plant equaled to flooding large areas and severing the 
electricity flow for domestic use and business. Comparably, the January 
2014 Islamist attack in Mali against a refinery and the subsequent hostage-
taking crisis undelined once more the huge risks to which the industrial 
entrepreneurship is exposed to in troublesome areas.  
The 9/11 attacks have revealed also the very important lesson of 
the globalised trend of terrorist threats. World Trade Center was a symbolic 
target but meant in fact the killing in its two towers of over 3,000 
individuals, mostly business profesionals. ISIS emergence has led to a global 
recruitment of wannabe juhadists, a few thousands of which from Western 
countries. The radicalisation of Western second and up-generation citizens 
of Muslim faith is by itself a serious development; their potential home 
return after taking part in ISIS training camps and battlefields could lead to 
major bombings against any political, military and economic entities. Their 
effective capacity for recruitment or conversion to radical Islam, given the 
peripheral status and cluster location in some Western metropolitan areas, 
could lead to civic insubordination and property damage with direct impact 
on commerce, for instance in the conflict zones with the security forces.  
It should also be added the fact that after 9/11, the business 
interests of Western companies have been extensively affected anytime a 
public figure and the media made use of their constitutional free speech in 
order to criticise or expose with humour „essential” aspects of Islam. Intent 
on promoting liberty of expression, the Danish cartoons of Prophet 
Muhammad could be enlisted as case study.  
 
1.2. Organised crime 
This category of asymmetric risks and threats has created in the 
entire history of (post-) modern state major dificulties for the good 
functioning of local and transnational economy. The share of organised 
crime and black market is by itself an indicator of good governance and 
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stability, weak or failed states being characterised by corruption, 
fragmentation and unpredictability. Finally, organised crime has been acting 
like a major rival of the state for the control of the production, processing 
and economic distribution within and beyond borders. Thus, the significant 
difference is made by mafia structures often substituting financial and fiscal 
state bodies in the collection (even partial) of benefits from the 
entrepreneurial process. 
Ineffective local (rural or metropolitan) administrative and police 
structures were nominated and controlled by organised crime families, to 
mention only the eloquent case of Chicago during the Prohibition time. 
Only the ambition and vocation of certain decision-makers (FBI director J. 
Edgar Hoover) and operatives (Elliott Ness) determined criminal conviction 
of mafia bosses (Al Capone) and unraveled some of their illegal but very 
lucrative outfits. 
In the country of origin, Italy, the most effective regime in 
combating the already traditional structures of honor proved to be the 
Fascist led by Mussolini, the ante and post-authoritarian Italian democracy 
being unable to provide a functional framework of legal and economic 
conditions for modern business world especially in the South. Intensified 
judicial campaigns like Mane Puliti had produced important results that led to 
the arrest of the most important Sicilian mafia dons. At the same time, other 
structures of organised crime continued to thrive in business, the 
Neapolitan Camorra and the Calabrian N'Drangheta succeeding to have 
oligo- or even true monopoly positions in the sector of services (harbour or 
waste management, for example). Thus, it should be emphasised the 
recurring case of Neaples, a famous tourist destination whose streets 
become covered by fetid garbage whenever the families grow dissatisfied 
with the level of their revenues, such crises ending up with pay rise or when 
the army does the cleaning; it is a worrying regional feature for one of the 
founding states of the European Union and G7. 
Protection rackets, loan sharking, gambling, prostitution, 
production and marketing of drugs, gangsterism, illegal trafficking of 
persons, goods, hard currency and weapons are some of the most important 
sources of untaxed and illicit income mafia structures have "organised" in 
the world16. An aggravating factor is that terrorist organisations often resort 
to mafia methods and goals in order to secure and diversify their income 
sources (Colombian FARC guerrilla, for instance). 
The states and the international community have developed best 
practices and effective remedies in the systematic fight against organised 
crime. The five largest New York families have been targets of extensive 
                                                     
16 T. Cretin, Mafias(s): A la découverte des sociétés du crime. Paris: Editions Chronique, 2009. 
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judicial campaigns that led to the detention of numerous leaders which 
marked the decline of the Gambino clan, the main force within the 
Commission until the arrest and imprisonment in 1992 of John Gotti (Don 
Teflon), the last boss of inter-war tradition. 
But we can assess the Italian-American organised crime as being 
outdated compared to new problematic structures at the southern border of 
the United States. Located in Mexico, but operating cross-borderly, the 
Mexican cartels (Sinaloa17, Zetas, Gulf, Knights Templar, etc.) are a major 
threat not only because of the extensive drug trafficking seriously affecting 
the lives of those addicted to drug use, but also due to destabilisation of 
certain regions and states of the Mexican Confederation18. Thus, the resilient 
power of drug cartels19 has translated into anarchy and severe damage of the 
socio-economic life due to the inability of Mexican authorities for decisive 
coercive intervention, over 100,000 people being killed and another 25,000 
missing between 2006-2012, the years of Calderon presidency20. Ciudad 
Juarez21, one of the main economic hubs on the border with the United 
                                                     
17 The leader of Sinaloa Cartel, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera, has been included 
by the Forbes magazine in its 2009 rankings of the most rich people in the world 
(no. 701, with an estimated fortune of $ 1 billion) alongside legitimate self-made 
businessmen like Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, Richard Branson, Carlos Slim or Steve 
Jobs. See ***, The World's Billionaires. #701 Joaquin Guzman Loera, Forbes, 03.11.09, 
http://www.forbes.com/ lists/2009/10/billionaires-2009-richest-people_Joaquin-
Guzman-Loera_FS0Y.html.  
His most recent evaluation, prior to his spectacular escape from a maximum security 
prison in July 2015, ranked him as the 67th on the 2013 list of most powerful people. 
See ***, Joaquin Guzman Loera, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/profile/joaquin-
guzman-loera/ 
18 I. Grillo, I., El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency, London: Bloomsbury Press. 
Amazon Kindle edition, 2012; A. Hernandez, Narcoland: The Mexican Drug Lords and 
Their Godfathers. London, New York: Verso, Updated Edition, Amazon Kindle 
edition, 2014. 
19 John Bailey, Roy Godson (eds.), Organized Crime. Democratic Governability. Mexico and 
the US-Mexican Borderlands, University of Pittsburg Press, 2000, 
http://www.google.fi/books?hl=fi&lr=&id=IQSS8siWycsC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&d
q=tijuana+tourism+organized+crime+insecurity&ots=Knx1gen42t&sig=XfE5C-
WPlgRNo6wC-EwBjkIsftU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false 
20 William Booth, Mexico’s crime wave has left about 25,000 missing, government documents 
show, Washington Post, November 29, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/the_americas/mexicos-crime-wave-has-left-up-to-25000-missing-
government-documents-show/2012/11/29/7ca4ee44-3a6a-11e2-9258-
ac7c78d5c680_story.html 
21 21 For an extensive depiction of daily, ordinary lives in the derelict Ciudad Juarez, 
see Charles Bowden, Murder City: Ciudad Juarez and the Global Economy's New Killing 
Fields, Nation Books, New York, 2011 
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States, where the foreign investment in the automotive industry is 
significant, has been facing a decade of cartel expansion affecting the 
economic productivity and shrinking the available workforce22. On the other 
hand, famous tourist destinations such as Acapulco and Tijuana are severely 
affected in terms of security of tourists23 and hospitality industry operations, 
considering that tourism has been estimated at 8% of GDP, with Mexico a 
top 10 state destinations worldwide24. An indicator of damage inflicted to 
tourism is the massive Acapulco opt-out by the sea liners, from aprox. 140 
voyages before the year 2010 (aproximately 1,800 passengers per cruise) to 
13 in 2013 (with about 600 passengers on board).25 
Mexican cartels26 had begun primarily as distributors of Columbian 
drugs on the narco-American markets. Gradually, in the context of the relative 
success of Plan Colombia (1999 - ), an eminently military initiative promoted by 
Washington and accepted by Bogota, the Colombian cartels were partially 
destroyed, which facilitated the rise of the Mexican. The level of intimidation 
and violence against the people of some communities exceeded the limits of 
occasional settling of accounts between different groups, and exposed cartel’s 
ambition for supremacy against any oponents (public administration, police, 
army, media, entrepreneurs). The arrest or physical elimination of alleged cartel 
leaders in the campaign initiated by the new president Nieto are notable 
successes but the narco-trafficking structures have a well-proven regenerative 
capacity. Only tangible economic stimulus measures and strengthening of the 
                                                     
22 n, Beatriz Magaloni, The Economic Consequences of 
Drug Trafficking Violence in Mexico, Stanford University, 2013, 
http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/RoblesCalderonMagaloni_EconCosts5.pdf 
23 The media has covered extensively in recent years many grim stories of rape, 
kidnapping and homicide against foreign tourists in Mexico, even in cities described 
as safe (by advertising campaigns). See for example Nathaniel Parish Flannery, Is 
Drug War Violence Scaring Away Mexico's Spring Break Tourists?, Forbes, 3/18/2013, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparishflannery/2013/03/18/is-drugwar-
violence-scaring-away-mexicos-spring-break-tourists/; Daniel Tovrov, Is Mexico's 
Drug War Hurting Tourism?, International Business Times, January 20, 2012, 
http://www.ibtimes.com/mexicos-drug-war-hurting-tourism-213786; Nicholas 
Casey, Alexandra Berzon, Mexico Tourism Feels Chill of Ongoing Drug Violence, The Wall 
Street Journal, June 8, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304432304576367710290674534 
24 Mark Stevenson, Mexico may drop out of top 10 tourist destinations, Associated Press, 
Mar. 19, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/mexico-may-drop-out-worlds-tourism-
top-10 
25 See ***, Mexico Tourism Report Q1 2014, Business Monitor International, 2013 
26 For an official in-depth evaluation of its dynamics, see June S. Beittel, Mexico’s Drug 
Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence, Congressional Research 
Service, April 15, 2013, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf 
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rule of law can be effective remedies against the scenario of deepening of such a 
state into anarchy and civil war. 
The clandestine production of drugs per se is a form of illegal 
entrepreneurship, which involves large workforce in rural areas with usually 
limited sources of livelihood. The degree of corruption of authorities can be 
an aggravating factor in the fight against such phenomenon, despite the 
presence in some theaters of operations of military units, the production of 
opium in Afghanistan being illustrative from this viewpoint. Regardless of 
the type of political regime in the country (Communist, Mujahideen or post-
Taliban), efforts to combat illicit popy crop, the essential ingredient in the 
production of opium and heroin, have failed, leading to the paradoxical 
situation of allowing some areas of production in order to avoid further 
radicalisation of local communities unable to have other sources of living. 
Military operations conducted by NATO against Taliban guerrillas and al 
Qaeda cells had initially included campaigns for destroying of the popy 
crops which led in turn to acts of local communities in suport of Islamist 
fighters. A corollary of this paradox is the fact that the Taliban regime was 
the most effective against popy harvests, despite its short period of reign. 
This type of illegal entrepreneurship is more difficult to replace by a licit one 
as long as local tribal communities constantly opose the cultivation of grain 
and vegetables (much less profitable sources of income against traditional 
narco-agriculture) and the weak Afghan state facilitates this duality. 
 
2. Geopolitical conflicts 
The most important form of geopolitical conflict is inter-statal 
while war is the most aggravated phase of it. 
In the contemporary world, the initial phase is related to diplomatic 
disputes that oftenly reflect a collective political imaginary based on 
identifying the other as the enemy, the source of all problems faced by the 
entity to which they belong. Denting state honor27 could therefore trigger 
collective mobilisation and popular suport for aggressive foreign and 
security policy. 
Regardless of geographic area, geopolitical conflicts are a major 
inhibitor of growth by directly affecting the investment environment. 
Entrepreneurs in conflict areas are adventurers who do not pursue 
sustainable economic development goals, but ad hoc accords with temporary 
holders of power (see the African black market of blood diamonds). Militia 
leaders who standardly come to power through coups, civil war or border 
aggression are oftently indicted by special tribunals established by the 
                                                     
27 A.P. Tsygankov, Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International 
Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
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international community. These warlords favour business solutions that 
quickly highlight the extracting capabilities of future investors who at their 
end of business interest aim for rapid exploitation of the abundant mineral 
resources of the African continent28. 
The presence in disputed border areas of significant mineral 
resources is accelerating the dynamic of geopolitical conflicts, the potential 
for destruction and effective escalation to classic war being very high. Target 
intervention by the international community can produce positive effects 
(see Sudan's peaceful secession), but the transition and fragility of newly 
created public institutions can generate a new form of internal instability 
between formerly allied factions for control of those geo-strategic areas (see 
South Sudan or post-Gaddafi Libya). 
The territory by itself, with or without extensive natural resources, 
is a generic stake. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, beyond its religious 
dimension, is a historic confrontation over a territory that the two parties 
define it differently. The recent Israeli military action in Gaza against Hamas 
guerrillas (with similar goals as to the previous actions in Lebanon against 
Hezbollah) meant another series of major damage to the Palestinian 
infrastructure. Entrepreneurial undertakings that were part of the 
international community’s efforts for recovery and subsequent development 
were highly affected given the fact they were located in the same area Tel 
Aviv intervened forcefully in 2009. The absence of a predictable security 
environment, in the context of failure of consensus and effective diplomatic 
intervention of the great actors, has generated or maintained black spots on 
the economic map of the world where only the propensity of organised 
crime and the black market can thrive. The dead or missing victims, and the 
waves of refugees caused by geopolitical conflicts are a serious problem, 
drastic loss of human potential seriously distorting the labor market. 
The collective psychology can be easily engaged in traditional or 
recent geopolitical disputes (Le Bon, 1895, 1912, 1915, 1921), but the 
Globalisation process is expanding and accelerating them against 
entrepreneurship. The decision taken in 2014 by the Chinese authorities to 
open oil drilling in the contested Paracelsus islands of the South China Sea 
caused not only Vietnamese adverse diplomatic reaction, but also street 
violence and acts of sabotage against Chinese economic interests and 
businessmen active in the former French colony. Following the killing of 
about 20 and injury of more than 100 Chinese citizens, entrepreneurs and 
                                                     
28 T. Burgis, The Looting Machine, Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and the Theft 
of Africa’s Wealth. New York: Public Affairs, 2015. 
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workers, the Beijing government decided to make an emergency repatriation 
of over 3,000 other citizens living in Vietnam.29  
The resurgence of China in the past decade as an international 
player with regional, at least, hegemonic ambitions30 has led to the inception 
or reignition of geopolitical conflicts in its immediate neighborhood. The 
fact that the Middle Kingdom is such a vast realm is nothing compared to the 
loss / failure to strategically recover very small pieces of land31 such as the 
Japanese Senkaku islands. In response, error and ignorance of the historical 
facts of aggression and genocide by the current Japanese government 
revisionists32 once again have fueled bilateral and multilateral tensions33 
(including the two Korean states and Taiwan) in the East China Sea. The 
street reaction was simply to be expected (August-September 2012), and 
angry crowds of protesters, by violence, vandalism and collective boycott, 
targeted the Japanese interests in China. Panasonic, for example, was forced 
to suspend production at many of its factories in mainland in the aftermath 
to arson and other forms of destruction by the Chinese demonstrators.34 
Also, such geopolitical conflicts could damage economic relations between 
the parties, the dispute over the Senkaku islands causing a retaliatory 
measure from the Chinese government to ban the export of rare metals 
                                                     
29 See Malcolm Moore, China evacuates over 3,000 citizens from Vietnam, The Daily 
Telegraph, 18 May 2014, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10839036/China-
evacuates-over-3000-citizens-from-Vietnam.html 
30 H. Kissinger, On China. London: Penguin, Amazon Kindle edition, 2011; K. Y. Lee, 
Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World 
(interviews and selections by Graham Allison and Robert D. Blackwill). Cambridge: 
MIT Press, Amazon Kindle edition, 2013. 
31 On the occasion of his visit to Pentagon in May 2014, general Fang Fenghui, Chief 
of Staff of the People’s Liberation Army, declared that his country „cannot afford to 
lose an inch” of its historical territory. – see ***, Vietnam riots: China accuses US as 
military chiefs meet in Washington, The Guardian, 16 May 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/may/16/us-chinese-military-leaders-
clash-riots-vietnam 
32 R. Katz, Voodoo Abenomics. Japan’s Failed Comeback Plan. Foreign Affairs, 93(4), 
2014, p. 133-141. 
33 Recent polls indicated an increased perception of war likelihood between China and 
Japan (53.4% Chinese and 29% Japanese). See ***, More than half of Chinese see war 
with Japan: poll, AFP apud Japan Today, September 11, 2014, 
http://www.japantoday.com/ category/national/view/more-than-half-of-chinese-
see-war-with-japan-poll 
34 See Kevin Voigt, Panasonic closes China plants after violent protests, CNN, September 17, 
2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/17/business/china-japan-panasonic/ 
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(REE) to Japan, thus affecting to a significant degree the Nipon hi-tech 
production.35 
 
3. Cyber-Crime 
The strategic aplications of technological progress, labeled in the 
modern and contemporary eras as industrial revolutions, have gradually led 
to the materialisation of quasi-mechanistic world of science-fiction writer 
Jules Verne. 
The IT revolution with its general implementation is intrinsically 
connected to Globalisation. But the cyber-space quickly came to be 
characterized by espionnage, war, and even terrorism, all accompanied by 
the prefix descriptor cyber-. 
Current entrepreneurship is based on IT solutions, and its global 
presence is dependent on the functionality of the long distance binomial 
terminal-server. Cloud computing technologies have facilitated once again the 
acceleration of cyber-communication dynamics by emphasizing the 
importance of wireless data transmissions. 
The world cyber society is not a perfect one despite SciFi thinkers’ 
utopias. Conflicts, hegemony, balance of power, anarchy have all 
accompanied human communities in cyber-space.  
The recent success of an excluded branch of Al Qaeda, namely 
ISIS, is also based on the latter's superior ability, compared to its parent 
structure to radicalise and recruit online Islamic believers, citizens and 
residents of the West. By exemplifying the area of religious cyber-terrorism, 
the author wants to underline the complexity of insecurity in cyber-space. 
The capacity manifested in the recent past by hostile entities to dismantle 
whole state computer networks (Russian cyber attack against Latvia in 2006) 
may ultimately translate into the non-illusory possibility for radical Islamists 
of access to critical infrastructure servers in the fields of transportation and 
energy production, for example. 
The cyber-industrial espionnage has however the main or direct 
impact on business and entrepreneurial perspectives. The technological 
espionnage has characterised humanity since ancient times with the 
industrial revolution just emphasizing it. Whether it was about Chinese 
porcelain and tea, Venetian crystal, military arsenal (Greek fire or atomic 
bomb), state intelligence sought for security raisons or financial gains to 
compensate in this way its technological inferiority versus an oponent / 
competitor. 
                                                     
35 See Mari Yamaguchi, China rare earth exports to Japan still halted, Bloomberg Business 
Week, October 2010, 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9J02PF01.htm 
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Specifics of post-modern technology allow much faster recovery of 
technological gaps by straight access to IT solutions embbeding the patent, 
meaning the business secret. The virtual attacks (technological espionage and 
cyber-piracy), whether against state or corporate targets, are already 
regulated by law, but mainly domestically. The relatively recent membership 
of Russia and China, for example, in the World Trade Organization serves 
the cause of regulation and enforcement of international norms. But the 
online environment, despite solutions for prevention or identification of the 
source of attack, is still full of risks and threats, if only to mention personal 
data theft, misapropriation of bank accounts and distortion of the activity of 
an economic rival. 
International organisations like the European Union and NATO 
have put to good use their multilateral powers and generated aplied 
solutions, ranging from institutions (within Europol or Euro-Atlantic 
commands reshaped on the basis of the Revolution in Military Affairs) to 
effective action to combat cyber-crime and cyber-war. However, the pivot 
policy of large international revisionist players in challenging the global 
supremacy of the United States and the West translated rapidly in major 
risks of cyber-security. 
 
Conclusions and Scenarios for the Future 
The industrial revolutions and Globalisation have given worldwide 
impetus to entrepreneurship and its expansion. The modern corporate 
system has been characterized by a multitude of phenomena, positive or 
negative, but is acting more and more like a full-fledged actor of the 
international system. Consequently, entrepreneurial vectors are exposed to 
numerous risks and threats, usually asymmetric, due to terrorism, organised 
crime, geopolitical conflicts for supremacy, and cyber-crime. 
The international cooperation has the potential of solving many 
problems the people of Planet Earth are facing, but trans-state legal rule still 
does not have normative power and coercion practice similarly effective to 
national laws. The fact that humankind is still lacking internationally usable 
clear definitions and legal concepts of terrorism and cyber-espionage should 
be analysed together with state revisionist potential in neighbourhood 
policies and global competition. All these, plus failure both internally and 
externally to eradicate organised crime, are all facets of the security dilemma 
which will characterise entrepreneurship for the foreseable future.  
The solutions implemented so far have been rather tactical, yet the 
author will try by the end of this paper to circumscribe two strategic 
scenarios for the future: 
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A. Continuation of the security privatisation process 
The global financial crisis of 2008, as well as the overall cost of 
modern war (based less on the presence of troops on battlefields and more 
on the hi-tech Revolution in Military Affairs), led to a reduction of the 
defence budgets and to an increased use of existing resources by joint 
efforts (the battlegroup concept aplicable to the EU Rapid Reaction Force or 
the time-sharing of military assets borrowed by NATO from the hospitality 
industry). The new rise of Islamist effective militancy through ISIS, the Al-
Nusra Front, Al-Shabab, Boko Haram, et alia led to NATO countries’ 
decision at the Wales North Atlantic Council to reach in a decade a budget 
allocation for the security sector of at least 2 percent of the GDP and 
spending of at least 20 percent of it to develop major capabilities (NATO, 
2014, §14). Beyond the positive but formal proclamation still remains the 
recent practice of non-compliance and buck-passing, which is inducing 
pessimism on the possibility of having an efficient and effective 
implementation of such financial commitments, adopted by consensus 
nonetheless.  
In the third millennium, the transnational corporations have 
responded to the continuous deterioration of global security environment 
by providing consistent financial resources to their private security 
structures, both for usual operations of perimeter security within 
headquarters as well as for even sending quasi-armies to secure their 
extractive industrial fields (e.g., Royal Dutch Shell, to the conflict-prone 
Niger Delta36).  
States themselves have used extensively in the past decade private 
contractors for providing security services. It can be profiled the activity of 
Blackwater37 company that was involved in niche missions of the Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (2004-2007), estimated to a cost of over 488 million dollars 
                                                     
36 Security costs estimated at 383 million dollars. – see Afua Hirsch and John Vidal, 
Shell spending millions of dollars on security in Nigeria, leaked data shows, The Guardian, 19 
August 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/aug/19/shell-spending-
security-nigeria-leak?CMP=twt_gu 
37 Now called ACADEMI as part of the security group Constellis, it has ongoing 
contracts with the American government in troublesome areas (bodyguards for the 
officials and offices of the State Department, training of Pentagon personnel, special 
assignments within the securitisation and reconstruction efforts of Afghanistan etc.). 
For further details on the dynamics and trends of concentration of the global private 
security services market, see Kate Brennan, Blackwater’s Descendants Are Doing Just 
Fine, Foreign Policy, July 1, 2014, http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/ 
2014/07/01/blackwaters_descendants_are_doing_just_fine 
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for the first contract38. One of the main reasons for the increased 
privatisation of the security sector is the enormous political cost for the state 
policymakers of ordering direct military involvement in operational theaters 
that are perceived at individual level to be too far and irrelevant compared 
to the subsistence and consumerism interests of post-modern Western 
citizens. The Vietnam syndrome is still present within the Western societies, 
despite the current legal framework of complete abandonment of 
compulsory military service. 
Labeled by some authors as mercenarism39, the act of contracting 
private services for the benefit of state or corporate customers is a 
substantial part of the privatisation of global security.40 Despite some 
controversy highlighted particularly by violent public incidents41 that have or 
have not led to legal proceedings, the author's opinion is that regardless of 
their weight in the balance of power of the international system, the 
increasing inability of states to get involved and solve security problems will 
turn the business sector and the entrepreneurs towards the use of private 
solutions.  
 
B. Return to Anarchy  
Although it is a perspective difficult to depict in details, the return 
to anarchy is innerly indicating the cyclicity described by the philosophers of 
history (Montesquieu, Hegel, Spengler, Toynbee, Djuvara, Kennedy or 
Fergusson).  
                                                     
38 Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, 2007. Memorandum, October 
1, 2007. Washington, D.C. 20515-61 43 
39 J. Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army. New York: 
Nation Books, Revised Edition, Amazon Kindle edition, 2008; S. Simons, Master of 
War: Blackwater USA's Erik Prince and the Business of War. New York: Harper, 1st 
Edition, Amazon Kindle edition, 2009; for opposite thesis, E. Prince, Civilian 
Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the Unsung Heroes of the War on Terror. New 
York: Penguin, Amazon Kindle edition, 2013. 
40 The author doesn’t share the vision outlined by Sean MacFate (2014) of a “neo-
medieval” world in which the modern “condottieri” will be dictating terms to 
regular states. Instead of that, the privatisation of security (subject to at least national 
regulation) will include market fragmentation both in terms of request and supply 
but which will not lead to limited containment or anarchy by itself. States will be 
challenged to offering better contractual terms to potential recruits but the leverage 
will nonetheless be on their side on judicial and hi-tech aspects. 
41 Blackwater forceful intervention on October 16, 2007 led to the death of 17 and 
wounding of another 20 Iraqi civilians in the Baghdad Nisour Square. - see Bob 
Drummond, Ex-Blackwater Guards Lose Bid to End Iraq Shooting Cases, Bloomberg, 
June 4, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-04/ex-blackwater-
guards-lose-bid-to-end-iraq-shooting-cases.html 
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The use of violence has characterized humankind from antiquity to 
the present time, both individually and collectively. Seen through family, 
ethnic, national, state, regional, trans- or intercontinental lens, within 
bilateral or multilateral alliances, the collective violent action has been based 
on the adversity of at least another actor. Furthermore, anomy is the 
corollary of anarchy, both concepts representing the excess of adversity at a 
general level.  
The skeptical perspective of the English philosopher Hobbes (homo 
homini lupus) in the context of the horrors of the Civil War in England has 
relevant indicators aplicable to the security environment of the XXI century 
as well. The growing importance of corporations at global level, the high 
degree of economic concentration on key markets, the conflicts with 
accelerated dynamics between large companies and the state, the lobbying 
activity and shadow funding of electoral campaigns of the incumbent 
political leaders, as well as the significant economic interests in the area of 
public procurement (especially manifest in weak or failed states), are all 
factors that facilitate and enhance conflict. 
The anarchist movements of the late XIX century were usually 
fighting the system. Despite some successes (the assassination of monarchs 
or other heads of state and government, public figures etc.), the anarchist 
structures were finally defeated by state coercive actions.  
The anarchic horizon that the author wants to indicate is related to 
the conflict condition in which corporations become ambitious in terms of 
possession and exercise of power at a level comparable to states. Private 
armies funded by corporations can also wage ad hoc wars of variable 
dimensions; the major difference between classic inter-state conflicts and 
potential corporate ones is given by the fact that in the past the maximum 
politico-military aggregation of business interests was the type of Hanseatic 
leagues of cities led by guilds involved in long distance commerce. The 
current corporate force can be significantly greater than that of a small and 
even medium-size state. Anarchy is not to be provoked by such conflicting 
interests, exarcerbated hypothetically. Simply continued deterioration of the 
security environment can cause companies whose interests are harmed by 
unpredictability to act proactively, but in excess; the worst consequence 
could be the undermining of stability and real force of rules, however 
incomplete and not fully aplied in the contemporary political, social, 
economic and cultural cohabitation. Regulating competition at the level of 
economic blocs is not uniform, nor fully functional42, but even with these 
drawbacks is still an important balancing factor in global markets. 
                                                     
42 I. Lianos, D. Sokol, (eds.), The Global Limits of Competition Law. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2012. 
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Furthemore, the efforts made to expand areas of free trade 
transcontinentally (e.g. TTIP and BRICS) make the global 
institutionalization of competition rules even more relevant despite the fact 
that the economic liberalization could trigger not only cooperation but also 
adversity and protectionism at the level of business lobby.  
The struggle for resources has diachronically characterized 
humankind, and only the collective memory of tragic and destructive 
(world) wars can serve as a crucial inhibitor. Otherwise, benign commercial 
products evolving from blockbuster movies, shooter games or pokemon cartoons 
to highly publicized performances in Ultimate Fighting Championship or 
Wrestling Mania may lead in time, because of fast and ever growing social 
media, to exacerbated violence. Its agents would be those having will of power 
and eager to celebrate triumph of the will, to mention but only a few of the 
1,000 year utopian Reich slogans of the Nazi regime whose ascent was 
based on racial discrimination, aggression and suport of German 
corporations eager for expansion. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The post Cold War Era has been characterised by the globalisation of terrorism and 
organised crime with major negative effects on business environment worldwide.  
The Islamic fundamentalism has targeted not only political and military assets but also 
businessmen-citizens of the “Evil”, “Infidel” West. The organised crime, on the other hand, while 
generating dynamic and lucrative black markets especially in weak states, has ignited violent 
internal feuds (e.g. the ongoing Mexico Drug War) that destabilise countries even more and 
annihilate prospects for investments or tourism. 
At the same time, an increasing number of geopolitical conflicts (e.g. Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islands, Vietnam-China oil rig disputes) have triggered widespread popular violence and distortion 
of the economic output, seriously affecting the regional markets. 
Nonetheless significant is the cyber-crime, its unconventional insecurity challenging the 
very foundations of competitiviness, technological progress and modern power prominence. 
 
Keywords: Terrorism, Cartel Wars, Geopolitics, Economic Nationalism, Cyber-
crime. 
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the Iron Curtain to Schengen 
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Introduction1 
After the end of the Second World War the Cold War begins, the 
world becomes bipolarized and Europe is divided between the East and the 
West. The need for security and the desire to preserve the identity and 
welfare had contributed to the imposition of securitized borders between 
the two rival camps. The most illustrious embodiment of this division 
represented the construction of the Berlin Wall, certainly the most shameful 
border of the 20th century. As Didier Bigo specified, the erection of walls 
around borders and the so-called block of persons within the state were 
some methods used by intransigent Communist leaders in that period. 
Western liberal democracies were against such protective practices, leaving 
their own citizens at least the exit option, giving them the right to move 
freely, but not to settle down. So, here we must make a clear distinction 
between the logic of blocking people within a state and the logic to prevent 
the outsiders to come in "even if the frontiers are the locus of these different 
kind of controls".2After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of 
Germany and the European enlargement, the need for security has 
contributed to the emergence of new frontiers in the old continent. Thus, in 
1985 was signed the Schengen Agreement, which entered into force a 
decade later, eliminated internal border controls within the Schengen area, 
                                                     
* Phd. in International Relations and European Studies, UBB Cluj-Napoca, 
edina_lilla@yahoo.com. 
1 See Mészáros, Edina Lilla. 2015. “Security Dimension as Trigger and Result of the 
Modification of the Frontiers of the European Union”, Doctoral Thesis, 
International Relations and Security Studies Doctoral School, Babeş-Bolyai 
University, Cluj-Napoca, 62-68. 
2D. Bigo, 2005. “Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in Control.” In 
Controlling Frontiers. Free Movement into and within Europe, edited by Didier Bigo and 
Elspeth Guild, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p. 56. 
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transferring control to its external borders, as Bort Eberhard noticed “just 
as the Iron curtain was lifted, bringing in its wake a softening and opening 
of frontiers, this became, under the auspices of ‘Europe 92’ and Schengen, 
the external frontier of the EU, which had to be hardened” 3, thus implicitly 
security apears in another aspect as result of the modification (apearance) of 
borders. 
 
1. The classifiction of borders/frontiers 
A considerable amount of theoretical work dealing with the 
definition and differentiation of the concepts of border/frontier has 
emerged in the last decades. Departing from an etymological analysis the 
concept of frontier apears for the first time in the 14th century, signifying an 
architectural façade or a military formation.4In the research entitled The 
European Union external border, an epistemological aproach, based 
on the definition given by the dictionary of geography border is identified 
with a limit that separates two areas, two states, being “a clash between two 
manners of space organization, between communication networks.”5  
According to the authors Ioan Horga and Ariane Landuyt borders 
apear as official delimitations between collective entities, politically 
organized identities in states or equivalent of states, having a dual identity: 
political, defending a set of laws and regulations, and symbolic protecting 
norms, customs and cultural identities.6  
Based on Malcolm Anderson’s viewpoint the concept of frontier has 
a more widened meaning, and can be referred to as “a precise line at which 
jurisdictions meet, usually demarcated or controlled by customs, police and 
                                                     
3 E. Bort, 1998. ”Mitteleuropa: the difficult frontier.” In The Frontiers of Europe, edited by 
Eberhard Bort, Malcolm Anderson, London: Pinter, p. 94 and E. L. . 2013. 
“Security Dimension of New EU External Communication:The Duplicity of 
Borders as Surveillance and Access Points.” In Communicating the EU Policies beyond the 
Borders. Proposals for Constructive Neighbour Relations and the New EU’s External 
Communication Strategy, edited by Ioan Horga, Ariane Landuyt, Oradea: Editura 
Universităţii din Oradea, p. 210. 
4A. Cuşco, 2007. “De la graniţa imperală la frontieră europeană [From imperial border 
to European frontier].” Revista Contrafort, p. 4-5, 
http://www.contrafort.md/old/2007/150-151/. Accessed March 26, 2016. 
5M. Brie and I. Horga. 2009. “The European Union external border: an 
epistemological approach.” Romanian Review on Political Geography, 11th year no. 1: 16. 
Accessed March 29, 2016. 
6I. Horga and A. Landuyt. 2013. “Communicating the EU Policies beyond the/Its 
Borders.” In Communicating the EU Policies beyond the Borders. Proposals for Constructive 
Neighbour Relations and the New EU’s External Communication Strategy, edited by Ioan 
Horga, Ariane Landuyt, Oradea: Editura Universităţii din Oradea, p. 5. 
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military personnel”7 or it can be identified as a “region, a zone with unclear 
lines of demarcation”8, sometimes described as a border region, becoming 
an area of exchange, interaction and integration.9 
In the 21st century many times the terms of border and frontier are 
interchanging and sometimes overlaping, but in the case of the European 
Union we have to make a clear distinction between these two notions. In 
the case of the United Europe we distinguish between internal (representing 
the limit between the members states) and external borders (which can be 
identified with the separating line between the EU and third countries). The 
notion of border generally refers to the drawing of some external lines of 
the political structures, within which a collective identity, stability and 
security are shaped. Unlike the borders between states, in the context of the 
European colossus the concept of frontier can be considered an intermediary 
contact zone between cultures and different political systems, in great part 
having a symbolic meaning, rather than a legal connotation.10  
According to the geographer born in Bukovina later immigrated to 
the United States, Ladis Kristof "the nature of frontiers differs greatly from 
the nature of boundaries. Frontiers are a characteristic of rudimentary socio-
political relations and/or absence of laws. The presence of boundaries is a 
sign that the political community has reached a relative degree of maturity 
and orderliness [...] Frontiers are the result of rather spontaneous or at least 
ad hoc solutions and movements, boundaries are fixed and enforced 
through a more rational and centrally coordinated effort after a conscious 
choice is made among the several preferences and oportunities at hand”.11 
Ladis studied frontiers and borders/boundaries as aspects of Realpolitik and 
as the organizational elements of the state, using functional aproach to show 
the differences between them. According to him, in terms of their position 
to the state borders are centripetal because they are moving towards the 
                                                     
7 M. Anderson. 1996. Frontiers. Territory and state formation in the modern world. Cambridge: 
Polity Press, p. 25. 
8D. Lynch, 2005. “From ‘Frontier’ Politics to ‘Border’ policies between the EU and 
Russia.” In Russia and the European Union, edited by Oksana Antonenko, Kathryn 
Pinnick. New York: Routledge, p. 15. 
9M. Comelli, E. Greco and N. Tocci. 2007. “From Boundary to Borderland: 
Transforming the Meaning of Borders through the European Neighbourhood 
Policy.” European Foreign Affairs Review, 12/2: 206, http://www.kluwerlawonline. 
com/abstract.php?area=Journals&id=EERR2007018. Accessed April 23, 2016. 
10 Horga and Landuyt, op. cit, p. 5. 
11L. D. Kristof 1959. “The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries.” Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, 49/3:269-282 apud K. Jowitt. 1992. New World 
Disorder. The Leninist Extinction. Berkley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
p. 308. 
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interior of the state, dividing and separating its territorial integrity. Unlike 
borders, frontiers are directed outward, challenging the state control 
functions, thus being centrifugal in their character.12 
Concerning their classification, borders/frontiers can be opened-
closed, soft-hard, inclusive-exclusive, positive and constructive, symbolic and ideological, 
and of course the list could be endless. An open border makes possible the 
freedom of movement of people between different jurisdictions with limited 
or no restrictions, allowing free movement of people between the two 
countries or between groups of countries. An example of this is the opening 
of international borders between different Member States of the European 
Union, which allowed free movement with very few restrictions, while closed 
borders can be identified as barriers, characterized by surveillance and strict 
control, restrictions and visa regime.13 
Nanette Neuwahl along with various collaborators of the volume 
edited by Joan DeBardeleben makes a clear distinction between the soft and 
hard borders, describing hard borders as closed, sharp or exclusive barriers, 
involving strict regimes of visa controls, extensive police and customs 
control on freight transport, while on the other hand, soft borders are seen as 
open, permeable, inclusive, even comparing them with some bridges.14 
Mircea Brie and Ioan Horga launch a rather interesting hypothesis, 
according to which in the European Community the hard frontier excludes 
not only the non-Europeans but also the Europeans therefore; the EU's 
borders are closed or opened depending on the exclusivist political interests.15  
                                                     
12 H. van Houtum and J. Scott. 2005. “Boundaries and the Europeanisation of Space: 
The EU, Integration and Evolving Theoretical Perspectives on Borders.” 
EXLINEA State of Art Report, p. 9-10. http://www.ctc.ee/implemented-
projects/border-research-exlinea. Accessed May 4, 2016. 
13F. Maron, 2007. “Les nouvelles frontiers de l’Europe: repenser les concepts [The 
new frontiers of Europe : rethinking concepts].” In Eurolimes 4, edited by Gerard 
Delanty, Dana Pantea and Károly Tepercsics, Oradea: Institute for Euroregional 
Studies, p. 115. 
14N. Neuwahl. 2005. “What Borders for which Europe?.” In Soft or Hard 
Borders?Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe, edited by Joan DeBardeleben, 
Hamshire: Ashgate, p. 24 
15 M. Brie and I. Horga. 2014. “Le frontiere europee – espressioni dell’identità” 
[European frontiers- expressions of identity].” In Transylvanian Review. Categorie 
europee. Rappresentazioni storiche e letterarie del ‘politico’ [Transylvanian Review. European 
categories. Historical and literary representations of the „political”], edited by Sorin 
Şipoş, Federico Donatiello, Dan Octavian, Cepraga Aurel Chiriac, Vol 23/1: 205. 
Oradea, Editura Metropolis. 
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In terms of relations of the European Community/European 
Union with the outside world, Michael Smith identified a set of four types 
of frontiers/borders, namely:16 
1. A geopolitical frontier/border, which during the Cold War 
produced a line of demarcation between the area of the European 
Community and that of peace, and dangerous world outside of Eastern 
Europe; 
2. An institutional and legal frontier/border that defines the 
institutional and legal framework in which the European Union works, 
creating the image of a "community based on the rule of law" and 
promoter of civic statehood; 
3. A transactional frontier/border through which the EU governs 
the access to the market for third countries; 
4. A cultural frontier/border, relatively permeable established 
between the inner and the outer for reasons of democratic, political 
and human rights values. 
Undoubtedly, the list concerning the classification of 
borders/frontiers could continue, but for objective reasons these will not be 
shown in the current lines, an exhaustive analysis of the typology of 
frontiers/borders not being the main objective of this article. 
 
2. Iron Curtain versus lace curtain, or the road from the fall of 
the arbirtrary border (Iron Wall) created during the Cold War to 
Schengen  
The Second World War redrew the borders in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and also led to the division of Germany and the establishment for 
more than four decades of the so-called Iron Curtain, which separated two 
different systems politically, economically and ideologically.17According to 
Ruben Zaiotti this Iron Curtain became the symbol of the Cold War, of 
which main battleground was the European continent.18 
It is already a known fact that the term Iron Curtain was first used by 
the former Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill, in a speech 
on March 5, 1946 at Fulton, Missouri, when he said that "From Stettin in 
the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the 
                                                     
16S. Gänzle, Stefan. 2008. “The EU’s Policy toward Russia: Extending Governance 
beyond Borders.”In The Boundaries of EU Enlargement. Finding a Place for Neighbours, 
edited by Joan deBardeleben, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 56. 
17M. Anderson and E. Bort. 2001. The Frontiers of the European Union. Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan, p. 1. 
18R. Zaiotti, 2011. Cultures of Border Control. Schengen & the Evolution of European Frontiers. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 56. 
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Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central 
and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, 
Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around 
them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one 
form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in 
some cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.”19  
This curtain was nothing but a militarized line separating the two 
enemy camps in Europe, also representing a special case of border20, which 
Zaiotti considered as a heavily securitized barrier, but looking on its 
function of protective shield against external threats, we can perceive it as a 
traditional border, meant to prevent the passage of people from one part to 
another. Undeniably, this preventive role was more powerful for the 
movements from East to West, than vice versa.21 John W. Donaldson talks 
about a special phenomenon, namely the Iron Curtain effect, referring to the 
fact that in case of the Communist side security measures were intended to 
prevent people to exit the state, condemning them to a complete isolation, 
without rendering much attention to entries from the Western countries.22 
Malcolm Anderson’s and Eberhard Bort’s perception about the Iron 
Curtain seems to coincide with that of Zaiotti, describing it as highly guarded 
border, highlighting its intrinsic protective role.23The innovation of this 
barrier, a territorial anomaly, is that it wasn’t a national border, and thus it 
contradicted entirely with the archetypal ideal of territorial sovereignty, 
overlaping the borders of several countries in Europe, in case of Germany 
dividing a territory that before was of a unitary state.24 
We identify better with the categorization of the American scholar 
Bruce L. Brager, who places the Iron Curtain among the arbitrary borders. If we 
look at the characteristics of the arbitrary borders we realize that they are 
usually imposed by external powers, contributing to a possible total breaking 
of social and economic contacts, thus affecting the lives of people on both 
sides of the border, as hapened in the cases of the Berlin wall or the border 
between North and South Korea. Arbitrary borders are ambiguous, as they 
can bring peace in an area consumed by war, or on the contrary they can 
                                                     
19J. Havardi. 2009. The Greatest Britons. Essays on Winston Churchill’s Life and Political 
Philosophy. London: Shepheard Walwyn Publishers, p. 307. 
20 Zaiotti, op. cit, p. 49. 
21 Ibidem, p. 56. 
22J. W. Donaldson. 2005. “Fencing the Line: Analysis of the Recent Rise in Security 
Measures along Disputed and Undisputed Boundaries.” In Global Surveillance and 
Policing. Border, Security, Identity, edited by Ella Zureik, Mark. B. Salter, Devon: Willan 
Publishing, p. 190. 
23 Anderson and Bort. op. cit, p. 148. 
24 Zaiotti, op. cit, p. 56. 
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become the catalyst of a devastating war.25 The Iron Curtain as an arbitrary 
border had a double meaning: on the one hand it was a protective buffer for 
the Soviet Union, and on the other hand, it represented a defensive line of 
democracy, a limit to the expansion of the Soviet control in Europe.26The 
Iron Curtain in addition to its role as a security cordon for the Soviets, gave 
an important impetus to Western democracies to develop their economies 
and strengthen their conventional defense.27 
We should mention that this Iron Curtain was more than just a 
territorial demarcation line it was a mental frontier that separated the two 
camps with different ideologies. From the perspective of the Western 
powers it was "a line between good and bad, truth and error, justice and 
opression, democracy and dictatorship"28 and for the Communists it meant 
the line that protected them for the democratic and capitalist ideology the 
so-called infectious Western product which was considered incompatible with 
the socialist doctrine. Based on the meaning of the word itself, maybe the 
reader would expect that a real curtain of iron was strewn over Europe, but 
if someone visited Europe, especially Berlin in that time, he/she didn’t see a 
piece of rigid drapery dividing the European continent between democratic 
regimes and dictatorships, but a lot of steel barbed wire, surveillance towers, 
ground radar, and armed soldiers with machine guns, who were willing to 
use them if necessary.29 
As mentioned above, the Berlin Wall can be perceived as the 
prominent symbol of this division, arguably the most shameful border of 
the twentieth century. Its construction was initiated on 13 August 1961 by 
the German Democratic Republic, culminating in the complete isolation of 
West Berlin from East Berlin and Eastern Germany. The purpose of the 
Berlin Wall was to prevent the citizens from East Berlin to flee to the West, 
driven by the desire to regain their freedom. Here we would like to highlight 
the character of the communist regimes, whose leaders did not have enough 
confidence in their own co-nationals, stipulating that they will flee across the 
border on the first occasion. To prevent this, an arbitrary, artificial border 
was not enough, they needed a real, physical and visible wall: this was the 
Berlin Wall.30  
 
 
                                                     
25 B. L. Brager. 2004. The Iron Curtain. The Cold War in Europe. Philadelphia: Chelsea 
House Publishers, p. 3. 
26 Ibidem. 
27 Ibidem, p. 116. 
28 Zaiotti, op. cit, p. 56. 
29 Brager, op. cit, p. 3. 
30 Ibidem, p. 4. 
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3. The creation of Schengenland in Europe  
The Iron Curtain didn’t only have negative effects but also 
contributed to an unprecedented economic development of Western 
democracies. When the peoples of Eastern Europe were isolated behind the 
Soviet security cordon, in the west took place the European integration 
process and the economies of Western countries flourished. On 25 March 
1957 under the Treaty of Rome was founded the European Economic 
Community, but the abolition of internal borders at that time was not yet a 
primary goal. 
Given the freedom of movement of people nowadays assuredly, it 
is one of the fundamental aspects of European citizenship, but it was not 
always like that.31 The Treaty of Rome in addition to creating a common 
market, aimed to achieve progressively the free movement of goods, 
services, capital and persons within the borders of the six member states of 
the European Economic Community, but the freedom of movement of 
people was conditioned, initially being aplied only to those citizens of the 
EEC who pursued an economic activity, such as workers, freelancers or 
people who provided certain services. Even these people with privileged 
status could enter on the territory of the Member States of the EEC or exit 
with a valid passport or identity card.32 
Later that freedom was extended to all EU citizens and also to third 
country nationals. For more than a decade the possibility of abolishing 
internal borders between Member States of the EEC wasn’t a major 
preoccupation for European leaders, reaching on their agenda only in 1972 
through the report to the European Council of the former Belgian Prime 
Minister, Leo Tindemans. Tindemans raised the issue of standardizing 
passports and later, the creation of a passport union, proposing “the gradual 
disapearance of frontier controls on persons moving between member 
countries, as a corollary of passport union.”33 
                                                     
31 F. Atger. 2008. “The Abolition of Internal Border Checks in an Enlarged Schengen 
Area: Freedom of Movement of a Scattered Web of Security Checks.”Challenges 
Liberty & Security Research Paper, no. 8:4. http://aei.pitt.edu/9405/. Accessed April 
23, 2016. 
32 E. Brouwer. 2008. Digital Borders and Real Rights. Effective Remedies for Third-Country 
Nationals in the Schengen Information System. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 15; 
“Tratatul de la Roma [Treaty of Rome].” 25 March 1957, p. 4, 21, 2, 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf. 
Accessed March 5, 2016.  
33 Commission of the European Communities. “European Union. Report by Mr. Leo 
Tindemans to the European Council.” Bulletin of the European Communities, 
Supplement 1/76, p. 27. 
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In the logic of elaborating this report we identify the desire to bring 
the citizens closer to the supranational European Community by abolishing 
internal border controls. At the time, unfortunately, this initiative hasn’t 
been warmly welcomed by the Member States of the EEC, but it 
contributed to the development and future implementation of basic 
concepts, such as passports union or Europe of the citizens.34 
The first concrete steps towards the abolition of internal borders 
were made at the Paris European Council from 9 to 10 December 1974, by 
creating a working group mandated with the task of investigating the 
possibilities for the achievement of a passport union. One of the necessary 
preconditions for creating this union was the issuing of uniform passports 
for the Community citizens. Harmonizing immigration law and the abolition 
of passport controls at internal borders were among the long-term 
objectives. This meeting of the heads of state of the EEC materialized a year 
later with the publication by the European Commission of two reports: one 
aimed not only the introduction of a passport union and lifting of their 
control at internal borders, but also the adoption of certain measures of 
control at the external frontiers; while the second one proposed granting 
privileged rights, including political rights to the community citizens. 
Nevertheless, the Commission's initiative for a Directive on a uniform 
passport came into being only in 1981 as a resolution adopted by the 
Council of Ministers.35 
But for more than a decade (1974-1985) we are witnessing a 
stagnation during which no serious Community legislation on the abolition 
of internal borders saw the light of day. 
A very important moment in the process of creating the Schengen 
zone meant the Fontainebleau European Council from June 1984 which, in 
addition to an ambitious plan aimed at creating the European Union, has 
emphasized the idea of abolishing internal border control.  
The political momentum generated by Fontainebleau was fructified 
a month later by the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, his 
undersecretary Waldemar Schreckenberger, the former French President 
François Mitterand and his foreign minister Roland Dumas, in Saarbrücken, 
by signing a bilateral agreement under which the parties pledged to gradually 
eliminate checks at the common borders.”36The agreement envisioned the 
immediate abolition of control of persons, the easing of control of vehicles, 
and the transfer of these controls to the external borders; the commitment 
to harmonize visa policy; the strengthening of police and customs 
                                                     
34 Brouwer, op. cit, p. 16. 
35 Ibidem.  
36 Zaiotti, op. cit, p. 68-70. 
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cooperation; and the commitment to harmonize legislation on foreigners, 
drugs and arms, and passport delivery.37 
This Franco-German bilateral agreement served as a positive 
example also for the Benelux countries, showing interest in starting similar 
procedures. The peak moment of consultations between representatives of 
these countries on the abolition of common borders and free movement of 
their nationals took place on 14 June 1985, in the small town beside the 
River Mosel in Luxembourg, Schengen. The agreement signed at Schengen 
was rather a draft than a detailed action plan, so the five signatories have 
initiated immediate action for the elaboration of a convention which would 
detail the provisions launched in this agreement.38 
Meanwhile falls down the wall of shame (Berlin) on 9 November 
1989, and after two years also the Soviet Union crumbles, leading to the 
disapearance of the Iron Curtain, the arbitrary border separating Western 
Europe from Eastern Europe. The former communist countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe turned their eyes westward and were expecting 
a softening, an opening of borders, their hopes, however, were quickly 
shattered by the 1990 Schengen Convention, which lifted controls at the 
internal borders of the signatory states (later being extended to other 
countries), but highlighted the need to strengthen the external border that 
separated the EEC members from the poor states from the East, generators 
of risks and threats.39 
After 5 years of multilateral consultations was aplied the 
Convention implementing the Scheme Agreement (CISA) on 19 June 
1990. The Dutch political scientist, Dennis Broeders considers that this 
convention nicknamed as “inventory of flanking measures” was the first 
documents, which associated and even more equalized Schengen with the 
Fortress Europe metaphor and with the consolidated securitization measures 
taken in the name of preserving security and welfare.40 
CISA is important because it has redefined both the meaning and 
function of borders.41 Already the first article of the Convention makes a 
clear distinction between the notions of internal and external border, the first 
referring to "the common land borders of the Contracting Parties, their 
airports for internal flights and their sea ports for regular ferry connections 
exclusively from or to other ports within the territories of the Contracting 
Parties and not calling at any ports outside those territories"; and the second 
                                                     
37 Ibidem, p. 70.  
38 Ibidem. 
39 Brager, op. cit, p. 115. 
40D. Broeders, 2009. Breaking Down Anonimity. Digital Surveillance of Illegal Migrants in 
Germany and the Netherlands. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, p. 159. 
41 Zaiotti, op. cit, p. 72. 
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to "the Contracting Parties' land and sea borders and their airports and sea 
ports, provided that they are not internal border".42 
The principle of abolishing checks at internal borders is 
pronounced in Article 2 paragraph 1, stressing in paragraph 2 that if “public 
policy or national security so require a Contracting Party may, after 
consulting the other Contracting Parties, decide that for a limited period 
national border checks apropriate to the situation shall be carried out at 
internal borders. If public policy or national security require immediate 
action, the Contracting Party concerned shall take the necessary measures 
and at the earliest oportunity shall inform the other Contracting Parties 
thereof.”43 
Logically, the removal of barriers between the five signatory states 
of the Convention and the free movement of people has created a security 
deficit, a vacuum inside that somehow had to be compensated.44At the 
ministerial meeting of 14 to 15 September 1987 the signatory states of the 
Schengen Accord have agreed to set up a computerized information system 
that would be used by border guards and police authorities.45The necessary 
steps for the creation of the Schengen Information System (Schengen SIS) 
and its institutional infrastructure have been included in Title IV (Arts. 92-
101) of the Convention, art. 93 describing its purpose: "to maintain public 
policy and public security, including national security, in the territories of the 
Contracting Parties and to aply the provisions of this Convention relating to 
the movement of persons in those territories, using information 
communicated via this system."46 
Besides setting up a Schengen Information System, the Convention 
also provided for the establishment of a system called SIRENE (an acronym 
                                                     
42“Convenţie de Aplicare a Acordului Schengen din 14 iunie 1985 între Guvernele 
Statelor din Uniunea Economică Benelux, Republicii Federale Germania şi 
Republicii Franceze Privind Eliminarea Treptată a Controalelor la Frontierele lor 
Comune [Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 
between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of 
checks at their common borders],” p. 1, http://www.schengen.mira.gov.ro/ 
Documente/utile/catutil/Conventia%20Schengen.pdf. Accessed April 17, 2016. 
43“The Schengen Acquis - Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 
June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual 
Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders”, Official Journal, 22/09/2000 P. 0019 
– 0062, p. 239, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? uri=CELEX: 
42000A0922%2802%29: en:HTML. Accessed May 5, 2016. 
44 Zaiotii, op, cit, p. 72. 
45 F. Atger, op. cit, p. 9. 
46 “Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement…”, p. 36. 
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of the definition of the activity for which it was mandated: Suplimentary 
Information Requested at the National Entries, of which task was to provide 
additional information relevant to the new alerts regardless of their location, 
facilitating the search for persons and property in the Schengen area. 
SIRENE involved creating a system of permanent electronic messaging in 
each state party to the Schengen Agreement and interconnecting it to the 
national database of the police authorities. In the conditions imposed by the 
lifting controls at internal borders of Schengen member states, the signalized 
alerts by the national police and customs authorities would be not only 
recorded but also stored.47 
In the final act of CISA it stated that before the entry into force of 
the Convention, the signatory States shall inform each other about all 
circumstances that could significantly affect the areas covered by this 
Convention and its entry into force. The Convention will enter into force 
before those preconditions for its implementation have been fulfilled in the 
Signatory States and checks at external borders are effective (Schengen 
acquis) it means that it shall not become aplicable after ratification, but only 
as a result of a separate decision of entry into force. 
Article 13148 laid the foundation of an Executive Committee in charge 
with the implementation of the Convention, which entered into force on 
September 1, 1993, after being ratified by the five signatory states. Its 
implementation was done by the Executive Committee but only two years 
after its ratification in Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, 
France, Spain and Portugal on March 26, 1995. In Italy the agreement 
entered into only in October 26, 1997, in Austria on 1st December 1997 and 
in Greece on December 8, 1997, Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland 
remained outside the Schengen through the opt-out option.49The Schengen 
framework was incorporated into EU law by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 
1999, creating a complex legal system.50 
Today, the Schengen area (European Commission, 5) comprises 26 
member states51 and covers an area of 42.673 km of maritime borders and 
                                                     
47 Poliţia Română [Romanian Police]. “SIRENE România- actualitate şi perspective 
[SIRENE Romania- present and prospects],” p. 1, http://www.politiaromana.ro/ 
Schengen%20nr%201.pdf. Accessed June 1, 2016. 
48 “Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement…”, p. 55. 
49 Ibidem.  
50 B. Hayes, 2004. “From the Schengen Information System to SIS II and the Visa 
Information (VIS): the Proposal Explained.” Statewatch Analysis, p. 5,  
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/analysis-sisII.pdf. Accessed May 29, 
2016.  
51Of which 22 are EU member states “ Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
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7.721 km of external land borders, enabling over 400 million Europeans to 
move freely without a passport.52 
In conclusion we might say that since the 1980s there has been a 
significant progress concerning the freedom of movement across the 
European continent, facilitating not just the travel for EU and non-EU 
citizens alike, but also the development of commercial relations. However, 
the lack of internal border checks between the Schengen member states has 
also enabled the unauthorized migrants, organized crime groups and 
potential terrorists to move without major obstacles in the Schengen area. 
During the current migratory pressure Schengen was seriously tested, and it 
didn’t pass the exam with brio, we can only hope that in the future it won’t 
outlive its usefulness and will disapear, triggering the reinstallation of 
internal border controls between member states.  
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Undoubtedly, the free movement of persons is one of the biggest achievements of the United 
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The creation of the League of Nations 
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1. The consequences of the ending of the First World War 
The real cause of the outburst of the First World War was the 
dismanteling of the system of the balance of powers in Europe and the fight 
of great European states for supremacy. It have to be taken into 
consideration also other aspects such as the imperialist rivalry outside 
Europe, the German challenge in front of British naval supremacy, the wish 
of French to take back Alsace and Lorreine or the ambitions of Russia to 
control the Constantinople and the channels Bosfor and Dardanele.  
It existed also a pretext, the assasination of archiduke Franz 
Ferdinand, fact that determined the declaration of war to Serbia by the 
Austro- Hungary. Russia mobilized in the suport of Serbia and Germany 
declared war to France and Russia. In the conflict it came up also England 
because of the fact that Germany refused to respect the neutrality of Belgium.  
After in 1914, the American president Woodrow Wilson 
pronounced himself for the neutrality of United States towards the war, in 
1917, in the context of the attacks against American vessels from the neutral 
waters by the German submarines, Wilson sustained the entrance of United 
States in the war. In 1917 there were sent in Europe aproximatively one 
million of American soldiers.  
Probably the most important aspect of this war was that United 
States, promoting until then an international isolation according to Monroe 
doctrine according to which America was of Americans and Europe of 
Europeans, accepted to get involved in the war. But of the same 
importance, is the fact that the renonciation to Monroe doctrine was only a 
temporary attitude, the refusal of American Senate to ratify the Covenant of 
the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles, but also the signing by 
USA of separated treaties of peace with the defeated powers, proving this 
idea. Still, the importance of the moment can not be diminished, the 
                                                     
* PhD research at the University of Oradea, Department of International Relations 
and European Studies. E-mail: olteananca@hotmail.com 
The European Space. Borders and Issues 
 
478 
intervention of United States in Europe proving maybe for the first time the 
affirmation of United States as a great universal power.  
Aspiration towards security and stability, existent at the end of the 
war was the factor that determined the creation of the League of Nations. 
But the context in which this idea took shape was precarious. The costs of 
the war were huge for Europe, both in human field, but also in the material 
one. The war costed Europe 8 millions of deceased persons and 6 millions 
of ingered people. France suffered at this chapter the hardest loss (1.300.000 
of deceased persons and 3.000.000 of ingered persons)1.  
Speaking about the material cost of the war, the most seriously 
affected regions were the regions transformed in teatre of war: North-
Eastern France, Belgium, Netherlands, North-Eastern Italy, Serbia, 
Romania, European Russia. France lost 30% of the fleet, and UK 20% of 
the fleet.  
In order to get sources of financing for the war expenditure, the 
allies apealled to internal and external loans. The internal loans determined 
the rise of the public debts (in France from 33, 5 to 219 milliards golden 
francs, in UK from 17,6 to 196,6 milliards and in Germany from 6 to 169 
milliards)2 (Milza & Berstein, 1998: 106). The external loans were made 
especially from United States from which France borrowed 33 milliards 
golden Francs, UK 32 miliards and Italy 20 milliards. To these money, 
United States was not willing to give up, fact demonstrated also by the vote 
of the American Senate which refused the anullment of debts. In 
consequence, European alliate powers wished too to recuperate the losses 
from the war on the expence of the defeated and, especially, on the side of 
Germany. This is explained the sevear treatment aplied to Germany to the 
peace negotiations from Versailles and the attitude hostile of France 
towards the Germany.  
The capitulation of Germany at November 11, 1918 produced 
somehow in a strange way in the conditions in which Germany lost the war 
of the Western front, although a year before it won the battle against Russia 
on Eastern front. The Americans, although they had no territorial claims on 
the expence of Germany, were the ones who sustained the constinuation of 
war against Germany until its unconditioned capitulation. 
The treaty of Versailles let the problem of Germany unfinished. 
This was required the reduction of armaments, of the army and the redrawal 
of the forces behind the Rhine. The enormous reparations which were 
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asked from Germany contributed to its full humiliation, but also to the 
dream that someday it will take its pay back.  
Germany was not the only country falled into disgrace, by a great 
antipathy enjoying also Russia because of the change of regime imposed by 
Russian revolution. The Bolshevic government did not manifest any 
intention to pay the debts of Russia towards the United States of America. 
After 1920, Russia tried to come back in the world arena through the 
signation of some comercial agreements with some Occidental states (in 
1921 Russia closes commercial agreements with Great Britain and 
Germany). A certain frustration still remained in the case of Soviet Union so 
as in the case of Germany, fact that will lead inevitably to their meeting.  
 
2. Woodrow Wilson and its role in the creation of the League 
of Nations 
The origins of Wilson are somehow modest. Born in 1856 in 
Stanton (Virginia), son of a presbiterian pastor, Woodrow Wilson proved 
his intelectual performances in the Academic environment both in time of 
the universitary studies made by Davidson College and College of New 
Jersey (the future Princeton university), but also during the doctorate studies 
at John Hopkins University. Before becoming president of United States he 
was professor and president of the University of Princeton, and then 
governor of the state New Jersey. In 1912 he was elected as president of 
United States, democrate candidate, being the 28 th American president. He 
had this function during 1912- 1920, benefiting of two mandates.  
I could say about Woodrow Wilson that he was a man who tought 
above his time. From here it results his idealism. Idealist, not because his 
ideas were not good, but, because they were unapliable in that moment. His 
thought was profoundly democratic and his intuitions were very accurate. In 
the moments when he urged the European states to a better treatment 
granted to Germany, otherwise proving that it could start another war, he 
did not suspect that the future will prove he was right. Unfortunately, the 
interwar epoch was not ready to accept the idea of the equality of states no 
matter of size and power, ellaboration of some norms of international law 
valuable for all the states and which to be aplied efficiently in practice or for 
dezarmation, democratic ideas, in their essence, proposed by Wilson.  
The attitude of Wilson, towards the war was, somehow, ambiguous. 
In 1914, he was an important sustainer of the neutrality of the United States. 
Still, United States did not remain outside the conflict, offering herself as a 
mediator in the solutioning of the conflict, fact demonstrated also by the 
presence of the colonel House in Europe with the purpose to negociate the 
peace, mission failed thow. On January, 1917, when the Germans started the 
submarine war attacking American vessels, Wilson pronounced himself for 
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the entrance of United States in the war. On January 22, 1917, president 
Wilson, hold a Speech entitled “Peace without a victory”3. By this syntagm 
he understood a common peace which will be instaurated after the war, 
although what hapenned in reality was only a change of the balance of 
power. Towards the old principle of European system of balance of powers, 
Woodrow Wilson was completely hostile4. Finally, what had seen Wilson by 
common peace it could be explained as such: no part of the beligerants had 
not to strive the other, that is why, it will be a peace without victory, 
because the victorious will not impose intolerable sacrifices which to 
determine resignation and eventual future hostilities. He was wrong about 
the strategy of the victorious, but he expected future hostilities. The treaty 
of Versailles proved as being contrary to the previsions of Wilson, this treaty 
containing very severe measures towards Germany and being considerated a 
genuine “Diktat”. 
The purpose for which United States entered into war was 
uninterested and generous, fact acknowledged by Wilson that considered 
that the objective of the United States is to defend the principle of peace 
and justice against the selfish and autocratic power5. Concerning the 
German people, Wilson declared that he does not feel animosity and that 
they are used by their elites. Unfortunately, his attitude was not regarded as 
an example.  
After the entrance of United States in the war, Wilson lanched in 
front of Congress at January 8 its famous “fourteen points” in which he 
proposed measures that would have been implemented after the end of the 
war. In essence, the ideas that result from these lead to economic freedom, 
dezarmation, open negociations, considerations regarding other states 
(mainly the ones coming from Austro- Hungaria) and, last but not least, the 
creation of a global organization having as task the maintenance of the 
international security.  
 
For a better analysis, I will formulate these points: 
a.- open negociations for peace with free participation (not to exist 
secret treaties) 
b.- free navigation on sea outside the territorial waters 
c. the equality of commerce and the dismanteling of economic 
barriers.  
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d. – adequate garantees given and received that the national 
armaments will be reduced to the lowest point corresponding to internal 
security 
e.- impartial adjustement of all colonial pretentions measuring 
equally the interests of the populations with the demands of governments 
f. – the evacuation of Russian territory, the posibility for the 
Russians to choose their own institutions and to get help according to their 
wishes and needs 
g.- evacuation and restauration of Belgium under its own 
sovereignty 
h.- the eliberation and restauration of French territory invaded in 
1871 and the return of Alsace and Lorreine to France.  
i.- a redrawal of the Italian frontiers should be made on the line of 
the separation of nationalities.  
j.- the population from Austria – Hungary should receive freely the 
right to an autonomous development 
k. – Romania, Serbia, Montenegru should be evacuated and 
restaured and the boundaries of Balcanic States should receive international 
guarantees of independence and territorial integrity. 
l. Turcia herself needs security, but also the other nationalities 
should be freed from the Turkish rule and it should be provided to them the 
autonomous deveopment, while the streches Bosfor and Dardanele should 
be open to all ships and commerce with international guarantees 
m.- an independant Poland should include territories of Polish 
populations, to have access to the sea and guaranteed teritorial integrity 
n.- a general Association of nations must be formed according to 
some specific deals with the purpose to allow mutual guarantees of political 
independance and territorial integrity both of big and small states.  
Some of this wilsonian points will be found in the objectives 
formulated by the pact of the Leagues of Nations.  
Wilson decided to participate to the Paris Peace Conference with a 
group of exerts in different fields (geographers, etnologists, economists), but 
it did not have the inspiration to invite aso members of the Senate, fact that 
determined maybe the American Senators to be more reticent after the 
ratification of the treaty. Wilson enjoyed a great welcoming in Europe, in his 
discourses from Paris, Manchester, Roma, a lot of Europeans coming to 
welcome him. And, in 1920, Wilson received the Nobel prize for peace.  
 
3. The treaty of peace from Paris. Reglementations and 
significations 
The choice of Paris as a centre for signing the peace negotiations 
was not very sure at the beginning. Several centres were taken into 
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disussions (London, Bruxelles, Hague, Geneve, Lausanne, Versailles or 
Paris). After some opinions, it would have been better that this conference 
not to be hold at Paris, city that kept so alive the memory of the war and 
whose air was full of resentments.6 For instance, the colonel House was 
saying that it would have been better that this conference to be placed 
somewhere else, away from the intrigues of Paris. From sentimental and 
moral reasons, because France had the hardest suffering after the war, it was 
voted finally for Paris (Versailles).  
 
a. Reglementations with general character of the treaty 
The Peace Conference took place during January 12 – June 28, 1919 
and reunited thirty allied countries. The discussions took place during the 
plenary sessions and in the sixteen committees of experts. A more 
important organ was the Council of the Ten who grouped the chiefs of 
governments and external affairs ministers of United States, Great Britain, 
France, Italy, Japan. But the essential organ of decision was the Council of 
the Four (Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando).  
The Treaty of Versailles was signed at June 28, 1919 in the room of 
the Mirrors. It contained reglementations of teritorial, economic, financial, 
military nature.  
From a territorial point of view it can be said that Germany lost 1/7 
from its territory (88 000 kmp) and 1/10 of its population (8 million). It 
ceased in the favour of France the provinces Alsace and Lorraine, in the 
favour of Belgium: the cantons Eupen and Malmedy. After a plebiscite, 
Germany lost in the favour of Danemark the Northern Schleswig, and Saar 
region passed after a period of 15 years under the administrations of the League 
of Nations, following that at the end of this period to have decided its faith by 
plebiscite. During this time, the mines from Saar were given to exploatation to 
France as a compensation for the destroyal by the Germans of the French 
mines from North. Pomeronia and Oriental Prussia (partially) were ceased to 
Poland to whom it was assured through a corridor the door to the sea through 
the port of Danzig, German city found under the controll of the League of 
Nations. Germany will never accept its Oriental frontiers. Also, Germany lost 
all his collonies, administered starting from 1919 under the form of mandate by 
influent states of the League of Nations.  
The economic and financial clauses has as a target Germany which, 
being considered responsable by the disasters of war, was forced to payment 
of some huge reparations (initially 132 milliards golden DM). Germany had 
to give up his commercial vessels and war machines and to grant the 
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winners the most favourite nation clause treatment. Germany, also, had to 
acknowledge the internationalization of its fluvial water courses.  
From a military point of view, the clauses of this nature reduced the 
German army to 100 000 of people, abolished in Germany the military 
obligatory service, pretended the ceasing of the fleet. Germany was 
forbidden to have heavy artilery, aviation or tanks.  
 
b. Projects regarding the statute of the League of Nations7 
Although the term of League or Society of Nations apeared for the 
first time at Leon Bourgeois in 1908, the associations constituted in states 
such as France, UK, United States with the purpose of creation of such 
organization apeared somehow later. In United States in the suport of the 
idea of League of Nations they were people of high prestige such as the 
presidents Roosevelt and Taft. In 1915, it took birth the League for the 
suport of Peace sustained by Taft.  
In fact, the first concrete project concerning the constitution of a 
League of Nations was launched in 1916 by the Woodrow Wilson. There 
were launched a lot of polemics in connection to this. State secretary Bryan 
was militating for bilateral treaties between states which to push them to 
enquette and arbitrage in case of confict. He militated also for a mutual pact 
which to guarantee the teritorial integrity and political independence of 
states parts. The vision of Wilson was through comparison much more 
larger, the organization foreseen by him having several purposes: the 
assurance of colective guarantees, of economic prosperity, of access to 
natural ressources, of liberty of circulation and safety of maritime 
navigation, considering the administration of the collonies under the form 
of mandates.  
In what concerns the foreseen of war, this had to be achieved in 
American view through open diplomacy, apeal of public opinion, economic 
sanctions, but not military. The British pronounced for economic sanction 
and military, while the French wanted the institution of some permanent 
international army.  
The dezarmation and arms controll were regarded as some peace 
guarantees. But, even here, exished clashes of opinions. The Americans 
wanted a general limitation of armaments and the prohibition of private 
arms production. The Britanics pronounced for the abolishment of military 
obligatory service and, the French, having more resentments, wished the 
dezarmation only in the case of Germany.  
                                                     
7 Informations with regard to the projects created having in view the statute of the 
League of Nations in L. Gyemant, Preistoria construcţiei europene, Efes, Cluj- Napoca, 
1999, p. 63-66.  
The European Space. Borders and Issues 
 
484 
Concerning the institutional structure of the future organization it 
was foreseen the existence of a Council, the main decisional organ of the 
future League. While the Britanics sustained exclusively the idea of a new 
restrained number of permanent members of the Council, the Americans 
and Italiens had the opinion that it should be also non-permanent members. 
The General Assembly was foreseen from British perspective as a 
deliberative forum, convocated without periodicity and with restrained 
atributions, while the italiens regarded as an organism with precised 
attributions, including decisional atributions, taken with qualified majority of 
votes. The Secretariat was regarded from all points of view as a future 
component of the League of Nations with the task to coordonate and 
accumulate informations, but without decisional attributes. These points of 
view constituted the subject of the debates from February- March 1919 in 
the framework of the Comission of the League of Nations from the Peace 
Conference from Paris.  
 
c. Decisions aproved at Paris concerning the League of Nations 
The Covenant of the League of Nations was included also in the 
treaty (the first 26 articles) and contained measures referring to the 
institutions and organization of the League of Nations. They were 
formulated also some principles which staied on the base of the creation of 
organisation: dezarmation, arbitrage in front of the Assembly (or of the 
Court) in case of conflict, economic and military sanctions in case of 
aggression.(article16)8 
Let us come back to the endeavours that have been made in the 
framework of Peace Conference from Paris with the view of creation of the 
League of Nations. In January 25, 1919 the plenary session of the Peace 
Conference was adopting in unanimity a resolution according to which the 
Covenant of the League of Nations was becoming an integrated part of the 
peace treaties. It was consituted a special commission in which fourteen 
states were reprezented and whose president was Wilson. The first meeting 
of the Commission took place in February 3. There existed several 
proposals concerning the organization and the character of the League of 
Nations. For example an interesting proposal was coming from the side of 
Leon Bourgeois who suggested the creation of an international army9 
(Duroselle, 1993: 58) placed at the disposal of the organization, or of a 
major state, ideea rejected by Anglo- Saxons, probably because they were 
afraid that this major state would have been at the disposal of general Foch 
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which had a hostile attitude towards Germany. Other projects such this I 
mentioned above.  
Finally the project of the League of Nations was presented by 
President Wilson and accepted in unanimity by the plenary conference from 
April 28. The project was of English and American inspiration, at its 
conception contributing Wilson but also David Hunter Miller (American 
expert) or Sir Cecil Hurst (British expert). This project had become, with 
very few modifications, the final Pact of the League of Nations. The pact 
was included in the texts of the Treaty from Versailles (June 28), but also in 
the text treaties from Saint Germain, Neuilly, Sevres.  
At January 16, 1920 it had taken place at Paris, under the presidency 
of Wilson, the first reunion of the Council of the Society of Nations. In the 
framework of the Council there were reprezented states such France, UK, 
Japan, Belgium, Brasil, Greece.  
 
4. The failure of the ratification of the Treaty from Versailles by 
USA 
A more or less probable cause of non-ratification by United States of 
the Treaty of Versailles (and implicitly of the Pact of the League of Nations) 
was the fact that Wilson omitted the invitation of American senators to make 
part from the delegation of USA at Paris. But the most important it was the 
fact that the American public opinion, tributary to the Monroe doctrine, 
considered that USA paied the price of its intervention in the war of Europe 
and that America will deal better without Europe than together.  
According to the Constitution of United States in order that the 
treaties to be aproved by the Senate it was necessarry the consent of qualified 
majority (2/3 from the total number of votes). In 1919, the Senate of United 
States had 47 democrats and 49 republicans. The democrat president, Wilson, 
could rely only on the votes of the 43 democrats because the rest of 
democrats (4) and 14 republicans were “irrevocables” and, implicitly, against 
the signing of the treaty. In order to obtain the qualified majority, Wilson had 
to win on his side 23 of votes of the Republicans. These people, in principle, 
would have accepted the ratification of the treaty with the condition that this 
to be ammended with some modifications, non- essentia, thow. They were 
reserved in what concerns the eleventh article which stipulated that the 
members of the League on Nations take the obigation to respect and prezerve 
the territorial integrity and political independence of all members of the 
League. In the case when one of them will be agressed or threatened with 
aggression, the Council of the League of Nations will advise with the means in 
which this mission will be achieved. (The Covenant of the League of Nations, 
art. 10) For the president Wilson, this was an essentia point. It was about 
Monroe doctrine aplied to the entire world and protected by everybody. 
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Wilson tried to diminish the conflicts, asserting that the measures of the 
Council were more of moral kind, while Lloyd George was asserting that the 
economic sanctions would prevail on military sanctions.  
In order to suport his point of view, the president Wilson tried to win 
the American public opinion and started, in spite of his precarious state of 
healthiness, a tour of propaganda on the territory of United States in order to 
convince the Americans by the importance of United States’ adherence to the 
League of Nations10. So, during 22 days, he travelled 8000 miles and held 38 
speaches. In Pueblo (Colorado) his state of health got worse, and the 
president returned to Washington where he suffered a hard attack. As a 
consequence of this illness, the president went out from three months from 
political life.  
In November 19, 1919 the text of the treaty, together with some 
ammendments, obtained in the Senate only 39 of votes in favor of pro- 
ratification and 55 of votes against. Non-ratification was dued to an 
incomprehensible phenomenon11 because, not wanting to make concessions, not 
wanting to bring ammendments, only its votation in its innitial form, Wilson 
advised the democrats to vote against. It was organized another vote for the 
ratification of the treaty without ammendmends in March 19, 1920. They 
were obtained 49 of votes pro-ratification and 35 of votes against. There 
would have been necessary 7 votes. Thus the treaty was never ratified by the 
Senate in United States.  
Wilson never gave up and tried to transform the elections from 1920 
in a plebiscit. His democrate candidate (Cox) was defeated by a republican 
candidate (Warren G. Harding). Until his death (in 1924), Wilson hoped that 
the Senate of United States will vote again and will ratify the Covenant of the 
League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles. It was not meant to be like 
that, and the non- involvment of United States in the problem of world 
security compromised from the very beginning the important innitiative that 
was the League of Nations. The failures of the League in its tryings to 
maintain the world peace contributed to the ascension of totalitarian regimes 
in Europe and, finally, to the outburst of the Second World War.  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper deals with the international context in which it was created the League of 
Nations and the aproaches and actions accomplished with the view of creating this organization.  
                                                     
10 See the article, The League of Nations Fight – A Chronology, Internet: 
http://history.acusd/edu/gen/ww2Timeline/1919League2.html  
11 Duroselle, op. cit. p 60 
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In order to reach this objective, I will analyze briefly the consequences imposed by the end 
of the First World War, the role plaied by the American president Woodrow Wilson in the 
promotion of the organization, the significance of peace treaties, especially of the signed at Paris–
Versailles, in which it was included the Pact of the League of Nations. It has not be forgotten from 
our analysis a factor of major importance, namely the non- ratification by the Senate of United 
States of the Covenant of the League of Nations, fact that lead to the non- participation of United 
States to the newly created organization.  
 
Keywords: League of Nations, First World War, United States, Covenant, peace 
treaties 
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1. Theoretical Underpinnings 
Territorial, cross-border or other types of cooperation cannot 
bearegarded as end in itself. Cooperation is a means whereby the human 
being, a social being par excellence, aims to achieve goals related to 
improving the quality of life. From this perspective cooperation should be 
aproached in terms of its actual outcomes, since without such results the 
inherent costs involved in any kind of cooperation will lead either to its 
weakening to a minimum level, or even to its extinction.1 
Grounded on their value to contribute to the objectives of EU 
Cohesion Policy, territorial cooperation programs aim at "strengthening cross-
border cooperation through joint local and regional initiative, strengthening 
transnational cooperation through actions that facilitate integrated territorial 
development under the priorities of the European Community, and strengthen 
interregional cooperation and the exchange of experience".2 
Cross-border cooperation can be defined in relation to direct 
cooperation between neighboring regions, found along a border, regardless 
of the level at which this relationship is achieved.3 
                                                     
* PhD lecturer at the University of Oradea, Department of International Relations and 
European Studies. E-mail: ctv_i@yahoo.com 
** PhD Candidate, University Babes-Bolyai, Cluj-Napoca, Romania 
*** PhD Candidate, University Babes-Bolyai, Cluj-Napoca, Romania 
1 Programul operational Dezvoltarea capacităţii administrative, Planificare aromonioasă şi 
strategică până în 2020, Compas 20-Concepţii şi Orientare Modernă, p. 2 
2 www.infocooperare.ro, the first official source of general information on such 
programs, accessed on 29 of September 2016 
3 AEBR-LACE Working Paper on the EU Initiative Interreg and Future Developments, July 
1997, p. 2-3 
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Cooperationcan take placein all fields of activity, between all 
national, regional and local authorities, involving all actors. Moreover, the 
text of European treaties foresees the need to ensure harmonious 
development by reducing the development gap between different regions 
and European countries. 
This concept is not a new phenomenon, as the changes on the 
international relations scene have led to a marked increase in the number of 
initiatives, which are also suported by the Community programs. 
The efficiency, reliability, authenticity and legitimacy of the European 
project, regarding European integration, are also linked to the success of cross-
border cooperation. "The basic principle of cross-border cooperation is to 
develop, in border areas, some contractual spaces that might allow for the 
finding of common solutions to similar problems, state entities avoiding to 
ignore, in the case of their peripheral communities, the peculiarity and the 
specific problems of neighborhood with which they are confronted4. 
Cross-border cooperation among the neighboring countries of the 
European Union (EU) aims to promote a coherent and integrated aproach 
to regional development, addressing common challenges, guaranteeing 
effectiveness and security at external borders and encouraging local 
cooperation. Thus, cooperation cross-border programs have emerged as 
solid financial and cooperation instruments. 
Currently, the border regions of Eastern and Western European 
Union represent the basis for the complete European integration process. 
Cross-border cooperation is seen as having an important role in the 
increased cooperation across national borders, in suporting the development 
of pan-European transport and communications networks.5 
Cross-border cooperation takes place within the Euro-regions, 
and through participation of developing regions to European structures and 
organizations that promote their economic and institutional development in 
order to achieve projects of common interest6. Thus, in what follows, we 
shall focus on the impact on the Romania-Hungary Cross-Border 
Cooperation Programme 2007-2013 on Bihor-HajduBihar Euroregion. 
 
  
                                                     
4 Ricq, C., Manual de cooperare transfrontalieră pentru uzul colectivităţilor locale şi regionale în 
Europa, Ediţia a 3-a, Serviciul de Editare şi Documentare Consiliul Europei F-67075 
Strasbourg Cedex, Bucureşti, 2000, p.10 
5 Europa în Direct, http://europaindirect.ecosv.ro/cooperare_trans.htm , accessed on 
25 of September 2016 
6 Europa în Direct, http://europaindirect.ecosv.ro/cooperare_trans.htm , accessed on 
20 of September 2016 
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2. Romania-Hungary Cross-Border Cooperation Programme 
2007-2013  
 
2.1. Program Overview 
Cross-border cooperation in the border area of Hungary-Romania 
is a strong basis on which to build in the future7. 
Hungary-Romania Cross-Border Cooperation Programme 2007-
2013 is a continuation of cross-border cooperation programmes 
implemented in the past in the region (Interreg IIIA in Hungary and Phare 
CBC in Romania), being implemented within a common institutional 
structure, through the use of common funds, while expanding and 
developingprevious results and experiences. The path leading to 
strengthening economic and social cohesion in the Romanian-Hungarian 
border was opened on December 21, 2007, with the formal aproval of the 
programme, by the European Commission. 
The programme provides a wide range of oportunities to potential 
beneficiaries by means of three priority axes and several areas of 
intervention. Projects launched under the various priority axes will help 
achieve the overall goal of the program. 
Thus: 
• Priority 1: Improvement of key conditions for joint sustainable 
development of the cooperation area (aproximately 48.9% of the total 
funding) 
• Priority 2: Improvement of key conditions for joint sustainable 
development of the cooperation area (aproximately 48.9% of the total 
funding) 
• Priority 3: Technical assistance (aproximately 9.8% of the total 
funding) 
The program awarded 211 million Euros as grant from the 
European Union to a number of 455 projects, with the view of facilitating 
harmonious development in the border area.8 
The Hungary-Romania Cross-Border Cooperation Programme 
(HURO) aimed at facilitating sustainable development and the integration 
of the cross-border region, by fostering cooperation and reducing barriers 
generally associated with borders. In 2007-2013, a number of 455 cross-
                                                     
7 Ţoca, C., V., Romanian-Hungariancross-bordercooperation at variousterritoriallevels, with a 
particular study of the Debrecen-Oradea Eurometropolis- The European Grouping of Territorial 
Cooperation, Editura Universităţii din Oradea, Oradea, 2013, p.51-52 
8 http://www.huro-cbc.eu/ro/stiri/rezultatele_si_stadiul_implementarii_programului_ 
de_cooperare_transfrontaliera_dintre_ungaria_si_romnia_au_fost_prezentate_in_ca
drul_unei_festivitati_de_inchidere_care_a_avut_loc_la_gyula_in_data_de_7_decem
brie_ac/443 , accessed on 25 of September 2016 
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border projects were implemented. They sought, among other things, to 
improve mobility and cross-border communications, environmental 
protection and tourism development, thereby suporting the development of 
joint initiatives and solutions that would contribute to economic recovery 
and the development of the economic, institutional (health, education) and 
cultural potential of the region9. 
The budget for the implementation of projects totaled 211 million 
Euros through the Regional Development European Fund, being 
complemented by the national contribution of 37 million Euros from the two 
countries participating in the program. The program has managed to attract a 
total of over 1,100 partners on both sides of the border, the distribution of 
funds between the Hungarian and the Romanian partbeing 50.46% to 
49.54%. It is estimated that the fund absorption rate exceeded 96%.10 
 
2.2. SWOT analysis Romania-Hungary Cross-Border Cooperation 
Programme 2007-2013 
To quantify the programme's impact on the two countries involved, 
we have used SWOT analysis, with the view ofanalyzing the results obtained 
from implementing the Romania-Hungary Cross-Border Cooperation 
Programme 2007-2013. 
 
SWOT Analysis 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Uniformly distributed urban-rural living 
environments in the county;  
 Significant development of main roads 
crossing the border and border-
crossing points; 
 Good connection with nearby urban 
areas (e.g. ClujNapoca, Timişoara etc.);  
 Increased residential interest, especially 
nearby Oradea;  
 A territory rich in natural resources and 
a huge availability of arable land; 
 Five international airports ensure a 
good access to the area by aircrafts, 
remarkable in this respect being 
Timisoara airport capacity. 
 Small dimensions of urban areas; 
• Relatively low degree of urbanization; 
• Severe demographic decline, particularly 
in the former mono-industrial towns 
(NucetVaşcău, Stei); 
• Phenomenon accentuated by 
urbanization in the municipality of 
Oradea - significant pressure on the need 
for mobility and public services (public 
utilities, infrastructure, education, social, 
etc.); 
• Low level of GDP per capita in the 
border area; 
• High degree of dependence of many 
urban centers (and their areas of 
                                                     
9 http://www.huro-cbc.eu/ro/stiri/rezultatele_si_stadiul_implementarii_programului_ 
de_cooperare_transfrontaliera_dintre_ungaria_si_romnia_au_fost_prezentate_in_ca
drul_unei_festivitati_de_inchidere_care_a_avut_loc_la_gyula_in_data_de_7_decem
brie_ac/443 accesed on 20 of Septmber 2016 
10Ibidem 
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 The existence of Oradea metropolitan 
region;  
 The favorable position of Bihor 
county, at the border with Hungary, 
which give its towns the role of „gate-
cities”, as well as oportunities for work 
force mobility and economic 
exchanges; 
 Intense and increasing commercial 
relations among borderline counties; 
 The existence of the Bihor - Hajdú-
Bihar Euroregion and the access to 
Hungary-Romania Cross-Border 
Cooperation Programme.  
 The availability of high-quality thermal 
water in the cooperation region, which 
may be used for tourism or alternative-
energy source. 
influence) on a single major employer; 
• Low level of business cooperation between 
the various bodies and organizations for the 
development of SMEs; 
• Poor infrastructure for research and 
development; low level of financial 
involvement of the private sector in 
research and development; 
• Low level of Roma population’s 
integration into the labor market; 
• Few tourist attractions that are well 
known internationally; 
• Lack of information about existing 
tourist attractions, lack of competitive 
tourism products;  
• Negative demographic trends: natural 
loss and migration from border regions 
of Hungary. 
Oportunities Threats 
 Availability of several funding 
programmes aimed at suporting local 
development projects and cross-
border cooperation, both at urban and 
local level; 
• The oportunity for positioning as an 
entry-exit axis from Romania; 
• Private developers interest in 
investment in the county, especially in 
the exploitation of natural resources. 
• Significant development of major 
transport routes on the Romanian and 
the Hungarian parts of the border 
area; 
• Improving connections between the 
two countries have a positive impact 
on the border regions 
 • Romania-Hungary Cooperation 
Programme 2014-2020 
• Conditions that favor the increase of 
development disparities in the district 
(for example, less access to financing on 
the part of small settlements, limiting the 
types of eligible projects, etc.); 
• Increased attractiveness of more 
developed urban centers nearby, which 
attract qualified people in the county; 
• The slow development of motorways in 
the Romanian side of the cooperation 
area might hinder the balanced joint 
economic development; 
• Lack of access to rural areas leads to 
perpetuating their backwardness; 
• Relatively high risk of large-scale 
pollution; 
• Relatively high risk of widespread 
flooding; 
• Education levels lower than the national 
standard on the Hungarian side can 
block or slow down the process of 
alignment in the region 
• The lack of integration on the job market 
of Roma citizens questions the social 
cohesion. 
Source: Table developed by the author using data available at: 
http://www.huro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on 28.09.2016 
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2.3 . Analysis in relation to Objectives 
 
a. Relevance 
The objectives established as a result of the SWOT analysis meet 
the common development needs of the two regions involved and implicitly 
the regional development needs of the European Union as a whole. 
 
b. Effectiveness 
The aim of this programme is to improve the economic, social and 
environmentalsituation, as well as infrastructure in the area of the 
programme area, in the context of secure borders, through increased contact 
of partners on both sides of the border. The analysis of the programme’s 
area shows an overall economic structure having a good agricultural and 
tourism capacity as well as good natural resources, which can be exploited 
for the development of the entire region. However, the poor quality of 
transport infrastructure (lack of highways in Romania), syncope on access to 
rural areas, the relatively low degree of urbanization and decreased 
demographic decline (particularly in the monoindustrial cities ofStei, Nucet) 
hinder the development of competitive cross-border economy in the region. 
Access to the border area and other elements of infrastructure must be 
improved so as to extend cooperation purposes. The Programme needs to 
balance infrastructure and initiatives such as networks, exchange of 
experience and joint events. 
 
c. Efficiency 
According to available information, financial resources were 
distributed equitably considering the importance of the issues aimed at. The 
table below details this aspect. 
 
d. Consistency and coherence 
The Joint Romania-Hungary Operational Programme, in close 
connection with a wide range of strategies currently operating at EU, 
national, regional and local level in the programme’s area. The priorities 
identified in the JOP are consistent with Hungarian and Romanian 
development strategies (National Development Plans for the two countries 
involved). 
 
e. Pragmatism 
The pragmatic character requires that the implementation of 
strategy should be reflected in accelerating the economic development of 
the border area, especially since it has become a second external border of 
the European Union. 
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f. Management and monitoring arrangements 
The main system of monitoring the programme will be a system 
based on different bodies. Thus, the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) 
ensures the quality and effectiveness of the programme’s implementation by 
respecting transparency, equal oportunities and financial management. The 
Joint Selection Committee (ASC) is responsible for the process of 
operations selection in the programme. The Managing Authority (MA) 
ensures implementation and capacity in accordance with the principle of 
sound financial management. Audit authorities (AA) and Research 
Authorities (RA) will control and audit the system of the 
Programme’smanagement operation. Bodies independent of the common 
management structure are National Authorities (NA), with obligations as 
regardsthe implementation of the program exclusively at the national level. 
 
3. The ex-post analysis of the impact of Romania-Hungary 
territorial cooperation operational program from 2007 to 2013 
on the Bihor-Hajdu Bihar Euroregiont 
Bihor-Hajdu-Bihar Euroregionhas played an important role in 
cross-border cooperation in areas of common interest between Bihor and 
Hajdu-Bihar counties. 
 
Chart No. 1 Total Number of projects Submitted in Bihor-Bihar Hajdu Counties 
 
Source: Chart completed by the authors based on information from the website 
http://www.huro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on.30. 09.2016 
 
It was created at the end of 2002, at the initiative of Bihor County’s 
Council (Romania) and of the Local Self-Government of Hajdu-Bihar 
(Hungary), two bodies that recognized the important role played by cross-
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border cooperation in areas of common interest for the European 
integration precession. The establishment of the Euroregion aims at 
stimulating new ways of cooperation between the two countries, in 
accordance to their objectives: maintaining and developing good neighborly 
relations, identifying areas for potential cross-border cooperation, 
organization and coordination of activities aimed at promoting cooperation 
in the established fields, implementation of concrete programmes in areas of 
mutual interest, promoting the collaboration of the Euroregion with other 
international organizations and suporting the Euroregion members in the 
European integration process. 
Graph No. 1.shows the total number of completed projects, both in 
Bihor and in Hajdu-Bihar County. At present, from a total of 86 projects 
submitted by Bihor county, all projects have been successfully completed. In 
Hajdu-Bihar 72 projects were submitted and completed. The total number 
of projects submitted under as part of this Programme is 441, the two 
counties submitting a total of 158 projects with a value that exceeds 100 
million Euros, which means that the Bihor -Hajdu Bihar Euroregion had a 
share of more than 35% in submitting projects as part of the overall 
programme. 
 
Chart No.2 Total Budget allocated for the projects in Bihor and Hajdu-Bihar 
Source: Chart completed by the authosr based on information found at the website  
http://www.huro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on 30.09.2016 
 
Graph No. 2 indicates that Bihor county has a total allocated 
budget of about 56 million Euros, while Hajdu-Bihar County received only 
43 million Euros. The difference of 12 million Euros results from the fact 
that in Bihor a total of 86 projects have been submitted, 14 projects more 
than in Hajdu-Bihar County. 
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Chart No.3 Number of projects for each county/year 
 
Source: Chart completed by the authors based on information found at the website  
http://www.huro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on.30.09.2016 
 
Graph No. 3 shows the number of projects on Bihor and Hajdú-
Bihar counties throughout the programme. In the first two years, after the 
beginning of the programme, the number of projects was zero (most likely 
due tothe lack of information provided by the actors / beneficiaries eligible); 
then, in 2009, the number of projects reached the number of 15 in Hajdú-
Bihar and of 10 in Bihor. Since 2010 we can identify a significant increase in 
the number of projects, which reached a maximum of 36 in Bihor and of 18 
in Hajdú-Bihar in 2012. In 2013, the last year of the programme, the 
number of projects fell sharply (due to a diminishing of the funds allocated), 
as indicated by Chart 3. 
 
Chart No.4 Total number of projects on areas of intervention 
Source: Chart realized by author based on information from site http://www.huro-
cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on 30. 09.2016 
 
The projects developed as part of the program were divided into a 
number of 9 major areas of intervention, as shown by Chart no. 4. In 
Hajdu-Bihar County most projects were submitted to the Innovation 
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domain, and reached the number of 15, while the highest number of 
projects in Bihor county projects were achieved in the field of Education 
and employment, i.e. 17 projects. The fewer projects were registered in the 
field of Tourism with a total of 7 projects on the two counties, followed by 
projects submitted and finalized in the areas of Transport, Communication 
and Health (11 projects). 
 
Chart 5 indicates that the submitted projects in both counties were 
on Priority 2, with a total of 111 projects. As regards priority 1, 27 projects 
were submitted by Bihor County, and 20 projects were submitted in Hajdu-
Bihar County. From the difference between projects submitted on the 2 
priorities mentioned above, we notice that they were double or even 
exceeded that figure, as compared to projects submitted on priority 1. 
 
Chart No. 5 Number of projects submitted under Priority Axis 
 
Source: Chart completed by the authors based on information found at thewebsite 
http://www.huro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on 30.09.2016 
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Chart No. 6 Number of projects submitted on each call / county 
 
Source: Chart completed by the authors based on information found at thewebsite 
http://www.huro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on 30.09.2016 
 
As part of the cooperation programme, 5 calls for projects were 
requested, the first being submitted in October 2008. The maximum of 44 
projects were submitted under call no. 4, where Bihor county exceeded, with 
a number of 28 projects submitted, Hajdu-Bihar county, which submitted a 
total of 12 projects. Regarding Hajdu-Bihar county, most projects were 
submitted under the first call, namely 22 projects, Bihor having filed, during 
that year, a number of only 14 projects. The fewest projects were submitted 
as part of the 2nd call, i.e. a total of 19 projects. 
 
Chart No.7 Number of Projects and Budget €, University of Debrecen and 
University of Oradea 
 
Source: Chart completed by the authors, based on information found at the website 
http://www.huro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on 30.09.2016 
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After analyzing the list of projects, we noticed that the main leaders 
of projects in Bihor and Hajdu-Bihar counties were the University of Oradea 
and University of Debrecen respectively. University of Debrecen, the supreme 
leader, has submitted most projects and managed to complete 21, with a total 
budget of about 10 million euros. With a difference of 2 projects, as regards 
the number of projects submitted, the University of Oradea managed to 
invest 9.8 million Euros. 
The total budget allocated to Bihor and Hajdu-Bihar counties was 
aproximately 100 million Euro. In Bihor County 79 projects were 
completed, totaling 56 million Euro. As we can notice in chart no.13, the 
highest amount was absorbed by Bihor county in 2012, namely 35 million 
Euros, when most projects (i.e. 160) under the program were submitted. 
Regarding Hajdú-Bihar, it allocated a maximum amount of 23 million Euro 
in 2011. The least amount of money from the budget was allocated in 2009, 
in both counties. 
 
Chart No. 8 Budget allocated for projects inBihor andHajdú-Bihar/Year/ € 
 
Source: Chart completed by the authors, based on information found at the website 
http://www.huro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on 30.09.2016 
 
Conclusions 
Cross-border Cooperation is a key priority of the European 
Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) of the European Union. 
This aims to strengthen cooperation between EU Member States and 
partner countries along the external borders of the European Union. 
In 2007-2013, Romania took part to 11 territorial cooperation 
programmes, including Hungary-Romania Cross-border Cooperation 
Programme, which aims to bring closer people, communities and businesses 
in the border area and thus to facilitate the joint development of the 
cooperation area, relying on key strengths associated to border regions. 
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The countieswe have focused on for the case study presented in this 
paper, namely Bihor and Hajdu-Bihar, have a common history. We can 
mention in this respect Bihor-Hajdu-Bihar Euroregion, which used to have 
an important role in terms of cross-border cooperation at the level of the 
two counties. A number of 158 projects were submitted by the two counties 
mentioned above, which eventually determined a high rate of funds 
absorption. From the total of about 100 million Euros absorbed in Bihor 
and Hajdu-Bihar counties, most projects were submitted to intervention 
areas such as Education and Employment (28), Innovation (26) and 
Business (18). 
This programme will be followed by CBC Programme Romania-
Hungary Interreg VA 2014-2020, which was aproved by the Government, 
and the first call for projects will be launched in October 2015. The 
program will be divided into 7 axes and will have a total budget of about 
232 million Euros, of which the sum of 189 Euros represents the financial 
allocation from the ERDF and the rest is represented by national co-
financing. 
 
Abstract 
 
Cross-border cooperation agreements have become increasingly relevant on the 
international relations scene, and implicitly in the area of cooperation policies developed by the 
European Union, as regards either Member States or the European Neighborhood Policy. 
From the perspective of specific objectives related to structural funds, such cooperation is 
considered a means whereby sustainable European regional development may be achieved. 
This paper aims to assess the impact of Romania-Hungary Territorial Cooperation 
Operational Programme 2007-2013 on the two neighboring countries modeled on the idea of 
objective-related evaluation (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, pragmatism and 
management and monitoring arrangements). The ex-post analysis will also be employed as research 
tool, in order to observe the positive outcomes of the program for Bihar-HajduBihar counties. 
 
Keywords: evaluation, objectives, effectiveness, partnership, European Neighborhood  
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EU Cross-Border Cooperation: Knowledge Alliances 
and Schools 
 
 
 
Vasile CUCERESCU* 
 
 
Introduction 
Even cross-border “relations” – as a practice – have existed since 
the foundation of the first states in the world; the cross-border policies and 
border studies have a recent history. Early borders are characterized by great 
permeability and instability. It is only in the 20th century when we deal with 
state border(s) as such. The nature of clear delimitation / separation at 
borders has passed through various processes, attaining the new concept of 
the European Union without borders, i.e. internal borders. All in all the 
human perception of border and otherness beyond the border has not been 
diluted fully. An argument speaking about it there are EU cross-border 
cooperation programmes. 
Cross-border cooperation initiatives and programmes have 
produced new knowledge and research findings in border studies. Research 
schools in border studies contribute to knowledge alliances not only in 
Europe but all over the world. The European Union plays a leading role in 
promoting cross-border cooperation, schools of border studies and 
knowledge alliances apeared in cross-border cooperation. 
The investigation follows to make an excursus on cross-border 
cooperation, formalized institutions of border studies and knowledge 
alliances in the field of cross-border cooperation. The primary focus is on 
the European Union’s internal and external borders. This is a project that 
does not claim to be an exhaustive to announced subjects nor limitative to 
relevant research findings.  
 
Cross-Border Cooperation 
Cross-border cooperation resides in collaboration between adjacent 
areas across the borders of two or more states. It is one of the forms of 
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territorial cooperation in the European Union alongside with the 
interregional and transnational cooperation.  
First of all let us answer to the question what a border means and 
what are the border functions: “A border has several functions and 
sometimes they conflict with one another. The most visible function of a 
border is to act as a barrier and an instrument to be aplied for controlling 
illegal immigration, human trafficking, drugs and weapons and for collecting 
duties on legal goods. This is the rationale for the infrastructure at a border, 
which consists of border crossing points and land border installations. 
Borders enable differences in prices, wages, working conditions, the 
availability of labour, taxation, public subsidies, business environment and 
the enforcement of legislation. Operating across the border – using borders 
as gateways– creates possibilities for arbitrage. On the negative side, the 
cross-border smuggling of drugs into a country where there is demand and 
purchasing power causes major problems on both sides of the border. 
However, borders also constitute an oportunity. A border is more than an 
obstacle to contacts; a border also creates “friction” which can offer 
business possibilities. Differing conditions across the border can therefore 
also be utilised to benefit regional development. Utilisation of a border as a 
gateway – legally or illegally – means that the border is a resource for those 
operating across it. It generates benefits that would not be available without 
the border”1. Generally speaking, cross-border cooperation has remained 
anchored within the framework of bilateral collaboration since, on the one 
hand. On the other hand, the European Union transformed internal borders 
from barriers into gateways. EU external borders had to be secured resulting 
in Schengen area (except the United Kingdom and Ireland) along with 
Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. Thus border territories have become 
oportunities and resources to be exploited by borderlanders and their 
communities. So, cross-border cooperation has brought together the people 
and the communities on both sides of the border. 
 
European Cross-border Cooperation 
European cross-border cooperation started in the 1950s onwards in 
the Rhine Basin, including Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. Different stakeholders were involved: central 
and local governments, universities and private business. Cross-border 
cooperation marks a tendency in eliminating disparities between the border 
regions. There are three development phases that characterize the European 
Union: “In the first phase, the lesser developed party has hardly any 
                                                     
1 Cross-Border Cooperation – Benefiting from Borders. Helsinki: Ministry for European 
Affairs and Foreign Trade of Finland, 2011, 2. 
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capability for real cooperation with the Member State regions across the 
border. The Member State regions involved offer expertise and training, 
organize study visits to the Member State, and conduct feasibility and other 
studies on the development potential of the border area. This creates 
important networks between the Member State and partner country actors. 
In the second phase, plans are drawn up with a view to social and economic 
convergence between the border regions. Convergence is promoted, among 
other things, through planning of investment projects that rarely attract 
outside financing and have little in the true nature of cross-border 
cooperation. In the third phase, the regions genuinely jointly recognise the 
potential for regional development provided by the border. The differences 
between regions are exploited with a view to bringing benefits on both sides 
of the border. Eventual investments are focused on border infrastructure in 
order to facilitate border crossing. Joint projects are developed by regional 
bodies. In addition, direct contacts between the citizens and communities 
across the border are suported. The nature of cross-border cooperation on 
the EU’s external borders has been a topic of discussion since the early 
2000s. Besides the important regional development dimension, this 
cooperation also has a very strong external policy dimension, and 
constitutes a broad reflection of the goals and activities of different policy 
processes. For reasons of geography, the character of cooperation varies in 
the different borders of the Union. In the Mediterranean area, external 
border cooperation is implemented largely in the form of economic and 
other development assistance to the Southern neighbouring countries. 
Member State and partner country regions are separated by the sea and their 
common interests are less easily identifiable. Recent developments on the 
Southern coast of the Mediterranean have changed the picture. With the 
emergence of democracy and civil society, there apears to be more demand 
for regional-level cooperation. On the EU’s new Eastern external border 
areas, state borders have undergone major changes in the last century. 
Before enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007, these borders were 
relatively lightly controlled and there was no visa requirement for citizens of 
the neighbouring countries. Accession to the European Union required the 
harmonization of the border controls with Schengen standards and the 
adoption of the EU’s common visa and customs rules. This complicated 
contacts across the border and endangered the development of the border 
regions, which had been largely based on small-scale undeclared trade. The 
new external border regions considered that they were entitled to 
compensation from the Union for the obstacles to regional development 
posed by the effective border controls, as well as assistance for re-
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establishing contacts across the border”2. Results of this cross-border 
cooperation are Euroregions. 
 
Cross-Border Cooperation Programmes 
The European Union has used funding for cross-border 
cooperation though regional development tools. These funds have been 
allocated both for internal and external border projects. Even non-EU states 
as Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, participate in INTERREG 
programmes. In the enlargement process, the European Commission 
proposed a new instrument for the Neighbourhood Policy based on the best 
practices of cross-border cooperation via the INTERREG, PHARE and 
TACIS funding programmes. The initial Neighbourhood Programmes 
implemented in 2004-2006 introduced joint initiatives by covering both 
sides of the border. Later, for the financial period 2007-2013, cross-border 
cooperation actions were part of the new European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI).  
The ENPI has four objectives for cross-border cooperation: “(1) to 
promote economic and social development in border areas, (2) to address 
common challenges, (3) to ensure efficient and secure borders and (4) to 
promote people-to-people cooperation”3. ENPI CBC programme 
represents functional instruments of EU external policy. It also refers to the 
Northern Dimension and the Eastern Partnership, the EU’s macro-regional 
strategies, the EU Baltic Sea Strategy and the EU Danube Strategy. The 
external dimension is well shaped by ENPI CBC actions. 
 
Border Knowledge Initiatives 
In the second half of the 20th century, the interest for border studies 
increased dramatically and irreversibly. Usually border studies have been 
institutionalized within different research centres, think-tanks, institutes, 
associations and networks. The mission of these institutions resides in 
developing border studies and cross-border cooperation in the regions that 
still have borders (enhancing cooperation of both sides of the borders) or 
eliminated borders in the result of European integration (peripheral 
borderlands lost the status of border regions, they become Euroregions).  
 
  
                                                     
2 Cross-Border Cooperation – Benefiting from Borders (Helsinki: Ministry for European 
Affairs and Foreign Trade of Finland, 2011), 4-6. 
3 Cross-Border Cooperation – Benefiting from Borders (Helsinki: Ministry for European 
Affairs and Foreign Trade of Finland, 2011), 8. 
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Centre for Cross Border Studies 
The Centre for Cross Border Studies (Ireland) is a valued source of 
research, information and suport for collaboration across borders on the 
island of Ireland, Europe and beyond. The centre follows two primary 
public policy imperatives: 
1. The commitment to Cross-border Cooperation that is integral to 
the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement; and 
2. EU Cohesion Policy, with its focus on social, economic and 
territorial cohesion suported in particular through EU Territorial 
Cooperation programmes (i.e. INTERREG and PEACE) and from 2014 
the mainstream Structural Fund programmes4. 
The policy says that the Centre has a specific and unique role in 
contributing to the increased social, economic and territorial cohesion of the 
island of Ireland through: 
 promoting and improving the quality of Cross-Border 
Cooperation between public bodies, and between public bodies, business 
and civil society; 
 improving the capacity of people involved in social and economic 
development of the island to engage in mutually beneficial Cross-Border 
Cooperation; and 
 addressing information gaps and other barriers that constrain 
cross-border mobility and cross-border cooperation through research and 
provision of resources, tools and other practical suport5. 
The Centre for Cross Border Studies provides numerous services, 
organizes events and publishes research results in the area of border studies 
and cross-border cooperation. 
 
EURES Cross-Border Partnership 
The EURES (European Employment Services) Cross-Border 
Partnership was established to make things easier for those who wish to 
commute daily or weekly across the border in order to earn a living. It does 
this by attempting to overcome at least some of the obstacles which people 
face. In particular it pathways to the information required by people moving 
across the border; for example, jobseekers who need information on 
employment and training oportunities on both sides of the border, on 
taxation and the social security systems. The Partnership also aims to assist 
employers by providing them with access to a larger pool of labour, i.e. 
jobseekers living on both sides of the border. Advice is available to 
                                                     
4 Centre for Cross Border Studies. Accessed on May 15, 2016. 
http://crossborder.ie/about-us/  
5 Ibidem 
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employers on a range of cross-border recruitment issues6. According to the 
profile of the centre, it is partnership that provides practical services to 
people facing cross-border challenges. 
 
Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière 
The Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière (MOT) was 
established in April 1997 by the French government to “provide operational 
assistance to project stakeholders and, more generally, to cross-border 
territories”. The mission network brings together cross-border cooperation 
stakeholders. Its members are diverse, representative of all levels of 
governance and actors implicated in cross-border projects, including states, 
local and regional authorities and their groupings, associations, federations, 
cross-border structures and major businesses7. The mission encompasses 
more complex activities being a linkage between the French government 
and various stakeholders. 
 
Central European Service for Cross-Border Initiatives 
The Central European Service for Cross-Border Initiatives (CESCI) 
is a Budapest based think-tank of cross-border issues. It was established in 
2009 following the model of the French Mission Opérationnelle 
Transfrontalière (MOT). CESCI provides professional suport to the 
stakeholders involved in territorial cooperation in Hungary and in Central 
Europe. By involving experts from neighbouring countries our association 
aims at strengthening the need and raising the spirit of cooperation and in 
this way facilitating mutual understanding and tolerance between the nations 
of the Danube region. CESCI is an open association the members of which 
are local and regional municipalities, natural persons and professional 
bodies8. The service follows the same complex priorities comparable with 
those of MOT. The exhaustiveness of cross-border cooperation is 
functional in the Central and Eastern Europe, too. 
 
European Institute of Cross-Border Studies 
The European Institute aims at performing a threefold activity: (a) 
scientific research in cross-border issues; (b) continued training according to 
the topics and the needs of border regions, as well as the training of 
Hungarian experts with professional knowledge in the field of regional 
                                                     
6 EURES (European Employment Services) Cross-Border Partnership. Accessed on 
May 15, 2016. http://www.eures-crossborder.org/About.aspx  
7 Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière (MOT). Accessed on May 15, 2016. 
http://www.espaces-transfrontaliers.org/en/the-mot/about-the-mot/  
8 Central European Service for Cross-Border Initiatives. Accessed on May 15, 2016. 
http://www.cesci-net.eu/about-us 
In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga 
 
509 
policy; (c) information service activities for any possible question on border 
regions (creating a Help Desk and Knowledge Portal)9. The objectives strive 
at satisfying the needs for better information and collaboration in the 
borderlands. 
 
Association of European Border Regions 
In line with its statutes, the Association of European Border 
Regions works on behalf of the European border and cross-border regions 
with the aim to:  
 highlight their special problems, oportunities, responsibilities and 
activities; 
 represent their common interests vis-à-vis national and 
international parliaments, bodies, authorities and institutions; 
 initiate, suport and coordinate cooperation between the regions 
throughout Europe; 
 promote exchanges of experience and information with a view to 
identifying and coordinating common interests among the diverse range of 
cross-border problems and oportunities, and to propose possible solutions. 
The activities of the Association of European Border Regions 
involve:  
 implementing programmes and projects, to aply for funds and to 
receive and to dispose of them; 
 to organise events that deal with cross-border problems; 
 to help to solve cross-border problems and to suport special 
activities; 
 to prepare and implement common campaigns within the 
networks; 
 to inform European political bodies and the public about cross-
border issues10. 
The Association of European Border Regions is considered among 
the most influential associations in the field of cross-border cooperation all 
over Europe. 
 
CECICN 
The CECICN is an EU platform of eight city networks (Atlantic 
Arc Cities, Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière, Forum of Adriatic and 
Ionian Cities, Medcities, Union of Baltic Cities, Council of Danube Cities 
                                                     
9 European Institute of Cross-Border Studies. Accessed on May 15, 2016. 
http://institute.cesci-net.eu/en/introduction-of-the-european-institut 
10 Association of European Border Regions. Accessed on May 15, 2016. 
http://www.aebr.eu/en/profile/aims_tasks.php  
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and Regions, Central European Service for Cross-Border Initiatives, City 
Twins Association-observer) representing almost 37% of the EU population 
and involving 600 cities in Territorial Cooperation. Its objective is to boost 
territorial cooperation among cities with specific geographical features in 
Europe. The main aim of this network is to put European Territorial 
Cooperation (ETC) at the core of the debate about 2014‐2020 policy 
implementation and the EU 2020 Strategy. The objectives, following a 
“bottom up” aproach, are the following: 
 to represent the interests of its members, especially in terms of 
cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation involving cities 
 to place European Territorial Cooperation at the heart of 
European politics in the new programming period 2014/2020 and the 
Europe 2020 Strategy 
 to exchange best practices among the different members of the 
network11. 
The platform comprises city networks to improve their common 
development taking into consideration cultural and geographical nuances. 
 
UniGR-Center for Border Studies (UniGR-CBS) 
The UniGR-Center for Border Studies (UniGR-CBS) is a thematic 
cross-border network of researchers from the UniGR universities 
conducting research on borders and border issues. The network, launched 
on 1 December 2014 on the initiative of the researchers, considers itself as a 
multidisciplinary platform of border studies within the Greater Region. 
Combining the projects of the participating universities in the field of 
border studies, the network suports the development of cross-border 
initiatives, and ensures greater international visibility. Aiming at 
strengthening the multidisciplinary field of work within the Greater Region, 
the UniGR-Center for Border Studies is active in four key areas:  
 profile formation for border studies in research; 
 integration of border studies in teaching; 
 exchange and networking with social stakeholders; 
 exchange and networking between the UniGR partner 
universities12. 
Even the UniGR-Center for Border Studies is a very young research 
initiative, it has a very ambitious research programme on border studies. 
 
  
                                                     
11 CECICN. Accesses on May 15, 2016. http://cecicn.eu/about/  
12 UniGR-Center for Border Studies. Accessed on May 15, 2016. http://www.uni-
gr.eu/en/about-us/unigr-key-areas/border-studies/center-for-border-studies.html  
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Transfrontier Euro-Institut Network (TEIN) 
The Transfrontier Euro-Institut Network (TEIN), formed in 2010, 
now brings together 14 partners from 8 border regions in Europe. Its 
unique feature is that it consists of universities, research institutes and 
training centres which are dedicated to the practical business of cross-border 
cooperation in Europe. TEIN is led by the Euro-Institut, created in 1993 in 
Kehl / Strasbourg on the French / German / Swiss border with the aim of 
facilitating cross-border cooperation. All members have subscribed to a 
common charter to ensure the organization of the network and the quality 
of its output. TEIN partners come from maritime borders, old European 
borders, new eastern borders, post-conflict borders and external borders. 
Because of this, TEIN is able to measure the need for capacity building in 
cross-border cooperation throughout Europe. TEIN Members are real 
actors of the cross-border cooperation. Their work involves cross-border 
training and facilitation, managing cross-border projects, providing 
mentoring, training and advice for cross-border actors, and researching on 
cross-border issues. In this respect, TEIN can be seen as representing a 
genuinely bottom-up aproach13. The Transfrontier Euro-Institut Network is 
a research partnership at the heart of Europe and a good example of inside 
and outside EU cooperation. 
 
Institute for Euroregional Studies 
One of the most prolific institutions in performing border studies 
and cross-border cooperation in the Eastern Europe is the Institute for 
Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen. The Institute for Euroregional 
Studies Oradea-Debrecen was founded in 2005 through the Jean Monnet 
project as a Jean Monnet Center of Excellence. Since 2008, the Institute for 
Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen had become a registered legal entity.  
The founders of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-
Debrecen are:  
- professor Ioan Horga (University of Oradea, Romania) and  
- professor Istvan Suli-Zakar (University of Debrecen, Hungary).  
The main research directions of the Institute for Euroregional 
Studies Oradea-Debrecen are borders, cross-border cooperation, security 
and regionalism in Europe.  
The main fields of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-
Debrecen are: 
 historic and demographic regional bases: testimonials on the 
border area identity; cultural heritage and the border area identity; 
                                                     
13 Transfrontier Euro-Institut Network. Accessed on May 15, 2016. 
http://www.transfrontier.eu/  
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mentalities in the regional area; demographical Heritage and the border area 
identity; 
 administrative and geographical bases: Euroregions – 
expressions of subsidiarity; cross-border cooperation from the perspective 
of community law; the issue of good governance in a borderless Europe; 
public services in cross-border area; freedom of movement in cross-border 
area; 
 the economic issue of Euroregional cooperation: mechanisms 
for cross-border communication; SMEs and cross-border cooperation; 
business management in cross-border area; 
 borderless Europe, new identity forms: media and their voice in 
a borderless Europe; the church and their voice in a borderless Europe; the 
family and their voice in a borderless Europe; the civil society and their 
voice in a borderless Europe; new behaviour forms in the border area, 
security on the Eastern European borders, European Neighbourhood 
Policy and Eastern Partnership, Black Sea synergy14.  
The researchers of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-
Debrecen are actively involved in implementing EU, regional, national and 
local projects in the above mentioned fields of interest. Here there are 
several relevant examples: Initiative and Constraint in the Maping of Evolving 
European Borders by Ioan Horga; Euroregional and Regional Structures – Efficient 
for the New EU’s Frontier by Ioan Horga; European Parliament in Campus For the 
Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighborhood Policy in the Carpathian Area by 
Ioan Horga; MA in Euroregional Studies and Cross Border Relations by Ioan 
Horga; Let’s Think Together the Future: Cross-Border Agglomeration Debrecen-
Oradea by Ioan Horga; Regimul juridic al organismelor de cooperare transfrontalieră în 
dreptul român şi maghiar. Modele europene de aplicare by Ioan Horga; The Future of 
Institutional Cross-Border Cooperation in Bihor-Hadju-Bihar Euroregion by Ioan 
Horga; Mass-Media and Intercultural Dialogue in Europe without Borders by 
Luminiţa Şoproni; Ethnie, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European 
Union Eastern Border by Mircea Brie; The Border, a Space of Innovation and 
Cooperation in the European Union by Adrian C. Popovici; Security Aproaches at 
the Eastern Border of the European Union by Dorin Dolghi; Cultural Diplomacy at 
the East and West Borders of the European Union – an Essential Element in the 
Process of European Integration by Alina Stoica; From Periphery to Center. The Image 
of European Union at the Eastern Border of Europe by Sorin Şipoş; Migration and 
European Integration of Minorities at the Eastern Border of the EU by Istvan Polgar; 
HURO Croos-Border Area for a Sustainable Development in the Next 2 Decades by 
Istvan Polgar; Boosting Inovation through Capacity Building of Network of Sciences 
                                                     
14 Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen. Accessed on May 16, 2016. 
http://www.iser.rdsor.ro/about_us.htm  
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Centers in SSE region by Mircea Brie; The Image of the Other in the European 
Intercultural Dialogue by Dana Pantea, etc. 
Thus, it is easily identifiable the border studies perspective of these 
projects. A part of the above mentioned projects were run through the 
Hungary-Romania Cross-Border Co-operation Programme 2007-2013, 
aiming at enhancing the joint social and economic development of the 
Hungarian-Romanian border area.  
Cross-border co-operation on the Hungarian-Romanian border has 
a strong foundation to build on. The Hungarian-Romanian Phare CBC 
programme started as early as in 1996, when the European Commission 
extended the programme – for the first time in its history – to a border 
region between two candidate countries. The experimental programme 
proved to be a success and, the European Commission continued making 
funds available from the Phare National Programme for Hungary. In the 
period 1996-2003, from EU Phare CBC fund, altogether 34 M EUR have 
been allocated for CBC projects to be implemented on the Hungarian side 
of the border and 28 M EUR for the Romanian side. The PHARE CBC 
programmes played an important role in establishing some key facilities in 
the border area, including the modernisation of border-crossing stations and 
roads, as well as business infrastructure development projects. 
Environmental protection has also been an area of importance; projects in 
this field have mainly focused on water resource management, in response 
to the joint challenges identified. The next stage of co-operation has been 
the implementation of the Hungary-Romania and Hungary-Serbia and 
Montenegro (tri-lateral) Cross-border Co-operation Programme 2004-2006; 
the programme had a budget of nearly 32 M EUR for Hungary 
(INTERREG), and nearly 20 M EUR for Romania (PHARE CBC), 
including national co-financing. The 12-year-long cross-border co-operation 
between Hungary and Romania has now arrived to a very important 
milestone. Within the frameworks of the Hungary-Romania Cross-border 
Co-operation Programme 2007-2013 the European Union ensures further 
assistance in territorial co-operation to the border area between Hungary 
and Romania, continuing previous INTERREG III.A. and Phare CBC 
2004-2006 Community initiatives. The novelties of the programming period 
are: Improved legal basis (Specific provisions for co-operation, Lead partner 
principle, EGTC, no mirror or individual projects); This cross-border co-
operation programme covers a different geographical area (Hungary-
Romania internal border area, since Romania joined the European Union at 
the beginning of the programme period); Clear focus on Lisbon and 
Göteborg strategies: more emphasis on competitiveness and environment; 
Joint European (ERDF) and national funding; In some cases up to 85% EU 
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co-financing for all regions plus 10-13% national co-financing – only 2-5% 
own contribution15. 
The general objective of the programme is to bring the different 
actors – people, economic actors and communities – closer to each other, in 
order to better exploit oportunities offered by the joint development of the 
border area. Moreover, the programme is aimed at improving the 
competitiveness and attractiveness of the border area, through various 
interventions contributing to the integrated development of the cooperating 
NUTS III level areas. 
The programme offers a wide range of oportunities for 
organisations through two priority axis and large number of key areas of 
interventions: 
 
Priority 1: Improve the key conditions of joint, sustainable 
development of the cooperation area (Improvement of cross-border 
transport, communication and environmental protection) 
Funds allocated to this Priority axis will be used to improve the key 
conditions of joint development in the co-operation area. This includes the 
development of the transport and communication infrastructure as well as 
public transport facilities of the area, which are instrumental to facilitating 
cross-border passenger and freight transport and proper flow of 
information. Besides these, the Priority axis also includes interventions 
aimed at prevention and protection of the relative pure natural environment, 
as the elemental condition of any kind of human operation. 
 
Key area of intervention 1.1: Improvement of cross-border 
transport facilities 
1.1.1 Road development: construction, rehabilitation of roads, 
bicycle paths, etc. 
1.1.2 Railway development: modernization of stations, 
harmonization of timetables, etc. 
1.1.3 Preparation of studies and plans 
 
Key area of intervention 1.2: Improvement of cross-border 
communication 
1.2.1 Development of cross-border broadband internet 
infrastructure: distribution points and networks, user accessibility 
1.2.2 Community access programmes: development of IT 
knowledge, development of public services 
                                                     
15 Hungary-Romania Cross-Border Co-operation Programme 2007-2013. Accessed on 
May 16, 2016. http://www.huro-cbc.eu/en/overview/ 
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1.2.3 Cross-border newscast: CBC publications, TV and radio 
programmes, training 
1.2.4 Preparation of studies 
 
Key area of intervention 1.3: Protection of the environment 
1.3.1 Protection of nature and natural values: harmonization of 
regulations, environmental friendly land exploitation, etc. 
1.3.2 Water management: rehabilitation of river basins, wetland 
fields, etc. 
1.3.3 Reducing pollution – waste management: rehabilitation of 
sites, selective waste collection, exchange of good practices, etc. 
1.3.4 Preparation of studies and plans 
 
Priority 2: Strengthen social and economic cohesion of the 
border area (Cooperation in the fields of business, RTD, education, 
labour market, health care and risk management) 
The overall aim of the Priority axis is to enhance the economic 
competitiveness of the area by development of the business environment, 
and improvement of the human resources. 
 
Key area of intervention 2.1: Suport for cross-border business 
cooperation 
2.1.1 Development of business infrastructure: modernization of 
facilities, elaboration of studies, plans, etc. 
2.1.2 Cooperation between businesses: business events, CB 
networks and partnerships, etc. 
2.1.3 Development of tourism: tourism attractions and 
infrastructure, etc 
 
Key area of intervention 2.2: Promotion of co-operation in the 
field of R+D and innovation 
2.2.1 Joint research infrastructure development: development of 
R&D and innovation infrastructure serving CBC, etc. 
2.2.2 Cooperation between sectors involved in R&D: exchange and 
training programmes, partnerships, etc. 
2.2.3. Realization of joint research projects 
2.2.4 Elaboration of studies, plans 
 
Key area of intervention 2.3: Cooperation in the labor market 
and education – joint development of skills and knowledge 
2.3.1 Cooperation between educational institutions: development of 
training and educational facilities, for knowledge transfer, etc.  
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2.3.2 Cooperation on the labour market: distance learning, training 
courses, co-operation of employment services, etc. 
 
Key area of intervention 2.4: Health care and prevention of 
common threat 
2.4.1 Development of infrastructure for common health and risk 
prevention: cooperation between health-care service providers, joint 
mechanisms for intervention, purchase of equipments, etc.  
2.4.2 Joint institution building, coordination and training: cross-
border ambulance centers, joint trainings, etc. 
 
Key area of intervention 2.5: Cooperation between 
communities 
People to people actions: joint cultural and sport events, institution 
building, co-operation networks, co-operation between educational 
institutions, etc16. 
Consequently, researchers of the Institute for Euroregional Studies 
Oradea-Debrecen succeeded to implement successfully and successively a 
couple of projects referring to Romanian and Hungarian border 
development actions. 
 
Eurolimes 
It is the journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-
Debrecen. The journal was founded in 2006 and has two editors-in-chief: 
professor Ioan Horga (Oradea, Romania) and Istvan Suli-Zakar (Debrecen, 
Hungary). Since its foundation, Eurolimes apeared in 20 issues having various 
thematic on border studies. Research results resided in joint volumes as 
follows: 
- Europe and Its Borders: Theoretical and Historical Perspective; 
- From Smaller to Greater Europe: Border Identitary Testimonies; 
- Media, Intercultural Dialogue and the New Frontiers of Europe; 
- Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers; 
- Religious Frontiers of Europe; 
- Intercultural Dialogue and the European Space; 
- Europe and the Neighbourhood; 
- Europe and its Economic Frontiers; 
- The Cultural Frontiers of Europe; 
- The Geopolitics of European Frontiers; 
- Leaders of the Borders, Borders of the Leaders; 
                                                     
16 Hungary-Romania Cross-Border Co-operation Programme 2007-2013. Accessed on 
May 16, 2016. http://huro-cbc.eu/en/objectives_and_priorities 
In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga 
 
517 
- Communication and European Frontiers; 
- Permeability and Impermeability of Socio-Economic Frontiers 
within European Union;  
- Enlargements, Borders and the Changes of EU Political 
Priorities; 
- A Security Dimension as Trigger and Result of Frontiers 
Modifications; 
- Cross-Border Governance and the Borders Evolutions; 
- The Social Frontiers of Europe; 
- The Security Dimension of European Frontier vs the Legitimacy 
of Political Priorities of EU and EU Members States National Preferences; 
- Border Cities in Europe; 
- Theoretical Aproaches and Borders’ Assessment. 
In order to draw a brief conclusion out of the activities of the 
Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen and the research results 
published in the Eurolimes journal, it is fair to say that professor Ioan Horga 
succeeded to put the foundation bricks of a new school on border studies in 
the Eastern Europe. Oradea School of Cross-Border Studies is open to 
academic and intercultural dialogue; the school cooperates both with 
scholars in the immediate proximity and those beyond it; the school 
cooperates both with inside and outside EU scholars, thus being an 
indisputable advantage for academia in a global world. 
 
Books 
There are many good books written on cross-border cooperation 
and border studies. However, a couple of them arrest one’s attention. A 
milestone study is A Companion to Border Studies, edited by Thomas M. 
Wilson and Hastings Donnan in 2012. The book A Companion to Border 
Studies brings together these disciplines and viewpoints, through the writing 
of an international collection of preeminent border scholars. Drawing on 
research from Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Europe and the Americas, the 
contributors argue that the future of Border Studies lies within such diverse 
collaborations, which aproach comparatively the features of borders 
worldwide. The book analyzes the following subjects in five parts and seven 
chapters: Part I Sovereignty, Territory and Governance – Borders and 
Border Studies; Partition; Culture Theory and the US-Mexico Border; The 
African Union Border Programme in European Comparative Perspective; 
European Politics of Borders, Border Symbolysm and Cross-Border 
Cooperation; Securing Borders in Europe and North America; Border 
Regimes, the Circulation of Violence and the Neo-Authoritarian Turn; Part 
II States, Nations, and Empires; Part III Security, Order and Disorder; Part 
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IV Displacement, Emplacement and Mobility; Part V Space, Performance 
and Practice. 
In the chapter Borders and Border Studies, the editors Thomas M. 
Wilson and Hastings Donnan mention that there are more international 
borders in the world today than ever there were before. This is a significant 
fact when one considers the impact of these many borders on the ways in 
which the billions of people encompassed by them live, work and travel. As 
important a development as this multiplication in international borders is, 
however, it alone is not the guiding imperative behind the origin and 
evolution of comparative border studies in scholarship worldwide. The 
proliferation of borders, and the many forces that have created and fostered 
their development, together have drawn scholars from all the humanities 
and social sciences to a mutual interest in what hapens at, across and 
because of the borders to nations and states, and in extension to other 
geopolitical borders and boundaries, such as those of cities, regions and 
supranational polities. Their interest has been as much in what hapens at 
specific borders, frontiers and borderlands as it has been in what borders 
help us to understand of major forces of change that seem to be sweeping 
the globe, forces often included as aspects of globalization, but which may 
also be seen as neo-liberalism, neo-imperialism, late modern capitalism, and 
supra-nationalism. Within these interests and perspectives, border studies 
scholars enter into dialogue with all those who wish to understand new 
liberties, new movements, and new mobility schemes17. 
Another book presenting interest is Beyond Methodological Nationalism: 
Research Methodologies for Cross-Border Studies, edited by Anna Amelina et al in 
2012. The book has the following structure: 1. Methodological Predicaments 
of Cross-Border Studies, Anna Amelina, Thomas Faist, Nina Glick Schiller 
and Devrimsel D. Nergiz; Part I: Researching International Migration after 
Redefining Spatiality and Mobility 2. Transnationality, Migrants and Cities: 
A Comparative Aproach, Nina Glick Schiller 3. Transnational Migration and 
the Reformulation of Analytical Categories: Unpacking Latin American 
Refugee Dynamics in Toronto, Luin Goldring and Patricia Landolt 4. 
Overcoming Methodological Nationalism in Migration Research: Cases and 
Contexts in Multi-Level Comparisons, Anja Weiß and Arnd-Michael Nohl; 
Part II: Material, Culture and Ethnicity: Overcoming Pitfalls in Researching 
Globalization 5. Global Ethnography 2.0: From Methodological 
                                                     
17 Wilson, Thomas M. and Hastings Donnan (Eds). A Companion to Border Studies. 
Malden-Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2012. Accessed May 15, 2016 
https://books.google.ro/books?id=yu4kFC_vNokC&pg=PA98&lpg=PA98&dq=c
ross+border+studies&source=bl&ots=txR3ATRp3h&sig=eMg69A-
lg1hhuklVLOcYbOuoujI&hl=ro&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwijnrvep_LMAhUH1SwK
HXofBvo4FBDoAQgqMAI#v=onepage&q=cross%20border%20studies&f=false 
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Nationalism to Methodological Materialism, Zsuzsa Gille 6. Uncomfortable 
Antinomies: Going Beyond Methodological Nationalism in Social and 
Cultural Anthropology, David Gellner 7. Aproaching Indigenous Activism 
from the Ground Up: Experiences from Bangladesh, Eva Gerharz; Part III: 
Juxtapositions of Historiography after the Hegemony of the National 8. The 
Global, the Transnational, and the Subaltern: The Limits of History Beyond 
the National Paradigm, Angelika Eple 9. Incorporating Comparisons in the 
Rift: Making Use of Cross-Place Events and Histories in Moments of World 
Historical Change Sandra Curtis Comstock 10. Interrogating Critiques of 
Methodological Nationalism: Propositions for New Methodologies, Radhika 
Mongia; Part IV: Conclusions 11. Transnational Social Spaces: Between 
Methodological Nationalism and Cosmo-Globalism, Ludger Pries and 
Martin Seeliger 12. Concluding Remarks: Reconsidering Contexts and Units 
of Analysis, Thomas Faist and Devrimsel D. Nergiz18. 
 
University Curriculum 
Cross-border studies are present including in the university 
curriculum. They are either independent courses or module courses. For 
instance, SUNY Buffalo Law School has among various offers a curriculum 
on Cross-Border Legal Studies Concentration. The school has such an offer 
on Cross-Border Legal Studies Concentration due to closeness to the 
Canadian border with the major business center of Toronto. The school has 
a strong network of alumni in Buffalo and in Ontario who engage in cross-
border legal practice. These lawyers work in the full range of cross-border 
activities, including trade, tax, immigration, business transactions, and 
related areas that take them across the border regularly. The Cross-Border 
Legal Studies Concentration capitalizes on their location and linkages on 
both sides of the border. The students can aply to cross-border work 
anywhere in the world. According to the requirements, the Cross-Border 
Legal Studies Concentration requires 16 course credits. There is one 
required course, the 4 credit Cross-Border Legal Studies capstone 
experiential course, in which students work with practitioners on a range of 
cross-border legal issues. The capstone course is generally taken in students’ 
final year of law school. In addition, students must take 12 credits from the 
following list of eligible courses: Advanced International Law; Comparative 
Law; Comparative Regional Human Rights; Criminal Immigration; 
Environmental Law and Policy Clinic; Federal Indian Law; Human Rights 
Lawyering: Advocacy, Influence and Impact (Bridge Course held in DC); 
Immigrants’ Rights and Human Rights Advocacy Clinic; Immigration Law; 
                                                     
18 Amelina Anna et al (Eds). Beyond Methodological Nationalism: Research Methodologies for 
Cross-Border Studies, London: Routledge, 2012 
The European Space. Borders and Issues 
 
520 
International and Comparative Labor and Employment Law; International 
Business Transactions; International Commercial Arbitration; International 
Corporate Transactions (Bridge Course held in Paris); International 
Economic Law; International Environmental Law; International Finance 
(NYC); International Finance Markets; International Human Rights Law; 
International Law; International Legal Research; International Trade and the 
Environment; International Trade Law; International Trade Law and Policy; 
New Zealand: International Economic Law in Context (Bridge Course held 
in New Zealand); Problems in International Finance (NYC); Public 
International Law; Refugee and Asylum Law; The Legal Culture of Thailand 
(Bridge Course held in Thailand); The Global Business Environment – 
Closing a Deal Across the U.S.-Canada Border; Topics in Global Finance 
(NYC); US-Canada Relationship; World Bank Group19. 
This is a very good example, especially for law students, in cross-
border concentration, which could be taken as an experience in promoting 
border studies. 
Another curriculum experience is the European Master Programme 
in Euoregional Studies and Cross-border Relations. Due to the experience 
of the Chair Jean Monnet in Euroregional Studies and to the Master in 
Euroregional Studies that was set up at the University of Oradea in 2001, 
which is associated to the Master in European Studies The Process of Building 
Europe of the Siena Network (Athens, Coimbra, Krakow, Granada, 
Hanovra, Strasbourg, Siena, Salamanca) and to the Master in EU Territorial 
and Urban Development and Planning organized at the University of Debrecen, 
in collaboration with the University Paris IV - Sorbonne, the Universities of 
Oradea and Debrecen, in agreement with the partners worked in setting up 
a European Master aiming at forming specialists in regional and cross-
border administration, as well as in project management in proximity areas 
of the European Union20. 
The Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen worked on 
the institutionalization of the legal entity, has produced research results and 
proposed a master program in border studies, completing the status of a 
school on border studies. The Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-
Debrecen is a rare example in the field of cross-border studies judging the 
accomplished results. 
 
  
                                                     
19 Curriculum on Cross-Border Legal Studies Concentration. Accessed on May 15, 2016. 
http://www.law.buffalo.edu/academics/jd/concentrations/cross-border.html 
20 Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen. Accessed on May 16, 2016. 
http://www.iser.rdsor.ro/er_studies.htm.  
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Conclusion 
Firstly, cross-border cooperation represents a possibility to 
transform the frontier from a barrier into an oportunity for regional 
development. Borderlands can easily and jointly face the specific regional 
challenges from geographical, historical, ethnic, cultural, civilizational, 
economic and societal perspectives. Both the European Union and the 
Member States are interested in promoting cross-border cooperation at 
internal and external borders for the sake of better regional development. 
Cross-border cooperation contributes greatly to regional stability and 
prosperity on the EU’s internal and external borders.  
Moreover, cross-border cooperation is an efficient instrument for 
consolidating inter-human and inter-community relations on both sides of 
the borders, thus generating mutual understanding, trust and valorization of 
the human capital in the region. Cross-border cooperation could be a 
melting pot for the socio-economic development as a whole in building the 
Europe. Alexander Stubb, the Minister for European Affairs and Foreign 
Trade of Finland, underlines that “it is useful to elaborate on the concept of 
cross-border cooperation and to examine the role and motives of various 
stakeholders: the EU and the Member States, partner countries, regional 
players and local operators. It is our shared responsibility to translate this 
innovative and unique form of cooperation into an even greater success in the 
future”21. Borderlands are considered spaces where people and energies meet 
to make benefits for local communities. 
Secondly, cross-border cooperation has become a research area of 
border studies and a part of university curriculum in a couple of countries. 
Border studies determined the foundation of specific institutes, centres, 
associations, and publication of specialized journals and books. All these data 
speak in favour of schools on border studies all over the world. The most 
efficient and visible schools on border studies are situated in Europe, namely 
in the European Union thanks to instruments of suport for cross-border 
development through cohesion programmes.  
Among the schools on border studies in the Eastern Europe can be 
mentioned the Institute for Euroregional Studies, initiated on the banks of 
Crisul Repede River in Oradea, Romania. Professor Ioan Horga is the 
founder and the leader of Oradea School of Cross-Border Studies, an 
unequalled pioneer and promoter of EU cross-border cooperation knowledge 
alliances. Professor Ioan Horga publishes the Eurolimes journal with research 
findings of various scholars all over the world. Oradea School of Cross-
                                                     
21 Alexander Stubb, “Foreword”, Cross-Border Cooperation – Benefiting from Borders 
(Helsinki: Ministry for European Affairs and Foreign Trade of Finland, 2011), 1. 
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Border Studies succeeded to explore relevant academic resources in order to 
establish a powerful centre of research and knowledge in this part of Europe. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The article strives at analyzing cross-border cooperation both on research and practical 
levels. The two-fold perspective refers to knowledge alliances of cross-border cooperation. The 
investigation focuses on cross-border cooperation in Europe, relevant initiatives in the area of 
interest, by pointing out the contribution of different institutions, centres, think-tanks, associations, 
networks, books, journals, funds and programmes in developing borderlands. A couple of schools 
can be identified according to the followed objectives and attained results. One of the schools in the 
field of cross-border cooperation in the Eastern Europe is the Institute of Euroregional Studies, 
containing programmatic manifestos and research results published in Eurolimes and other relevant 
studies; in other words it is Oradea School of Cross-Border Studies.  
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Building the Borderless Europe. A historical Overview 
of the Romanian and Hungarian Cross-Border 
Cooperation 
 
 
 
POLGÁR István* 
 
 
European Union and integration in the European Community 
developed itself on three basic ways, creation of a common market, 
development of common institutions and several common policies. Market 
integration has progressed a long way, although it stops and restarts again. 
The institutional integration is left behind, but the must difficult of all is 
represented by the common policies, espacially where they have required 
founding. 
With the reform of the Structural Funds, regions have gained a key 
role in the design and implementation of regional policy. Yet some of the 
weakest regions were not equiped with apropriate institutional structures 
and have struggled to benefit. 
While the reform may have given regions an entitlement to 
participate, we argue that some have lacked the capacity to do so effectively. 
In this context, enlargement raises questions over the future of the Funds, 
and how far a commitment to cohesion and convergence can be maintained. 
The concept of “Europe without borders” can provide the solution 
to the ethnic problem on the continent. Some politicians and political 
scientists consider that the model of the “nation state” has not been able to 
provide sustainable finality through the citizenship institution. Limited in its 
defining pattern, the classic citizenship offered only a kind of equality 
principle, abstract, to residents within the borders of a national state, but the 
same borders did split many ethno-cultural communities, dividing the 
population into two categories, the majority and the inhabiting minorities1. 
                                                     
* PhD lecturer at the University of Oradea, Department of International Relations and 
European Studies. E-mail:  
1 Renate Weber, Un concept românesc privind viitorul Uniunii Europene, Iaşi: 
Editura Polirom, 2001, p.53 
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The disapearance of multinational empires such as Russia and 
Austria-Hungary at the end of WWI led Central and Eastern Europe to 
building national states firstly based on ethnic and demographic criteria, but 
also on economic and strategic interests of the powers at that moment. 
History has proven that the way in which the managing of a new 
European architecture was envisaged during the interwar period was 
doomed from the start, as the myriad of ethnic enclaves marring the 
national unity of the successoral states were as many reasons to trigger 
revisionist actions, which in reality were only the mask that concealed 
economic interests. This situation was due to the fact that between citizens 
of different ethnic groups in the same country rose „internal frontiers – as 
defined by Professor Andrei Marga - separating the parties and their stages 
from each other (...) limits their areas of availability, values, ideas”2. 
In turn, the communist Europe shaped into a separate structure. 
Unlike Western Europe, the binding of this superstructure was the common 
ideology and not interpersonal relationships, an ideology maintained when 
the situation was thought to require armed intervention. Such an event 
shows failure of communist ideology to build social order based on justice 
and freedom3. 
Ethnic intolerance that marked the history of Europe over the 
centuries has failed to find a cure even under the dome of the proletarian 
internationalism. Adrian Marino believes that it only froze and preserved the 
seeds of ethnic adversity. The results of these pseudo-politicians were seen 
as soon as the system collapsed, the most dramatic example being that of 
Yugoslavia4. 
On the same issue, the former counterintelligence officer, Paul 
Abraham, said in a paper that, based on information collected during 
nationalist demonstrations in Hungary in 1989, Romania experienced fear of 
military intervention from Hungary to occupy Transylvania5. 
Analysis of the system shows that the basic characteristic note 
describing the vicinity of the two antagonistic blocs was fear, a sentiment 
felt on both sides of the “iron curtain” that led to the birth of the so-called 
                                                     
2 Andrei Marga, Filosofia unificării europene, Cluj:Biblioteca Apostrof, 1997, 92, 
p.140 
3 Ştefan Delureanu, Geneza Europei comunitare: mesajul democraţiei de inspiraţie 
creştină, Bucureşti: Editura Paideia, 1999, p. 368 
4 Adrian Marino, Revenirea în Europa: idei şi controverse româneşti : 1990-1995, 
Bucureşti: Editura Aius, 1996, p. 398  
5 Florin Abraham, Transformarea României: 1989-2006 : rolul factorilor externi, 
Bucureşti: Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2006 , p. 74 
In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga 
 
527 
“strategy of intimidation”, which in turn chiped some of the sovereignty of 
the states that made up the two military sides6. 
After WWII, the West seems to have learned from the tragic 
experience that a new European structure can no longer be built from 
antagonistic positions and sought to gap and extend bridges to facilitate 
convergence between the states of the free world, eventually ending up as 
the European Community, or “Little Europe”. Advances performed here 
since the early years, especially in inter-system communication, have been 
felt even in the neighbouring communist countries. Hungary is one such 
example. Arrangements for travelling abroad being in Budapest more liberal 
than in the rest of the Communist bloc countries, allowed an innovative 
blast into the country by accepting into a centralized state economy of a 
small segment of private enterprises. After the fall of communism, their 
contribution has proven to be most important in Hungary’s transition to a 
market economy7. 
The fall of communism in Europe has created new situations and 
the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia demonstrated the 
volatility of postwar borders, at least in the latter case through a peaceful 
process. In these circumstances, the American politician Henry Kissinger 
expressed the need to adapt the NATO strategy on the old continent 
because – noted he – a “paradoxical tend to believe that in Europe two 
categories of boundaries can be defined: those guaranteed although not 
threatened, and those threatened but that cannot be guaranteed”8. 
Analysed through the economic lens, the “national state” in its 
classic sense is perceived both by the local investor, as well as the foreign 
investor as an obstacle to the smooth exchange of goods and consequently, 
a source of diminishing of profit. “Europe without borders” could provide 
the ideal space in which inputs could freely cooperate, in real conditions of 
competitiveness, and trade might move towards a market free from customs 
duties, excise or other protectionist means9. 
National economies have proved incapable of responding within 
parameters of maximum efficiency to world market demands, to global 
exchange and to capital movement, therefore the latest solutions 
recommend the adoption of “borderless world” concept, developed by 
Kenichi Ohmae in 1995. 
                                                     
6 Andrei Marga, op. cit., p. 53, 142, 167 
7 Ibidem, p. 138, 177 
8 Apud: Adrian Năstase, Roxana Nicolae, România şi noua arhitectură mondială: 
studii, alocuţiuni, interviuri, 1990-1996, Bucuresti: Asociaţia Română pentru 
Educaţie Democratică, 1996, p. 191 
9 Renate Weber, op. cit., p. 58 
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Regional economic policies offered for a while solutions to 
microeconomic problems, but not to the macroeconomic ones. However, 
they were the first form of cross-border cooperation and brought coherence 
and synergy to different economic and equity instruments10. 
However, the procedure for accession to the European Union is 
extremely difficult today because it is conditioned by a long line of 
institutional and economic parameters which optant states must meet in 
advance; there are also subjective reasons that go beyond the statutory 
framework of the European Union.  
Along with states targeting their entry into the Union, there are 
countries on the continent that fall within the institutional and economic 
standards claimed by the Union but which are not interested in joining the 
organization, such as Switzerland or Norway. This does not mean that they 
would fall outside the circuit of cultural and economic values. It is obvious 
that we are dealing with two kinds of community aspirations. 
That is why Renate Weber proposed in 2001 the establishment of 
some pre-accession federative structures, which then be integrated in the 
Union. “The existence of the two dimensions allows the absorption of an 
initial failure of the federal project without having the entire European 
edifice collapse. On the contrary, the enlarged EU will be a welcoming 
«house», from where, after reconsideration, it may be returned with a new 
project of political integration” - concludes the future Romanian MEP11.  
These federative structures could perpetuate their existence even if 
the EU would become inoperative for any reason. An entity of this type 
could be the “Danube Federation”, a structure planned since the ‘20s of the 
XX century, adapted to the current requirements, bringing together Austria, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria12. 
In 1996, Adrian Marino had proposed a transposition in the real 
world of older project of establishing a Danubian confederation. He saw 
Romania’s membership to such a structure as a possibility only if our 
country will be able to defuse the conflict between Romanians and 
Hungarians. During his travels through Europe, Marino noted the existence 
and the persistence of a collective forma mentis at the inhabitants of former 
Austro-Hungarian regions such as Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Banat, Transylvania, Bukovina, a feeling which 
                                                     
10 Aurel Iancu, Eugen Simion, Dezvoltarea economică a României: competitivitatea şi 
integrarea în Uniunea Europeană, Bucureşti: Academia Românǎ . Secţia de Ştiinţe 
Economice, Juridice şi Sociologie, Editura Academiei Române, 2005, p. 6, 625 
11 Renate Weber, op. cit., p. 79 
12 Ibidem, p. 351 
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could facilitate the creation of a confederation also from an interethnic 
understanding angle13.  
Membership to the European family does not preclude the national 
element. Nationalism played a decisive role in forming the modern nations 
of Europe. According to Professor Andrei Marga, “conservative 
nationalism” would be the element that could jeopardize the channels of 
communication with other nations, through the fear that a suprastructure as 
the EU would create the very conditions for the disapearance of the national 
identity of the people that make it up. The Union’s main feature is that the 
largest proportion of the composing nations coexist well with each other, 
and within them the same can be said about the majority with the 
minority14. 
In addition to these findings, Adrian Marino believes that there 
must be made a clear distinction between the “need for national identity” 
and the “national extremism”, which by its bursts of aggression and 
chauvinism not only fails to serve the aspirations of national identity, but is 
even able to compromise them15. 
An important role in removing ethnic barriers in the perspective of 
European integration of the Eastern European countries lies in the 
exchange of information between communities after 1990, more often 
circulated through personal experience gained in this respect by those who 
lived “abroad” and managed to adapt to the requirements of other social 
realities16. 
Internally, the removal of ethnic barriers could be possible only if 
educating both subjects, the majority and the minority, in the spirit of 
recognizing “ethnic otherness” and of promoting multicultural dialogue. It 
is a requirement of the today citizenship that ethnic minority rights be 
defended, a requirement that can only be met through adequate training 
programs. The level of tolerance of the majority towards minorities indicates 
the development of “civic nationalism” or “liberal nationalism” as a form of 
modern nationalism17. 
But the Conference of the EU Stability Pact in March 1995 
delivered significant reasons of concern for Romania and gave rise to vivid 
discussions about the oportunity and the price she had to pay in return for 
accession, in particular the paragraph in the French party document that, 
when referring to the agreements to be concluded within the Pact, read that 
                                                     
13 Adrian Marino, op. cit., p. 260, 274 
14 Andrei Marga, op. cit., p. 51, 141, 315 
15 Adrian Marino, op. cit., p. 321 
16 Ioana Petre, Ecaterina Balica, Dan Banciu, Tineret, norme şi valori: repere pentru o 
sociologie a tineretului , Bucureşti: Editura Lumina Lex, 2002, p. 43 
17 Ibidem, p. 26, 124, 152 
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“it cannot be excluded that such arrangements lead to minor changes of 
frontiers whose intangibility would have been ensured by the conference”, 
given that a number of acceding countries constrained by circumstances 
assumed the borders after WWII18. 
In 1995, Romania’s preparations to add the accession file to join the 
European Union reached a halt at the chapter of concluding bilateral treaties 
with neighboring countries, as Hungary introduced in the draft document 
the Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, document that referred to the collective rights of 
minorities. Unlike Slovakia, Romania failed for this reason to conclude the 
treaty end until March 20, 1995 when the Stability Pact Conference was 
meeting19. 
The Romanian part considered that the requirements were met with 
respect to protecting “the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to 
minorities”, a condition Romania assimilated to the “collective rights of 
national minorities” – a claim disputed by the Hungarian part although that 
internationally there was no such thing as a universally accepted definition 
of collective rights; moreover, art. 10 of the Framework Convention clearly 
specifies that “The Parties undertake to recognize all persons belonging to 
national minorities the right to use freely and without hindrance their 
minority language in private, as well as in public, orally and in writing”20, 
without mentioning anything about collective rights.  
Corroborating the particular requirement with documents issued by 
the UDMR (Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania), Professor Valentin 
Stan establishes that in 1995 it was about a disguised form to obtain 
ratification of a form of “internal self-determination” targeted by both 
Budapest and the Hungarian minority in Romania, following the model of 
the “autonomous community” in the Spanish Constitution enacted as a 
form of self-government of Catalonia and the Basque communities. In his 
opinion, the “ethnic vote” established by the UDMR within the Hungarian 
minority is in oposition to the concept of democracy because it places group 
interests above the general interest of society. “If we consider the Western 
democratic system we must accept that the «ethnic vote» in itself 
undermines any democratic system, since it indicates that ethnic issues 
outweigh in importance the economic, social and political issues. The ethnic 
vote diminishes the election purposes because it assumes that the interests 
of the ethnic group, per se, are more important than the various interests of 
                                                     
18 Valentin Stan, România şi eşecul campaniei pentru Vest , Bucureşti: Editura 
Universiţătii din Bucureşti, 1999), p. 153, 175 
19 Ibidem., p. 175, 231 
20 Ibidem, p. 161-163, 236 
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individuals within the group. In situations where such divisions exist, the 
choices become a declaration of loyalty” - states Professor Stan21. 
The same terms are used by another analyst to qualify the insistence 
of the UDMR to force the creation of a so-called “Szecklerland” and the 
insistent stubbornness with which Romania’s situation is compared to that 
of Yugoslavia in international environments22. 
Also, Recommendation 1201 (1993) hindered the process of 
concluding the bilateral Friendship and Cooperation Treaty between 
Romania and Ukraine, this time the contesting being Romania, in relation to 
the status of the Romanian minority in Ukraine23. 
Returning to the Romanian-Hungarian problem, the sociological 
surveys jointly undertaken by Romania and Hungary in a programme to test 
youth tolerance towards foreigners in the two countries provided interesting 
results. As expected, the young Hungarians in Romania registered a greater 
valuing of the importance of minority rights by comparison with the 
Romanian majority, the nationalist attitude of the latter, however, could not 
be regarded as a negative reporting on ethnic otherness. 
A similar attitude was recorded at young Hungarians in Hungary, 
but towards the immigrants, because minorities in Hungary are insignificant, 
being almost completely assimilated by a refined policy of denationalization. 
It was found that young Hungarians have a relatively low tolerance towards 
immigrants, a feature that was made in consonance with attitudes towards 
other ethnic groups or nations. But the public perception of immigration 
has similar forms in other European countries, as well24. 
As concerns the level of awareness of belonging to the European 
culture and civilization, the investigation established that only 6% of young 
Hungarians were aware of their country’s membership to Western Europe 
and 7.5% thought that the country belonged to the Eastern Europe. In 
contrast, 14% of young Romanians located Romania in Central Europe, 
25% in the Western Europe, while 33.8% located it just in Europe. It is one 
of the expressions of insufficient valorization of liberal nationalism in 
comparison with the conservative nationalism25. 
However, the main category of beneficiaries of European 
integration is the youth, because, unlike previous generations who 
remember controversies and conflicts that troubled the peace of the 
                                                     
21 Ibidem, p. 216, 239, 266 
22 Călin-Radu Ancuţa, Interesul naţional şi politica de securitate, Bucureşti: Institutul 
Român de Studii Internaţionale, 1995, p. 121 
23 Victor Duculescu, Instituţii de drept public şi relaţii internaţionale în dinamică, 
Bucureşti: Editura Lumina Lex, 2002, p. 195 
24 Ioana Petre, Ecaterina Balica, Dan Banciu, op. cit., p. 101, 125, 142, 144 
25 Ibidem, p. 53-54, 104 
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continent over the years, the younger generation is not haunted by ghosts of 
the past26.  
Conflicts can be settled only if the states involved do not remain 
ingrained for too long in incompatible positions. Therefore, the 
contribution of the European Union to this kind of problems was possible 
to produce results only where the parties agreed to change positions, 
otherwise a requirement of the European integration process. The model in 
this regard was the manner in which the antagonistic positions between 
France and Germany turned in time to common. 
To the other end, we can look at the former Yugoslavia, where the 
ethnic conflicts simmered throughout the period of the Cold War, although 
aparently all seemed “good and beautiful”, and in a blink of an eye, once the 
conditions maintaining her in a latent state disapeared, everything collapsed 
in a most violent manner27. 
Unfortunately even the European Union provides examples of the 
conflicts that have not been resolved, like the situation in Cyprus where 
NATO and the EU’s strategic interests were decisive in the decision to 
accept the Cypriot state in the Union28, or the situation in Greece, an older 
Member State, but who refuses to recognize the right as international 
political subject of the Republic of Macedonia29, or the situation maintained 
between Spain and the United Kingdom on the British occupation of the 
Gibraltar, catalogued by the specialised literature as minor national “identity 
crisis”, but kept under control. 
Even if the European Union and the Schengen spectrum will 
virtually abolish national borders, the mark of the past clenched between 
boundaries can survive if between official statements of the leaders of 
European states and their concrete policy there is guilty ambiguity between 
majority-minority relations in the everyday life. 
 
 
  
                                                     
26 Ştefan Delureanu, Geneza Europei comunitare: mesajul democraţiei de inspiraţie 
creştină, Bucureşti:Editura Paideia, 1999, p. 278 
27 Thomas Diaz, Mathias Albert, Stephan Stetter, The European Union an border 
conflicts. The Power of Integration and Association, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008, p.15 
28 Ahmet Sözen, Dogu Akdeniz, The Cyprus conflict: looking ahead, Eastern 
Mediterranean University: Printing-House, 2008, p. 122 
29 P. Ioakimidis, „The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment”, in Kevin 
Fetherstone, Georgios A. Kazamias, Europeanization and the southern peripheria , 
London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, p. 73 
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Abstract 
 
The article entitled “Building the Borderless Europe. A historical Overview of the 
Romanian and Hungarian Cross-border Cooperation” aims to present the obstacles, problems and 
tensions which existed during the European construction and integration process with a special 
regard on Central and Eastern Europe. Also, is focusing on a wide variety of European 
development and regional policies, which represents the solution for a permanent and harmonious 
development of the European Union. 
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Introduction  
Cultural cooperation in Europe has a long and varied tradition, and 
is strongly influenced by those technological, economic, social, political or 
demographic transformations that have modelled both local communities 
and the global society as a whole. The changes witnessed along the years in 
European countries bring forth new perspectives, imposing the use of new 
concepts and aproaches in a post-modernist and post-colonial society. 
Moreover, the creation and enlargement of the political and economic 
construction that today we call the European Union has raised culture to a 
higher level. Thus, in parallel to keeping its anthropological dimension, 
based on a symbolic world of meanings, beliefs, values and traditions 
expressed through art, religion and myths, culture fully contributes to the 
construction of the identity of a community and to its dynamic and 
progressive development. 
The diversity of the forms of expression and the mutual 
dependence of the different constituting elements of culture create bonds 
between the strata of society (vertically) and between communities 
(horizontally). These allow individuals and groups to conceive their future in 
relation to their past and present1 or to re-define “the architecture of their 
value model”2. The transition of culture from a traditional and conservative 
interpretation to a role as socio-economic cohesive factor, especially as of 
                                                     
* Lecturer Phd at University of Oradea, International Relations and European Studies 
Department, E-mail: fchirodea@uoradea.ro 
1 Mario D’Angelo, Paul Vespérini, Cultural policies in Europe: Regions and Cultural 
Descentralization. Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 2000, p. 10 
2 Mălina Cocea, Securitatea culturală. Dilema identităţii în lumea globală, Tritonic Bucureşti, 
2009, p. 70 
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late, changes the agenda of many international stakeholders. The European 
Union is among these. In this field, the EU creates policies and instruments 
for the coexistence of parallel cultures - whether they are national, ethnic, 
regional or local3. The process which underpins the Europe of cultures model 
is changed due to the initiatives influenced by the Member States’ interests. 
The principle of subsidiarity is relevant here - under this principle, national 
competence takes precedence in the field of culture4.  
In the absence of a genuine supranational cultural policy, the 
European Commission launched a new strategy in 2007. As part of the 
latter, “the relationship between culture and Europe is explored and new 
partnerships and instruments of cooperation are proposed to the Member 
States, the civil society and the European Parliament”5. Thus, instruments 
were developed in order to emphasize the linguistic diversity and cultural 
richness of the Member States, so as to preserve and develop the European 
cultural heritage. A whole variety of initiatives and programmes promote the 
access and participation to culture, cultural expression and awareness or 
multilingualism and suports or suplements actions on a national level6. On 
the other hand, the cultural factor is used in cross-border cooperation 
programmes as a vehicle of change. Change in the attitude towards the 
identity of the ”Other”. It is also used to initiate actions that allow the local 
leaders to establish paradiplomatic relations or regional de-bordering 
relations, at least in the cultural sphere7. As a result, the crystallization of 
regional cooperation relations (whether they be interinstitutional or 
interpersonal) in an organic network-like structure and its extension on a 
global scale can only stir the interest both of relevant actors in regional 
development, and of the scholars. 
In this context, the study intends to highlight a mechanism for the 
establishment of cultural networks as part of the cross-border cooperation 
programmes financed by the European Commission during the 2007-2013 
budgetary programming period. We shall concretely focus on the Hungary-
Slovakia-Romania-Ukraina ENPI CBC Programme (HUSKROUA), due to 
its particularities, more specifically due to the complex set of relations 
                                                     
3 Alina Stoica, Mircea Brie,”The Cultural frontiers of Europe. Introductory Study”, in 
Eurolimes, no. 9, 2010, p.5 
4 Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro,”Europe of Cultural Unity and Diversity”, in 
Eurolimes, n. 9, 2010, p. 23-24 
5 Perla Innocenti, Cultural Networks in Migrationg Heritage. Intersecting Theories and Practicies 
across Europe, Ashgate, 2015, p. 1 
6 Ibidem, p. 2-3 
7 Attila Fábián, ”Constructivist Views of Cooperation along the Border”, in Acta 
Universitatis Sapientiae, Economics and Business. The Journal of "Sapientia" Hungarian 
University of Transylvania, no.1, 2013, p. 44 – 46 
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created between the four states. These states shared a common history and 
nowadays, three of them are members of the EU (Hungary, Romania and 
Slovakia). One of the specific goals of this programme is the creation of 
connecting bridges between the different communities on the Eastern 
border of the EU. This facilitates the descovery of common values and the 
use of instruments of promotion of the cultural heritage of the eligible areas. 
We shall hereby describe the financed projects, which meet this goal, after 
which our research will focus on the analysis of the impact of the actions 
undertaken and of the results obtained. Our intention is to identify a model 
of cultural cooperation whose characteristics are similar to those that 
specialised literature associates with cultural networks. Moreover, the 
maping of a relation territory, based on a map of the partnerships and 
cooperation agreements under the projects, allows us to locate the elements 
of these networks (knods and interlaced lines) in the eligible area of the 
HUSKROUA Programme.  
 
Instruments used by the EU in the development of cultural 
networks  
It was at the beginning of the '80s that the first cultural networks 
began to crystallize in Europe. It was also then that the European 
institutions began to finance such structures so as to reach the objectives of 
fast integration, social cohesion or good neighbourhood relations at the 
borders of the European Union. At the request of the European Parliament, 
the Commission finances the European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages 
(EBLUL)8. It was organized as a network of national committees working in 
the Member States, in order to promote linguistic diversity and lesser-used 
languages. Five years later, the same institution proposes a new instrument, 
MERCATOR, to encourage knowledge dissemination in order to improve 
the exchange of information on minority languages and cultures9.  
                                                     
8 The actions under this project were meant to disseminate information on the 
community activities in the field of languages and represent and inform lesser-used 
language communities on Community policies and funding programmes which are 
appropriate to their languages.  Also, the Bureau provides information on European 
policies and programmes to its Member State Commitees and local and regional 
authorities, and it serves their activities through supporting administrative 
procedures for applications and seeking partnerships. Finally, EBLUL actively 
produced informations on linguistic issues in Europe and the situation of linguistic 
communities. See http://eblul.eurolang.net/index. php?option=com_frontpage& 
Itemid=1, accessed on the 2nd of September 2015.  
9 Through the establishment of the information and documentation network, 
MERCATOR, four pilot centers will do the groundwork for the creation of a 
computerized data bank and consider ways and means of involving public and 
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The contribution of European cultural networks to the 
development of intracommunity cooperation was officially recognised in 
1991, during the Congress of the Ministers of European Culture. The 
resolution then adopted encouraged those organisations active in the 
cultural sphere to actively participate in non-governmental cooperation and 
it also emphasised the objective of and role played by cultural networks in: 
facilitating the mobility of those involved in different cultural sectors, 
facilitating communication between different civilisations, avoiding 
extremist phenomena, developing those cultural expressions without an 
economic nature, promoting cooperation between community states10. In 
this context, beginning with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, 
the suport given to culture evolved and intensified, and part of the EU 
programmes have already used networks so as to suport cultural creation, 
cultural heritage or different cultural organisations/structures. The first 
programme of this genre was Kaleidoscope (1996-1999, 36,7 million euro), 
which financed the events, projects and large-scale European cooperation 
actions organised by cultural networks or by partnerships of organizations 
from at least three Member States11. The next such programmes, Ariane 
(1997-1999, 11,1 million euro) and Raphaël (1997-1999, 30 million euro) did 
not speciffically focus on cultural networks. They only financed certain 
activities: artist and professional mobility, cross-border cooperation or 
annual or multiannual crossborder events12.  
The European Commission programmes which suport cultural 
networks have been considered insuficient. Along the years, there have been 
numerous workshops and debates argumenting the importance of and the 
potential contribution of cultural networks to the development and 
promotion of European culture. The most important declaration is made 
                                                                                                                       
private organizations in the various regional or minority language communities. See 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-90-37_en.htm?locale=en, accessed on the 
2nd of September 2015. 
10 Nikolaos Karanikolas, Peristera Lafazani, Myron Myridis, Dimitris Ramnalis, The 
cultural networks of Europe. Towards Europe of citizens and civilizations. International 
Conference of I.C.A., 2007, Moscow, p. 2, http://karanik.webpages.auth.gr/ 
main/images/papers/conferences /final_cultural_networks_final2.pdf, accessed on 
August 4th, 2015 
11 See KALEIDOSCOPE programme – European Community support for culture, 
http://cordis.europa.eu/ news/rcn/7078_en.html, accessed on 11 of September 
2015.  
12 See RAPHAEL - A cultural heritage programme for Europe, http://cordis.europa.eu/ 
news/rcn/9322_en.html, accessed on 11 of September 2015 and EU cultural 
programmes - ARIANE advances but no agreement on RAPHAEL,  
http://cordis.europa.eu/news/ rcn/8387_en.html, accessed on 11 of September 
2015. 
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during the European Cultural Network Forumin Brussels (September 1997).  
The Manifest of European Cultural Networks, adopted then, recommended the 
EU institutions and the Member States to ”recognise the importance of 
these cultural networks through real and significant suport”. Based on the 
ideological platforms of already existing networks, the signatories of the 
document urged for ”the recognition of cultural networks in professional 
contracts at all government levels in the EU institutions and in the Member 
States, an adequate environment ensuring both development and 
sustainability and structural financing, thus recognising that these networks 
are economically efficient”13. The Culture 2000 programme (236,5 million 
euro), launched by the European Commission, initially designed as a 
combination of the old Raphaël, Ariane and Kaleidoscope programmes, has 
not fully met the expectations of the participants to the Forum. The 
programme (2000 – 2006) focused on the establishment of a European 
cultural area by promoting cooperation between creative artists, cultural 
operators and the cultural institutions of the Member States. To ths effect, 
creativity, the transnational dissemination of culture, the movement of 
creators, other cultural operators and professionals and their works were 
promoted. Culture 2000 also contributed to the strenghtening of the role of 
culture as an economic factor and as a factor in social integration and 
citizenship14. 
The Council of the European Union had a more stronger reaction. 
In January 2002, it adopted the ”Resolution on Culture and the Knowledge 
Society”. This document urges the European Commission and the Member 
States ”to promote the use of the existing networks or of any other future 
networks to facilitate cooperation and to exchange information and good 
practices at a European level”. Towards the end of that same year, on the 
19th of December, that same European institution drafted another 
Resolution on the identification and assessment of the European added 
value of cultural actions15. The purpose of these initiatives was the massive 
capital transfer through the European operational programmes and 
financing lines, for the implementation of actions and projects along the 
common strategic lines of the financing bodies and cultural networks16. The 
                                                     
13 Dragoş Eduard Neamu,”Suntem în reţea, vom exista!” in Revista muzeelor, no.1, 
2006, p. 7 
14 See Culture 2000 Programme, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/? 
uri= URISERV:l29006, accessed on 11 of September 2015 
15 Decision No 79/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 
establishing a Community action programmme to promote bodies active at European level in the 
field of culture. Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2004, L 138/40 – L 
138/43. 
16 Dragoş Eduard Neamu, op. cit., p. 6 
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Decision no. 792/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a Community action programme to promote bodies active at European level in 
the field of culture was adopted for this specific purpose. For three years (2004-
2006), this programme financed two European structures, EBLUL and the 
Mercator network (already suported at a European level for more than 20 
years), and 53 bodies active in the field of culture among which 40 cultural 
networks, recognised as such at a European level. Out of  the 19 million 
euro allocated, a third tranche was directed towards actions meant to 
preserve and commemorate the main sites and archives associated with 
deportation17.  
After numerous consultations, the European Commissions 
launched a new Agenda for Culture in 2007. This covers the relation 
between culture and Europe in a globalised world. It suggests new methods 
of cooperation to the Member States, the civil society and the European 
Parliament. The programmatic documents recognise the role played by 
culture in human development and in the complex process of individual and 
community identity building. During that financial year, those cultural 
networks which had been functioning for at least one year had access to 
financing through the CULTURE Programme (400 million euro)18. The 
establishment of new European cultural networks was also encouraged 
through the Commission framework for the implementation of the 
Cohesion Policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy. The latter is ”a 
new aproach in the relations between EU and its neighbours, an aproach 
that exceeds the traditional one based on cooperation”19 and it uses cross-
border cooperation (CBC) to promote the package for integration, 
unification and integrated regional development20. The short and long-term 
                                                     
17 Decision no 792/2004/EC and Ernst&Young, Final external evaluation of the 
Community action programme to promote bodies active at European level in the field of culture, 
2007, p. 5, http://ec.europa.eu/ dgs/education_culture/more_info/evaluations/ 
docs/culture/culturalbodie s_en.pdf, accessed on 11 September 2015 
18 European Commission, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency.. 
Culture Programme (2007-2013). Programme Guide, 2010, p. 67, 
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/culture/ programme/documents/2010/may/ EN.pdf, 
accessed on 11 September 2015 
19 Mircea Brie, ”Europe from Exclusive Border to Inclusive Frontiers. Case Study 
Romanian – Ukranian Frontier”, in Ioan Horga, Istvan Suli-Zakar (eds.), Cross-Border 
Partnership: with special regard to the Hungarian – Romanian - Ukrainian tripartite border,  
University of Debrecen Press, Debrecen, 2010, p. 28 
20 James Anderson, Liam O’Dowd, and Thomas M. Wilson, “Culture, Co-operation 
and Borders”, in James Anderson, Liam O’Dowd, and Thomas M. Wilson (eds.), 
Culture and Cooperation in Europe’s Borderlands,  Rodopi, New York, 2003, p. 22; 
Ioordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, Mircea Brie, Nicolae Toderaş, Cooperarea 
transfrontalieră între Romînia şi Ucraina, respective între România şi Republica Moldova. 
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positive effects of CBC in the social and cultural fields are multiplied by the 
new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. It was created 
in 2007 and its objectives are: promoting sustainable economic and social 
development in the border areas; working together to address common 
challenges in the fields of environment, public health, the prevention of and 
the fight against organised crime; ensuring secure and efficient borders; 
promoting local “people-to-people” type of actions21. Meeting these 
objectives depends on the design and implementation of cross-border 
cooperation initiatives22, among which the HUSKROUA Programme 
incentivises cross-border partnerships and actions meant to intesify and 
deepen a sustainable cooperation in the environmental, social and economic 
fields between the regions of Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska and 
Chernivetska in Ukraine and the adjacent NUTS III areas in Hungary, 
Romania şi Slovakia. The programme area includes 598,9 km coomon 
border between the EU and Ukraine, and it covers the following territorial 
units: Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (Hungary), 
Košický and Prešovský (Slovakia), Maramureş, Satu-Mare and Suceava 
(Romania), Zakarpatska, Ivano–Frankivska and Chernivetska (Ukraine). 
Suceava and Chernivetska are included on the basis of special rules23. On 
the basis of the common cultural heritage and religious traditions, one of the 
priorities of the programme is to encourage small organisations or the town 
halls of the localities in the elligible area to fiind new ways and new 
cooperation partners in order to strengthen territorial cohesion and mutual 
understanding. By promoting both institutional cooperation and small scale 
”people to people” cooperation, these measures help initiate new forms of 
partnerships, which, on a closer analysis, could have the characteristics of 
cultural networks24.   
 
The HUSKROUA Programme and the development of 
cultural networks 
The elligible area covered by the HUSKROUA Programme is 
inhabited by 8,012,259 people. More than 44% of the total population is 
                                                                                                                       
Oportunităţi şi provocări în perioada 2014 – 2020, European Institute from Romania, 
Bucureşti, 2016, p. 31 
21 Mircea Brie, op. cit, p. 31 
22 Filippo Celata, Raffaella Coletti, ”Cross-Border Cooperation Along the EU’s 
External Frontiers”, in Filippo Celata, Raffaella Coletti (eds.), Neighbourhood Policy and 
the Construction of the European External Borders, Springer, 2015, p. 104-105 
23 European Commission, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Hungary-
Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine Cross-border Cooperation Programme 2007-2013. Joint Operational 
Programme,  2008, p. 7-8 
24 Ibidem, p. 35 
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made up of Ukrainian citizens, 16% Hungarian, 19% Slovak and almost 
20% Romanian. The average population density varies from 82 per/sq km 
(Maramureş), to 114 person/q km (Košice region). This means 94 
person/sq km on average, which does not differ significantly from the 
European average. The majority of the population lives in rural areas 
(51,4%) and is affected by a negative demographic growth, caused by natural 
loss and a very high share of migration loss25. With regard to the population 
ethnic structure, synthesized in the Table 1 and Graph 1 from below, in 
each elligible region, the majority has the nationality of the country of 
residence. Roma communities are present in regions in all 3 Member States. 
Another regional characteristic is the significant presence of Hungarians in 
the population structure of the elligible areas in Romania (10%), Slovakia 
(4,69%) and Ukraine (4,26%). Romanians are a significant demographic 
presence only in Ukraine (4,14%). The groups of Slovaks and Ukrainians 
registered outside their country of origin are not very numerous. Only 2,6% 
of Ukrainians live in the elligible counties in Romania.  
 
Table 1. The population ethnic structure in the elligible area of HUSKROUA Programme26 
Country of the 
elligible region 
Hungarians Slovaks Romanian
s 
Ukrainian
s  
Roma Other 
ethnicities 
Hungary 84,5% 0,18% 0,11% 0,12% 8,22% 6,87% 
Slovakia 4,69% 77,72% - 0,33% 4,95% 12,31% 
Romania 10% 0.1% 79% 2,6% 4,3% 4% 
Ukraine 4,26% - 4,14% 86% - 5,6% 
 
On the territory of the elligible regions, one notices that „spatial 
structures parallel to the border in Ukraine but especially in Romania 
(although as compared to the territory of the whole country, this is of 
                                                     
25 Ibidem, p. 11 
26 The data for Hungary, Slovakia, Romania are extracted from the 2011 Census,   
http://www.recensamantromania.ro/noutati/volumul-ii-populatia-stabila-rezidenta-
structura-etnica-si-confesion ala/; http://www.ksh.hu/nepszam 
lalas/tables_regional_15; https://slovak.statistics.sk/wps/portal/ext/themes/ 
demography/census/indicators/!ut/p/b1/jZBBDoIwEEXP4gk6hQplWRBKTcV
SKCobw8IYjIoL4_kthI0LwNk1817-
n6IaHVH9bD7ttXm33bO59_aO1dS0TDEDGi6wyASqSoVl1iHYIGTBWBiGAx7
ovRz3QMomK6y3BQNaj 
PwP0flIohwWERxu9Tw6cmghPQcAj37EWUp8CUAlX4NgqdFB7rrA3P_6zwQs-
AdUD8hcgwG6LfEO6XNiT 
LClPR3M0DZwSmSnJvAbBXZGn3uKDXwxhzhFbcyOoLZD3wSQ!!/dl4/d5/L0
lDUmlTUSEhL3dHa0FKRnNBLzRKVXFDQSEhL2Vu/. For Ukraine, in the 
absence of a similar census, the numbers were extracted from the official documents 
of the programme in 2008. 
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secondary importance), while in Hungary, structural lines perpendicular to 
the border (one of them is of national importance) are determining”. The 
largest cities in the region are Košice in Slovakia, Miskolc in Hungary, 
Ivano-Franivsk and Chernivitski in Ukraine with over 150,00 inhabitants 
and Nyiregyhaza (HU), Satu Mare and Baia Mare (RO) and Uzhgotrod (UA) 
with over 100,000 inhabitants, their role and econo-mic importance being 
relatively low27. 
 
Graph1. The population ethnic structure in the elligible area of HUSKROUA Programme28 
 
On the territory of the elligible regions, one notices that „spatial 
structures parallel to the border in Ukraine but especially in Romania 
(although as compared to the territory of the whole country, this is of 
secondary importance), while in Hungary, structural lines perpendicular to 
the border (one of them is of national importance) are determining”. The 
largest cities in the region are Košice in Slovakia, Miskolc in Hungary, 
Ivano-Franivsk and Chernivitski in Ukraine with over 150,00 inhabitants 
                                                     
27 Judit Molnár, Zsuzsanna Ladányi, Viktoria Blanka, Ferenc Kovács, Ex-ante 
Evaluation and Strategic Environmental Assessment for the Joint Operational Programme for the 
HUSKROUA ENI CBC Programme 2014-2020, Hitesy Bartucz Hollai 
Euroconsulting and Hydea Kft., Budapest, 2015, p. 48-49; Cosmin Chiriac, Liviu 
Bucur, ”Polycentric Development initiatives in Romania at the First Local level of 
the NUTS System (LAU1)”, in Annals of University of Oradea. International Relations and 
European Studies Series, no. VII, 2015, p. 217-228; Gábor Csüllög, ”Spatial structure 
problems in developing cross-border relationship along the Hungarian-Romanian-
Ukrainian triple border ”, in  Ioan Horga, Istvan Suli-Zakar (eds.), Cross-Border 
Partnership: with special regard to the Hungarian – Romanian - Ukrainian tripartite border, 
University of Debrecen Press, Debrecen, 2010, p. 44-46 
28 The chart was drawn based on the data presented in Table 1 
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and Nyiregyhaza (HU), Satu Mare and Baia Mare (RO) and Uzhgotrod (UA) 
with over 100,000 inhabitants, their role and econo-mic importance being 
relatively low29. Nevertheless, the whole area is renowned for its unique 
traditions and cutoms, still alive in the border region, and for the relatively 
high number of tourist activities30:  
- Fortified settlements aimed at protecting merchants and useds as 
places of refuge during the raids of Tatars and Turks (13th and 16th 
centuries); 
-  Towns that, due to their commercial flourishing in the XVth century, 
became important points on historical roads such as the Gothic 
Road, the Post Road, the Wine Route, the Minor Amber Road etc;  
- Wooden churces in the East wich combine the esthetic ideals of the 
people and two cultural traditions – the Russian/hByzantine ones and 
Latin culture. Among these, in Romania (Maramureş County) we can 
find 92 of them, three other styles of wooden churches – Lemko, 
Boyko and Hutsul – are named after the Ukrainian ethnical groups; 
- The eight churches built from the late 15th century to the late 16th 
century, from Suceava (Romania), with their external walls covered in 
fresco paintings inspired by Byzantine art; 
                                                     
29 Judit Molnár, Zsuzsanna Ladányi, Viktoria Blanka, Ferenc Kovács, Ex-ante 
Evaluation and Strategic Environmental Assessment for the Joint Operational Programme for the 
HUSKROUA ENI CBC Programme 2014-2020, Hitesy Bartucz Hollai 
Euroconsulting and Hydea Kft., Budapest, 2015, p. 48-49; Cosmin Chiriac, Liviu 
Bucur, ”Polycentric Development initiatives in Romania at the First Local level of 
the NUTS System (LAU1)”, in Annals of University of Oradea. International Relations and 
European Studies Series, no. VII, 2015, p. 217-228; Gábor Csüllög, ”Spatial structure 
problems in developing cross-border relationship along the Hungarian-Romanian-
Ukrainian triple border ”, in  Ioan Horga, Istvan Suli-Zakar (eds.), Cross-Border 
Partnership: with special regard to the Hungarian – Romanian - Ukrainian tripartite border, 
University of Debrecen Press, Debrecen, 2010, p. 44-46 
30 Lórant Dávid, Zoltán Bujdosó, Bulcsú Remenyik, ”Potential Tourism Development 
Priorities of the Ukrainian-Hungarian Border Region”, in Ioan Horga, Istvan Suli-
Zakar (eds.), Cross-Border Partnership: with special regard to the Hungarian – Romanian - 
Ukrainian tripartite border, University of Debrecen Press, Debrecen, 2010, p. 206; 
Maria Nadova, ”Tourist potential in Carpathian Euroregion”, in Ioan Horga, Istvan 
Suli-Zakar (eds.), Cross-Border Partnership: with special regard to the Hungarian – Romanian 
- Ukrainian tripartite border, University of Debrecen Press, Debrecen, 2010, p. 221-
222; Annamária Oláh, ”Hungary-Romania-Ukraine Trilateral Border Area and its 
Potential”, in in Ioan Horga, Istvan Suli-Zakar (eds.), Cross-Border Partnership: with 
special regard to the Hungarian – Romanian - Ukrainian tripartite border, University of 
Debrecen Press, Debrecen, 2010 
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- The only one place in Europe (Lviv region) with remainders of a 
wooden fortress that was built on the top of the rock and was 5-6 
storeys high; 
-  The three-room buildings in the countryside which have a 
characteristic high pitched roof covered with wooden shingles. 
The ENPI Cross-Border Cooperation Programme Hungary-
Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine financed 15 projects31, mostly meant to 
strengthen the cultural cooperation relations in the eligible regions. The 
cumulated financing of the projects represent 3,5% of the allocated funding 
for the programme. The absolute values are 2.409.767 euro aut of a  total of 
68.638.28332. The 15 projects had an average implementing period of one 
year and a half, and they facilitated the involvement of 45 organisations and 
institutions in the closing of bilateral, trilateral or multilateral partnerships 
between different local actors on both sides of the border33. The main 
categories of specific objectives are34: 
-  Increasing the level of cultural cooperation between NGOs 
and cultural institutions, thus facilitating communication and 
the promotion of interculturality through local traditions and 
values; 
- Establishing new cooperation relations or strengthening the 
existing relations between institutions active in the artistic and 
educational fields, so as to transmit cultural traditions and 
values to younger generations; 
- Maintaining and preserving the existing culturalheritage, 
developing new cultural oportunities for the inhabitants in the 
eligible regions and increasing the commercial interest in 
handicrafts. 
                                                     
31 The 15 projects focusing on cultural cooperation are: Joint action for multiculturalism 
cross-border promotion; Friendship SK-UA-HU; Hutsul Cultural Center; Cultural centre – 
binder of cross-border cooperation; Study of research and exploitation of the cross border cultural 
heritage; Artistic Traditions. Pattern for Non Formal Learning in Romania and Ukraine; The 
International Festival of Religious Choral Music „It is You We Praise”; People to People – 
effective cooperation based on love for folklore; ’Get To Know Each Other’ – televisions without 
borders; Together – Televisions without Borders; Three in Unity – a project of maintaining 
ecclesiastic cultural heritage for joint cultural and touristic development; Breaking-throug coolture - 
European values and common future; Interactive institutional cooperation: History, traditions and 
culture without borders; Promotion of folk-arts and handicrafts in Carpathian Euroregion; 
Cultural cohesion through promotion of Hungarian folk traditions. See http://www.huskroua-
cbc.net/en/financed-projects. 
32 See http://www.huskroua-cbc.net/en/information-about-the-programme. 
33 See Annex  
34 Ibidem 
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At the end of every implementation period, the following types of 
activities were registered: 
- Organisation of common cultural events in the field of folk arts 
and crafts (thematic festivals, shows, concerts, open air events, 
photography exhibitions, fairs, folk costumes parades); 
- Organisation of seminars, professional training, exchanges of 
experience, musical education classes, exchanges of 
information; 
- Common anthropologic and ethnographic research, on 
different themes (folk costumes, ecclesiastic cultural heritage, 
traditional art of weaving), the results of which were 
disseminated through scientific publications, conferences, 
round tables etc; 
- Editing and publishing of materials which emphasise cultural 
elements which are common to the communities on both sides 
of the border (guidelines for the preservation of the cultural 
heritage; catalogues of icon collections, potery collections and 
woodcraft collections, repertoire and musicological materials); 
- Creation of new cultural products in the following fields: 
traditional dances; instrumental music; visual arts; choirs' 
repertoire; folk costumes; television programmes; 
- Signing of bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements 
which facilitated the establishment of common, short-term and 
medium-term cultural strategies. 
On a closer analysis of the specific objectives, we can state that a 
regional infrastructure was created under the umbrella of the 15 projects. 
This facilitated the horizontal interaction of the different communities 
covered by the HUSKROUA Programme. The concrete results were the 
identification of common objectives and the strengthening of the 
communication between local cultural actors. The location of the 45 partner 
organisationson the map of the elligible areas covered by the HUSKROUA 
Programme allows us to delineate a relation territory (Map 1), and the spatial 
maping of the partnerhips under the 15 projects shows a dense network in 
the area between the cities of Satu Mare, Uzhhorod, Košice, Miskolc and 
Nyíregyháza (Map 2).  The second structure, created in the area between the 
cities of Baia Mare, Ivan Krevan and Cernăuți is the result of the 
implementation of only 3 projects and is not as significant as the previously 
mentioned one.  
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Map 1. Network maping for the 15 projects implemented as part of the  HUSKROUA 
programme35 
 
 
Map 2. Spacial maping of the relations established under the partnership agreements36 
 
                                                     
35 Own elaboration based on data collected from the official website of the Program 
HUSKROUA. 
36 Ibidem 
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One can identify a few common traits of the cooperation relations 
between the partners in the projects implemented in the region: 
- All projects are grouped around a common interest: to preserve 
and promote the heritage and traditions in the elligible regions; 
- Each partnership was based on diversity and knowledge and 
had as fundamental purpose the promotion of interculturality 
and intercultural dialogue, as well as the overcoming of regional 
cultural barriers; 
- Cooperation relations did not apear spontaneously. They were 
favoured by the framework of the HUSKROUA Programme, 
and some of them were even based on links established prior to 
the year 2007; 
- No local or national public authority intervened in the initiation 
and development of the partnerships; 
-  The activities were not organised under the umbrella of a 
formal or informal organisation, but they rather had a 
decentralised character;  
- The institutional framework provided by the European 
Commission through the HUSKROUA Programme imposed a 
ceratin degree of internal organisation, which granted 
functionality to the partnerships within each network; 
- In promoting the general and specific programme objectives, in 
organising activities or in implementing medium and long term 
contracts, ICT instruments were and will continue to be used 
(project sites, on-line result dissemination, ethnographic 
collections or anthropological material on DVD, a common 
television infrastructure, common TV programmes, digitalised 
choral repertoire, etc); 
- Most of the results obtained as part of the projects are tangible 
and they generate a short-term impact, but medium and long-
term benefits were also obtained (a common cultural strategy, 
medium and long-term cooperation agreements, the 
involvement of youth in activities for the promotion of regional 
cultural values, strengthening the existing professional networks 
etc). 
The above-mentioned characteristics do not allow us to state that a 
network was created in the area delineated by the cities of Satu Mare, 
Uzhhorod, Košice, Miskolc and Nyíregyháza, given that the cooperation 
relations established through partnerships did not coagulate into an organic, 
be it formal or informal, structure. Nevertheless, given that these projects 
led to the creation of dissemination platforms for knowledge, experiences 
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and research methodologies, or platforms for professional development and 
cooperation through trainings, meetings, debates, round tables, we can 
identify in this area a cultural network in full process of institutionalisation 
and organisation. 
 
Conclusions 
Cultural cooperation in Europe has a long tradition and numerous 
forms of organising common activities. In time, these forms have been 
influenced by geographic, political and socio-economic factors De-a lungul 
timpului aceste forme au fost influențate de factori geografici, politici şi 
socio-economici specific to each and every European country. Starting with 
the second half of the XX th century, the establishment and creation of the 
European political and economic Community started to have an influence. 
Thus, alongside the cultural exchanges organised by the relevant ministries 
and used as diplomatic instruments to strengthen the relations between 
states, more and more often we started seeing activities involving contacts 
between artists, researchers of professionals above national borders and 
above rigid structures set aut by formal relations between countries. With 
the explosion of such activities, the 80s witnessed the existence of new 
forms of cultural cooperation, which facilitated the multilateral flow of 
projects and initiatives of individual artists, non-profit organizations, local 
museums, theatres and companies, arts management companies, local and 
regional autorithies, national gouvernments or those organizations coming 
under their structures37. 
In the European cultural space, the barriers or conflicts generated 
by potential differences are overcome/avoided through new means of 
communication, of relating and of information. The paneuropean 
connections in the field of museums, theatres and festivals or the 
strengthening of cultural cooperation between cities, regions, universities or 
associations favour and incentivise the contacts between artists, researchers 
and other professionals in the field. Moreover, these forms of cooperation 
are not blocked by national borders or by rigid structures generated by the 
formal relations between the member states; on the contrary they represent 
a new aproach of the concept of cooperation. In the last decade, the 
numerous studies published in the field of cross-border cooperation 
emphasised, in their turn, the role of culture in reinvigorating interpersonal 
and intercommunity relations, in establishing new horizontal cooperation 
networks and in multiplying the number of cross-border partnerships. 
                                                     
37 Anna Hieropolitańska, Kamila Rola (eds), Closer look: European cultural cooperation. 
Networks in Practice, Adam Mickiewicz Institute. Cultural Contact Point Poland, 
Warsaw, 2013, p. 8 
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Researchers agree that, as oposed to traditional systems, these models offer 
important advantages as concerns the informal nature of contacts, the 
flexibility in the decision-making process, the speed of exchanges and 
actions, the short time span of the implementation of common projects. 
The grouping of institutions, organisations or associations in 
cultural networks at a regional, interregional or transnational level ensures 
the development of the capacity to communicate, cooperate and understand 
diversity. This phenomenon is more visible in border regions where two or 
more cultures meet, and where the mutual multi-level connexions favour 
dialogue, cooperation, socialisation, identification of rules of cohabitation or 
unique identity constructions. We thus begin to perceive a solution to the 
problem posed by borders, as mentioned by Denis de Rougemont in his 
work Aspects culturels de la cooperation transfrontaliere: the fact that they might 
separate regions which are otherwise homogeneous form several points of 
view, their rigidity or their accidental and arbitrary nature38. All these do not 
allow for smooth exchanges, so necessary for the integration process. 
Moreover, according to constructivist theory, culture can create a societally 
safe climate in these border regions, thus significantly increasing the chances 
of avoiding inter-state conflicts. In the same time, culture can become one 
of the crucial factors in regional socio-economic progress39. Consequently, 
we witness a new model of regional cohesion creation, defined by 
sustainable values based on adaptation and mutual trust, where culture plays 
an important role. 
Cross-border cooperation programmes allow civil communities to 
realise that there are several ways of counteracting rigid thought when it 
comes to the perception of the other and that solutions need not necessarily 
come from state institutions. On the contrary, solutions rather partain to the 
sphere of responsibility of local communities. From this perspective, 
programmes have proven their usefulness by creating connecting bridges 
between different European communities, especially in border  regions, 
areas where different cultures interact without losing their traditions and 
fundamental features. In these areas, the cultural regional landscape exceeds 
the political one in importance. Mutual influence impacts the way in which 
the other's identity, values and interests are perceived. The coagulation of 
                                                     
38 Cristina Maria Dogot, ”Euro-Regions and Permeability of Borders, a Romanian 
Perspective”, in Ioan Horga, Istvan Suli-Zakar (eds.), Cross-Border Partnership: with 
special regard to the Hungarian – Romanian - Ukrainian tripartite border, University of 
Debrecen Press Debrecen, 2010, p. 77 
39 See Florentina Chirodea,”The Role of Culture in Regional Competitiveness”, in 
Alina Stoica, Ioan Horga, Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro (eds.), Culture and 
Paradiplomatuc Identity. Instruments in Sustaining EU Policies, Chambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2016 
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the interactions, communication and exchanges of experience in organic 
structures, aparently spontaneous, horizontal and decentralised, yet with a 
certain internal organisation, enough to allow for their functioning40 has 
proven beneficial throughout the European territory, and the development 
of cultural networks in the Eastern areas of the common border between 
the EU and Ukraine will increase the security and social cohesion in the 
region. Based on the case study proposed in our research, we managed to 
identify a rather significant relational territory, created as a result of the 
implementation of the projects financed through the HUSKROUA 
Programme during 2007-2013. The cooperation relations between the 
different partners naturally led to the emergence of elements which are 
defining for a cultural network. Still in its incipient stage, the network which 
emerged in the area delineated by the cities of Satu Mare, Uzhhorod, 
Košice, Miskolc and Nyíregyháza does not have a well defined organic 
structure, but the continued implementation of the Programme during 
2014-2020 budget exercise provides new oportunities fot the network's 
consolidation and development41.  
 
 
Abstract 
 
In the current global context, culture is an important factor in socio-economic 
development, cooperation, identity and citizenship, innovation and social cohesion. In 2007, the 
European Commission started using culture in order to set up new partnerships and cooperation 
models, thus placing an emphasis on the role of culture in the building of individual and collective 
identities. Consequently, a complex and heterogeneous architecture of relations between the different 
actors takes shape. This architecture is the basis of European cultural networks. Among the 
specific objectives of cross-border cooperation programmes is also the creation of connections between 
different European communities. From this perspective, this study aims at identifying the 
mechanisms whereby the Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine ENPI CBC Programme 
facilitates interactions, communication and exchanges of experience between the involved 
communities. The collected data will be analysed and interpreted so as to bring forth arguments for 
the existence of cultural networks in this area of Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
                                                     
40 Javier Brun, Joaquin Benoti, Pedro Canut, Redes Culturales. Claves para sobrevivir en la 
globalización, Agencia Española de Cooperación International para el Desarrollo, 
Madrid, 2008, p. 89 
41 During 2014-2020, one of the specific objectives of the programme is promoting 
local culture and historical heritage. We thus have the pre-conditions for forming 
the basis of cultural events, preserving buildings with historical heritage and creating 
market for local products. All these mean specific activities under projects managed 
by partners in a cultural network. See JOP, Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine 
Cross-Border Cooperation Programme 2014-2020, approved on 25 June 2015. 
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Annex 
 
The projects under the HISKROUA Programme whose main 
objective is the strenghtening of the cultural cooperation relations in the 
elligible areas in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and the Ukraine through the 
preservation and promotion of the cultural heritage and regional traditions  
 
Curr
ent 
no. 
Name of 
project 
Amount / 
Implementing 
period 
Partners Specific objectives / 
Results 
1.  Joint action for 
multiculturalism 
cross-border 
promotion 
99 569,93 € 
12 months 
 (Dec. 2010  
– Dec. 2011) 
 Ópályi\'s Circle of 
Friends Association 
Hungary 
 Commune Council 
of Nevetlenfalu, 
Ukraine 
 Commune Janík, 
Slovakia 
 Bridge Association, 
Lazuri, Romania 
 Community 
Association „Crasna“ 
Domăneşti, Romania 
- Creating a network of 
active  NGOs and 
institutions that works in 
the cultural field in the 4 
regions 
- A cooperation agreement 
signed by the 5 partners 
- A common medium-
term cultural strategy 
- Promoting the 
intercultural dimension 
through local traditions 
and values  
- Transmission of culture 
and common traditions 
to the younger 
generations 
2.  Friendship SK-
UA-HU 
90 299,00 € 
15 months 
(March 2011  
– May 2012) 
 For Region, Kosice, 
Slovakia 
 Uzhgorod Palace of 
children and youths 
“PADIUN” – 
Ukraine 
 Sports Association of 
Szerencs – Hungary 
- Organizing of joint 
cultural events in border 
regions aimed at 
promoting folk arts and 
crafts, maintaining 
identity and traditions, 
and developing cultural 
oportunities for residents 
of the border regions 
- Carrying out 
presentations of crafts, 
folk art and culture in all 
partnership countries and 
co-presentation with the 
participation of selected 
presentations from local 
undertakings  
- Joint publications on 
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Curr
ent 
no. 
Name of 
project 
Amount / 
Implementing 
period 
Partners Specific objectives / 
Results 
culture and the common 
website. 
3.  Hutsul 
Cultural Center 
219 600,00 € 
24 months 
(Dec. 2010  
– June 2012) 
 Local Council 
Poienile de Sub 
Munte, Romania 
 Local Council of 
Zelene, Ukraine 
 Verchovina District 
Council, Ukraine 
 The Ivan Krevan 
Association for the 
Local Development, 
Maramureş Romania 
- Organising a festival of 
the Hutsuls 
- Thematic workshops on 
the cultural values of the 
Hutsul community  
- Capitalising the Hutsul 
traditions and customs 
- Increasing the cultural 
cooperation between 
Romanian and Ukranian 
Hutsuls  
4.  CULTURAL 
CENTRE – 
binder of cross-
border 
cooperation 
114 530,29 € 
24 months 
(Dec. 2010 – 
June 2012) 
 Repedea Cultural 
Centre 
Romania 
 The Maramures 
Local Council, 
Romania 
 The Bistra 
Commune, Romania 
 The Local Council of 
Poienile de sub 
Munte, Romania 
 The Ivan Krevan 
Association for the 
Local Development, 
Maramureş Romania 
 The Cultural Centre 
of The Rahiv 
District, Ukraine 
- Facilitating relations 
between the 5 cultural 
institutions and cultural 
centres in Romania and 
Ukraine 
-  Drafting 5 development 
strategies for the cultural 
institutions in the area 
- Drafting a genuine 
floklore collection and 
training courses on 
dances and 12 traditional 
Ukrainian folk songs 
- Organising a common 
entertainment show (5 
folk groups participated) 
-  Organising two 
exchanges of experience 
between representative 
cultural operators in the 
area  
5.  Study of 
research and 
186 990,86 € 
19 months 
 County Museum 
Satu Mare, Romania 
- Protection and exhibition 
of cultural heritage 
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Curr
ent 
no. 
Name of 
project 
Amount / 
Implementing 
period 
Partners Specific objectives / 
Results 
exploitation of 
the cross border 
cultural heritage 
(Aprilie 2011  
– Oct. 2012) 
 Transcarpathia State 
University, 
Uzhhorod, Ukraine 
- Creation of new cultural 
products 
6.  Artistic 
Traditions. 
Pattern for Non 
Formal 
Learning in 
Romania and 
Ukraine 
69 200,00 € 
12 months 
(Aprilie 2012 –  
31 of March 
2013) 
 Childrens House 
Satu Mare, Romania 
 Asociatia Super Kids 
Satu Mare, Romania 
 Liga Pro Europa 
Filiala Satu Mare, 
Romania 
 Solotvyno children 
school of arts, 
Ukraine 
 Solotvyno village 
council, Ukraine 
- cooperation 
between after-school 
institutions in Satu Mare 
and Zakarpatska counties 
in the fields of visual art, 
traditional dance and 
instrumental music 
- suporting 
information exchange 
concerning the cultural 
inheritance and the 
educational experience 
- involving teachers 
and children from both 
areas in joint cultural 
activities 
- crating an artistic 
products in the three 
artistic fields (traditional 
dances, instrumental 
music and visual art) 
7.  The 
International 
Festival of 
Religious 
Choral Music 
„It is You We 
Praise” 
42 899,63 € 
12 months 
(May 2012 – 
Aprilie 2013) 
 Romanian 
Orthodox 
Episcopate Satu 
Mare, Romania 
 Social Organization 
“Hope”, Solotvino, 
Ukraine 
 
 
- Enriching the choirs’ 
repertoire - due to the 
inclusion of some 
valuable musical plays of 
the Romanian music 
culture 
- Cultivation and 
popularization of choral 
music 
- Continuing the tradition 
of choir singing and 
conducting  
- Setting up new choirs 
and choral associations 
- Creating a sustained 
activity of musical 
education suported by 
concerts, shows and 
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Curr
ent 
no. 
Name of 
project 
Amount / 
Implementing 
period 
Partners Specific objectives / 
Results 
other events initiated by 
other organizers in the 
country; 
- Establishing cooperation 
relationships with local 
artistic and educational 
institutions;  
-  Establishing 
relationships with other 
similar national 
associations and with 
choirs from other 
countries;  
-  Encouraging the 
publishing of repertoire 
and musicological 
materials in the choir 
singing field;  
8.  People to People 
– effective 
cooperation 
based on love for 
folklore 
260 698,00 € 
12 moths 
(May 2012 – 
April 2014) 
 Raslavice 
municipality, Presov, 
Slovakia 
 Fund of 
transborder 
cooperation and 
special economic 
zones development, 
Uzhgorod, Ukraine  
 Transcarpathian 
Regional Center for 
development of rural 
tourism, Ukraine 
- Promotion and 
presentation of cultural 
events, especially folklore 
festivals and historic 
landmarks 
- Creation of new 
products in the field of 
culture 
- Educational activities 
for the organizers of 
cultural events (especially 
of the folklore festivals) 
- Research and 
production of folk 
costumes, that shall be 
utilized in case of further 
project activities (dance 
schools) 
9.  GET TO 
KNOW 
EACH 
OTHER – 
televisions 
without borders 
110 940,00 € 
12 months 
(Febr. 2012 – 
March  2013) 
 Zemplén 
Television Public 
Ltd., Sátoraljaújhely, 
Hungary  
 Transcarpathian 
State Television and 
- Establishing and 
maintaining a joint 
communication 
infrastructure within the 
cooperation of the three 
televisions involved, 
through the 
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Curr
ent 
no. 
Name of 
project 
Amount / 
Implementing 
period 
Partners Specific objectives / 
Results 
Radio Company 
(Tisza 1 Television), 
Uzhhorod,  Ukraine 
 
implementation of the 
project on five areas 
- Establishing a new 
communication 
infrastructure operated 
by the cooperation of the 
three televisions 
10.  Together – 
Televisions 
without Borders 
99 785,00 € 
12 months 
(Aug. 2013 – 
Aug. 2014) 
 Zemplén 
Television Public 
Ltd., Sátoraljaújhely, 
Hungary  
 Transcarpathian 
State Television and 
Radio Company – 
Uzhhorod (Tisza 1 
Television), Ukraine 
 The First  
Contact Center – 
Michalovce, Presov, 
Slovakia 
- A joint 
communication 
infrastructure within the 
cooperation of the three 
televisions involved 
- Fostering the 
professional cooperation 
among the televisions 
stations,  
- Providing 
professional training and 
establishing a new 
internet communication 
channel and organizing 
joint events 
- Making television 
programs in cooperation, 
exchange of programs, 
implementation of joint 
events and creation of an 
internet television 
homepage 
11.  Three in Unity 
– a project of 
maintaining 
ecclesiastic 
cultural heritage 
for joint cultural 
and touristic 
development 
394 034,22 € 
29 months 
(Jan. 2013  
– June 2015) 
 Greek Catholic 
Apostolic Exarchate 
of Miskolc, Hungary 
 Transcharpathia
n Disrict of the 
Reformed Curch, 
Beregovo, Ukraine 
 Roman catholic 
Parish of Královsky 
Chlmec 
 
- Creating a guide for 
ecclesiastic cultural 
heritage 
- Specialised training 
programme for 
preserving and handling 
cultural heritage 
- Setting the solid 
foundations of a far 
reaching cooperative 
effort to collect and 
exhibit religious cultural 
heritage (artefacts) 
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Curr
ent 
no. 
Name of 
project 
Amount / 
Implementing 
period 
Partners Specific objectives / 
Results 
- Developing of cross-
border ICT based 
religious heritage 
information resources 
12.  BREAKING-
THROUG 
COOLture - 
European 
values and 
common future 
308 655,00 € 
18 months 
(July 2013 
– Jan. 2015) 
 Satu Mare 
County Museum, 
Romania 
 The 
Transcarpathian 
Museum of Folk 
Architecture and 
Lifestyle, Uzhhorod, 
Ukraine 
 
- Elaborating a visual 
guide of the 
Transcarpathian Museum 
of Folk Architecture and 
Lifestyle (”disability 
tour”) 
- Organizing an 
exhibition with photos 
and traditional costumes 
from Zakarpatska region 
of Ukraine and eligible 
and adjacent areas of 
Romania 
- Organising 
exhibition with photos of 
the investigated and 
preserved heritage 
- Organising Open air 
events in Romania and 
Ukraine 
- Elaborating a 
traditional folk costume 
album, a collection of 
photos and information 
about the folk costume in 
the border area, an 
anthropological film and 
DVDs including the 
traditional art of weaving  
- Elaborating 
catalogue of icon 
collection, pottery 
collection and  traditional 
woodcraft collection of 
the County Museum of 
Satu Mare  
13.  Interactive 
institutional 
cooperation: 
211 693,00 € 
32 luni 
(ian. 2014 – 
 County Museum 
Satu Mare, Romania,  
- Protection and 
exhibition of cultural 
heritage, creation and 
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Curr
ent 
no. 
Name of 
project 
Amount / 
Implementing 
period 
Partners Specific objectives / 
Results 
History, 
traditions and 
culture without 
borders 
 
Continuation 
of the project 
Study of 
research and 
exploitation of 
the cross border 
cultural heritage 
aug. 2015) 
 
 Transcarpathia 
State University, 
Uzhhorod, Ukraine  
exhibition of new cultural 
products 
- Improvement of 
conditions concerning 
protection and 
presentation of cultural 
heritage 
- Protection and 
capitalization of common 
cultural heritage, of 
traditions, of religious 
values specific to majority 
population or minority 
- Promoting history, 
culture and traditions of 
the minorities 
-  Digitizing of 
common cultural 
inheritance in the cross 
border region 
- Involvement of the 
young generation in 
knowledge and 
promoting of traditions, 
of cultural, historic and 
touristic values 
- Organizing the 
“Trade fair and of 
contemporary creators”, 
the traditional and 
contemporary costume 
parade, the “CBC Party – 
Culture that unit us”- 
dances, songs, recipes 
and traditions and photo 
exhibition “Together 
without Borders”. 
14.  Promotion of 
folk-arts and 
handicrafts in 
Carpathian 
Euroregion 
101 608,00 € 
12 months 
(Aug. 2013 
 – July. 2014) 
 Transcarpathian 
Regional Non-
governmental 
Organization 
„Ukrainian-
Hungarian Regional 
- Establishment of 
permanent co-operation 
network between 
Ukrainian and Hungarian 
handicraftsmen 
- Increasing awareness 
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Curr
ent 
no. 
Name of 
project 
Amount / 
Implementing 
period 
Partners Specific objectives / 
Results 
Development 
Centre”, Uzhgorod, 
Ukraine 
 Szabolcs-
Szatmár-Bereg 
County Village 
Tourism Association, 
Nyíregyháza, 
Hungary 
 
of the local 
handicraftsmen about the 
legal issues of their 
activity, including state 
registration of 
entrepreneurship, 
commercial activity, 
financial and other 
reporting issues 
- Increasing awareness 
of the wider public and 
visitors to the region 
about the unique local 
handicrafts and folk-art 
in the region 
- Contribution to 
commercial interest of 
the handicraftsmen, 
rising of economic 
welfare of the local 
handicraftsmen 
15.  Cultural 
cohesion through 
promotion of 
Hungarian folk 
traditions 
99 263,97 € 
12 months 
(Nov. 2013 – 
Nov. 2014) 
 Non-
Governmental 
Organisation 
“Chaslovtsi 
Chicherho Chayok”, 
Chaslovtsi, 
Ukraine 
 Culture and 
Heritage Association 
of Ajak 
Ajak, Hungary 
 Chaslivtsi Village 
Council, Ukraine 
- Cultural exploration 
of the project region;  
- Dialogue stimulation 
between students, 
teachers and community 
representatives;  
- Promotion of cultural 
oportunities in the 
project region 
- Organizing of four 
etno-folk concerts  
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Spatial Analyses and Representations in the Field of 
International Relations. A Brief Overview 
 
 
 
Cosmin CHIRIAC* 
 
 
 
Introduction 
At a first, quick look, International Relations is a field of study that 
focuses on the different types of interactions that involve more than one 
state. Each state, due to a multitude of reasons, extends over a certain 
amount of territory and interactions among them are expressed through 
space and time. Consequently, cartographic representations, as a result of 
spatial analyses, seem fit to present the way the international environment 
presents itself at a certain moment in time, or as it evolves in time.  
Based on this, our aim in this study is to outline spatial analyses that 
due to their results are at the core of this research area. A few questions 
arise from this initial inquiry such as: What does the speciality literature 
within the field of IR provide in this respect? What is at the core of the field 
of IR? What methods of research are there in the field of IR? How can they 
be presented in a cartographical way? What kind of spatial analyses are out 
there? Which of them do aply to the field of IR? 
Considering the questions above, that will not be responded in full 
here, the initial step, put together in the first section of this paper, is to look 
take a look at some of the basic elements of the field of IR, outlining how 
they relate to territory and location. 
The second section of the study provides a very succinct 
introduction to the field of spatial analysis, always making reference to the 
specifics of IR, in order to make it obvious how the latter can make use of 
the former. 
The third section of this paper takes a look at what the speciality 
literature has to offer in this regard, without having the goal of making it an 
exhaustive one. The focus will be on IR studies that use cartographic 
                                                     
* Assistent Phd at Yniversity of Oradea, International Relations and European 
Studies Department, cchiriacuniv@yahoo.com 
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representations but also on those that use quantitative or spatial analyses. In 
order for the study to be overarching, enormous efforts would be required 
in the direction of making a list of such representations from the speciality 
literature, efforts that are not justified at this point. The purpose of this 
section is to provide a starting point through which a few measures of the 
relations between states can be outlined.  
We conclude that the field of IR already is not foreign to the use of 
spatial analyses and representations in its studies.  
 
The core elements of International Relations 
International Relations, a field of study that emerged in the 
beginnings of the 20th century, is built on a rather large array of fields from 
the social sciences family, such as anthropology, economics, law, geography, 
political science and sociology amongst others. As the name would suggest, 
it covers the subject of relations between nations however, the international 
system is built on states, a territorial entity that receives enough recognition 
from other states to be called itself a state1. 
The scope of the study is not to clarify what the difference between 
states and nations is, however, it is important to outline that they are not 
synonymous and the difference is significant for spatial analysis. 
Consequently, to define them, we’ll take a look at just a few texts of the 
speciality literature that analyse the two terms and we’ll use those definitions 
in this paper. Nation and nationalism, are discussed by Barrington2 with the 
purpose of clarifying the meaning of these two terms since, as he observes, 
they “are often still misused, used loosely, or used inconsistently, especially 
among those in political science who discuss these terms in passing”3. In any 
case, two characteristics are important according to Barrington in defining a 
nation:  
- That it consists of a group of people with common traits,  
- That has the desire to control a territory that they consider 
rightfully theirs. 
This is the definition we’ll use further in this text. 
The definition of the state is also problematic, several alternatives 
considering an institutional view, a functional one, or both. The key points 
of Weber’s definition, presented by Brenner in his text, that are of interest at 
this moment is that a state covers a certain territory that it governs through 
                                                     
1 Christopher Lamont, Research Methods in International Relations, SAGE Publications, 
2015. 
2 „“Nation” and “Nationalism”: The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science”, 
PS: Political Science & Politics, vol. 30, nr. 4, 1997. 
3 Ibidem, p. 712. 
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institutions that control it from a centre through rules, physical violence being 
mentioned as a means to uphold those rules4. 
Considering the definitions above, it seems that the nation-state is the 
endpoint of the struggles of a nation to becoming an official body. The 
cases of Canada and Switzerland, two countries that consist of different 
ethnic groups, according to Kaufmann and Zimmer5, still fit the definition 
of a nation-state bringing together two uncommon traits such as ethnic 
pluralism and extensive wild territories. But just as there are states where ethnic 
pluralism is not an issue and they can be called nation-states, there are states 
in which different ethnic groups coexist without the common traits that 
would make them a nation, so they can only be called states. Getting such 
differences to a conflictual situation, can transform a state in a failed state a 
subject extensively covered by the field of IR. 
The origin of the state is another subject central to the field of IR. 
Caneiro6 examines some of the theories regarding the formation of the state, 
ignoring theories that have been “thoroughly discredited”, “metaphysical or 
adventitious”. He mentions that coercive theories, as oposed to voluntarist 
ones, are the valid ones, with the addition that war is not sufficient for the 
rise of the state. The circumscription theory provides the sufficient 
condition for the rise of a state, Carneiro considers, and it includes reasons 
such as environmental, social or political circumscription as well as resource 
concentration. The circumscription theory outlines that the territory and its 
different characteristics, either human related or natural, are significant in 
the field of IR. 
Due to some of the reasons mentioned earlier and others as well, 
the division of the world’s territory into states is not a finished process. 
States apear and disapear, their territorial integrity being shattered by either 
internal or external threats, or both. 
Considering a certain territorial division of the state system at one 
moment in time, each element of this system can be described based on 
different attributes it carries. The governing type is one of them, the 
different categories of governing types offering limits or possibilities to 
cooperation. Geographical, economic, political, military and other 
characteristics of the states provide the means for the existence of 
international, transnational, multinational, supranational, or global 
                                                     
4 Neil Brenner et al., State/space: a reader, John Wiley & Sons, 2008, p. 53. 
5 „In Search of the Authentic Nation: Landscape and National Identity in Canada and 
Switzerland”, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 4, nr. 4, 1998. 
6 „A theory of the origin of the state: Traditional theories of state origins are 
considered and rejected in favor of a new ecological hypothesis”, The State, vol. 169, 
1993. 
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organizations. Examples for each of these types of organizations are quite 
numerous so they won’t be listed here.  
Since every state extends over a certain territory, geographical 
representations and the analysis required to build them can certainly bring a 
plus to the field of international relations. Physical characteristics of the 
territory are many times significant, such as landscape in the example given 
above regarding the Canadian and Swiss cases. Territories also hold 
resources, so their location, extent and volume can also be significant, no 
matter if they are natural resources or anthropological ones. One important 
note about landscape and natural resources is that they usually don’t follow 
state limits, though sometimes state limits do follow natural limits, however 
loosely or strictly they can be defined.  
The scale of analysis can also be moved downwards, towards the 
inner structures of the states, defined by their hierarchical system, going 
down to the level of localities, as cooperation and conflict sometimes 
include subnational territories, which might or might not cross their 
borders, but might indirectly affect neighbouring states. 
Territorial extent inevitably brings along discussions about borders, 
and frontiers. Their nature has been discussed in the IR speciality literature 
and they have also been subject to spatial analysis. Furthermore, borders 
and frontiers are dividing lines that can be subject to interaction either 
positive, meaning cooperation or negative meaning conflict. 
This very brief, and far from complete, introduction to the field of 
international relations has only the purpose of outlining the fact that 
territory, and consequently geographical and spatial analyses methods are 
apropriate for studies that give insight regarding the international climate, its 
structure and its dynamics.  
 
A brief introduction to the basics of Spatial Analysis and GIS 
Spatial Analysis is used in many fields of study, including IR, some 
studies going back to the 19th century, however, they only gained popularity 
in the second half of the 20th century7 when the field of GIS started to 
emerge, as a result of developments in computer science. Spatial Analysis 
and GIS have developed independently, though the former can certainly 
benefit from the latter by providing the technical capabilities, while the latter 
can benefit from the former in order to enhance its analytical capabilities8. 
                                                     
7 A.S. Fotheringham, P.A. Rogerson, The SAGE Handbook of Spatial Analysis, SAGE 
Publications, 2008; J Terry Coppock, David W Rhind, „The history of GIS”, 
Geographical information systems: Principles and applications, vol. 1, nr. 1, 1991. 
8 Yuemin Ding, A Stewart Fotheringham, „The integration of spatial analysis and 
GIS”, Computers, Environment and Urban Systems, vol. 16, nr. 1, 1992, p. 3; Morton E 
O’Kelly, „Spatial analysis and GIS”, Spatial analysis and GIS, 1994, p. 65, 66. 
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According to the Sage Handbook of Spatial analysis four categories can 
be outlined that contain the many techniques of spatial analysis such as data 
reduction techniques, exploratory data analysis, the examination of randomness in spatial 
patterns, and mathematical modelling and prediction techniques. 
Spatial datum includes three or a “triple of measurements”9, 
specifically an attribute, a location, and a moment in time. Though attributes 
and locations are an indivisible part of GIS, time has only recently been 
included in the capabilities of GIS software and is usually present as part of 
the attributes of a dataset.  
There are different implementations for spatial data and they can be 
categorized in two views: the object view and the field view10. 
The object view, modelled through points, lines and polygons is a 
very important part of GIS aplications. They help identify geographical 
features of the world, such as states, supra-national organizations or sub-
national structures, all apropriate for storage through the object view. The 
way they can be implemented is also dependent on the scale of analysis11. 
Even though it is called the object view, an object does not have to be an 
identifiable feature of the geographical environment. Events taking place in 
different locations of the world, relevant to the field of IR, can be included 
in point datasets with all the relevant details stored as attributes. Spatial data 
represented through these elements are also called vector data and their 
input can be done, either automatically or manually, through vectorization. 
The field view is usually implemented as a raster. The basic element 
of a raster is the cell, which is a rectangle representing part of a territory. All 
cells in a raster file occupy the same amount of surface, in different 
locations, basically dividing a territory into matrix like structures.  Each cell 
can have a value, thus providing the ability to store data continuously across 
a territory. The surface of a cell provides an important feature of a raster 
file, its resolution. The resolution of a raster file gives us the measure of how 
detailed the spatial distribution of data in a certain territory is. Raster files 
can be generated from vector features, through different techniques. One of 
them is interpolation, and is apropriate for point data sets providing a way to 
display and analyse the dispersion of phenomena and events relevant to the 
field of IR. 
One of the main characteristics of GIS is the overlay technique, 
specific to mapmaking in geography. Combining different information, such 
as economic, social, demographic, political, historical, and so on, through 
                                                     
9 Robert Haining, „The special nature of spatial data”, The SAGE handbook of spatial 
analysis. Sage, Los Angeles, 2009, p. 5. 
10 Ibidem. 
11 A city can be represented either as a polygon or as a point, depending on the scale 
and on the relevance of the territorial extent. 
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the overlay technique is the core of GIS and it certainly brings benefits to 
the field of IR, through geometric operations performed on one or more 
layers of data. 
As mentioned previously, time is not yet properly implemented in 
GIS aplications and Goodchild makes the argument that a “space-time 
geographic information system is unlikely to emerge in the near future”12. 
Langran emphasises the difficulties in implementing such a system13. One of 
the major issues, especially as far as spatial representations as results of 
spatial analyses are concerned, is that spatial representations are static and 
the presentation of changes in time requires dynamic capabilities. 
Just as the field of international relations, spatial analysis and geographical 
information systems are too large and complex to contain in such a short paper. 
Further insights, though useful, are not justified at this moment in time, 
consequently we move towards the presentation of a few examples of spatial 
analyses that scholars of international relations have employed in their 
studies.  
 
Examples of spatial analyses in international relations 
Whenever the territorial extension of states14 is mentioned, 
inevitably, borders have to be mentioned as well. These lines of division, hard 
or soft, can be described in many ways through attribute data, using 
measurable parameters such as length, number of divisions (depending on how 
many states surround a country), to descriptive or categorical ones such as 
land-based or across-water or maybe not so obvious ones such as homeland or 
colonial 15. 
Some of the attributes of borders, along with other features that 
provide information about the characteristics of the land on both sides of a 
border, give the measure for the oportunity and willingness for and towards 
interaction between a dyad of states. Harvey Starr16, for example, with a rich 
background in studies employing these two indicators explores, through the 
use of GIS, some of the attributes of borders, in order to define their 
nature. A difference is made between those situations in which conflicts 
                                                     
12 Michael F. Goodchild, „Prospects for a Space–Time GIS”, Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, vol. 103, nr. 5, 2013, p. 1072. 
13 G. Langran, „Temporal GIS design tradeoffs”, Journal of the Urban and Regional 
Information Systems Association, vol. 2, 1990. 
14 No matter if they are a nation-state or a state without the attributes of a nation 
15 H. Starr, „Opportunity, willingness and geographic information systems (GIS): 
reconceptualizing borders in international relations”, Political Geography, vol. 21, nr. 2, 
2002, p. 246. 
16 H. Starr, „Opportunity, willingness and geographic information systems (GIS): 
reconceptualising borders in international relations”. 
In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga 
 
569 
arise between the initial participants in a war, and the situation in which 
other states are drawn into an existing war. 
The method developed in the paper discussed here uses vector 
spatial data along with attribute data17, reclassification of values and vector 
to raster transformations, through GIS software, in order to create a 
cartographical representation through a raster layer, for the oportunity of 
interaction in a buffer area along dyads of borders18.  
For the willingness for interaction, different indicators where used 
than in the case of oportunity19, though the method of analysis was 
developed in much the same way as in the case of the previously presented 
indicator, as the author also mentioned20. What is different in this case is the 
use of a cartographical representation that combines both size and colour to 
present the categorical values of the willingness for interaction, through 
point vector data. 
Though the paper described here also involves some standard 
statistical analysis, what was presented here is enough to outline one 
example of the use of spatial analysis in the field of international relations. 
One interesting example, that uses both space and time in IR 
analysis, is that of Lamarche-Perrin and collaborators21. It analyzes the one-
sided and mutual occurrences of country names, in online newspapers, 
ranging from local to global events. The analysis uses an agent-based model, 
and multiple aggregation techniques, depending on the particularities of 
different countries or geographical areas and their occurrence of their name 
in online newspapers in other countries, in order to identify spatial or 
temporal irregularities that could outline the occurrence of international 
critical events, or rare events. The aggregated parameters are represented, at 
different scales, as proportional symbols in the world map that accompanies 
this brief paper. 
Rare events have been at the core of IR studies for some time now 
though, until the development of automated identification techniques of 
such events, just as the one above, they have been left aside22. They are 
                                                     
17 Roads and terrain slope values were the main indicators used. 
18 The case of Israel is presented as an example for the results. 
19 Such as urban concentration areas and the location of important military, social or 
economic objectives. 
20 H. Starr, „Opportunity, willingness and geographic information systems (GIS): 
reconceptualizing borders in international relations”, p. 251. 
21 Robin Lamarche-Perrin, Yves Demazeau, Jean-Marc Vincent, „Analysis of 
international relations through spatial and temporal aggregation”, Springer, 2013. 
22 Gary King, Will Lowe, „An automated information extraction tool for international 
conflict data with performance as good as human coders: A rare events evaluation 
design”, International Organization, vol. 57, nr. 3, 2003. 
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discussed in detail by King and Zeng, providing alternative methods of data 
collection and analysis that they consider more efficient than previous 
efforts23.  
Though there are many other representation types available for use 
in the field of IR, including choropleth, isopleth, dot distribution or 
dasymetric maps amongst others, there will be no other examples examined 
here. Spatial analysis is also a very rich field of study and further exploration 
is not considered necessary at this point.  
 
Conclusions 
Regardless of their use, argumentative or descriptive, spatial 
analyses and representations can offer good insights to International 
Relations studies. As shown above they are not new to this field, and the 
development of GIS technology, and of communication possibilities 
provide more and more oportunities for interaction between these two 
fields. 
The simple goal of this paper is just to provide a very brief 
introduction to spatial analysis and representations, especially for students 
of IR, in order to introduce them to a world of possibilities that they seem 
to be unaware of. Though performing such analyses might not necessarily 
be something they would do voluntarily, collaboration with students or 
researchers from the fields of computer science, GIS or geography, can 
enhance their possibilities of expression. This paper was in written in the 
hope that this might be so, but also to initiate future research in the use of 
spatial analysis in the field of IR for this author. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
What usually stands out when teaching to students of International Relations (IR) 
disciplines related to the field of computer science, is their initial reluctance, or even refusal, to 
learning anything that requires mathematical thinking. This is a drawback for the future scholar of 
this field that, amongst other methods, can also make use of statistical ones and, when geographical 
features are meaningful, of spatial analysis. However troubling statistical methods may be to the 
student of IR, at least they are aware of them. On the other hand, spatial analysis is something 
that students in this field are not really aware of so, in this paper, we’ll try to address this problem 
by discussing the territoriality of IR, by explaining the essentials of spatial analysis and by looking 
at the scientific literature of IR and Political Science that already employs such techniques. 
 
 
                                                     
23 Gary King, Langche Zeng, „Explaining rare events in international relations”, 
International Organization, vol. 55, nr. 3, 2001. 
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The Beginnings of the EU in the Western Balkans: A 
Milestone of Its International Role 
 
 
Cristina Maria DOGOT* 
 
 
The actual (more) peaceful situation in the Western Balkans, 
although it is not outside of any potential risk (and the conflict of May 2015 
in Kumanovo1 could be an example), is largely due to the complementary 
actions of the UN, NATO and of the EU in the region. Despite of many 
deeply convinced voices regarding the contribution of any of these 
international actors in the disintegration of Yugoslavia, it is not so easy to 
exactly measure their role in solving the conflict or, according to the critics, 
in continuing it. By comparison with NATO or even the UN’s operations, 
the EU’s actions in the conflict from the former Yugoslavia were less 
spectacular and enough (if not very little) known and understood by the 
large public, although they were initiated from the beginnings of the strife. 
In the early stages of the tensions (since June 1991), when the UN and 
CSCE were less or not present in the region2, the EU focused especially on 
mediation, sending its representatives in the conflict theatre with the 
mission to convince the parties to reconcile their positions and so to 
maintain peace in Europe and a given geopolitical status quo in the region. 
                                                     
* Lecturer Phd at University of Oradea, International Relations and European Studies 
Department, E-mail: cmgheorghe@yahoo.co.uk 
1 “Violence in Macedonia. Danger or Distraction? After a Long Political Ferment, a 
Short Burst of Fighting”, The Economist, May 16th, 2015, 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21651262-after-long-political-
ferment-short-burst-fighting-danger-or-distraction, accessed June 12, 2015. 
2 As Hill and Smith commented, “States could not decide whether this was a case 
requiring enforcement and measures against identified guilty parties or one in 
which neutral mediation and interposition were more appropriate; the actions of 
the international community reflected this confusion. Only when finally the 
United States stepped in, with a heavy dose of realpolitik, to impose a solution 
after war-weariness had set in, did the conflict end in the Dayton Accords of 
November 1995.” “Conclusions of the European Council in Helsinki, 11 
december 1999 (Enlargement)”, in Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith (eds), 
European Foreign Policy. Key Documents, Routledge, London and New York, 2000, p. 
358.  
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Although the first mediation mission (troika) concluded with a satisfying 
first fire-ceasing agreement, „European Council remains concerned about 
the situation in this country and requests the relevant organs of European 
co-operation to remain seized of this situation and to follow developments 
closely. It took note of the fact that Luxembourg has invoked the 
emergency mechanism in the CSCE framework in view of the extreme 
gravity of the situation in Yugoslavia.”3. The immediately following troika, 
that met Slovenia and Croatia’s representatives in Brioni, obtained a delay of 
the implementation of their declarations of independence with three 
months. Another output of this mission was the „institutionalisation” of the 
idea of monitoring, materialised in the establishment of the European 
Community Monitor Mission (ECMM), which role was to survey the 
implementation of cease-fire agreements, providing direct communication 
between the parties of the conflict and mediation during the hostage crises 
(but outside of any direct mediation), monitoring the air-traffic in Croatian 
airports, humanitarian tasks (beside UN and Red Cross missions).4 
In parallel with the actions of mediation a Commission of 
Arbitration was established5 (Badinter Commission, August 1991 – middle 
of 1993), a “body of legal experts” playing a consultative role beside the 
Conference on Yugoslavia developed by the European Community of 
which opinions partially contributed to the diplomatic recognition of the 
new states separated from the Yugoslav federation6. Along with mediation 
                                                     
3 European Council, „Presidency Conclusions”, Luxembourg, 28 and 29 June 1991. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/luxembourg/lu1_en.pdf, p. 15, 
accessed October 12, 2015. 
4 “Conclusions of the European Council in Helsinki, 11 December 1999 
(Enlargement)” (in continuation: “Conclusions of the European Council in 
Helsinki…”), in Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith (eds), European Foreign Policy. 
Key Documents, Routledge, London and New York, 2000, pp. 358-359; Rémy 
Landry, „The European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) in Former 
Yugoslavia: Lessons Learned for OAU Civilian Missions”, ACCORD Occasional 
Paper no. 5, 1999, pp. 3-4, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docsPNACL721.pdf, 
accessed November 02, 2015. 
5 The deep analysis of Matthew Craven on the legal basis of this Commission (in its 
different forms and periods), on its very arbitration capabilities and on the basis of 
the influence of its opinions represents the proof of the very low expertise of the 
European Community in international issues and the dramatic need for 
specialized institutions. These missing legal bases and institutions will represent a 
very good reason for the power of Belgrade to deny any decision considered as 
adopted following the opinions of the Arbitration Commission. Matthew C.R. 
Craven, “The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia”, in 
British Yearbook of International Law vol. 66, no. 1, 1995, pp. 339-353. 
6 Ibidem, pp. 334-335. 
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missions and actions of arbitration, the European Community initiated both 
military sanctions/arms embargo, since July 1991 and conducted against 
the Yugoslav government and Croatian nationalists, and economic 
sanctions (since May 1992) against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the 
last ones being maintained, modified and directed against the other actors 
detached from the federation7. Unfortunately, none of these actions stopped 
the conflict or impeached the “policy vacuum”8 on some territories of the 
former Yugoslavia. 
Critics of actions of the European Community and of the other 
international actors in the conflict from Yugoslavia were and still are 
numerous. The scant and deficient support for the victims (the Bosnian 
Muslims), the weak determination against the aggressors (Serbia), the 
negative effects of the military and economic sanctions over the aggressed 
parties (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia), all were perceived as mistakes 
with long-term effects both at European/regional and international level 
(relations between the Western and Arab world)9. Hence, it is no wonder 
that the Dayton/Paris Agreement, which was concerning the end of the war 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was perceived as the first serious step towards the 
end of the conflict. During the negotiations the EU was represented by a 
Special Negotiator, Spain as holder of the presidency of the EU, and by 
some member states which were part of the Contact Group, but without 
receiving or assuming afterwards an important role in the management of 
the conflict, other than the economic and political recovery10 of the Balkans 
and of South-Eastern Europe. The EU tried to compensate for this lack of 
presence in the conflict management by initialising the Royaumont Process, 
a new approach related to the war from Bosnia-Herzegovina, focused on 
democratisation and normalisation, with the support of OSCE and using the 
                                                     
7 “Conclusions of the European Council in Helsinki…”, p. 358; „Sanctions against 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”, in ICGBalkans Briefing Paper, 10 October 2000, 
pp. 4-5, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Serbia%2013.pdf, 
accessed October 30, 2015; Milica Delevic, „Economic Sanctions as a Foreign 
Policy Tool: The Case of Yugoslavia”, in International Journal of Peace Studies vol. 3, 
No. 1, 1998, accessed October 12, 2015, 
http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol3_1/Delvic.htm. 
8 Catriona Mace, “Operation Concordia: Developing a European Approach to 
Crisis Management?”, International Peacekeeping vol. 11, no. 3, 2004, p. 475, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1353331042000249055, accessed December 18, 2015. 
9 Cohen considers that the genocide of Muslim people in Bosnia Herzegovina will 
influence relations between the Western and Arab states in the world to come. 
Philip J. Cohen, “Ending the War and Securing Peace in Former Yugoslavia”, Pace 
International Law Review vol. 6, no. 1, 1994, pp. 20-25, 29-31. 
10 We should not forget that these new economical and political approaches were 
doubled by the negotiation process developed by ECMM. 
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political dialogue as a main instrument, and the “interstate relations and 
supporting civil societies” as a basis for future better relations between the 
states involved in the regional conflict (Former Republic of Yugoslavia, 
FYROM, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia), with all their 
neighbours and with the EU too.11 The proposed projects by the participant 
states concerned “the media, inter-ethnic dialogue, dialogue between 
political leaders, academic co-operation and education, co-operation 
between women's organisations, co-operation between cities, trade unions 
and youth organisations, inter-parliamentary dialogue, co-operation in the 
areas of business and legal matters, public administration, medicine, culture, 
science and technology, and the environment”, and according to one of 
coordinators of the programme, Panaghiotis Roumeliotis, the meetings 
developed with Phare support allotted the development of a regional 
network of actors interested in the process of pacification of the region.12 
In the meantime the EU developed two economic initiatives, 
focused on the micro (the first) and macro (the second) multilateral 
programmes: Regional Approach (1996-1999) and the Stability Pact for South 
East Europe (1999-2008)13. Beside the two large programmes mentioned 
above, the EU developed some other regional initiatives connecting the 
Balkans and the South-Eastern Europe: Royaumont Process, South-East 
European Cooperation Process, Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, 
Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Central European 
Initiative, Adriatic–Ionian Initiative, Central European Free Trade Area.14 
                                                     
11 Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “Prevention and Regional Security: The Royaumont 
Process and the Stabilization of South-Eastern Europe”, in OSCE Yearbook, 
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy of the University of Hamburg, 
1998, pp. 332sqq, http://ifsh.de/file-
CORE/documents/yearbook/english/98/OSCE_Yearbook_1998.pdf, accessed 
November 25, 2015. 
12 Panaghiotis Roumeliotis,. “The Royaumont Process. An Initiative for Stability 
and Good Neighbourliness in South-Eastern Europe”, 1998, 
http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/autumn98/royaumont.html, accessed 
December 01, 2015.  
13 Niels Van Willingen, “The European Union’s Evolving Conflict Management 
Role in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo”, Paper for the EGPR Joint Sessions, 
Rennes 11-15 April 2008, https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/2d6944e1-
29c5-402d-8346-bd1b873b87d7.pdf, accessed November 23, 2015; Othon 
Anastasakis and Vesna Bojičić-Dželilović, “Balkan Regional Cooperation & 
European Integration”, The Hellenic Observatory, The European Institute, The 
London School of Economics and Political Science, July 2002, pp. 21-24, 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/5706/1/policyPaper2.pdf, accessed November 24, 2015. 
14 Othon Anastasakis and Vesna Bojičić-Dželilović, op. cit., pp. 52-55; Dusko 
Lopandik, “Regional Initiatives in South-Eastern Europe”, 
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The experience achieved by these programme15 facilitated the EU to 
establish, in November 2000, in the framework of the Summit of Zagreb, 
the new lines of its cooperation with the Balkan states (political dialogue, 
free trade, justice and home affairs, illegal immigration, different forms of 
trafficking, financial and economic crimes) and to reconsider the 
Stabilisation and Association Process as the core element of the new 
bilateral relations between EU and the states coming out of the conflict 
from the Balkans.16 
The ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam allowed the adoption 
of the WEU’s Petersberg Tasks and provided the possibility for the EU to 
develop “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making”17, an 
important non-economic step to the external engagement of the EU. The 
Declaration of Saint Malo considered as very important the EU’s 
international attendance and exposed the framework of the EU-NATO 
cooperation18. One year later, in 1999, the European Council in Helsinki 
delivered to the EU “the military and non-military crisis management 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.seedcenter.gr/projects/MNE/1stconfer/1stconf_papers/Lopandic.
pdf, accessed November 24, 2015.  
15 My consideration was focused especially on the EU’s own initiatives related to the 
parties involved in the conflict, and not on the internal structures established just 
to analyse the risk factors of the conflict and to identify some possible solutions, 
as they were done by the European Parliament - Conflict Prevention Network, 
the Group of Experts (Günter Burghardt, “Early Warning and Conflict 
Preventions Tasks of the European Union and EU-OSCE Co-operation”, OSCE 
Yearbook, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy of the University of 
Hamburg, 1995, pp. 423-424, http://ifsh.de/file-
CORE/documents/yearbook/english/99/OSCE_Yearbook_1999.pdf, accessed 
November 25, 2015) or over the cooperation with some other organisations, such 
as NATO, UN or OSCE, as much as they were important in turning off or 
preventing the conflict. 
16 Othon Anastasakis and Vesna Bojičić-Dželilović, op. cit., 24-25; European 
Commission, “Summit 24 November 2000. Final Declaration”, 
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/bridges/bosnia/ZagrebSummit24Nov2000.pdf, 
accessed November 26, 2015. 
17 The process was largely explained by Fabrizio Pagani, “A New Gear in the CFSP 
Machinery: Integration of the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty on European 
Union”, European Journal of International Law, no. 9, 1998, 
http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/9/4/695.pdf, accessed December 01, 2015. 
18 “Joint Declaration on European Defence. Joint Declaration issued at the British-
French Summit (Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998)”, 
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998-
en-f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f.html, accessed December 01, 2015. 
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capability as part of a strengthened common European policy on security 
and defence” and the possibility “to develop an autonomous capacity to 
take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and 
conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises”, with 
the participation of the EU’s political and military bodies19. 
Correspondingly, the European Council of Nice adopted the principles of 
the European Security and Defence Policy and defined some new 
permanent political and military structures and procedures fledged to 
support the implementation of EU’s decisions concerning the civilian and 
military operations20. During the Council of Laeken, the EU stated that by 
“the strengthening of its capabilities, both civil and military, and the creation 
of the appropriate EU structures, the EU is now able to conduct some 
crisis-management operations” alongside its partners (NATO and third 
states)21. These initiatives were followed by some new agreements between 
EU and NATO, that allotted their cooperation in three very important 
fields: “EU access to NATO planning, NATO European command options 
and use of NATO assets and capabilities”22, and opened the possibility, for 
the EU, to launch its first military operations, Concordia and EUFOR 
Althea, their development being appreciated as a milestone for the future 
international interventions of the EU, as a first step in solving the 
international imbalanced economic and political leading role of EU, and, 
very important at the time and for the future, as “important test cases for 
the Union’s ability to apply some of the military policy instruments it 
envisaged under 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal”23 and for the future security 
in the Balkans and of Europe as a whole. 
                                                     
19 “Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999. Presidency 
Conclusions”, II (25), (27), (28), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm, accessed December 02, 
2015.  
20 Mark Oakes, “European Security and Defence Policy: Nice and Beyond”, Research 
Paper vol. 1, no. 50, 2001, House of Commons Library, 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=44313, accessed September 08, 2015. 
21 “Presidency Conclusions European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 
December 2001”, Annex II (A), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-01-
18_en.htm, accessed December 04, 2015. 
22 “EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus”, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-
11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf, accessed December 05, 
2015. 
23 Dov Lynch and Antonio Missiroli, “ESDP Operations”, Institute for Security 
Studies, http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/09-dvl-am.pdf, accessed 
November 12, 2015. 
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All these decisions, though important for the relations of the EU 
with the new states of the Western Balkans, proved, each in turn, 
insufficient to solve the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Hence, it is not 
by chance that Romano Prodi considered the Balkans “an acid test” 
regarding the EU’s credibility and its “ability to deliver the effective action” 
at external/international level, and proposed a boosted economic and 
political cooperation with these states, with the objective to enhance the 
civil society, the rule of law and free media, and so “to bring stable peace 
and strong economic growth, not just to bring a temporary halt to centuries-
old conflicts”.24 Though for the instant the Romano Prodi’s proposed tools 
are yet preponderantly economic ones, his statement will act as a basis for 
some very important actions of the EU related to the Balkans: the 
partnership with UN (Commission of the European Communities 2001) 
and Berlin Plus agreement25, that will establish the principles and put the 
                                                     
24 Romano Prodi, “2000 - 2005: Shaping the New Europe”, Speech 00/41/, 
Strasbourg, 15 February 2000, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-
00-41_en.htm, accessed May 10, 2016. 
25 The agreement was preceded by the meeting of Romano Prodi with Bill Clinton 
in October 1999 (only one month after Prodi’s appointment as President of the 
European Commission), when beside the economic discussions they approached 
the matter of the “our common security” (William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States, Book II, July 1 to December 31, 1999. United States 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 2001, 1894); by Prodi’s clearly 
expressed objective to enhance the EU-NATO cooperation in the Western 
Balkans (“Meeting of President Prodi with US Secretary of State Powell”, 
Brussels, 27 February, 2001, IP/01/267, europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-
267_en.pdf, accessed May 08, 2016), and his determination to confer to the EU a 
most important role in providing the international security by its involvement in 
the stability of the Balkans and other conflict zones  (Romano Prodi, “A Wider 
Europe - A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability.” “Peace, Security And 
Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU”, Sixth ECSA-World 
Conference. Jean Monnet Project. Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-619_en.htm, accessed May 
08, 2016); by the first EU-NATO foreign ministers meeting, in Budapest, May 
2001, which established the basis of Balkan strategy and some progress in EU-
NATO relationship (Laszlo Szocs, “Week in Review: NATO, EU Foreign 
Ministers Meet in Budapest”, Transitions Online: Regional Intelligence, June 04, 2001, 
http://www.tol.org/client/article/3286-week-in-review-nato-eu-foreign-
ministers-meet-in-budapest.html, accessed May 03, 2016) and was followed by the 
adoption of the European Capability Action Plan, based on “coordination 
between EU Member States and cooperation with NATO” (“2386th Council 
Meeting. General Affairs”, Excerpt from the Press Release. Brussels 19-20 
November 2001, p. 4,  
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basis of the military cooperation between the two organisations26. These 
agreements opened the way of the EU to the adoption of the European 
security strategy “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, where the role of 
NATO and USA in European security is highlighted, but the improved role 
of the EU in providing security and stability in the neighbourhood is 
considered “in the European interest” and “The importance of this is best 
illustrated in the Balkans”, where the role of the EU should be 
strengthened.27 
All these steps28 represented as many situations by which the EU 
learned “by doing”, as Wallace described the process of development of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy of EU29, its lessons, and so, with the 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/European%20Capability%2
0Action%20Plan%20-
%20Excerpt%20Press%20Release%20November%202001.pdf, accessed May 13, 
2016). The intentions of the EU related to the European future of the Balkans 
needed for its deeper involvement in the region, which is why President Prodi 
asked to Greece and Italy, as next holder of rotating presidency of EU, to put on 
their agenda the problem of the Balkans. (“Athens News Agency: Daily News 
Bulletin in English, 03-01-24”, http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/2003/03-01-
24.ana.html#05, accessed May 13, 2016; “Our Europe. Sharing the Future in a 
Community of Values. The Priorities of the Greek Presidency 2003”, 
http://www.eu2003.gr//multimedia/pdf/2002_12/267.pdf, accessed May 13, 
2016) Despite the problems created by Italy, the plans of Prodi will be 
continuated. Francesc Morata and Lynn Mastellotto, “The Italian Presidency of 
the European Union: An “Abnormal” Semester?.” In “Italy between 
Europeanization and Domestic Politics.” Italian Politics vol. 19, 2003, Berghahn 
Books, pp. 124, 127. 
26 NATO, “EU-NATO Declaration on CSDP”, Press Release 16 December 2002, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19544.htm, accessed May 
10, 2016. 
27 “A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy”, Brussels, 
December 12, 2003, passim,  
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, accessed May 
03, 2016. 
28 We have to remember some individual mistakes or even failures of the Member 
States in managing some conflicts that they have the task to manage, as for 
example the Dutch failure in avoiding the massacre in Srebenica. For more 
examples, see Bastian Giegerich and Willem Wallace, “Not such a Soft Power: 
The External Deployment of European Forces.” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 
vol. 46, no. 2, 2004, pp. 166-167, DOI: 10.1080/00396330412331343713, 
accessed December 22, 2015. 
29 „Or „experiential learning”, according to Petar Petrov. (William Walace, „Foreign 
and Security Policy. The Painfull Path from Shadow to Substance”, in Helen 
Wallace, William Wallace and Mark Pollack (eds), Policy-Making in the European 
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remaining military forces of the regions of the Balkans, the EU sent its own 
military capabilities in the conflict areas, but without following the classical 
recipe of these interventions, that of the use of force against citizens or of 
their governing. 
 
Final remarks 
Unlike its partners, NATO or UN, the EU was a beginner both in 
the process of mediation in a situation of conflict and as participant in the 
military actions. While USA and NATO developed targeted approaches, the 
EU developed both micro- and macro-regional approaches for both 
political elites (and economic and social environment, trying to solve 
problems in the long term and for more different levels. The following EU’s 
military actions combined both constructivist and realistic principles and 
tools, whether they are considered the result of a demand or that of a search 
(a solution adopted following an analysis of the situation), they followed the 
so old (and often used) principle of the stick and carrot. Nevertheless, the 
‘stick’ of the EU was not so inflexible and harsh such as that of classical 
geopolitical actors, while the carrot was not so difficult to obtain by those 
who were determined to follow certain rules. If the results of EU’s actions 
are not the expected ones, this is not because EU used a compromised 
approach, but especially because the process of assuming the norms needs 
more time and, probably, a greater firmness of (some leaders of) the EU 
against of the situations of non-compliance of the norms which would have 
made impossible the decay of “desires to do right”30. According to Vucetic31 
“Balkan states have never completely ‘Europeanized’”. However, “the 
Western Balkans hold a special place in European security because much of 
the impetus to create the ESDP came from the conflicts in former 
                                                                                                                       
Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 439-441; Petrov Petar, “Early 
Institutionalisation of the ESDP Governance Arrangements: Insights From 
Operations Concordia and Artemis”, in Sophie Vanhoonacker et al. (eds), 
Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy, European 
Integration online Papers Vol. 14, Special Issue 1, 2010, p. 1, 5, 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2010-008.pdf, accessed December 06, 2015). 
30 James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical 
View”, Walter Carlsnaes et al. (eds), Handbook of International Relations, London, 
Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2002, p. 83. 
31 Srdjan Vucetic, “The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe as a Security 
Community-Building Institution”, Southeast European Politics Vol. 2, no. 2, 2001, p. 
111. 
The European Space. Borders and Issues 
 
582 
Yugoslavia during the 1990s and the EU’s inability to formulate an 
appropriate response”32 
 
 
Abstract. 
 
From its inception the European Union was granted with an international actor role, 
possible to be played only with peaceful methods and tools. During the process of European 
integration the common foreign policy of the EU coagulated only difficultly, though the first debates 
and actions in this direction started in 1969. Hence, the crisis and following conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia found the EU uncovered both from the point of view of experience and the necessary 
tools for its involvement in negotiations and peacekeeping actions. However, despite the inherent 
difficulties, the EU succeeded both to adopt the needed norms and to establish the most useful (at 
least for the period) tools of its intervention in the negotiation process and, later, even in the conflict, 
although “only” (according to realist voices) as peacekeeping actor. The present paper proposes an 
overview on the initial stages of progress of the EU on its road to the role of actor of the system of 
international relations. 
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